Initial findings point to an ISIS connection, not Iran, which has been proven responsible for torching synagogues and Jewish businesses in the country. The distinction between streams of radical Islam does not diminish the threat: The Iranian model is sometimes replicated in other influence networks, both state and non-state, and in any case, lays the "fertilizer" for attacks on Jewish life.

In August, Australian intelligence concluded that Iran stood behind two attacks: the arson of a kosher delicatessen in Sydney and the torching of a synagogue in Melbourne. The investigation revealed that the Revolutionary Guards recruited local criminals for the "dirty work" – attacking Jewish institutions. In response, Australia expelled the Iranian ambassador, closed its embassy in Tehran, and declared the Revolutionary Guards a terrorist organization. This marked the first time Australia has expelled an ambassador since World War II.

Tehran also operates "soft power" mechanisms, which allow it and Hezbollah to expand their influence in countries with a significant Shiite minority, among these mechanisms: control over the appointment of imams in religious centers, academic institutions like Al-Mustafa University, cultural centers of the embassy, and the media activities of the Iranian Broadcasting Authority.

In Australia, the influence has manifested in trips to Lebanon and meetings with Hezbollah officials, and even in money transfers through Qard al-Hassan (Hezbollah's banking institution) – as revealed in the breach of the organization's systems.

The disregard for Iran and Hezbollah's "enabling infrastructure" in Australia created a sense of comfort to operate in the country without interference. Similar to the Iranian operational pattern of recruiting Australian criminals for "dirty work" on behalf of the Revolutionary Guards, there has been evidence in the past of connections between criminal elements and Shiite religious institutions, and figures from the Australian underworld were linked to a money laundering network that operated for Hezbollah's benefit.

As a result, Shiite religious centers became the leaders of anti-Israel demonstrations after October 7, waving terror flags without any interference. Iranian Ambassador Ahmad Sadeghi did not hesitate to praise Hassan Nasrallah, while the embassy simultaneously intensified surveillance and persecution of Iranian dissidents in the country.

The battle is only beginning

But Australia is just one example. Iran operates similar networks around the world: Quds Force planning an attack from Venezuela against the Israeli embassy in Mexico, recruiting Swedish teenagers to attack the embassy in Stockholm, and attempting to harm Israel-Thailand relations through pressure on Thai workers. In Britain, Iranian accounts were exposed, pushing for Scottish independence to weaken the kingdom from within. In Italy, Iranian elements used the cultural center in Tehran to track exiles, and in Germany, the government admitted that the Al-Mustafa University branch in Berlin became a spy center.

The "Israel-centric" view of the Iranian threat causes Israel to miss an opportunity. While Israel focuses on the Iranian power structure – the nuclear program and missiles – Iran enjoys broad freedom of action far from the Middle East. But these developments also create fertile ground for cooperation with countries facing the same negative Iranian influence, and sometimes they are not even aware of the danger.

Western countries are dealing with large-scale immigration, exposing them to various types of foreign influences. Exposing the way Iran uses the Shiite diaspora and the religious power it holds within it could serve as a model for dealing with other radicalization networks: from ISIS's online and partisan networks, through mosque unions controlled by other Middle Eastern states, to non-religious state influences.

In the past year, there has been some awakening. Alongside Australia's moves, Germany closed the Al-Mustafa branch in Berlin and expelled the imam at the "Blue Mosque" in Hamburg, who was accused of receiving direct instructions from the Supreme Leader's office. The "hysterical" response of the regime to any damage to these mechanisms indicates their importance – and also that the battle is only beginning. Whether Iran is responsible for the Sydney attack or not, history proves the need to fight that same "enabling infrastructure."

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If you follow this issue, this name will sound familiar. Around 200 leading industry figures have now signed a petition calling for his release from Israeli prison, with the hope that the Palestinian prisoner will become the leader of a future Palestinian state. Among the signatories to the petition you will find names that haven't escaped notice around the world, such as British actors Sir Ian McKellen and Benedict Cumberbatch, musician Sting, and also Jewish actresses Miriam Margolyes – known mainly from the Harry Potter film series – and Hannah Einbinder, joining actors who have already expressed their anti-Israel views over the years, Mark Ruffalo and Javier Bardem.

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In light of the clear support of Hollywood's stars for Barghouti, one can only wonder – who does Hollywood want to crown as "Palestinian Mandela" and the future leader of a Palestinian state?

15-year-old Fatah operative 

Born in a village near Ramallah in 1959, Marwan Barghouti joined the Fatah terrorist movement under the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) at the mere age of 15. Israeli authorities detained him for the first time at 19, and he served a two-year prison sentence for his involvement as an operative in a Fatah unit that executed a terrorist attack. During the first intifada of the late 1980s, Barghouti gained political prominence in the West Bank by directing Palestinian clashes with Israeli forces. He enrolled at BirZeit University to study History and Political Science, but his campus political work for Fatah, and his involvement in establishing Fatah's youth movement, triggered another imprisonment and subsequent deportation to Jordan.

