With an Israeli flag hanging on the wall behind him, the detainee detailed trips to Iran, voyages across Africa, clandestine meetings with Hezbollah's chief military commander Fuad Shukr, and directives flowing directly from the organization's leader Hassan Nasrallah.

Throughout the year he remained in captivity, Imad Amhaz, known as "The Captain," systematically laid out the complete picture behind one of Hezbollah's most secretive and organized operations – a strategic, creative, and ambitious project dubbed "The Clandestine Maritime File." Only now can the existence of this underground initiative be disclosed for the first time, along with fresh details about the commando mission to abduct Amhaz from the heart of Lebanon – a bold and extraordinary operation that remained submerged in the depths of memory due to the torrent of wartime events.

This narrative, which could easily become a Hollywood film, might begin on the night of November 2, 2024, when a handful of Shayetet 13 commandos silently raided the Lebanese coastal town of Batroun, located 87 miles from the Israeli border, and removed Amhaz while he slept in his bed without firing a single shot. Alternatively, the story could open with a close-up of Colonel A., head of Naval Intelligence, standing on the dock at the Shayetet base in Atlit, welcoming the fighters returning home from the successful operation, merely patting their shoulders and verifying everyone's health and safety. The account might also start with a scene unfolding in the basements of Dahieh, starring Secretary-General Nasrallah, Chief of Staff Shukr, and "The Captain," where the three architects weave a hair-raising conspiracy.

However, the story begins with A., a quiet, slender 23-year-old woman who, had you passed her on the street, you would never imagine was primarily responsible for one of the war's most astonishing operations.

A. started her path as an "Arabist" (an Arab world specialist) in Unit 8200, subsequently transferring to serve as an analyst in Naval Intelligence. Today, she serves as a permanent staff member with the rank of Sergeant First Class, whose role is to track anyone who could pose a threat to Israeli Navy vessels. "We have, in Naval Intelligence, operational methods and capabilities that allow us to search for almost anyone in the fringes," she stated.

At the end of 2021, A. began monitoring a mid-level Hezbollah operative named Imad Amhaz, whose organizational nickname was "Jarich." Amhaz, 39, a Shiite native of the Bekaa Valley, joined Hezbollah in 2004. In 2007, he completed a several-month military course in Iran, and upon his return to Lebanon, joined Unit 7900 as a radar operator – Hezbollah's coastal missile unit that has deeply troubled Naval Intelligence personnel since the Second Lebanon War and the deadly strike on the INS Hanit.

The interrogator asked Amhaz: Who knew about the project?

The operative responded: "Who was aware of this was the team itself, Nur al-Din, the operator, Male,k who was the head of the bureau of Fuad Shukr (Hezbollah's Chief of Staff who was eliminated in July 2024), Fuad Shukr himself, and Abu Musa, who came after Fuad Shukr but didn't stay for long. All were killed except Nur al-Din. I don't know if he was also killed while I wasn't (in Lebanon)."

Q: Did you meet with senior officials? For example, with Fuad Shukr?

Amhaz answered: "The first time we returned from the file, he asked to meet with us... This file is related to the maritime domain ... These can be defensive or offensive operations... As long as you have a ship, money, and people, you can operate against anything. Israel is the main target."

Q: Does Hezbollah operate against other targets as well?

Amhaz confirmed: "The organization sees the US as an enemy, for example."

To all appearances, Imad Amhaz was just another Hezbollah operative among dozens who appeared on A.'s radar. Yet something about him was unusual. Despite being a devoted operative who was educated in the Hezbollah youth movement, Amhaz was not a devout Shiite. He spent much of his time at the gym, his body decorated with muscles and tattoos. One of these was a portrait of his wife, who was herself tattooed. "She had tattoos of roses," A. said. "During his interrogation, he shared that he and his wife had many fights, and at one point, they separated. After that, he had to hide the tattoo with her portrait until they eventually reunited. He is not the perfect partner – one who likes to play the field and loves to live the bachelor life, even when he is not single. He cultivates his muscles, a true hedonist. In short, he was not the conservative operative. During this period, I tracked several figures, but Amhaz was always at the back of my mind. Each time I returned to him to see what was new. I tried to understand why he was exposed, what his value was as a Hezbollah operative."

Q: It sounds as though you knew him well.

"Yes. I knew his daily routine, his weaknesses, his character – everything."

Q: And what can you say about his character?

"That he is a good soldier. When he is given an order, he says 'yes' and executes it."

To identify a big fish

I met A. in the office of the Head of the Naval Intelligence Department, Rear Adm. A., who has held the most senior position in Naval Intelligence for the past year. Several floors below us is the unit's "Pit" (underground command center), from which the operation to abduct Amhaz was managed. Joining the conversation was Lt. Col. D., who began her military career as a combat soldier in the Snapir Unit (naval port security unit), fell in love with the sea, and rose through the ranks to become head of the Targeting and Direction Branch in the Naval Intelligence Department.

The branch's production floor is filled with analysts like A., all of whom are Arabic speakers who serve as intelligence detectives. "Fishermen," as the veteran seaman Rear Adm. A. phrased it. "It is like casting a line and seeing which fish is caught on the hook. The point is to identify, amid the blur of people on the other side, who could be a 'big fish' and then focus on him. This is exactly what happened with Amhaz."

From the moment she began to take an interest in Amhaz and to focus more and more of her intelligence resources on him, A. discovered that he held mysterious meetings with senior Hezbollah officials. One of them was Ali Abed al-Hassan Nour al-Din. Nour al-Din is married to the daughter of Fuad Shukr, who, until his assassination in July 2024, served as the Hezbollah Chief of Staff and the right-hand man of Hassan Nasrallah. As such, Nour al-Din managed several of Hezbollah's secret projects, those directed personally by Shukr and Nasrallah. And now, for some reason, it turned out that he was meeting secretly with the muscular and tattooed Amhaz. "They sat at the same table and passed messages," Lt. Col. D. said. Later, during his interrogation in Israel, Amhaz would reveal that he also met Fuad Shukr himself. "This was a great excitement for him," D. said. "The connection to senior officials gave him pride and motivation."

