A lack of professionalism, non-compliance with basic orders and procedures, absence of reporting and coordination on all levels – these are just some of the findings of the investigation into January's friendly fire incident, in which two Egoz special forces unit officers – Maj. Itamar Elharar, 26, and Maj. Ofek Aharon – were killed.
Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram
Although the probe focused on the tragic event alone, it has revealed a much more profound and deep-rooted issue. It turns out that such misconduct has taken place in the Israel Defense Forces for many years but remained unknown because there were no casualties.
As such, what does this say about the degree of internal control in Egoz and other special forces units? Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi's decision to suspend all training in the brigade was, as he put it, correct and necessary. Too many things about this event show a lack of knowledge of direction, which – like in the general rule of navigation – requires one to go back to the last familiar point, and continue from there.
However, the IDF cannot be content with that alone. It must make sure that no stone is left unturned in the effort to prevent such a tragedy from happening again.
In addition, there is an inconceivable gap between the result – two commando brigade officers killed – and the relatively lenient conclusions that evaded the senior ranks. Worse yet, there is an obvious mismatch between the results of the commission of inquiry – led by Maj. Gen. (res.) Noam Tibon – and the decisions made by Kochavi.
The commanders involved are outstanding, but sometimes, in order to shock an organization fundamentally – following an event that is fundamentally shocking – drastic measures are required. The fact that the brigade and division commanders – excellent officers by all means – have received not even a notation on their service records is surprising, to say the least.
Kochavi may have avoided this so as not to further shock the unit, which has lost two of its officers in the tragedy, along with the dismissal of several others involved. However, Egoz is a tough unit, which has experiences crises in the past, and with proper management and support, it would have faced the difficult decision successfully.
On a related note, Tibon's report dismisses claims by some politicians that Elharar and Aharon were the first casualties in the fight over the sovereignty of the Negev. The probe insists that had procedures been conducted properly, the officers would have lived.
Sovereignty in the Negev is another matter, which certainly requires a firmer and more orderly response. But even in this case, the IDF should not make allowances to itself. Had the Egoz unit guarded its weapons as required, they would not have been stolen and the officers would not have needed to go look for it.
Sometimes simple is best, and if IDF soldiers and officers remember that, something good can come of the Egoz tragedy.
Subscribe to Israel Hayom's daily newsletter and never miss our top stories!