Barghouti returned to Judea and Samaria in 1994, enabled by the terms of the Oslo Accords. He supported the Oslo Accords and even engaged in dialogue with Israeli political figures, an approach that significantly differed from his previous behaviour within Fatah. He began positioning himself against Yasser Arafat, then-leader of Fatah, particularly over disagreements with the Palestinian Authority. At the same time, he seized the opportunity to consolidate his power further within Fatah, whether through participation in mass demonstrations or by aiding and promoting terrorists from the Tanzim – Fatah's ground forces, who pioneered terrorist strikes against Israel during the Second Intifada, which he led in 2000.

When the second intifada erupted that September, he was directing marches toward Israeli checkpoints and provoking riots against Israeli soldiers. His compelling speeches aimed at urging Palestinians to use violence to drive Israel from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. During intensifying violence, Fatah spawned a new terrorist branch designated the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, which conducted strikes against Israelis – including a March 2002 suicide bombing that claimed 30 lives.

Israeli authorities accused Barghouti – still commanding the Tanzim – of holding a prominent position in the Brigades, and Israeli forces arrested him in April 2002 by tracking his phone. Israel charged him with terrorist organization membership and dozens of murder counts for ordering deadly attacks, with courts convicting him of five charges in 2004 and imposing five life sentences plus 40 years.

The court found Barghouti accountable for a June 2001 attack in Ma'ale Adumim that resulted in the death of Greek monk Tsibouktsakis Germanus, a January 2002 kidnapping and murder of American citizen Yoela Hen, a March 2002 attack at Tel Aviv's Seafood Market restaurant that killed three individuals, Eli Dahan, Yosef Habi, and Salim Barakat, and a car bombing in Jerusalem.

The connection to Hamas 

Despite two decades of imprisonment, Barghouti has preserved much of his political power – including playing a key role in facilitating negotiations between Hamas and Fatah in February 2007 prior to Fatah's bloody ouster from the Gaza Strip, and securing election to Fatah's party leadership in absentia in 2009.

Throughout negotiations between Hamas and Israel since October 7, Hamas has repeatedly demanded Barghouti's release, despite his membership in the rival Fatah organization. Hamas' demand for his release connects to debates about Gaza's "day after" – Mahmoud Abbas' succession as the president of the Palestinian Authority and Hamas' future involvement in Palestinian political affairs. Since Abbas is unpopular among Palestinians, and Hamas is looking to extend its reach to the West Bank, Barghouti, who, according to polls, has garnered significant support from Palestinians, has become Abbas' natural successor.

Last March, Fadwa Barghouti began campaigning for her husband, hoping he might replace Abbas as president. Her campaign, which included meetings with high-ranking officials in the Arab world and the US, has also received support from pro-Palestinian Hollywood stars, as Barghouti is portrayed as a leader who will "unify" the Palestinian people in both Gaza and the West Bank.

Hamas previously attempted to secure Barghouti's release during negotiations for the return of kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit, who was kidnapped in 2006. Still, even then, Israel firmly refused, and the deal was carried out with the release of over 1,000 security prisoners in exchange for Shalit. To this day, this deal continues to stir controversy in Israeli society. Given the risks associated with freeing Barghouti, his release remained off the table during the Iron Swords negotiations as well.

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Abu Shabab led the first militia in Gaza established with Israeli support during the war against Hamas. He had two deputies who managed the organization's main divisions. The commander responsible for the gunmen and the military infrastructure is Rasan Duheyn. The commander overseeing the civilian system is Hamid al-Sufi. Both may now share leadership of the militia following Abu Shabab's death.

For now there has been no official announcement, and contradictory reports are circulating in Gaza regarding the circumstances of Abu Shabab's death. Some claim that a fighter who recently joined the militia was the one who attacked Abu Shabab. Hamas supporters expressed open glee and said this is the "fate of every spy and traitor". In the Palestinian camp in Ain al-Hilweh in Lebanon, residents distributed baklava to celebrate reports of Abu Shabab's death, saying they were celebrating the "killing of the pig Abu Shabab and his descent to hell and a bitter fate". Still, a commentator affiliated with the terrorist organization said the report of his death has not yet been fully confirmed.

Yasser belonged to the Abu Shabab clan, which is part of the Tarabin tribe, one of the largest Bedouin tribes in the region with tens of thousands of members. Some in the tribe cooperated in the previous decade with the Islamic State terrorist organization in the smuggling industry between Gaza and Sinai, in which Hamas was also a major actor. Abu Shabab himself lived in Rafah and was involved in illegal trade. Because of this background, he was often described as a former drug dealer.

