While it's difficult to predict what lasting impact the coronavirus pandemic will have on the Middle East, a region long beset by military, political and economic crises, it's clear that in multiple countries the outbreak is already heightening uncertainty and exacerbating internal tensions.
In Persian Gulf countries, which heavily rely on energy exports, economic turmoil unfolded as oil prices fell alongside global demand: Saudi Arabia and Russia clashed over the latter's unwillingness to stabilize prices by reducing output. Perceiving Moscow's stance as an attack on its market share, Riyadh increased production in order to further boost tank prices and hurt Russia, which survives almost exclusively on energy exports.
It is unclear how Saudi Arabia will itself contend with such low prices, as it needs more than double the current market rate to balance its budget. In recent days it appears that a new deal on oil prices has been reached between the major oil producers.
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In Riyadh, the oil crisis comes amid an internal power struggle within the royal family – Saudi authorities rounded up two senior royals shortly before price cuts were announced. Mohammed bin Salman, the current crown prince, may have to take tougher measures as the kingdom's problems – a worsening economic outlook and royal unrest – converge.
Iran has also been dealt blows by falling oil prices, with tumbling revenues intensifying the pressure exerted by American sanctions and its own public health disaster. The challenge posed by the outbreak itself was compounded by Tehran's initial denial of its existence. The delayed effort to stymie the spread has resulted in a colossal wave of cases that the system is struggling to handle.
Iran is still reeling from the US killing of Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, as well as the erosion of public confidence following Tehran's initial attempt to conceal its responsibility for the downing of a Ukrainian passenger plane. Iran's leaders must now navigate the worsening pandemic, a weakening economy, lack of public confidence and the loss of a linchpin in the Islamic Republic's foreign operations.
Efforts to counter the spread of the virus have led to protests in some countries – for instance, Morocco and Iran – while in others, like Lebanon and Syria, there is a sense that authorities are simply not dealing with the massive problem.
As long as the Iranian regime does not face a wide coalition of opponents, which can mobilize hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, it doesn't seem like this situation – with all its difficulty and complexity – will pose an existential threat. More broadly, as long as no ruling regime feels a fundamental loss of control, the authorities, who are experienced with handling the dissatisfaction and alienation that agitate the street from time to time, will be able to confront the challenges raised by the coronavirus.
Until there is a real alternative to the reigning power, the bitter masses will prefer relative stability to anarchy, which has not proven itself a better substitute for corrupt and ineffective governance, even as living conditions deteriorate amid the coronavirus pandemic.
In the meantime, it doesn't seem as though Iran – the driving force behind most of the friction in the Middle East – is changing its plans in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq or even Yemen. It will continue igniting tension in these countries, even if the flame has slightly dimmed since Soleimani's killing. The attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq made clear that the Iranians are continuing to push their agenda, though less vigorously and perhaps less ably.
Will Iran's status as the regional epicenter for the spread of coronavirus hurt it after the dust settles? Will the Iranians who transmit the virus as they move between Iraq, Syria and Lebanon remind Tehran that many people are being unnecessarily harmed – that the scar their policies have inflicted will remain forever?
It is currently impossible to tell, as the crisis is still ongoing, and its conclusion is shrouded in fog.
Reprinted with permission from JNS.org.
