A group of captives taken by Hamas on Oct. 7 was kept in the first week of the war in the Shifa Hospital compound in the Gaza Strip, Israel Hayom has learned. Following this information, the IDF planned a large-scale operation to rescue them, but IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi ultimately chose not to give the order. This information is part of a new book by Ido Norden, an officer who served in the "Pit" at the Kirya – the epicenter of the decision-making operation in the bunker underneath the Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv – and was exposed to real-time information.
In the book, Norden writes: "One day after October 7, the Shayetet 13 [naval commando unit] began formulating a plan to attack Hamas' command center located under the Shifa Hospital in western Gaza City. Originally, the plan's goal was to eliminate a senior command level, which we assumed was under the hospital, strike Hamas' symbols of power, and gather intelligence. A day later, when critical and definite information arrived about the existence of Israeli captives inside Hamas' headquarters in Shifa, the strategic importance of the plan increased."
From the Shayetet, according to Norden, the plan went to the desk of the commander of the 98th Division, "and from there it went up a floor to the 'Depth Command' – a special IDF command whose purpose is planning, force operation, and leading special and multi-armed long-range operations in the area defined as the strategic depth of Israel's enemy states."
The operation was supposed to involve the IDF's most elite units in very large orders of battle. "Just days after the Oct. 7 attack, after the planning and intelligence consolidation efforts were complete, the plan was sent to the chief of staff's desk. But he never signed off on it." It should be noted that many operations during the war were brought to the General Staff's table only to be later rejected due to low chances of success.
The units that were supposed to take part in the large-scale operation, in addition to Shayetet 13, were also the General Staff Reconnaissance Unit (Sayeret Matkal) and Shaldag (the air force commando).
Two military sources confirmed to Israel Hayom that the details are correct. One of them said that a few days after October 7, sensitive and likely accurate information was received about the presence of captives in Shifa. As a result, the initiative for action at the hospital was expanded into a large operation and placed on the desk of the commander of the 98th Division, Brig. Gen. Dan Goldfus."
"Goldfus assembled for the operation everyone he trusted. The action was supposed to be very complex, and there were units that said the risk was too great and they did not want to be part of it. But he conceived the operation and obtained approval for its plans from senior IDF officials. The purpose was to arrive in a surprising and rapid manner, rescue whoever was there, and kill many terrorists – including senior ones and those who took part in the October 7 attack. He believed in it and still believes today that it could have been done, and therefore worked on the operation 24/7, literally not getting up from his chair. In his opinion, it was a missed opportunity," one of those involved in preparing for the operation said.
All parties involved in the planning emphasized that it was complex and high-risk, as is typical of commando operations. There were disagreements about it among the IDF's top brass. The Depth Command chief, Nimrod Aloni, and the Southern Command chief, Major General Yaron Finkelman, supported the operation. In contrast, the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, Aharon Haliva, opposed it. Chief of Staff Halevi backed him and ordered the preparations to be stopped.
In a conversation with Israel Hayom, a military source said that during the war, the chief of staff approved captive rescue operations while taking responsible risks. According to the sources, in some cases, captives were rescued, but some efforts failed – and some operational ideas were not approved because they did not meet the conditions for execution. As is well known, after the IDF entered the hospital, evidence was found of the presence of captives, including some who were murdered there. The book received the Military Censorship's approval for publicaiton.
The IDF Spokesperson's Unit told Israel Hayom in response to the revelation: "Contrary to the publication, this was not a canceled operation, but rather operational planning that lacked the required operational conditions, and there was no actionable intelligence on the location of captives; therefore it was not carried out. The IDF presents its operational plans to the political echelon and is subject to its decision. Any attempt to claim that the chief of staff did not advance efforts to rescue captives is baseless. The IDF operates and makes every effort to return the captives in accordance with operational and intelligence feasibility."