Hamas previously arrested Yasser Abu Shabab on suspicion of criminal activity and sent him to prison. During the war, he managed to escape from a Hamas prison and settled in Rafah. There, in cooperation with Israel, he established a militia known as the Popular Forces.

In response to accusations that he had stolen supplies, Abu Shabab accused Hamas of seeking the continuation of mass looting. He also boasted that he had succeeded in securing international aid for the area under his control in eastern Rafah.

The militia he created included hundreds of armed men and, in its first months, also set up a civilian infrastructure. This included a school, a mosque and a communal kitchen used by members of the group. Video from the school highlighted efforts to teach students values of peace and tolerance. Abu Shabab often spoke of his desire to establish an alternative government to Hamas.

In recent months at least four additional militias have been formed in Gaza using the same model. They are led by individuals formerly associated with the security apparatus of the Palestinian Authority.

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Video: The funeral of Ali Tabataba'i / Credit: Al-Mayadeen

Up to this point, Hezbollah's strategic decision has been to avoid skirmishing with Israel, claiming that confronting Israel is the Lebanese state's responsibility, and prioritizing its own reconstruction. The organization has demonstrated strategic patience. Concurrently with the IDF attacks over the past year, it has acted determinedly by reorganizing its arrays, collecting and attempting to upgrade the weapons that survived the war, and finding alternative routes to smuggle in new weapons and funds to increase its power. Its operatives have operated discreetly and kept a low profile. They maintain a radical religious ideology, driven by hatred for Israel and the determination to restore the organization to its former position as a threat to Israel's residents and a strong deterrent against the IDF.

While Israel's military superiority is a primary factor restraining the organization, it's not the only reason for Hezbollah's restraint. Following its wartime defeat, Hezbollah's prominent standing within the Lebanese political system also diminished. Despite still being the country's strongest military force, it must consider domestic opponents. These opponents accuse Hezbollah of severely harming Lebanon – contradicting its claim of being "Lebanon's defender" – by fighting Israel to serve the foreign interests of Iran and the Palestinians. The disarmament of Hezbollah, led by the new Lebanese leadership, President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, is the primary issue currently on the Lebanese agenda. However, the killing of Tabataba'i, along with four other Hezbollah operatives in the heart of the Dahiyeh area in Beirut, is pressuring the organization to execute a military response rather than limit itself to threats.

Hezbollah has a wide range of options , and it still possesses the capability to act. It retains military capabilities from the war , supplemented by additional weapons it has managed to smuggle in and develop over the past year, with direct assistance from Iran. Iran increased its influence over the organization following the assassination of Nasrallah and is committed to supporting its rearmament in every way possible. US diplomatic officials indicate that Iran transferred approximately $1 billion to Hezbollah for reconstruction purposes in the past year alone. Despite this support, it is unlikely that Tehran, preoccupied with its own internal issues and efforts to find an acceptable solution with the international community concerning its nuclear interests , would now push the battered Hezbollah into an adventure against Israel.

Nonetheless, the organization could adopt a broad set of options for a possible response against Israeli targets. These potential actions include attacking IDF forces in the five locations it still controls within Lebanon; firing on northern communities or infiltrating a cell into Israel; launching deeper missile fire aimed at the Israeli home front; or carrying out a terror operation against Israeli targets abroad by Hezbollah itself or its partners in the axis, such as Palestinian operatives in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Shiite militias in Iraq. Israel should also account for the possibility of an operation by rogue elements within Hezbollah that might disregard a decision to continue exercising restraint.

Considering its current difficult state, it's probable that the official Hezbollah, led by the new Secretary-General Naim Qassem – who lacks significant respect – will seek to avoid another wide-ranging round of fighting with Israel , especially since Israel has already threatened a disproportionate response. The organization will likely choose to postpone its response or, due to internal pressure, settle for a limited, symbolic action along the border or overseas, while continuing its efforts to increase its power in anticipation of the next campaign. The challenge for the IDF therefore remains. However, residents of the north can rest assured: the army has the upper hand this time and is prepared for any scenario.

Orna Mizrahi, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies, joined INSS in December 2018, after a long career in the Israeli security establishment: 26 years in the IDF (ret. Lt. Col.) and 12 years in the National Security Council (NSC) in the Prime Minister's Office (she served under 8 heads of the NSC). 

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Tabataba'i, who rose through the ranks of Hezbollah's special forces, was more than just a senior commander in the Radwan unit. He was dispatched on key assignments during the civil wars in Yemen and Syria throughout the last decade. Through this work, he provided extensive support to other elements of the Iranian axis, enabling them to establish themselves against their rivals from the Sunni and Islamist axis.