During the interrogation, the goals of these secret meetings were also fully clarified. It turned out that several months before A. began to focus on him, Amhaz was chosen to be the central axis in an ambitious Hezbollah venture – the kind of secret projects that Nour al-Din managed for Shukr and Nasrallah. Amhaz, the organization's leadership decided, would become the captain of the "Secret Naval File."

"A very, very secret strategic project, an event that could have changed the situation against us and also against other countries," Rear Adm. A. said. "This is the big fish we caught on our hook."

"The big surprise"

The "Secret Naval File" germinated sometime in 2016. From fragments of information that reached Israeli intelligence over the years, it became clear that the goal was generally to create a Hezbollah "terror ship" – an infrastructure that would allow the organization to independently operate a large civilian merchant vessel that could roam the seas without suspicion, enter civilian ports, and carry out attacks that would change the balance of terror against Israel and its allies. "To take a civilian vessel under cover and place offensive capabilities on it as far as the imagination can go," Rear Adm. A. said. "Think about September 11 – you take a civilian platform and use it to carry out a strategic terror act. This was the goal."

The project, which, due to its importance, was directed personally by Hassan Nasrallah and Fuad Shukr and whose management passed to Nour al-Din after their elimination, was, as stated, highly compartmentalized and included only a small handful of secret partners. "Nasrallah and Shukr treated this as their big surprise," A. said. "Because of this, everything was managed in a very centralized manner, without intermediate ranks."

After several years of delays due to budget difficulties and internal organizational problems, in 2021, by order of Nasrallah, the project gained momentum. One of the first steps was to choose the captain of the future terror ship, someone who could manage the project from a maritime perspective. The Captain.

Amhaz was the one chosen for the role. Beyond his mysterious meetings with Nour al-Din, he began sailing between European and African countries and gained experience as a worker on cargo ships, all under the guise of an innocent civilian. "He simply boarded ships as a civilian and sailed with them with the aim of gaining maritime experience," D. said. "The ambition was to log enough sea time, rise through the ranks, and eventually become a civilian captain who could lead a civilian merchant ship himself. Alongside the practical hours, he also studied theory, and he progressed. This path gave him both operational experience and civilian cover so that once he became a certified captain of a civilian ship, he would not be suspected. In fact, he was operating under cover."

What kind of attacks did the leadership plan to carry out using the terror ship that Amhaz would sail? One can only imagine – the hijacking of a passenger ship, an attack on the Karish gas field, a raid by dozens of armed operatives through Israel's Haifa or Ashdod ports. "In the interrogation, we insisted with Amhaz, saying to him, 'Come on, tell us what you planned,'" D. said. "But then we realized the goal was still only to build the capability, this muscle. He said, 'Whatever the organization decides, we will know how to do.' For them, everything was on the table – from hitting strategic points to striking the soft underbelly of Israel."

As part of his training as a civilian captain, Amhaz was absent from his home in the village of Qmatiye for many long months, where he lived with his wife and children. "In the process, he received a salary from Hezbollah, and while he was absent from home, the one who took care of his family was Nour al-Din," A. said.

In 2024, he returned to Lebanon, and in September, he began studying for a captain's degree at the Maritime Sciences and Technology Institute, a civilian institution located north of Beirut in the town of Batroun, a Christian-majority area where Hezbollah has only a minimal presence. Amhaz also rented a vacation cabin in Batroun, even though his home was about an hour's drive away. "He could finish the school day and drive home, yet he chose to rent an apartment in Batroun and sleep there," Lt. Col. D. said. "This is part of his hedonism, perhaps also part of his desire to concentrate on his studies." And Amhaz concentrated very much on his studies. "A diligent student," D. said. "Even in the interrogation, you see that he is an educated person, not a peasant who just came to fight."

In December 2024, after three years of preparation and several more weeks of study in Batroun, Amhaz was supposed to receive his coveted captain's diploma. He never received it. "The moment Amhaz moved to live in the coastal town of Batroun, I realized there was an opportunity here," A. said. "I understood that he could be plucked."

Setting out

Part of the role of analysts like A. in the Targeting and Direction Branch is not only to research the enemy on the other side of the border but also to direct operations toward them. When A. realized that she had indeed caught a big fish on her hook, she began to pull. "A. is the one who brought the initiative, the tug on the sleeve to set out on an abduction operation," her commander, Lt. Col. D., said. "She came and said, 'Someone is interesting here, let's bring him.' And from the moment this idea was thrown into the air, we, as commanders, said, 'There is a cool idea here, let's examine it.'"

The idea, which A. first raised during September 2024, progressed through the chain of approvals at a dizzying speed. "Everyone understood that there was someone privy to the secret, who was part of a strategic capability that Hezbollah is building," D. said. "Beyond that, the timing was good. We were already in Operation Northern Arrows (the military offensive against Hezbollah) and amidst an escalation in the campaign against Lebanon, and it was possible to dare more and challenge the boundaries and carry out operations of this type."

Naturally, the unit chosen to carry out the abduction was Shayetet 13, the elite commando unit of the Navy, which was practically born for operations of this kind. In the Shayetet, they took the mission with both hands, drew on all the intelligence A. had to provide about Amhaz and his daily routine, and within a few short weeks, they prepared a detailed raid plan. "The Shayetet enlisted immediately; they were very enthusiastic," D. said.

Although this was a dangerous move intended to take place deep in enemy territory, within a short time, the operation to abduct "The Captain" had received all required approvals, including that of the prime minister. "It was necessary to convince the appointed levels that the risk level for the force justified this operation," Rear Adm. A. said, who was present at some of these dramatic meetings. "These are places where you feel the weight of responsibility."

