Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's declaration about moving to comprehensive hostage deal negotiations, and the cabinet's decision several days later on taking control of Gaza City (and subsequently the central camps), have brought the entire system and all involved parties into a new phase of the war. Hamas is proving to be a tough negotiator, far from an organization that has lost its grip. It also accurately reads reality and translates it into moves that allow it to control the agenda and improve its position.
Exploiting the French desire for Palestinian state recognition and international pressure led it to harden its stance. The "starvation" campaign brought flooding of the Gaza Strip with humanitarian aid (including approval of a massive Israeli budget of 1.6 billion shekels [$451 million]) and a 10-hour humanitarian ceasefire daily. All this, without the terror organization being forced to pay anything.
Its agreement to the mediator proposal (and the phased release deal), which until two weeks ago Israel supported and promoted, can be interpreted from two perspectives: the threat of conquering Gaza created pressure that forced Hamas to fold, or it agreed to the deal knowing Israel would refuse – each side can choose the explanation that serves its desire and beliefs. The Israeli government chooses the second explanation and is delaying its response to Hamas's agreement to the phased deal, understanding that if the threat moves the terror organization from its refusal so far, then implementing the threat and beginning the IDF's attack on the Gaza area will continue the trend.
Proportionality and time
Israel's gamble on conquering Gaza City could prove to be a dangerous gamble, after more than 22 months of war and quite a few times promising decisive moves against Hamas. Among them, bisecting the Strip, the Philadelphi Corridor that would choke Hamas, Rafah that was declared the "last stronghold" with the "last brigade" and a city of refuge for all Hamas leaders, stopping humanitarian aid that would deny its governmental grip – and brought upon us the starvation campaign and flooding the Strip with humanitarian aid.
Gaza City remains almost the last card in Israel's hand to hope it's the one that will bring the decision and end the war. It's already possible to prepare the absolutely last card – the central camps. Moreover, public discourse is diverted from the main point. Taking control of Gaza is presented in the same breath as the action on Beit Hanoun or even the conquest of Rafah. Except reality is completely different and much more complex – Gaza City, the largest of the Strip's cities, sprawls over an area of about 45 square kilometers (28 square miles) (Tel Aviv, for comparison, covers 52 square kilometers [32 square miles]) with 700,000 residents and up to a million civilians.
It's worthwhile and proper to hold the discussion with all its implications. How long will a move to take control (not even clearing) of upper Gaza and lower Gaza, built with many branched and long tunnels? Will the hostages have time to survive in the sub-conditions in which they are held? And another thing – when was the last time Israel conquered an enemy city the size of Gaza? The answer is never. Even in the First Lebanon War (1982), we conquered and controlled only West Beirut in a limited area and population. The IDF has no similar experience, Israel has no idea what this looks like, and we have no ability to assess how this will end, if it indeed begins.
Name shapes consciousness
Even the name chosen for the Gaza City takeover operation testifies to fixation and largely confusion – "Gideon's Chariots B," after Part A of the operation failed and had a limited goal, at least the declared one, to bring conditions for hostage release by applying pressure on Hamas. The operation's continuation testifies to the same thinking, same method, continuity of action. One can only hope for a different result.
Generally, giving names to operations that are part of the "Swords of Iron" war – what's the purpose? What's the need? After all, if we remain faithful to the war's objectives, then all actions serve the same objectives: toppling and destroying Hamas and returning the hostages. Why do we need all that Tower of Babel of names that only shape consciousness, confuse, and don't really advance us toward achieving the war's objectives?
Until military operations commence in Gaza's core areas, the hope remains that the military track – threatening credible conquest of the city – will function as leverage rather than reality. This pressure should compel Hamas to scale back its resistance posture. Ideally, the political track will prevail, leading to a hostage release agreement and war conclusion, with deal terms and conditions yet to be determined.