During those years, Hezbollah was operating at the peak of its strength, sending delegations of military advisors to distant corners of the Middle East. These missions were instrumental in aiding the Houthis in their fight against the Yemeni government and its allies, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. They also served as a major source of support for the Assad regime in Syria and offered counsel to militias in Iraq. Furthermore, the previous Secretary-General was not content with merely sending an advisory team, but also, according to reports in foreign publications, personally provided telephone consultations to the Houthi leader.

The defeat on the northern front and the continuous elimination of top leadership have since catapulted Tabataba'i to the helm of the terror organization's "military wing." He collaborated closely with Mohammed Haidar, a senior advisor on the "Jihad Council" who himself survived an assassination attempt. Over the past year, both men, like the few other surviving senior officials, have been focused predominantly on attempts to reconstruct terror infrastructure within Lebanon, not on engagement in Sanaa or Damascus. Consequently, the Iranian axis has suffered severe setbacks, or even outright collapse, on both of those distant fronts.

Tabataba'i's death will exacerbate Hezbollah's debate over how to respond to Israel's strikes in Lebanon – a conversation the deceased official himself was engaged in. Recently, Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem ramped up his rhetoric, declaring that "the current situation cannot continue." Qassem seems to have channeled the discontent brewing within the organization's ranks following the hundreds of targeted killings in the past year.

Yesterday, two senior Hezbollah figures addressed the attack. While Member of Parliament Ali Ammar spoke about finding "the appropriate time" for a response, Mohammed Qamati stressed that "all options are open." These remarks are highly indicative of the profound disagreement within Hezbollah that will dominate the leadership's upcoming consultations.

Video: The attack in Beirut on November 23, 2025

On one side, Hezbollah finds itself in a position of historic weakness and is disadvantaged against Israel, despite its efforts to recover. Launching a single rocket or a full salvo could provide Israel with the perfect pretext for additional strikes, eliminating the few remaining senior commanders. Qassem may lack strength and charisma, but the organization has no superior alternative. The head of Hezbollah's political council, Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyed, is an equally uninspiring figure. On the other side, the organization faces growing turmoil among the Shiite public due to delays in reconstruction and compensation payments, fueling a strong desire for revenge.

Despite these immediate pressures, Hezbollah's calculus is rooted in the long term. Their reasoning dictates that as long as the Shiite Muslim population continues to expand at the expense of Christians and maintains its support for the terror group, they can afford to wait and concentrate solely on infrastructural repair. With the passage of time, Lebanon will become progressively more Shiite and pro-Iranian. Under this view, the current Lebanese government, including figures like President Michel Aoun, represents the final stand of the country's "pro-Western" elements.

This dynamic shifts the central dilemma to Israel. Can Jerusalem accept a diminished Hezbollah, fully aware that it might fully rebound in ten years, or should it exploit the current opportunity to push the terror group into an even deeper abyss – a crisis point where its rivals within the Land of the Cedars will finally have the courage to step in and permanently dismantle the organization's arsenal.

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This week, that red line may face its biggest test in decades, with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's planned visit to Washington and the expected US approval for the F-35 deal to the kingdom.

The Americans have always viewed the Saudis as an important strategic partner, but the idea of supplying the stealth fighter – the only fifth-generation jet operated by any country in the Middle East (Israel) – was seen until recently as a line best not crossed. The reason is simple: the F-35 is no longer just a fighter jet. It is an intelligence, strike, and electronic platform that enables penetration into spaces that were previously impassable, and it is a source of security, diplomatic, and strategic power not only in the local arena but also in the broader regional balance of power.

The stealth fighter entered Israeli Air Force service as a result of a long, complex, and sometimes politically sensitive process. Although the F-35 was born as a large-scale international project led by the United States called JSF – Joint Strike Fighter, Israel was not included in the first group of countries that participated in it.

The main reason was that the Americans carefully examined the combination of industrial partnership and security sensitivity: Israel was not a producer in NATO frameworks, and it was known as a country that makes deep modifications to almost every air platform it acquires. From Washington's perspective, there was a need to carefully examine whether Israel's modification requirements would not endanger particularly sensitive technological components. Only at a later stage, after a prolonged process of secret coordinations and technological protection mechanisms, did Israel join as a special procurement partner and not as a full member in the JSF coalition.

The US president who essentially approved the sale of the stealth fighters to Israel was George W. Bush. His administration made the principled decision to allow Israel to acquire a fifth-generation jet, out of the understanding that the rise in regional threats – including Iran – requires Israel to have a significant qualitative advantage. The actual agreement was signed during the Obama administration, which continued this policy and gave the green light to the first order. Israel was indeed outside the circle of countries that contributed to the development of the tool, but it became the first customer in the world to receive Washington's approval for deep Israeli modifications in the avionics systems, electronic warfare, and connectivity.

