"The main lesson from Operation Defensive Shield is that Israel cannot defeat the enemy without ground maneuvers. That was true for terrorism in Judea and Samaria, and it's true for Gaza and Lebanon," commander of the IDF's Ground Forces, Maj. Gen. Tamir Yadai, tells Israel Hayom in a special interview marking the 20th anniversary of the operation. During Defensive Shield, Yadai commanded an Egoz unit that carried out a series of actions, most notably seizing the Muqataa in Ramallah.
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"Wherever we can't put boots on the ground – in Gaza, in Lebanon, or anywhere else – we won't win. Everything else can only improve your situation, roll back the situation, create deterrence for a certain amount of time. But you achieve victory on the ground," Yadai says.
Q: But a ground incursion means a lot of wounded and abducted soldiers, and that's a concern that always hold the political echelon back from approving an action like that.
"So therefore the main question is always what price we're willing to pay. Anyone who thinks that we can make significant achievements without paying a price won't find a partner in me. It's not as if we send a few divisions out to fight a war over every mortar or rocket [fired], but we need to acknowledge the limitations of the expected achievements if we opt not to pay the price. Of course, I'm in favor of doing everything possible so we don't put our soldiers in danger, but we have to understand that a major success, or a victory over one enemy or another, will not be possible without a massive ground maneuver, which comes at a cost."
Yadai is a member of what is termed in the IDF the "Lebanon generation." As someone who came up in the Golani Brigade, he spent most of his service in the security buffer zone in southern Lebanon and lost a number of officers and soldiers. Even after the IDF retreated from Lebanon in 2000, the Egoz Unit continued to operate nearly exclusively in the north. The abduction of three IDF soldiers on Mount Dov, and the fact that the withdrawal took place before Israel finished building its security fence on the Lebanese border, required Israel to keep skilled forces on the border. The primary of these is the Egoz Unit, which was established in the 1990s to specialize in guerrilla warfare against Hezbollah.
"We were on intensive operations, mainly on Mount Dov," Yadai recalls. "When the Second Intifada began [in October 2000] we had a hard time convincing the Northern Command and the General Staff to release us so we could operate in Judea and Samaria. We needed to go in bit by bit, almost sneak in. Send teams from time to time," he says.
The start of the Second Intifada was characterized mainly by terrorist shootings. The IDF was looking for ways to reduce the number of these attacks, which were a daily threat to civilians and soldiers, and deployed a heavy contingent of forces. This turned into the brunt of Israel's security activity.
"Our advantage in Egoz was that we brought the unit's character to Judea and Samaria, as well as its tactics. We operated in places where we had a relative advantage, mostly in open territory, trying to locate and hit terrorists who were attempting to place bombs or shoot at roads. We only started going into urban areas at a later stage, mainly to arrest cells behind terrorist attacks."
This activity shifted gears in 2001, when the suicide bombings started. It was Sisyphean, sometimes demoralizing. The Shin Bet security agency and the IDF didn't have enough intelligence, and when there was any, Israel was careful not to violate Palestinian sovereignty by operating in Area A, which turned into an industrial zone of labs where bombs were built, bombers were recruited, and attacks plotted.
The fact that Israel took virtually no offensive action left the IDF on the defensive. Often, it worked, but the general result was frustrating. The number of attacks and their lethality were growing consistently, and without any separation along the Green Line, there was a sharp rise in the number of attacks in major cities. Today, it seems like a far-off nightmare, but at the time, it was the daily reality – citizens were afraid to ride buses, go into shopping malls, and eat at restaurants.
Two processes led Israel to change its policy. The first was international. By ignoring the terrorism and not rejecting Palestinian Authority sovereignty (and also by continuing to recognize the PA as a legitimate partner), Israel scored considerable international credit. This was particularly notable after the Dolphinarium bombing in June 2001, in which 21 people were killed, mostly youth who had made aliyah from the former Soviet Union.
Then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon rejected the IDF's demands to operate in PA territory and declared that "restraint is also power." Following this, the US supported Israel's demand for the PA to fight terrorism. Of course, that didn't happen. PLO leader Yasser Arafat encouraged the attacks, thinking that they would pressure Israel to make major concessions in negotiations to establish a Palestinian state.
The second process was domestic. The IDF and the Shin Bet stepped up pressure on Sharon and then-Defense Minister Binyamin (Fuad) Ben-Eliezer to approve offensive action in PA territory. It took time – and more deadly terrorist attacks – before the government gave the green light. A factor that helped was the dramatic change in the US government's stance following 9/11. Then-President Bush thought that Al-Qaida was a much bigger threat to world security than Palestinian terrorism was, and even asked Israel not to draw attention away from the battle against it, but Sharon kept up the pressure and gradually, the administration removed its sweeping opposition to Israeli operations in Area A, effectively releasing the IDF to prepare for Defensive Shield.
