Public attention over the past 24 hours has naturally remained focused on the IDF's offensive in Gaza, but defense officials are now mostly troubled with defense, or more specifically, how to keep the defense strong until the end of the campaign.
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Despite the painful price of 12 Israelis killed, Operation Guardian of the Walls has thus far been unprecedentedly successful from a defensive perspective. This applies to the Gaza envelope and to deeper inside the country. In the envelope, aside from one case in which Hamas was able to kill an IDF soldier and wound others, the terrorist organization has failed in all of its attempts to kill Israelis with anti-tank missiles. Its efforts to use its underground tunnels, drones and UAVs, along with the immense number of mortar rounds fired at the border-adjacent kibbutzim, have also failed to produce casualties.
Deeper inside Israel, the Iron Dome system has intercepted 90% of the rockets fired at population centers, even amid the particularly challenging salvos comprising an inordinate number of projectiles. This, combined with the high level of discipline practiced by Israeli civilians (most of the casualties did not follow the safety directives), Hamas has been unable to find the formula for inflicting its desired level of destruction and loss.
Essentially, this is a resounding failure from Hamas' point of view. the organization invested a fortune in recent years in two key projects: its network of defensive tunnels and offensive weapons. In this context, it promised "surprises" that were supposed to provide it with perceptional victories. In this regard, it has seen all of its efforts go up in smoke when on Monday the IDF destroyed a bomb-laden underwater vehicle moments before it was deployed to explode near an Israeli navy ship.
Thinking about the end
It's safe to assume that these failures will now accelerate Hamas' efforts to exact a price from Israel before the final whistle is blown on the entire campaign. Israel understands this, and to prevent Hamas from any type of accomplishment to cloud its failures and give it one last win, the IDF will now fortify and expand its defensive posture.m The army will do this parallel to its offensive efforts that will continue focusing on three central facets: hunting rocket launchers and rocket launching cells; demolishing infrastructure (including tunnels, headquarters, government offices, and the homes of senior leaders), and targeting the group's leaders for assassination.
As far as the first two are concerned, the IDF has notched quite a few accomplishments. Updated assessments are that 170 terrorists have been killed, along with an unknown number buried or trapped in the tunnels (a senior defense official estimated on Monday that this number is between 70-120). Hamas, as per usual, is not revealing the true figures, both to obfuscate the Israeli success but also to prevent demoralization within its ranks. The IDF has also destroyed a considerable number of homes of Hamas' senior military commanders -- a measure that has proven effective in previous rounds -- when on Monday the homes of several battalion and platoon commanders were demolished.
At present, the brunt of the effort is toward assassinating the group's leaders, which could provide a "victory image." Eliminating one of Hamas' three top leaders − political leader Yahya Sinwar, and joint military chiefs Mohammed Deif and Marwan Issa − has been a primary objective since the outset of the operation and certainly is now. It's difficult to estimate the odds of hitting them because they are very experienced and take extreme precautions. The hope now is that under the pressure of airstrikes (and methodical destruction of the underground defensive network the group has built), they will make a mistake that exposes them − which was the case with Islamic Jihad's northern division commander on Monday before he was assassinated.
Along with the intensive fighting, Israel is preparing for the campaign to end. Officially, this is not on the table, but behind the scenes, informal talks have picked up steam through Egyptian, American and United Nation intermediaries. Contrary to various reports, it's unlikely that a formal agreement will be drafted that includes the conditions for a ceasefire. It's more likely that the sides will decide to stop shooting and discuss the technical details at a later date.
This formula of "quiet will be met with quiet" is convenient for Israel, if it is upheld, but because the degree of deterrence impressed upon Hamas is unclear, Israel will have to retaliate with greater force than in the past if is violated. Assuming that Israel will not launch a preemptive campaign against Hamas' future armament efforts, it will have to make sure that Gaza-area communities remain safe and secure.
Yet again, the prisoners are forgotten
Israel will also be asked to gradually lift restrictions on Gaza, including the fishing zones and commercial border crossings. Israel might also ask to alter the mechanism for Qatar's monthly money transfers so that the funds first pass through the Palestinian Authority, with the aim of increasing its involvement in Gaza's affairs. Hamas will likely object to this. Israel, for its part, has already stated that it won't allow any ceasefire to be tied to issues pertaining to Jerusalem.
One painful matter that won't be included in a ceasefire deal is the Israeli prisoners and bodies of IDF soldiers in Hamas captivity. Despite the efforts by the families and others to make their return a precondition for any ceasefire, senior Israeli officials said on Monday that bringing the boys home will not be one of the goals of the operation. With that, Israel can intertwine the issue in future talks over the rehabilitation of Gaza, although it's hard to believe that Hamas will retreat from its entrenched position on the matter.
While Israel wants to continue the fighting to hurt Hamas as much as possible, officials are very troubled with the negative public opinion accumulating overseas. This criticism intensified significantly following the demolition of the high-rise that housed several foreign news agencies, and Israel has yet to provide evidence that the building was also being used by terrorist groups. This has only fortified the sense that on the public relations front, in contrast to the military front, Israel is losing badly.
There are numerous reasons for this. The prolonged degradation of the Foreign Ministry, the allocation of authorities between three superfluous ministries (Diaspora, Intelligence Affairs, and Strategic Affairs), the lack of one person in charge of the country's public relations policies, insufficient investment in technologies, and more. The result is immense damage to Israel's image (and unprecedented affinity for the Palestinian issue in general, and for Hamas in particular), which will require considerable effort and resources to fix.
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