When A. received the news that "her" operation was moving forward, she found it hard to believe. "I was in shock, they were so on board," she smiled with embarrassment.

The operation was carried out on the night between November 1 and 2. Around 1:00 a.m., a small force of Shayetet soldiers positioned themselves at the entrance to Amhaz's vacation cabin in Batroun. The operation was accompanied by Naval Intelligence personnel from within the Navy's Pit in the Kirya (IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv). "It is as if you are part of the force," A. recalled. "We are not physically with them, but we understand exactly what is happening on the ground. Many times, the executing force looks to intelligence for guidance, asking whether the target is at the objective and whether everything is working according to the plan. When you answer 'yes, he is there,' it is a moment with a lot of responsibility, but also a moment of a dream coming true."

According to reports in the Lebanese media, the abduction operation was carried out by a force of about 25 combat soldiers and lasted only four minutes. In a short video recorded by a security camera in the area of the operation, Shayetet personnel can be seen in their combat gear leading Amhaz down one of the streets, his head covered by a shirt.

In an urgent military inquiry conducted in Lebanon in the days following the abduction, it was claimed that the Lebanese Navy did not identify the Israeli infiltration into Batroun and that German naval forces, who are supposed to secure the maritime arena in the area under the UNIFIL mandate, did not report any suspicious movement during the night. "The army cannot identify small boats that slip under the radar," the Lebanese Chief of Staff Joseph Aoun, today the President of the State, was quoted as saying in a local newspaper.

By the time the inquiry was published, Amhaz was already deep in Israeli territory, having vomited several times on the way from Batroun and shown signs of anxiety. "I held my breath until the moment the commandos returned to the country's territory," A. said. "It was a sense of relief. I have been on this thing for two years, and here – we finally reached that moment."

Lt. Col. D. said, "If it were possible to open champagne in the army, we would have done it."

Rear Adm. A. said, "For me, in this event, there were two moments of satisfaction. The first was when they realized the force had arrived in Israel along with Amhaz, and we knew our soldiers had returned safely. I waited for them on the beach at the Shayetet base in Atlit, and it was a great pride. Shayetet 13 is a wonderful, mission-driven unit. It is a cliché, but there is no mission they cannot meet. The second moment of satisfaction came after several days of interrogations, when we realized we had not caught a small fry. The moment he spoke about the 'Secret Naval File,' about what he knows how to do – and it took several days – we realized we had done something valuable that truly contributed to the security of the State of Israel."

Not exactly an "innocent civilian"

The interrogation of Amhaz indeed revealed new details to Naval Intelligence that they had not known about the "Secret Maritime File" and the extent of Hezbollah's seriousness in implementing the project. "At first, he completely denied any connection to Hezbollah," A. related. "But slowly, as time passed, he began to open up. He gave us a lot of information about the file and also revealed to us the meetings with Shukr."

Rear Adm. A. said, "Before that, we knew a general story, and he not only confirmed it for us but fleshed out the details for us. This gave us the understanding that there was a real, actual project here, with intentions."

The publication of details from Amhaz's interrogation, for the first time, may certainly change the narrative built in Lebanon around his abduction. His family took the trouble to demonstrate and be interviewed wherever possible to claim that Amhaz is merely a civilian seaman who was abducted through no fault of his own. "My son is a civilian maritime captain who took a course at the Institute of Marine Sciences in Batroun," his father, Fadel, said in a newspaper interview. "My son is at sea most of the time and has no connection to parties. He is not connected to politics."

The Prime Minister of Lebanon at the time, Najib Mikati, also announced the day after the operation that Lebanon would file an official complaint with the UN Security Council regarding the abduction of Amhaz, and the Lebanese Transport Minister said that Amhaz was a "captain of civilian ships."

"We are now sending a clear message," Lt. Col. D. said in response. "The Navy is not bored and does not abduct innocent civilians. This is an exceptional operative in Hezbollah who was entrusted with a secret project that was supposed to surprise Israel completely. He is as far from innocent as possible."

The Lebanese attempt to attach a civilian image to Amhaz fit well with another move that took place about a year after his abduction – the release of the Israeli Elizabeth Tsurkov from captivity in September 2025, who was kidnapped in Iraq and held there by a pro-Iranian terror organization. The official Iranian news agency Tasnim claimed then that Tsurkov was released in exchange for two Lebanese figures held by Israel, including Amhaz.

In the Naval Intelligence Department, they are not aware of any such thing, and in any case, Amhaz is still in Israeli hands while Tsurkov is at her home. In our conversations, we were unable to confirm that the release of Amhaz was part of the move to release Tsurkov.

Despite Amhaz being in our hands, the analyst A. and her commanders are not at rest. "For us, the operation is not over," D. said. "We are still following the 'Secret Naval File,' and Nour al-Din, who stands at the head of the file, is still with us. To our understanding, he is still promoting this project, and perhaps other secret files as well, and it is important to us that he knows the account with him is open."

Q: By the way, did you meet Amhaz after he was brought to Israel?

D. said, "A. and I were in the same corridor with him, but we only looked at him. Interrogation is less our field. The unit responsible for his interrogation is 504, and there is a clear division between us. Even if Amhaz noticed us, he has no idea who we are and what our connection to him is."

A. said, "We saw him from a distance, but we did not speak with him."

Q: And how did it feel to see "The Captain" like that, face to face, after two years in which you tracked him from afar?

"Shocking," A. said. "Absolutely shocking."

The post How Hezbollah's 'September 11' was thwarted appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

Across all theaters, Israel has achieved significant gains following the blow it suffered on October 7. It has struck its enemies hard and, with American assistance, succeeded in forcing Hamas and Hezbollah into moves they had refused to take – releasing hostages while the IDF maintains its presence in the Strip, and ceasing fire from Lebanon as an expression of solidarity with Hamas, despite Israel's continued freedom of operation in Lebanon and ground presence at five points along the border.