In early 2002, the DIF started operating in PA territory. Operations limited in scope were conducted in a few towns, two of which created shockwaves. One was in the Jenin refugee camp, a key terrorist locale and Palestinian Islamic Jihad stronghold from whence attacks and suicide bombers were being launched on a near-daily basis, and the second was in Tulkarem, which at the time was also one of the top Palestinian terrorist centers, mostly for Hamas.
Some people warned that an operation like this would come at a heavy cost. They talked about heavy losses to Israeli forces, and the strong resistance that could be expected from the Palestinians.
"I remember all the severe assessments that were given," Yadai says. "Jenin was the first time that an entire battalion [of Golani troops] went into the biggest vipers nest in Judea and Samaria and came out with considerable success."
In Tulkarem, the message was even more honed. Golani forces were active there, too, and at the end of the operation gathered hundreds of Palestinian suspects, in their underwear only, their hands bound and their eyes covered, in one of the best-remembered images from the Second Intifada.
Yadai: "That image, of hundreds of terrorists surrendering, made it clear to the government and also the public that these operations were possible. It had very deep ramifications in terms of operations and mindset. It was a victory image that played a significant part in shaping their understanding that there is no place we can't reach, and also let the political and military leadership know that it was possible. It made it clear to the terrorists that they were not immune – nothing less."
After this, Yadai and the Egoz Unit were sent into Ramallah for operations designed to deter the PA and Arafat. There were three deployments – in the first two, the forces were called back while still en route, once because of American intervention and a second time because the government hadn't approved an incursion into Area A, which at the time was an international border that could only be crossed if permits were in place.
"It took time for us to decide that Area A was no longer sacred, that we would treat it like Area B and enact our security control there. This was the result of diplomatic processes and the need for international and domestic legitimacy, but our sense, on the ground, was that it was taking too long. We would wake up every morning to [news of] a terrorist bombing on a bus or at a restaurant, that terrorists had invaded settlements, and numbers of wounded that today sound incredible."
Those numbers reached a peak in March 2002, when over 130 Israelis were murdered in a series of major suicide bombings. The successful operations in Jenin and Tulkarem were forgotten, and it seemed that Israel had no effective response to suicide terrorism. There was growing public pressure, and pressure inside the IDF, to take real action. Israel was still hesitant, until the Passover eve suicide bombing at the Park Hotel in Netanya on March 27, 2002. Thirty Israelis were murdered and 160 wounded.
In the weeks leading up to this attack, Egoz forces were operating alternately in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. While the target for operations was Judea and Samaria, because of the terrorist attacks being launched at Israel, the IDF was very concerned about the weapons being smuggled into Gaza via the Philadelphia Corridor.
"Then-Chief of Staff [Lt. Gen.] Shaul Mofaz instructed me to go down to Philadelphia to put an end to the tunnel problem once and for all. We found ourselves operating there as an entire unit, and we carried out a lot of actions, mostly under fire, with casualties and wounded on the other side. We even uncovered two or three tunnels. Because it was clear we'd be there for some time, I worked it out with the division commander that we'd all go home for Passover eve, then go back down south."
The Park Hotel bombing changed the plan. "About the time the evening started my beeper went off and I realized I wouldn't be celebrating seder. I got a phone call from Chico [Golani commander Moshe Tamir] and he told me to go to Beit El. I arrived at about midnight, and from there we started a complicated logistics operation – calling up the entire unit, on a holiday eve, to bring all our equipment, which was on Kibbutz Sufa in southern Israel and start planning an operation.
"I was told immediately that our target would be the Muqataa – Arafat's command center in Ramallah. I was assigned Golani reconnaissance troops, and also the Duvdevan Unit. We starting poring over intelligence, and it was clear that the Muqataa was surrounded by all the Palestinian security branches to protect Arafat.
"The 51st Battalion was deployed to storm Ramallah. It took time for the equipment to arrive, and even then it was complicated to go in because the city's network of roads was very narrow at the time. We [Egoz] and the reconnaissance troops were sent in on foot, and we flanked along the Wallerstein route [part of Highway 463, which links Gush Telmonim to Beit El and goes around Ramallah to the northwest] – at night, in bad weather, pouring rain and fog so thick you couldn't see a yard ahead."
Q: What was your mission?
