Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to Saudi Arabia this week and his meeting with the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman made headlines worldwide, but it is safe to assume that they were not the first of their kind. It has previously been hinted that Israeli officials of various levels have visited the Gulf kingdom, and it was also reported the prince had visited Israel.
These relations - just like the peace deals with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain - are based on common interests; and they are less about mutual affection and more about mutual aversion of a common adversary. And even without being present at the royal palace, it isn't farfetched to assume that Iran was the focus of talks.
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Both Jerusalem and Riyadh are troubled by the US President-elect Joe Biden's stated intention to re-enter to the nuclear deal with Iran, which US President Donald Trump exited in 2015.
The concern is that just now, when the heavy sanctions imposed on Iran have brought it to its knees, the ayatollah's regime will again rear its head in a way that will not only see it rehabilitate its devastated economy, but also accelerate Iran's military buildup and the scope of the support it provides to its proxies in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip.
In terms of the moderate axis in the region, which Israel and Saudi Arabia are leading, this is the stuff of nightmares. The Abrahamic Accords have created a Middle East in which the "good guys" and the "bad guy" stand distinctly apart: the Iranian Shiite Crescent, which begins in Yemen and ends on the shores of the Mediterranean, is now offset by a moderate axis that stretches from the Persian Gulf to Israel and farther in the northwest.
It seems that this axis, to which the Gulf states are partners, now seeks to present a united front vis-à-vis the new administration in Washington in an attempt to use whatever leverage it can with respect to the Iranian issue.
The primary preference of the moderate axis is to keep Iran in economic ruins and under heavy sanctions. The more realistic approach, however, is to spare no effort to influence Washington to reach a better nuclear deal than the one from which the US withdrew under the Trump administration.
Many in Israel and in the West believe that the accords reached with Iran is not necessarily inherently bad. Regardless of its stipulations, over the past few months, Iran has been slowly advancing its nuclear program and it has already recorded six notable violations of the 2015 deal, although it remains careful not to make overly egregious violations or making a mad dash for a nuclear bomb.
If talks with Tehran are resumed, they will aim to see the new deal stipulate a period longer than the 15 years in which Iran was originally banned from pushing its nuclear project, as well as restricting it in terms of nuclear research and development, as well as place limitations on its ballistic missiles program and global terrorist enterprise.
Naturally, Iran vehemently opposes any restriction and it has already made it clear that it will only again undertake the principles of the original agreement. However, it is doubtful whether it has any leverage: in its current situation, it will do anything to breathe life into its moribund economy.
The retribution dilemma
The stakes are high and they are likely to affect Iran's decision on whether to mount retribution against the US on the upcoming first anniversary of the assassination of Gen. Qasem Soleimani, the infamous commander of Iran's notorious extraterritorial black-ops arm, the Quds Force.
Seemingly, the date – Jan. 3) – is ideal for exacting revenge: Washington will be gearing up for the presidential inauguration on Jan. 20, the transition of the administration will be in full swing, Trump will be unable to retaliate and Biden's hands will be equally tied.
Still, this would be too adventurous for Tehran, and the timing is actually less desirable than it seems, not only because of Iran's desire to return to the nuclear deal, but the Islamic republic itself is gearing for a presidential election in May, and outgoing President Hassan Rouhani will do everything to leave a conciliatory legacy, with the nuclear deal as its main highlight.
But Iran cannot let the first anniversary of Soleimani's assassination simply go by, and may choose to exact revenge on Israel, along the lines of retribution by proxy. The IDF remains on high alert in the norther sector, when Iran has Hezbollah in Lebanon and IRGC forces in Syria at its disposal.
(Reuters via West Asia News Agency)
Israel is taking this threat very seriously and it has already utilized every backchannel to send a clear message to every actor in the region, warning that the Israeli reaction to any attack will be utterly disproportionate.
Alongside Iran, this message is meant mostly form Syrian President Bashar Assad, who has already demanded Iran roll back its activities on Syrian soil so as not to undermine his interests.
At the time, Tehran agreed, but that is no longer the case. Assad is financially and psychologically dependent on the ayatollahs for his survival and as Iran was the first to rally to his aid when the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, he will have to receive a substantial incentive to truly try to shake off the entirely tight the Iranian bear hug.
What Assad really wants is for the US to lift the sanctions on Syria and deliquesce its demand that any such move would follow his removal from power.
This is an ostensibly immoral move: Assad is a mass murderer and a senior accomplice in the axis of evil. There is no reason to show him any leniency. But the reality is more complicated, and in the fabric of Middle East interests now being woven, it may be possible to back a regional move that would include the removal of US sanctions, followed by extensive investments by Gulf state that would allow Syria to recover and remove, by agreement, foreign forces - US and Iranian.
It is doubtful whether such a deal was possible in the past, but as has been proven many times recently - the ideology in the area is dead, and only the interests remain.
Given a choice between Iran and the big money - when Russia, Assad's other key ally, clearly sides with money – the Syrian president will have a hard time consciously choosing to remain poor and under threat.
Syria is not the only one at a crossroads: Qatar also wants to turn a new leaf in its relations with the West and with its Gulf frenemies, and Iraq is also wary of completely falling for Iran's charms, preserving its interests vis-à-vis the Americans and the West.
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