Israel's potential allies act not based on the amount of enriched uranium Iran produces, but on the determination Israel exhibits against Iran as a whole, as a state. It is the fierce and effective resistance by the United States and Israel that led Gulf nations, as well as Sudan and Morocco, to normalize ties with the Jewish state.
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However, today, the United Arab Emirates begins to form closer ties with Iran, not because of the amount of enriched uranium on the other side of the Gulf, but because of the opposing force that is the United States and Israel, which Abu Dhabi perceives to be dramatically weakened.
The potential embrace of Iran by the United Arab Emirates is what prompted Prime Minister Naftali Bennett to visit the Emirati capital this week.
The delegate the UAE sent to meet with Iranian intelligence chiefs is a senior figure from the royal family, which reflects the country's attitude toward the visit.
According to government sources, Bennett's main goal was to bring the UAE in line with the Israeli position in light of the nuclear negotiations in the Austrian capital of Vienna.
Rather than reaching a partial agreement, Israel prefers there was no agreement at all as well as an increase of sanctions on the Islamist republic. The UAE is not perceived as a significant enough player to add bearing to Israel's position.
At this critical juncture, most of the propaganda efforts of the government and the media are directed at former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
They speak of his "mistake" when Washington withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018. What exactly was the mistake? That no alternative was prepared in case the "maximum pressure" campaign failed.
Critics of Netanyahu's policy mainly blame the lack of a "military option." According to sources familiar with the matter, and according to journalist Barak Ravid's book Trump's Peace: The Abraham Accords and the Reshaping of the Middle East, then-Chief of General Staff Gadi Eizenkot said that in the era of former President Donald Trump, the prevailing opinion was that if he said Iran wouldn't have a nuclear weapon, he meant it.
A senior Trump administration official said that at no point did the Iranians reach a point that would have required military action.
Once they withdrew from the JCPOA and imposed sanctions, together with clandestine activity, there was an increase in operational activity, and between the fall of 2020 and spring of 2021, Israel – according to foreign sources – targeted the Natanz nuclear facility twice – and assassinated nuclear mastermind Mohsen Fakhrizadeh.
The more interesting question is why the new Israeli leadership declared that it had no military option vis-à-vis Iran. Because even if there isn't one, Israel has created a certain image over the years, which has intensified in recent years due to actions in Iran.
Why did it all of a sudden announce that it does not possess such capabilities? Just to gain some propaganda points against Netanyahu? I guess, everything is possible.
Bloomberg news has recently released a diagram showing the uranium enrichment activity in Iran: the amounts on the eve of the signing of the original nuclear agreement in 2015 – officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – were significantly higher than they are today.
Progress in uranium enrichment began in late 2019. But Iran abandoned its commitments under the nuclear deal only on Feb. 23 this year.
Iran's progress stems from President Joe Biden's commitment to return to the JCPOA as soon as possible.
The fiasco in Afghanistan encouraged them to increase enrichment efforts. Given the current circumstances, the Israeli leadership will be lucky if the US and Iran return to the original agreement. This is ultimately the explanation for the blitz against Netanyahu. To justify political incompetence and dependence on a weak and alienated democratic government.
The composition of the Security Cabinet, the way it is today, does not guarantee a complete anti-Iranian approach. And one cannot be sure that Bennett, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, and Defense Minister Benny Gantz will be able to persuade the other ministers.
There is a great gap at this stage between Iran's ability to obtain enough fissile material for a bomb and the technological capability to run a nuclear facility.
It is up to Israel to decide when to act.
Dore Gold, former director-general of the Foreign Ministry, returned last week from a research conference in Bahrain. He said that a new field of research is being developed – deciphering the Israeli system – mainly by elements in the Arab world, such as Jordan.
It is a fact that even in Israel, expertise is required to understand the decision-making process here and the process of changing policy.
Canada's Michael Richer attempted this as early as the 1970s. He called it "the narrow circle of decision-makers." This was not the entire government. This can clearly be seen in the Yom Kippur War affair.
The government was out of the loop. The decision-making circle consisted of the prime minister, the defense minister, and a close associate or two, as well as the IDF chief of staff and head of the Mossad.
During former Prime Minister Levi Eshkol's, for example, IDF Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin had more bearing, and during Golda Meir's, so did IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar. Yigal Alon's arrival in the government in 1961, even though he was only a member of the Labor party and the defense committee, created a significant change in the decision-making and perception.
Similarly, some point out that despite all the testosterone in the current Security Cabinet, the fact that Nitzan Horowitz entered the closed circle of decision-makers marks a change that may in the long run develop in unexpected directions.
The dichotomy is between a decisive Netanyahu-style anti-Iranism and a conciliatory approach that minimizes danger. And on this scale, the current circle of decision-makers cannot be considered strictly anti-Iranian.
There is the leading trio, who agree on the Iranian issue – Bennett, Gantz, and Lapid. If the three reach a decision, the question is, will they have the power to bring the rest of the nine ministers on board.
The key figure is, of course, Gantz, who is considered more moderate and reliable, and if he comes to the conclusion that a certain action is required – he will have the power to convince. The presence of an unbalanced minister such as Education Minister Yifat Shasha-Biton in this circle is absurd.
What's even more absurd is that three members of New Hope are in the Security Cabinet – Gideon Sa'ar, Ze'ev Elkin, and Shasha-Biton – meaning that a quarter of the votes will come from lawmakers from a party that has no public support.
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