However significant these achievements are, they do not guarantee sustained and strategically meaningful long-term change in the regional landscape. To achieve this goal – which means victory in the war – Hamas must be fully disarmed, and Hezbollah must either be disarmed or at minimum prevented from strengthening and returning to southern Lebanon.

Realizing these objectives is far more difficult than achieving the goals reached so far, because for Hamas and Hezbollah, this is no longer about paying a heavy price to ensure survival and protect strategic assets, but rather about making concessions of existential significance. This is because they require Hamas and Hezbollah to relinquish a central component of their identity and control over territory, and because such a move would amount to Hamas admitting that the October 7 attack was a mistake and accepting that, in Palestinian national memory, the attack that galvanized the Palestinian public will be recorded as a disaster and grave error.

The impression is that the American administration has not yet decided whether to back powerful Israeli force moves that would enable completing the collapse of Hamas, or to prefer, as it currently leans, to begin implementing phase two of the plan (perhaps even without waiting for the return of Ran Gvili's body), at least in the area under IDF control, without disarming Hamas. Each path faces numerous obstacles due to the plan's ambiguity, which requires agreement on small details, the parties' differing interpretations of the plan's intent, the multiplicity of parties meant to be involved, and above all – President Trump's eagerness to demonstrate progress and strengthen the message that the war has ended, even when conditions on the ground actually indicate difficulty in advancing the plan.

To avoid having to make a strategic decision between completing the war objectives and leveraging achievements so far to shape a better security reality for the coming years, versus avoiding an undesired confrontation with an especially friendly American president who operates from his own motivations – Israel must make every effort to convince Trump that backing Israel to complete the mission is also in his interest. Among other reasons, it could help expand the Abraham Accords. One way to do this is to create a broad internal Israeli front on this issue, beyond the government. After all, the hostage dispute is already behind us.

The writer is the head of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

The post On fighting to disarm Hezbollah and Hamas appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

Throughout the year he was held captive, Imad Amhaz, "The Captain," methodically laid out the complete picture behind one of Hezbollah's most secret and well-funded initiatives – a strategic, creative, and ambitious project that received the name "The Secret Maritime File." Only now can the existence of this underground project be revealed for the first time, along with new details about the commando operation to kidnap Amhaz from the heart of Lebanon – a daring and extraordinary operation that, due to the torrent of war events, remained buried in the depths of memory. Until now.

Nothing about the apparent IDF naval commando raid on Batroun to capture a single mid-level Hezbollah commander Imad Amhaz adds up.

The IDF doesn't seem to lack info from inside Hezbollah, and they have not been shy about eliminating targets with F-16s as they find them. Could… pic.twitter.com/MVVNbozbG4

— Saul Sadka (@Saul_Sadka) November 2, 2024

The codename: Jarih

A. is a 23-year-old woman, slim and quiet. If you passed her on the street, you wouldn't imagine she was the primary person responsible for one of the war's most impressive operations. She began her career as an "Arabist" in Unit 8200 and later transferred to Naval Intelligence as an analyst. Today, she's a permanent service member with the rank of staff sergeant, whose job is to track anyone who could pose a threat to Israeli Navy vessels.

The Israeli Navy's Shayetet 13 commando unit carried out a raid in northern Lebanon last night, capturing a Hezbollah official, the military confirms.

The Hezbollah operative, Imad Amhaz, is considered by the IDF to be a "significant source of knowledge" in the terror group's… pic.twitter.com/21GZJGcgkh

— Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian (@manniefabian) November 2, 2024

 "At Naval Intelligence, we have operational methods and capabilities that allow us to search for almost anyone's traces," she says.

At the end of 2021, A. began tracking a mid-level Hezbollah operative named Imad Amhaz, whose codename in the organization was Jarih. Amhaz, 39, a Shiite native of the Bekaa Valley, joined Hezbollah as an operative in 2004. In 2007, he completed a several-month military course in Iran, and upon returning to Lebanon, joined Unit 7900 – Hezbollah's shore-to-sea missile unit – as a radar operator. Since the Second Lebanon War and the fatal strike on the INS Hanit, this unit has greatly troubled Naval Intelligence personnel. He managed to assist the Assad regime forces in the Syrian civil war, and his brother was also a Hezbollah operative as a fighter in the Radwan Force.

In retrospect, it would become clear that a few months before A. began focusing on him, Amhaz was chosen as the central axis of Hezbollah's ambitious and secret project. Amhaz, it was decided at the organization's leadership level, would become the captain of "The Secret Maritime File" – "a strategic project, very secret, an event that could have changed the situation against us and also against other countries," says Colonel A., head of the Intelligence Division in the Navy.

"We can grab him"

After two years of surveillance, Naval Intelligence understood there was an opportunity to kidnap Amhaz and bring him for interrogation in Israel. "I realized we could grab him," says A., who initiated the idea. Her proposal advanced up the approval ladder with dizzying speed and received the prime minister's approval as well.

Naturally, the unit chosen to execute the kidnapping was Shayetet 13, the Navy's elite commando unit, which seemed born precisely for operations of this type. The Shayetet took the mission with both hands, extracted from A. all the intelligence she had to provide about Amhaz and his daily routine, and within just a few weeks prepared a detailed raid plan.

The plan was executed in early November 2023 and carried out with stunning success. Amhaz was kidnapped from the apartment where he was staying, approximately 140 kilometers north of the Israeli border, without a single shot being fired.

The full article will be published this weekend on the website and in the "Israel This Week" section.

The post Without firing a shot: How Israel captured 'The Captain' of Hezbollah appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

Initial findings point to an ISIS connection, not Iran, which has been proven responsible for torching synagogues and Jewish businesses in the country. The distinction between streams of radical Islam does not diminish the threat: The Iranian model is sometimes replicated in other influence networks, both state and non-state, and in any case, lays the "fertilizer" for attacks on Jewish life.