The first Adir landed in Israel on December 12, 2016, at Nevatim Airbase, in a ceremony that made clearer than anything the significance of this acquisition for Israel. For the first time, the Air Force received a jet capable of entering almost any point in the Middle East with little warning, generating independent intelligence, and carrying out precise strikes with a level of survivability higher than that of any other tool. It gave Israel an advantage that is not only technological but also conceptual: the Air Force moved from an era where it had to "break into" enemy airspace to an era where it can operate within it with relative ease.

Since 2016, three batches of jets have arrived in Israel. Today, the Israeli Adir fleet numbers about 36 F-35 jets integrated into squadrons at Nevatim. The Israeli government has already approved the purchase of another 25 jets, which will bring the operational strength to more than 60 jets. There are also discussions about further expansion later this decade, among other things to ensure a response to new threats and the replacement of some of the veteran fourth-generation jets.

The combination of operational flexibility, stealth capability, unique Israeli electronic warfare modifications, and natural integration into national control systems created a new reality: the stealth fighter is no longer just a component in the Air Force but an overlay layer that gives Israel freedom of action that no one in the arena holds, and continues to shape Israeli combat doctrine even today.

In Israel, especially after Operation Rising Lion, the significance of this process is even clearer. In the campaign that lasted 12 days and spanned thousands of kilometers, the F-35 was the tool that changed the rules of the game. It enabled deep penetration into Iranian airspace saturated with radars, missile batteries, and electronic warfare capabilities without the need to open a route through a wave of preliminary strikes. It provided real-time intelligence, sensor fusion that creates a continuous battle picture, and surgical strike capability on targets essential to the nuclear program – and all this while maintaining almost complete stealth. Israeli pilots described how they saw Iran's defense arrays "waking up", if at all, only after the strike had already been completed. That was a moment that illustrated how much this tool changes reality, and how much the Israeli advantage on it is not only tactical but essential.

This is exactly where the Israeli concern lies. If Saudi Arabia indeed joins the select club that holds the American stealth fighter, the implication is not just another advanced jet in the region; it is a change in the basis of the balance of power. Not because Saudi Arabia is an enemy state, today it is seen as a potential strategic partner, but because the qualitative advantage is a resource that must be maintained over time, especially in a region where the balance of alliances can change in a few years, if not months.

Israel needs unique technological depth, one that cannot be closed in two or three years. And if Saudi Arabia is indeed equipped with the stealth fighter, it will be the first time an Arab country receives access to a technological generation equal to that of Israel. In the past, Saudi Arabia requested – and received AWACS and F-15 jets from the US, but Israel managed to impose certain restrictions on the Saudi jets, thereby leaving a technological advantage in its hands.

Supporters of the move argue that Israel holds an advantage of many years over any country that enters the deal now. They point to its extensive operational experience, the unique hardware and software modifications it has made, and the complementary capabilities – intelligence, communications, and logistical capability that other countries are still far from holding. The QME mechanisms (ensuring qualitative edge), they remind, do not erode in one day. But on the other hand, there are those in Israel who warn that these gaps are not a given. Technology is a dynamic matter, and from the moment the door opens, it is hard to return it to full closure.

In this reality, Mohammed bin Salman's visit to Washington becomes a top event. The US president's decision will not approve just a deal – it will define the contours of air supremacy in the Middle East in the coming decade. The fact that in Israel they use examples from Operation Rising Lion to gauge the significance of the stealth fighter only sharpens the tension: Israel knows very well what the F-35 allows it to do. It also knows what will happen the day these capabilities reach its large, wealthy, and ambitious neighbor.

Either way, the discussion is not about Saudi Arabia. It's about Israel, about a longstanding American commitment, and about the question of whether the era of Israeli exclusivity in the stealth domain is about to come to an end – or whether Washington will find a way to preserve the additional edge on which Israeli security policy has relied for three decades.

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"Janet Jara, labor and welfare minister in Boric's government, Communist Party leader and candidate of the united left-wing bloc for president, leads all polls heading into the elections with 30% of voter support," a senior Chilean journalist and political analyst told Israel Hayom. "She maintains stability, her polling graph looks like a completely straight line, but that's actually her problem – 30% of the votes is essentially her ceiling, because most Chileans will vote against her at the decisive moment. She's perceived as continuing Boric's path, and even more extreme than him on many issues, and her attempts to distance herself from him during the campaign were probably too little and too late."

Johannes Kaiser, Chile's presidential candidate, wants to be Chile's Milei. The online betting platform Polymarket gives Kast a 71% chance of winning the elections after the second round (Jara settles for 15%). A candidate who registered an impressive rise is Johannes Kaiser (48), born to a Chilean-German family (his grandfather was a social-democratic activist who fled Nazi Germany and integrated into Chilean politics). He spent many years in Austria, where he studied at several universities and worked in the tourism field and as a sports journalist.

