In recent years, and especially since Oct. 7, Iran has launched multiple influence operations targeting Israeli society. Their strategic aim is to destabilize Israel's political system as a means of weakening Israeli society itself. To achieve this, Tehran operates a wide network of fictitious online identities across numerous social media platforms. These profiles serve as efficient tools for spreading disinformation and advancing the Iranian regime's goals.
Learning from the 2022 election, when Iran was involved in a variety of influence efforts, and given Tehran's understanding of the importance of the upcoming vote, it should be assumed that Iranian interference will take place before, during and after the election.
Iran will apply the extensive experience it has accumulated through years of direct engagement with Israeli online discourse, using that familiarity to refine and upgrade its influence campaigns ahead of Election Day.
An analysis of Iran's previous attempts, particularly during the last election cycle, makes it clear that Tehran has no intention of waiting for Election Day. Iran is likely to try to disrupt the political system's "pre-election alignment" among both Jewish and Arab voters, seeking to shape internal political organization in a way that promotes its strategic goal of political chaos.
This would then serve as preparation for Election Day itself. Iran is expected to activate hidden assets in selected online communities to spread fake news and disinformation designed to disrupt the proper functioning of the election. This would set the stage for a third phase: undermining the election results afterward.
The US model
A relevant example is Iran's involvement in the 2020 US presidential election. Iranian operatives used the name of the far-right Proud Boys movement to intimidate potential voters and discourage them from casting ballots, intentionally seeking to disrupt the voting process in the US. Iran could replicate this pattern in Israel by attempting a series of moves aimed at harming the integrity of the election.
Another important point to consider is the possibility that Iran will use its online assets to persuade individuals, whether through political impersonation or financial incentives, to carry out actions not only in cyberspace but also in the physical world, all with the aim of harming the voting process in Israel.
Past experience shows Iran has become highly effective at recruiting individuals inside Israel to act on its behalf, knowingly or unwittingly. Tehran leverages its deep familiarity with Israeli society to make such recruitment easier.
Recent revelations indicate that Iran's influence apparatus enjoys significant resources from the regime. Dozens of operatives work under special Revolutionary Guard units whose sole purpose is to run influence campaigns not only in Israel but also in the US and the UK. It must be assumed that some of these operatives are already preparing their systems for Israel's Election Day.
To counter these efforts and safeguard the integrity of the vote, relevant Israeli authorities must prepare for Iranian influence operations that are aimed specifically at the election. The understanding must be clear: preparations are already underway or about to begin.
The primary goal must be to identify all Iranian assets that have been deployed, are currently being deployed, or will be deployed to influence the upcoming election. This will not be easy. Iran has significantly improved its methods in recent years and now designs its assets to be distinctly different from one another, making them harder to detect.
A related challenge is the expected use of AI tools by the Iranian regime to improve the credibility of these assets. Iran may even use Israeli influencers, manipulated without their knowledge, to amplify its content. In parallel, Iranian cyber units are expected to cooperate with influence-operation teams to flood social media with information obtained through planned hacks of Israeli websites, all aimed at damaging the election process.
Beyond Israeli government agencies, civil society organizations also play an essential role. These groups must work daily to keep online discourse free of foreign manipulation. Combined efforts between government bodies and experienced civil society monitors, who can identify suspicious activity on social networks, will greatly improve Israel's ability to detect and disrupt Iranian interference.
This is a significant challenge, and Israel's limited success in recent years in curbing Iranian influence operations proves it. But given the potential damage Iran can cause, it is crucial to invest the necessary resources to counter these efforts. Iran's capability to harm Israel's election process must not be underestimated.