"To occupy the Muqataa, surround and isolate Arafat, but without hurting him or anyone from his inner circle. On one hand, it required a massive action, and on the other, it had to be surgically precise. We knew more or less where his office was, but we had no indication where exactly he was, and that required us to attack responsibly, with precision.
"As soon as we entered Palestinian territory, the clashes started. My Company A was attacked from a five-story building that was still under construction, and that forced us to go door-to-door, room by room. We killed three terrorists there, and in the last room we lost Lt. Boaz Pomerantz, a team commander. Because it took time and I was afraid we wouldn't stay on schedule, I ordered Rafi Milo, my deputy, to go on to the Muqataa. We finished the encounter and joined him when he was already outside the compound."
As in many Palestinian cities, the forces encountered less resistance than they expected at the Muqataa. They quickly took control of the compound, and Egoz troops began cleaning out offices, rooms, and basements, collecting every bit of intelligence and weapons they came across.
"We found everything in the world. From a prison of Arab Israelis who had been interrogated by the PA and were being held in the basement, to safes that held – along with gold and money – operational plans that showed how deeply the PA was involved in the organized terrorism against Israel, to machines for counterfeiting money and documents. And of course, storerooms of weapons that weren't intended to be used for policing, but rather in terrorist attacks against Israelis.
"If there was one thing that really hit me, it was how deep and authentic that terrorism was. There, I realized that this was no popular resistance that erupted because Sharon visited the Temple Mount. This was organized terrorism, funded by the Palestinian Authority. We found waiting lists of potential suicide bombers and documents listing payments to the shahids. We realized the PA was playing both sides: holding talks, while also working to ensure that the terrorism continued at full strength."
Egoz took control of the entire Muqataa compound and left Arafat and his people with limited ability to act. A single wall separated the Israeli soldiers from the Palestinian leader, but the instruction to the soldiers was unequivocal: Arafat was not to be harmed, nor was anyone else, unless they shot at or otherwise threatened the Israeli forces.
"We dug holes in the wall so we could keep an eye on what was happening in the compound. From time to time, shots were fired between us and Arafat's presidential guard, and it was very tense. Right after we arrived, Chico called me and said he had to apologize, but Egoz would have to stay near the Muqataa. He said he couldn't leave any other unit there because it was a powder keg and someone judicious and responsible had to be there, someone who knew how to live in a complicated zone that wasn't black and white."
The Egoz troops spent many more days at the Muqataa. "We created a defense and isolated the Muqataa and Arafat from the world outside," Yadai says. "From time to time, we set out on operations in Ramallah, at least one of which was exceptional. I got a phone call from Chico, sending us to a house where intelligence said Marwan Barghouti [then leader of the Fatah movement] was hiding. We were the first to arrive, and Barghouti was there."
Even in the Muqataa itself, Egoz had work to do. The presidential guard would harass the forces with shots from time to time, and Yadai decided that the next time they fired, he would shoot a LAU missile at the building from where the shots had come.
"We knew more or less where Arafat was hiding, and we decided to fire at the room next door to 'explain' that they really shouldn't keep shooting. We were taking the LAU up to one of the upper floors to get a good angle, and as we were aiming, an urgent phone call came in and told me not to fire it because Arafat wasn't in his room. It turned out he was in the room we'd been aiming at. We could have changed the Middle East a little more quickly."
Q: Did you have any interaction with Arafat himself?
"Not directly. After a few days, we started to bring them food and water, but nothing beyond that. We were in eye contact with people in the building, including him, and that was it."
Q: I assume you had plenty of soldiers who would have been happy to take him out.
"True, but that's why we were the ones left there. Egoz has outstanding fighters, but also intelligent people who realize the meaning and the government's commitment at the time, that we wouldn't harm him. In the moments we were being shot at it wasn't always easy to keep them in check, and if the situation had been otherwise, our response probably would have been more aggressive."
But what worried Yadai was the fact that the main battles were being waged elsewhere. The Muqataa mission was important, but Golani was in charge of the main efforts at the Kasbah in Nablus, and later in Jenin, and Egoz found itself serving as Arafat's bodyguards.
"It wasn't that we didn't have any operations to carry out, or felt discriminated against, but the unit's character was that we always wanted more."
Eventually, Egoz was moved from Ramallah to Hebron, the last Palestinian city the IDF took control of in Defensive Shield. Yadai later completed his service as unit commander and was assigned to the western division on the Lebanon border. After that, he was made commander of the Golani Brigade (a position he held in the 2006 Second Lebanon War), and then head of the division responsible for the Egyptian border. He returned to Judea and Samaria twice: as commander of the regional division, and as command leader – both jobs that offered him an unusual perspective about the territory.