Even earlier, in 2019, Jewish community members distributed honey jars to Congress members in Santiago, and in response, Boric tweeted on his Twitter account, "Everything is very nice, but instead of distributing honey, stop killing Palestinians and return their land to them."

"Foreign investors were deterred by Boric," he added. "Therefore they're waiting for the administration to change so they can return and inject money into Chile, which desperately needs it. Therefore, voters will need to choose between the 'values' of Jara and Boric and Chile's rehabilitation."

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These developments come as Ankara invests heavily in increasing Turkish visibility in Gaza via Turkish and Palestinian aid organizations. Turkish posters and flags are flying across the Strip, including on bulldozers clearing debris and searching for deceased hostages.

Trump has enlisted Turkey, alongside Qatar, as a lead partner in his initiative and views Ankara as the most effective lever over the Hamas terrorist organization. Erdogan has thrown himself into the task. He credits Turkey with persuading Hamas to accept, and begin implementing, the plan's first phase, and he wants what he considers proper payment for that achievement: a deeper Turkish presence, involvement and influence in Gaza.

Turkey's interest, and Hamas's

For Erdogan, that payoff serves two strategic aims. First, to elevate Turkey's status as a leading regional power that is actively shaping Middle Eastern geopolitics. Second, to hem in Israel, erode its regional standing and blunt its ability to advance Israeli priorities over Turkish ones. A clear example is the Israel–Greece–Cyprus strategic alliance, which Turkey see as threatening key Turkish interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

Ankara regards Israel as its most challenging regional competitor, chiefly in military terms but also in technology, and economically through the potential opened by expanding the Abraham Accords, including IMEC, the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor linking India and East Asia through Saudi Arabia and Jordan to Israel and on to Europe. Diplomatically, Israel's widening ties in the region and its special relationship with the US also come into play.

Backing Hamas and political Islam is one of Turkey's levers for asserting leadership of Sunni Islam in the Middle East. That logic drives Ankara's Hamas policy and its insistence that Hamas retain its standing as a relevant and influential political actor, not only in Gaza but in Palestinian politics more broadly. A significant Turkish presence in Gaza would allow Ankara to safeguard Hamas's vital interests, which by definition are also vital Turkish interests.

A winning combination

Influence in Gaza, coupled with Erdogan's closeness to Trump and the favor the US president shows the Turkish leader, creates what Ankara sees as a winning combination. Erdogan believes, and hopes, that this mix will enable Turkey to force a broad military presence in Gaza as a central pillar of the ISF. A Turkish military footprint in the Strip, reinforced by the growing dominance of Turkish civilian aid groups, could, in Erdogan's view, narrow Israel's room to maneuver and its operational freedom in Gaza, and thus its ability to act consistently, deeply and effectively against Hamas's reconstruction efforts.

Israel's understandable caution about harming Turks, together with Erdogan's sway over Trump to restrain Israel, gives the Turkish Armed Forces a chance to clamp Israel in a pincer, via Gaza in the south and Syria in the north. That is how the Turkish president could carve out and stabilize a strategic comfort zone that works to Israel's detriment.

Given these moves, and in light of Erdogan's hostility toward Israel and his open antisemitism, Israel would do well to keep firmly opposing any Turkish military presence in Gaza. It should act creatively and in close coordination with Washington, working with the Egypt–Saudi Arabia–UAE axis to minimize Turkey's role in the Gaza Strip.

At the same time, Israel should push to prioritize deeper involvement, military presence and influence by that counter-axis, which also sees Turkey and its maneuvers as a threat and a challenge. Above all, Israel needs to internalize the implications: if Erdogan succeeds in executing his broader strategy, Israel could find itself in a Turkish stranglehold, where Ankara sets the rules.

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Hamas' military wing made clear early this week that fighter surrender or weapons abandonment remain off the table. Mohammad Nazzal, a senior Hamas official abroad, rejected exile outside Gaza and urged mediators to intervene.

Turkey wasted no time seizing this as another diplomatic opportunity, with sources saying it is "working to ensure safe passage for approximately 200 'Gazan civilians' trapped in Rafah tunnels" – as if 200 civilians simply got stuck in underground passages.

The deteriorating relationship between Ankara and Jerusalem, sparked by Turkish arrest warrants and Israel's response, combined with Israeli opposition to Turkish participation in Gaza's multinational force, will feature in Jared Kushner's discussions with Netanyahu, though not as the central focus.

Washington's primary objective is stabilizing the ceasefire. Meeting this goal requires advancing to stage two of the Trump plan and generating implementation momentum. With everyone occupied by processes and mechanisms, reality on the ground will shift toward non-combat, enabling Trump to pursue his broader diplomatic ambitions.