In August, Australian intelligence concluded that Iran stood behind two attacks: the arson of a kosher delicatessen in Sydney and the torching of a synagogue in Melbourne. The investigation revealed that the Revolutionary Guards recruited local criminals for the "dirty work" – attacking Jewish institutions. In response, Australia expelled the Iranian ambassador, closed its embassy in Tehran, and declared the Revolutionary Guards a terrorist organization. This marked the first time Australia has expelled an ambassador since World War II.

Tehran also operates "soft power" mechanisms, which allow it and Hezbollah to expand their influence in countries with a significant Shiite minority, among these mechanisms: control over the appointment of imams in religious centers, academic institutions like Al-Mustafa University, cultural centers of the embassy, and the media activities of the Iranian Broadcasting Authority.

In Australia, the influence has manifested in trips to Lebanon and meetings with Hezbollah officials, and even in money transfers through Qard al-Hassan (Hezbollah's banking institution) – as revealed in the breach of the organization's systems.

The disregard for Iran and Hezbollah's "enabling infrastructure" in Australia created a sense of comfort to operate in the country without interference. Similar to the Iranian operational pattern of recruiting Australian criminals for "dirty work" on behalf of the Revolutionary Guards, there has been evidence in the past of connections between criminal elements and Shiite religious institutions, and figures from the Australian underworld were linked to a money laundering network that operated for Hezbollah's benefit.

As a result, Shiite religious centers became the leaders of anti-Israel demonstrations after October 7, waving terror flags without any interference. Iranian Ambassador Ahmad Sadeghi did not hesitate to praise Hassan Nasrallah, while the embassy simultaneously intensified surveillance and persecution of Iranian dissidents in the country.

The battle is only beginning

But Australia is just one example. Iran operates similar networks around the world: Quds Force planning an attack from Venezuela against the Israeli embassy in Mexico, recruiting Swedish teenagers to attack the embassy in Stockholm, and attempting to harm Israel-Thailand relations through pressure on Thai workers. In Britain, Iranian accounts were exposed, pushing for Scottish independence to weaken the kingdom from within. In Italy, Iranian elements used the cultural center in Tehran to track exiles, and in Germany, the government admitted that the Al-Mustafa University branch in Berlin became a spy center.

The "Israel-centric" view of the Iranian threat causes Israel to miss an opportunity. While Israel focuses on the Iranian power structure – the nuclear program and missiles – Iran enjoys broad freedom of action far from the Middle East. But these developments also create fertile ground for cooperation with countries facing the same negative Iranian influence, and sometimes they are not even aware of the danger.

Western countries are dealing with large-scale immigration, exposing them to various types of foreign influences. Exposing the way Iran uses the Shiite diaspora and the religious power it holds within it could serve as a model for dealing with other radicalization networks: from ISIS's online and partisan networks, through mosque unions controlled by other Middle Eastern states, to non-religious state influences.

In the past year, there has been some awakening. Alongside Australia's moves, Germany closed the Al-Mustafa branch in Berlin and expelled the imam at the "Blue Mosque" in Hamburg, who was accused of receiving direct instructions from the Supreme Leader's office. The "hysterical" response of the regime to any damage to these mechanisms indicates their importance – and also that the battle is only beginning. Whether Iran is responsible for the Sydney attack or not, history proves the need to fight that same "enabling infrastructure."

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Two weeks ago, a first meeting took place between Israeli and Lebanese representatives, laying the groundwork for ongoing talks concerning both preventing Hezbollah's re-armament and issues related to the border line and IDF activity in Lebanese territory. A follow-up meeting was already scheduled, and at the Netanyahu-Barrack meeting they agreed on a framework for talks and topics to be discussed between the sides, including coordination on the return of residents from southern Lebanon to their homes, specifically those not from pro-Hezbollah villages.

Israel's active defense rights

According to the sources, the meeting reinforced coordination between Israel and the US on Syria and Lebanon issues. They say there is a consensus that Israel has the right to defend itself actively, meaning to strike terrorist organizations and terrorists wherever they pose a real threat. On the Lebanese front, discussion focused on tightening coordination with the Lebanese army to enable it to fulfill its mission of uncovering Hezbollah's weapons and ammunition stockpiles in the country's south. Barrack was presented with data and intelligence showing that the Lebanese are not sufficiently determined in this mission and that the IDF, therefore, needs to conduct strikes on sites where the Lebanese army cannot or does not want to operate.

Warning about al-Sharaa forces

In the Syrian sector, Israel presented intelligence showing that the forces of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa cannot be trusted. One member of these security forces carried out an attack in which two soldiers and an American civilian were killed. The Damascus administration was quick to declare that this was a terrorist from ISIS, and Washington adopted this version. Israel warns that this is not a lone terrorist and that al-Sharaa's forces are responsible for massacres of minorities, including Druze and Alawites.

The American representatives requested that Israeli activity in Syria be coordinated and that Israel allow government forces to impose order. This week, in one of the Syrian villages not far from the Israeli border, a patrol of Syrian forces was filmed passing by an IDF checkpoint in what appears to be a coordinated passage between the sides.

Turkey's regional involvement

Another topic raised was Turkey's involvement across all sectors. The meeting clarified that Israel's firm opposition to Turkish forces entering the Gaza Strip remains in place. Regarding Syria, Israel seeks to preserve aerial freedom of operation in the country, and the Americans propose strengthening coordination in this context through CENTCOM headquarters to avoid clashes with the Turks. The meeting was attended by, among others, Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar, acting National Security Advisor Gil Reich, Military Secretary Brig. Gen. Roman Gofman, US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee, and Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter.