Q: Looking back 20 years later, what have we learned?
"The first thing has to do with Israeli society. Despite its image as a society that is unwilling to fight, what we saw during Guardian of the Walls [in May 2021] – in the context of legitimacy and the percentage of enlistment in compulsory service and reserves – was very impressive, even though it was an unavoidable war."
Q: Today we are seeing social cohesion fall apart and less public faith in the army.
"That is the paradox of security. The better our security situation is, the more the public – who aren't exposed to the activity we carry out every day in zones close by and far away – thinks that everything is fine, and [wonders] – if so, why do we need a large defense budget and why bother enlisting in combat units, etc. Of course, I'm not complaining about our defense situation, and I'm certain that if it gets iffy, Israeli society will show up.
"The second thing has to do with us, the IDF. We talk a lot about the enemy. We don't underestimate them and take them seriously. But I think that Israel and the IDF, compared to the organizations we are dealing with and compared to the Middle East in general, are a regional superpower. It's not that we can't improve, but the capability of the tactical echelon and the confidence of our soldiers and the high-ranking commanders in our ability to get the job done are valuable assets.
"Take Egoz, which back then hadn't really seen service in Judea and Samaria, and was able to acquire techniques and learn the intelligence and operational material quickly, and did fantastic work.
"The third thing, and maybe the most important for my current role as commander of the ground forces, is that as much as we talk about our desire for a decisive victory – ground warfare is the only way of achieving it. A combination of artillery and intelligence are good for creating deterrence, and sometimes to restore order, but they aren't tools we can use to win.
"To a large extent, this is also the reason for the quiet that has been maintained in Judea and Samaria since then [Defensive Shield], because the IDF has total control over what happens there. The fact that for the past 15 years, Israel's security reality has been good is thanks to two conditions that are being maintained optimally in Judea and Samaria: superior intelligence and freedom of operation. This is what doesn't allow terrorists to collect weapons and plot and carry out attacks, with sporadic exceptions."
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"I assume that it's obvious that terrorists in Judea and Samaria don't read Jabotinsky's writings, but the fact that they are having a hard time operating is because of the extensive, daily military activity on the ground that allows us to get to anyone who even thinks about carrying out a terrorist attack."
Q: You're saying that even the best air force and intelligence in the world couldn't win the Second Intifada – that only a ground incursion could.
"They weren't able to do it then, and they won't be able to do it in the future. In the reality in which we are fighting terrorist organizations, most of which operate with popular backing or from inside civilian centers, in urban areas, underground – without ground warfare there will be no victory. I'm not downplaying the importance of the air force or intelligence, but the lesson has to be clear, and we're seeing it in the Ukraine war, too."
"Using massive forces to bomb indiscriminately, that's not playing by the rules. Without ground warfare in the main cities, even the biggest and strongest army, like the Russians, won't win. The Russians have total military superiority over the Ukrainians, and operational freedom in the air, but still, to occupy main cities, with tens or hundreds of thousands of residents, you need to operate on the ground. There's no other way."
Q: Do you think there might be a third Intifada?
"I don't think it's very likely. The challenging time coming up is because Hamas in Judea and Samaria as well as Gaza, and other players, see it as a period in which the post-Abu Mazan [PA President Mahmoud Abbas] future will be determined. They are trying to organize in a way that will give them a hold on Judea and Samaria, which could cause a rise in violence.
"But I don't think it will drag us into an intifada – among other reasons because there isn't any distinction anymore between Areas A and B, and the IDF operates freely anywhere, at any time. In Defensive Shield, we needed to occupy the cities to operate there. Today, when we go in to make arrests, we do it with two armored cars and the HQ."
Q: Still, the Palestinian people could think, like they did then, that violence and terrorism are the answer.
"I think that the Palestinian people are smart enough to understand that Defensive Shield created a difficult reality for it for over a decade, from which it was very difficult for them to recover. The Middle Eastern experiment of the Arab Spring also proved that there is no point to uprisings like these, since things go back to the way they were.
"Ultimately, every Palestinian thinks for themselves. When they look objectively at the situation of their brothers in Gaza or at what's happening in the Arab world at large, I think they're realistic enough to understand that they live in an excellent reality.
"It's not that they've lost their motivation or their dream or their nationalist ideas, but they are more realistic. They identify with the ethno-religious aspects of the story up to the point where they have to go out and fight or protest. Most of them feel fine with a social media post or a tattoo, but more than anything else, they just want to live their lives."