From Israel's perspective, however, the ceasefire is not the end goal. Particularly not now, after recovering living hostages and most deceased remains. Eliminating enemy capabilities and removing weapons from the territory remain Israel's core objectives, which cannot be sacrificed to ceasefire demands or satisfied through cosmetic arrangements.

Furthermore, Israel's approach in Gaza will directly impact Hezbollah arrangements (and the reverse), leaving no room for creative half-measures that sound good but deliver nothing.

Even without this consideration, regional discourse is already showing such formulas emerging. Examples include attempts to limit disarmament definitions to offensive weapons only – excluding tunnels, personal arms, and other capabilities from discussion. Another involves establishing an "administrative committee" for civilian Gaza governance, supposedly without Hamas participation, when the terror group already influences personnel selection and will clearly control such governance as the Strip's dominant force.

Returning to the besieged in Rafah – their number remains unclear. Media reports citing Israeli sources estimate 150 to 200. Foreign press mentioned lower figures, while Hamas websites simply stated the military wing withholds information due to sensitivity, describing them as "Qassam elite" facing high risk "while contending with medical supply shortages, electricity deficits, and the need to secure tunnels after extensive war damage."

Hamas spokesmen have raised no claims about broken commitments on this matter. They frame the connection to recovering IDF soldier Hadar Goldin's remains through humanitarian considerations and stability interests.

Given these circumstances, Israel possesses every advantage to transform this incident into a powerful symbol of its Hamas dismantlement commitment. Time favors us here, and provided our forces can block attacks from the besieged or other directions, no rush exists. Regardless, this event's conclusion must be decisive – mass surrender, detention or terrorist deaths. Images and publicity carry value. This is how regimes fall. Exile, as some mediators suggest, while not inherently rejected, should only acceptable as a post-surrender, post-arrest step, never as a replacement.

A Al-Resalah Hamas website editorial characterized the besieged issue as testing Hamas' capacity for post-war challenges. "It combines military, diplomatic, and humanitarian aspects and conveys an important message to the Palestinian public and the world regarding Hamas's ability to protect its people and manage humanitarian crises, in an extremely complex environment and under international supervision." This equally tests Israeli determination, providing further reason Israel cannot accept any solution Hamas would claim as an achievement.

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Anyone who wishes can rage against the victors and once again remind everyone how awful Mamdani is. In the days before the race, the young, inexperienced candidate did everything he could to signal that he had no intention of softening his most extreme positions. On the contrary: he spent the final stretch of the campaign in the company of Jeremy Corbyn, the former British Labour leader ousted over rampant antisemitism.

To the million New Yorkers who voted for Mamdani, none of that mattered. Statements such as "When the boot of the NYPD is on your neck, it's been laced by the IDF," meant to blame Israel for all of America's real and imagined evils, only boosted his standing.

But the real story of these elections isn't the winners, it's the losers.

The power of a shout

How did the Republicans suffer such a crushing defeat? In the coming weeks we'll hear countless explanations, hopefully backed by turnout data. But anyone looking for one central cause need not look far: Republicans were beaten because, for months, the party has been waging what increasingly looks like a civil war within its own ranks.

Their leader, President Donald Trump, remains as popular as ever, even as Washington's prolonged paralysis eats away at public support. The federal government, for example, has been shut down for weeks due to the parties' failure to agree on a budget. But Trump, for better or worse, is an unconventional candidate. He was elected despite—and not because of—the Republican Party, and brought with him a broad, diverse coalition of voters who see him, not the party brand, as their champion. With three years left in his term and no legal path to run for a third, the race to succeed him has already begun.

This time, though, the battle is not only over who will be the next Republican nominee after Trump. It's about what the party itself will become.

On one side stand figures like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who promise a return to classical conservatism: a muscular foreign policy, aggressive free-market economics, and an unrelenting fight against the progressive chaos that took root in America under Barack Obama and Joe Biden. On the other side are candidates like Vice President J.D. Vance, pulling the party in a very different direction.

A troubling example of that direction came just last week. Vance spoke at a Turning Point USA event, the conservative movement founded by his late friend Charlie Kirk, who was murdered earlier this year by a left-wing gunman. A student in the audience asked Vance: "I'm a Christian," he said, "and I don't understand why we support Israel, a Jewish state that doesn't seem to share our values."

Vance could have easily explained the importance of the US-Israel strategic alliance. He could have emphasized the obvious point that, in a war between a Jewish democracy and an Islamist terrorist organization, there should be no question where America stands. Instead, Vance mumbled something about Trump and how Israel doesn't tell him what to do, then veered into theology: "The reality is that Jews don't believe Jesus Christ is the Messiah," said Vance, a Catholic convert baptized in 2019. "My approach has always been that if we have disagreements, we should discuss them publicly."