Saudi normalization disappointment

Meanwhile, an American source says that Washington's disappointment over the lack of progress toward normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia and the latter's joining the Abraham Accords is directed at both sides. He confirmed our Israel Hayom report that the Saudis, therefore, did not receive immediate signing of the F-35 aircraft deal, nor their request regarding the nuclear facility. He added that Israel's actions in Judea and Samaria (establishing new settlements) and reports of Jewish violence against Arabs are among the factors in the failure to achieve rapprochement with Saudi Arabia.

President Trump is disappointed, the source says, but he is not giving up, as this move (bringing Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords) is a key move for a comprehensive Middle East solution. The source confirmed that the White House and State Department conveyed messages of dissatisfaction about the assassination of senior Hamas figure Raad Saad, but described as "exaggerated" the publications on this matter. "Israel is entitled to defend itself and strike terrorists, but in the background, there is a ceasefire and moves to end the war, and care must be taken not to torpedo that. Trump's plan returned all the living hostages and almost all the deceased, Israel needs to give it a chance to be completed," the source said.

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For years, Saad topped Israel's target list, evading numerous assassination attempts until Saturday's successful strike. Together with Izz al-Din Haddad, who now leads Hamas' military apparatus in Gaza, he stood as the sole survivor among the organization's pre-war senior leadership and among the handful who knew the intimate details of Hamas' assault blueprint, which Israel designated "Wall of Jericho" (Hamas's operational code for the October 7 attack).

Israel justified Saad's elimination by pointing to his ongoing efforts to reconstitute Hamas' capabilities and an explosive device that injured two reserve soldiers near the southern Strip on Friday. Yet these explanations appear tailored for Washington's consumption: The authentic motivation boils down to a score Israel had to settle with him – or stated plainly, vengeance.

By Saturday evening, Hamas had yet to acknowledge Saad's death. The silence might reflect internal disarray, though questions remain whether the organization retains meaningful retaliatory capacity. Hamas has hemorrhaged most of its military strength alongside its military and civilian leadership throughout the war, leaving it organizationally shattered. Currently it channels its remaining resources toward consolidating control over the Strip's western sector, which stays under its authority. Israel presumably factored this weakness into its assassination calculus, which earned unanimous backing from the diplomatic-security establishment's uppermost echelons.

The singular gamble Israel appears to have accepted concerns the Washington administration. Saad's elimination provides Israel an opportunity to gauge President Donald Trump's temperature, for whom the Gaza accord stands as his first presidential term's marquee diplomatic accomplishment. Trump recently pressed Israel to throttle back its Gaza operations, affording space for the agreement's advancement; if he refrains from erupting now, Israel can interpret his silence as tacit authorization to persist in eliminating Gaza's senior hierarchy, mirroring its Lebanon approach.

Hamas will naturally strive to derail this trajectory, mobilizing its Qatari and Turkish sponsors hoping they'll persuade Trump to muzzle Israel. This contest for the president's attention – and by extension his policy direction – will dictate Gaza's near-term landscape. Israel seeks maximum postponement of transitioning to Phase 2, apprehensive it will mandate further withdrawals absent fundamental shifts in Gaza's circumstances. It partially attributes delays to Hamas' failure to return fallen hostage Ran Gvili, with Hamas contending that Israeli intelligence leads proved fruitless in pinpointing his location.

Three unpalatable paths

Meanwhile, Americans wrestle with assembling a multinational contingent to shoulder Gaza's security burden and execute its demilitarization. Simultaneously, mobilizing the billions required for the Strip's reconstruction proceeds at glacial speed: precisely as before, a chasm yawns between verbal pledges and written commitments. Trump must deploy his full leverage extracting promised funding – including from prosperous nations, principally Saudi Arabia – lest he grow tempted to embrace Qatari financing once more.

This tangle poses difficulties for Israel by generating three unpalatable paths. First, the grandiose promises yield nothing and Hamas continues governing overtly. Second, Americans declare victory prematurely, accepting a phantom governing structure masking Hamas' continued dominance. Third, the accord disintegrates entirely, forcing Israel back into comprehensive Gaza combat – bearing its physical, economic and diplomatic toll.

Israel will likely endeavor provisionally, at least publicly, to afford the agreement implementation opportunities as Trump desires. The assassination will be rationalized, as noted, through immediate operational necessity, simultaneously insisting Hamas cease its ongoing violations. Meanwhile, deliberately avoiding excessive administration irritation and projecting restraint, Israel shelved plans Friday to strike Hezbollah installations in Lebanon.

Israel maintained the scheduled operation was aborted because the Lebanese Armed Forces requested (and obtained) the intended target and pledged to address it independently. This signals encouragingly that threats of escalating military pressure toward renewed warfare are producing results, propelling the Lebanese Armed Forces toward action. Prudence nevertheless counsels withholding definitive conclusions: presently the probability of another Hezbollah confrontation remains elevated, merely deferred temporarily.

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Sources in Lebanon have written off the Egyptian initiative, which was based on the complete disarmament of Hezbollah in the area south of the Litani River and a commitment not to use weapons in areas north of it against Israel.

Meanwhile, the Lebanese News Agency reported that an Israeli force blew up a residential building on the outskirts of the village of Meis al-Jabal in southern Lebanon.

In addition, European diplomatic officials in Beirut were reported to have quoted American envoy Morgan Ortagus as saying that Israel intends to carry out "large and harsh strikes" against Hezbollah, particularly in Dahieh and the eastern Bekaa region, if the terror organization does not hand over precision missiles and drones by the beginning of the new civil year.

It was also noted that US Ambassador to Beirut Michel Issa conveyed a message that the diplomatic track is separate from the war track against Hezbollah. Issa met with Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and later explained, "Israel separates between negotiations with the Lebanese government and its war with Hezbollah. What is happening is an attempt to reach a solution."

