The Simchat Torah attack is the 2023 version of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. The complete surprise – the governing paradigm, the collapse of the lines of defense – is very reminiscent of what happened here exactly 50 years ago.
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In a well-synchronized and orchestrated move, Hamas managed to surprise even the best and brightest in Israeli intelligence and completely toppled the Gaza Division's doctrine, which relied in recent years on the security barrier that gave a false sense of security.
A similar scenario, involving infiltration, kidnapping, and a killing spree carried out under the auspices of massive rocket fire, has been discussed in recent years by the top brass in the IDF, only in regard to the northern border, after Hassan Nasrallah publicly announced in that he intends to "conquer the Galilee" – that is, to cross the border, enter residential towns and villages and kidnap civilians and soldiers. But no one expected that the evil would start from the south, and without any intelligence warning.
Video: Terrorists in Gaza demolish border fence with Israel
Ten hours after the start of the events – these are several of the difficult questions that someone will be forced to give answers at the investigative committees that will be established when the disaster is over.
Q: Where was the intelligence?
This is the first question that cries out to the sky. Just like 50 years ago, even if the intelligence had real signs of such an operation, these were not converted into actionable intelligence, and this complacency blew up in our faces with a colossal intelligence failure.
In the last few weeks, and even in the last few days, senior army officials have been heard talking about the fact that Hamas is not interested in escalating its relations with Israel and emphasized that the fact that thousands of workers enter Israel every day restrains the organization's leaders that are controlling Gaza, which wants to ensure the welfare of its residents.
Even though Hamas carried out a live drill of a crisis on the fence in the last two weeks, the intelligence assessment did not change. As part of that exercise, Hamas sent hundreds of rioters to violent demonstrations, similar to the violent Friday protests held in the months before the COVID-19 pandemic. A few days ago, and after several pinpointed signal attacks, the IDF believed that the problem had been solved when the minister of defense gave the order to continue permitting the entrance of workers into Israeli territory.
Not only that but according to a military assessment of the situation, the IDF, the strongest army in the Middle East, which prides itself on good intelligence in our region and perhaps in the entire world, reduced its forces in the Gaza Strip in recent months and transferred them to Judea and Samaria in order to deal with the wave of murderous terrorism. And when the intelligence did not give any warning, even not a hint, the IDF top brass did not train the troops, did not order the deployment of Iron Domes, and this most serious incident caught most of the senior IDF commanders at home.
Like in the Yom Kippur War, the entire political and security leadership is accountable for the failure. The dire result is that even hours after the start of the attack, which erupted at 6:30 AM, there were still besieged towns, terrorists barricading themselves in houses, and a significant number of civilians and soldiers who had been kidnapped and taken into Gaza.
Q: How did the Gaza Division's defense collapse?
It is not new news that Hamas' goal is to penetrate Israeli territory. For many years the organization has been practicing infiltration into Israeli territory. The security establishment believed that the greatest threat was the underground tunnels, and therefore invested billions to build the mighty barrier around Gaza, above and below ground.
Upon its completion, the IDF thought they had managed to almost completely solve the problem of the tunnels, and conventional wisdom held that the situation was simpler above ground – thanks to two fences. The army believed that the "perimeter" area – a space of about 100 meters near the surrounding fence within Gaza – constituted a sufficient security space. A "See and Shoot" system was also placed on the fence, which was supposed to allow IDF observers to open fire at any infiltrator but could not cope with a rushing crowd.
The big plan did not consider a scenario of a mass assault of hundreds of armed men charging towards the fence, blowing it up, destroying it, and vandalizing it with tractors. The IDF's concept of defense collapsed, similar to the collapse of the famous Bar-Lev Line on the Sinai front in October 1973. Except that fifty years ago, the Bar-Lev Line was far away, located somewhere in Sinai, while now, there are Israeli settlements very close to the Gaza border, only a few meters away, and the voices coming from there this morning were simply heartbreaking.
Q: Why did it take the forces so long to take control of the situation?
For many hours, armed terrorists wandered through Israeli territory, inside army posts, bases, and villages. They went from house to house, looking for civilians and members of the security forces. Many residents called the rescue forces and the media to report the terrorists who were near their homes or already inside them, but no one came to help.
It took the forces a very long time to reach the besieged settlements, and even now, even though many hours have passed since the beginning of the attack, terrorists are still wandering around residential settlements in the south, with drawn weapons, and continuing to massacre civilians.
Q: Where are Israel's foreign relations?
Hamas' fierce attack on Israel began at 6:30 AM. For the first four hours, no one at the IDF Spokesperson's Unit briefed the reporters or the civilians. The army, as well as Israel's entire foreign relations system, let the Hamas narrative, the rumors, and the pictures they wanted on WhatsApp lead the public dialogue.
The truth is that even in the briefing held by the IDF spokesman, Brigadier General Daniel Hagari, at 10:30 AM approximately, no sufficient details were reported about the events or answers to the difficult questions given, even regarding the basic situation. The IDF was satisfied with statements such as "we are at war," asking the residents of the south to shut themselves in shelters, and that was that. At a relatively late stage, the IDF asked the citizens not to cooperate with Hamas and distribute its videos and reports, but the requests were delayed, and it seemed that no one was really listening to them. What's more, you can't argue with the harsh reality.
Q: Did the internal disputes actually weaken the level of deterrence?
For many months, Israel was involved in internal conflicts about the government's decisions regarding judicial reform. Hundreds of pilots in the reserves, intelligence personnel, and reservists from various divisions announced that they were suspending volunteering for the reserves, and the army leadership had to deal with reinforcing competence and cohesion and preventing the degeneration of the military units.
The internal situation in Israel is also clearly visible in assessments of the situation by Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. Israel's enemies were waiting for Israel to weaken itself, and while the army leadership dealt with the internal discord that penetrated the IDF ranks, they dealt with exploiting the situation and preparing for the next war.
The political and military leadership will have to ask themselves how they allowed the internal dispute to weaken Israeli deterrence in a way that made Hamas have the audacity to launch the most murderous attack from Gaza.
Q: Looking to the future: Is the IDF prepared for the possibility that Hezbollah will join the military operation?
The scary scenario that materialized on Saturday morning at the border of the Gaza Strip will not necessarily end in the south and there is a likelihood that it will extend over into other areas as well. Anyone who has a basic understanding of the situation and is aware of Hezbollah's capabilities knows that what Israel experienced on the Gaza border pales in comparison to what awaits it in the confrontation with Hezbollah in the north. Currently, the possibility that Hezbollah and Iran are coordinating with Hamas cannot be ruled out, and even if not, there is a possibility that they will decide to jump on the bandwagon and join the military operation after the inventory of Iron Dome interceptor missiles is depleted in the operation in the south.
One way or another, we have heavy days of fighting ahead of us, and we can only assume that the consequences of the operation will be very extensive in every possible arena – both military and political.
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