Imagine for a moment a serious presidential candidate declaring that Americans should publicly debate whether Catholic politicians can be trusted to represent voters rather than follow the pope's orders from Rome. Or whether Hindus, who don't believe in one God, should be allowed to run for office. Such questions sound absurd, and rightly so. The separation of church and state is a bedrock principle of the American constitution. So what made the vice president, one of the GOP's highest-ranking figures, think that the right response to a political question was to turn it into a religious one?

The answer, in short, is Tucker Carlson.

The popular television host was ousted from Fox News in 2023 under complex circumstances. He launched his own podcast and wasted no time steering it in a new ideological direction. In February 2024 he traveled to Moscow for a warm interview with Vladimir Putin, who claimed, among other things, that Poland was to blame for the Nazi invasion in World War II and that Volodymyr Zelensky was the villain in his war with Ukraine. Carlson then toured Moscow's subway and shops, telling his audience that such order and cleanliness couldn't be found in any American city.

Some raised eyebrows, lavish praise for Russia and propaganda that demeaned the US hardly sound conservative. But Carlson was just getting started. Months before the presidential election, he hosted online influencer Darryl Cooper, who told viewers that Hitler was the real victim of World War II and that Winston Churchill refused to compromise with the "peace-loving" German chancellor only because a small group of people—no need to specify who, but they control the banks and the media—pressured him.

Last month, Carlson invited an even viler guest: Nick Fuentes, a social-media personality who has repeatedly expressed admiration for Hitler and Stalin.

What drove the supposedly conservative pundit to such extremes? The reasons are many, but the overall direction is clear: Carlson, and now Vance after him, understand that to capture the imagination of young and apathetic voters, one must sound extreme and exciting.

Replacing one madness with another

Some call this trend the woke right: just as the progressive left embraces absurd ideas, like denying biological reality and claiming men can become women and vice versa, the right is now flirting with its own delusions. If the left compares every conservative to Hitler, the right responds by admiring Hitler himself. If the left denounces public expressions of faith, the right flaunts overtly religious dogma.

Is this strategy sustainable? Sadly, for now, yes. Mamdani, a textbook representative of left-wing wokeness, won 81 percent of the vote among young women aged 18 to 29 in New York. Carlson, the face of right-wing wokeness, has surpassed media giants like Joe Rogan and taken his podcast to the top of the US ratings. Voters—especially younger ones—are flocking to the loudest, most extreme voices on both sides, a reality that no serious politician can ignore.

Instead of governing or even trying to beat the Democrats, Republicans are spending more and more time reacting to provocations from Carlson and his allies.

Just last month, Kevin Roberts, head of the leading conservative think tank the Heritage Foundation, released a fiery video defending Carlson, claiming the right must not bow to the left's "cancel culture" and declaring his unwavering support for his friend. Almost immediately, politicians, columnists, and major conservative donors pushed back, rightly arguing that conservatives must be clear about what they stand for. There is nothing conservative, they said, about backing a demagogue who boosts his profile by promoting ideas, such as support for Russia and Iran or chummy interviews with neo-Nazis, that have nothing to do with mainstream Republican values.

To his credit, Roberts listened, apologized, and fired the young staffer responsible for the pro-Carlson video. But the damage was done. In the critical weeks before key elections, Republicans focused not on policy or candidates but on internal feuds that signaled to voters that the party had lost its way.

And that process is deeply troubling.

Voters who have traditionally backed Democrats but are repelled by radicals like Mamdani looked naturally to the GOP, as one of only two parties in a binary system, and wondered if they might find their new political home there. But a Republican Party that seems intent on signaling that its next leader could embrace dangerous, delusional, anti-American ideas has abandoned the moderate center. The same holds true on the other side: any Republican seeking refuge from today's madness finds only a different flavor of madness across the aisle.

The question of price

The consequences of this spiral were visible this week at the ballot box. In New York—where affluent, highly educated voters, the classic profile of woke leftists, abound—the radical candidate swept over a million votes. Elsewhere, voters recoiled from the GOP's recent turmoil and placed their trust in uninspiring but steady Democratic candidates.

Since this internal civil war shows no sign of ending, it's not hard to imagine a similar defeat awaiting conservatives in next year's far more consequential elections. One can only hope that someone in the party will finally read the map correctly and make the effort to define what Republicans actually believe in. If that doesn't happen, the GOP will be left with only the loudest fringe voices, and a shrinking voter base.

Still, there is another possibility. The voices already warning against extremism, like Texas Senator Ted Cruz, might yet lead a rare process in global politics: one in which candidates are required not merely to throw around slogans and promises but to confront serious questions honestly and explain, clearly and credibly, what they truly stand for.

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