Against this backdrop, all parties were reported to be waiting for the end of the current month – the final deadline of the Lebanese army's plan to collect Hezbollah weapons in the area south of the Litani River and move north. Hezbollah has emphasized that the ceasefire agreement applies only to the area south of the Litani, while Israel and the US are waiting for steps by the army.

At the same time, informed sources told Al-Akhbar that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's reference to economic cooperation with Lebanon was not made in a vacuum. According to the sources, the Israeli side raised the matter in meetings of the oversight committee.

The sources noted that when the issue of economic cooperation was raised, according to the American vision for rehabilitating the border region, Lebanese representative Simon Karam made clear that "Lebanon first wants the occupation to end, the attacks to stop, residents of the area to return to their homes and villages, and no interference with the rehabilitation process. Lebanon sees this as a mandatory condition for any discussion about the future of this region."

The sources added that Lebanon has previously heard such ideas from American envoy Tom Barrack, including a proposal for an infrastructure project in the border area. For example, it was reported that "security stability will enable a process of building an economic cooperation zone" in which Gulf investors would operate. According to the sources, Tom Barrack estimated that "disarmament [of Hezbollah] is a difficult thing, and it is not possible to convince people to give up weapons without offering an alternative."

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US forces seized an oil tanker off Venezuela's coast Wednesday that was sanctioned for alleged ties to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah, officials confirmed, according to CBS News. The vessel, identified as The Skipper, had been involved in "an illicit oil shipping network supporting foreign terrorist organizations" for multiple years, Attorney General Pam Bondi stated. President Donald Trump announced the capture during a White House meeting, saying the tanker was "seized for a very good reason" and indicating America would keep the oil cargo.

US commandos seized a substantial petroleum tanker near Venezuela Wednesday in a military operation, government sources confirmed, according to CBS News. President Donald Trump stated America would retain the vessel's oil cargo.

Video: Trump speaks about The Skipper off Venezuela on Dec. 10, 2025 / Credit: X/@FBIDirectorKash

Bloomberg initially reported the capture, which Trump announced during White House meetings as "seized for a very good reason," CBS News noted.

"As you probably know, we've just seized a tanker on the coast of Venezuela, a large tanker, very large," Trump told attendees, per CBS News. "Largest one ever seized, actually. And other things are happening, so you'll be seeing that later and you'll be talking about that later with some other people."

Queried about the petroleum's fate, Trump replied, "Well we keep it, I guess," before stating, "I assume we're going to keep the oil," according to CBS News.

Caracas issued a denunciation "strongly denounces and repudiates what constitutes a shameless robbery and an act of international piracy," CBS News reported. "In these circumstances, the real reasons for the prolonged aggression against Venezuela have finally been exposed. It's not migration. It's not drug trafficking. It's not democracy. It's not human rights. It was always about our natural wealth, our oil, our energy, the resources that belong exclusively to the Venezuelan people," the Venezuelan statement declared.

Today, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Homeland Security Investigations, and the United States Coast Guard, with support from the Department of War, executed a seizure warrant for a crude oil tanker used to transport sanctioned oil from Venezuela and Iran. For multiple… pic.twitter.com/dNr0oAGl5x

— Attorney General Pamela Bondi (@AGPamBondi) December 10, 2025

Knowledgeable sources identified the vessel as "The Skipper", with action commencing around 6 a.m. Wednesday deploying two helicopters, 10 Coast Guard personnel, 10 Marines and specialized operators, senior officials told CBS News. Forces intercepted the tanker moments after its Venezuelan port departure.

Helicopters carrying Coast Guard Maritime Security and Response Team members – an elite interdiction unit from Chesapeake, Virginia – launched from the USS Gerald Ford, America's most sophisticated carrier currently stationed in Caribbean waters, CBS News reported.

Treasury imposed sanctions on The Skipper in 2022 for connections to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah, according to the report. The vessel formerly sailed as Adisa and The Toyo.

Attorney General Pam Bondi distributed seizure footage via social media, noting the tanker was "used to transport sanctioned oil from Venezuela and Iran" and was captured by FBI, Homeland Security Investigations and Coast Guard personnel, "with support from the Department of War," CBS News stated. "For multiple years, the oil tanker has been sanctioned by the United States due to its involvement in an illicit oil shipping network supporting foreign terrorist organizations," Bondi declared.

Coast Guard authorities directed the mission with Naval assistance, per CBS News. Though federal agencies have confiscated sanctioned tankers before, fast-rope helicopter boardings remain uncommon at sea.

Officials are evaluating further similar missions, sources told CBS News. Trump has warned about extending America's maritime campaign targeting alleged narcotics vessels onto Venezuelan territory. Washington dispatched two fighter aircraft over Venezuela's gulf this week amid regional force augmentation.

Last week during a Cabinet session, Trump informed journalists, "We're going to start doing those strikes on land, too," when questioned about maritime operations, CBS News reported. "You know, the land is much easier ... And we know the routes they take. We know everything about them. We know where they live. We know where the bad ones live. And we're going to start that very soon, too."

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Al-Shibl was an adviser who accompanied Assad in footage published in recent days on the Saudi channel Al Arabiya, in which he mocked Syria, Syrians and even Russian President Vladimir Putin's plastic surgeries. The magazine also reported on the circumstances of the disappearance of al-Shibl's brother and his wife at the end of April 2024. An event that occurred after the Israeli strike on a building near the Iranian embassy in Damascus, in which Zahedi was killed – the Quds Force commander in Lebanon and Syria.

The documents include a transcript of a conversation between Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, who was assassinated in 2020, and Ali Mamlouk, head of the national security apparatus in Assad's regime. According to the documents, the two held a brief conversation about al-Shibl, during which Soleimani explained why he believed she was a spy.

Al-Shibl, born in Damascus in 1974, came from a Druze family. Her mother raised her alone and worked in the Ba'ath Party (the ruling party in Syria). Al-Shibl later became active in the party's youth organization and integrated into the regime's media. Subsequently, al-Shibl moved to work for Al Jazeera and married a Lebanese journalist, through whom she obtained Lebanese citizenship. She later divorced him and married a Syrian citizen.

