Across all theaters, Israel has achieved significant gains following the blow it suffered on October 7. It has struck its enemies hard and, with American assistance, succeeded in forcing Hamas and Hezbollah into moves they had refused to take – releasing hostages while the IDF maintains its presence in the Strip, and ceasing fire from Lebanon as an expression of solidarity with Hamas, despite Israel's continued freedom of operation in Lebanon and ground presence at five points along the border.

However significant these achievements are, they do not guarantee sustained and strategically meaningful long-term change in the regional landscape. To achieve this goal – which means victory in the war – Hamas must be fully disarmed, and Hezbollah must either be disarmed or at minimum prevented from strengthening and returning to southern Lebanon.

Realizing these objectives is far more difficult than achieving the goals reached so far, because for Hamas and Hezbollah, this is no longer about paying a heavy price to ensure survival and protect strategic assets, but rather about making concessions of existential significance. This is because they require Hamas and Hezbollah to relinquish a central component of their identity and control over territory, and because such a move would amount to Hamas admitting that the October 7 attack was a mistake and accepting that, in Palestinian national memory, the attack that galvanized the Palestinian public will be recorded as a disaster and grave error.

The impression is that the American administration has not yet decided whether to back powerful Israeli force moves that would enable completing the collapse of Hamas, or to prefer, as it currently leans, to begin implementing phase two of the plan (perhaps even without waiting for the return of Ran Gvili's body), at least in the area under IDF control, without disarming Hamas. Each path faces numerous obstacles due to the plan's ambiguity, which requires agreement on small details, the parties' differing interpretations of the plan's intent, the multiplicity of parties meant to be involved, and above all – President Trump's eagerness to demonstrate progress and strengthen the message that the war has ended, even when conditions on the ground actually indicate difficulty in advancing the plan.

To avoid having to make a strategic decision between completing the war objectives and leveraging achievements so far to shape a better security reality for the coming years, versus avoiding an undesired confrontation with an especially friendly American president who operates from his own motivations – Israel must make every effort to convince Trump that backing Israel to complete the mission is also in his interest. Among other reasons, it could help expand the Abraham Accords. One way to do this is to create a broad internal Israeli front on this issue, beyond the government. After all, the hostage dispute is already behind us.

The writer is the head of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

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