In 2008, al-Shibl met Syrian President Assad for the first time. According to various testimonies, the media figure developed a "special relationship" with him. Within two years, she moved to work for him. Initially, she worked in the office of the security apparatus headed by senior Syrian official Ali Mamlouk. In the previous decade, she was appointed head of Assad's media office.

According to Al-Majalla, as part of her role at the time, al-Shibl worked to push out the previous office head, Bouthaina Shaaban. A bitter rivalry developed between the two. Over the years, al-Shibl consolidated her influence and simultaneously developed a close relationship with the dictator's wife, Asma al-Assad.

Al-Shibl's power grew until she became a mediator on various issues. For example, she conducted lengthy meetings with the Hamas terror organization's political bureau chief at the time, Khaled Mashaal, before he left Damascus. Despite this, it was reported that Maher al-Assad, Bashar's brother and a Syrian general, never trusted her.

According to information obtained by Al-Majalla and sources who spoke with the magazine, Maher al-Assad warned Bashar against al-Shibl, as did Qasem Soleimani, who believed she was a spy. In a document revealed in the magazine, an exchange appeared between Soleimani and Mamlouk at the end of 2019. The conversation took place a few moments after al-Shibl left Mamlouk's office, when Soleimani had just arrived.

"Who is that?" Soleimani asked, according to the transcript. "Luna al-Shibl, the president's adviser," Mamlouk replied. "I know," Soleimani said, "but who is he really? Where does he work?" Mamlouk replied that at the Qatari network, Al Jazeera. According to Al-Majalla, the Quds Force commander at the time used masculine pronouns, as is customary in such contexts.

Soleimani then asked about al-Shibl's salary, and Mamlouk did not know how to respond. The Iranian official answered him himself, "I'll tell you – $10,000. And what is his salary today?"

Mamlouk again did not know how to respond, and Soleimani replied to him once more, "I'll tell you – half a million Syrian pounds. Does it make sense that he would give up $10,000 for half a million Syrian pounds? He's a spy." It should be noted that even today, the value of the Syrian currency is almost zero compared to the dollar.

Despite the warnings, Syrian President Assad only brought al-Shibl closer into his inner circle, appointing her as a special adviser. His wife, Asma, supported her and appointed her as a trustee of a private university.

However, in 2023, Asma began to distance herself from al-Shibl because of the earthquake in northwestern Syria, after which the wife requested that she serve as her adviser, instead of her husband's – a request that al-Shibl did not comply with. According to the publication, from that moment on, the adviser's influence waned. Her associates said she frequently expressed an aspiration, even obsessively, "to become Syria's first lady." When she learned that Asma al-Assad had fallen ill again with cancer, it was reported that she responded, "Inshallah, she will die."

At the beginning of 2024, additional signs emerged raising suspicion about her activities. For example, she purchased real estate in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, worth eight million dollars. Two years earlier, she opened a Russian "luxury restaurant" in the al-Mazzeh neighborhood in Damascus, called Nash Krai. According to rumors, the restaurant was a gift from Assad himself.

Al-Shibl's assets abroad were registered under her sister-in-law, Nasrin Mohammad (she and her husband, Mulham, "disappeared" last year). Following these matters, Asma al-Assad began to suspect al-Shibl's unusual enrichment.

According to the Al-Majalla publication, Luna and her brother expressed great hostility toward Iran, Hezbollah, and members of the pro-Iranian axis. These statements raised accusations among Assad regime circles and Tehran's allies that al-Shibl was an "Israeli agent." Against the backdrop of the series of assassinations of senior Iranian and Lebanese officials in Damascus, these suspicions grew.

In July 2024, Luna al-Shibl was injured in a car accident while driving to her home in Syria. She was hospitalized, but died there. According to photos of the armored BMW in which she was traveling, only minor damage was caused to the vehicle.

Eyewitnesses told Al-Majalla that another vehicle hit her after the accident. According to testimonies, after her bodyguard exited, an unknown person approached the vehicle, struck al-Shibl on the head, and paralyzed her. This strengthened the magazine's suspicions that this was a political assassination.

The Syrian presidential office announced al-Shibl's death in a brief statement. A modest funeral was subsequently held, attended by several Syrian officials. Bashar Assad was absent. Before al-Shibl's death, her brother Mulham and his wife were arrested on April 26, several weeks after the assassination of senior Quds Force official Zahedi in Damascus.

According to Al-Majalla, in circles close to Iran in Damascus, they claimed they "worked for Israel," and were in contact with the Iranian delegation that was attacked as part of that assassination. Luna al-Shibl's brother did not appear again, and there is an assessment that the Assad regime operatives murdered him.

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Iran had functioned as one of Damascus's most essential supporters throughout the civil war that ignited in 2011 after the regime's brutal response to pro-democracy demonstrations, sending military advisers and Revolutionary Guards forces to Syria, AFP reported.

Revolutionary Guards units and regional allies – chiefly Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon, plus combatants from Iraq and Afghanistan – had occupied strategic locations and propped up Assad's regime, only to vanish as Islamist-led forces charged toward the capital, according to AFP.

Syrian military officers and troops operated under Revolutionary Guards command, whose influence grew during the conflict while Assad's authority weakened, AFP reported.

A former Syrian officer posted at a Guards security facility in Damascus said that on December 5, 2024, his Iranian commander ordered him to an operations center in Mazzeh district the next day to address an "important matter," according to AFP. The ex-officer, requesting anonymity over safety concerns, said his commander – identified as Hajj Abu Ibrahim – delivered a bombshell announcement to about 20 Syrian officers and soldiers assembled for the briefing, AFP reported.

"From today, there will be no more Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Syria. We're leaving," those present were informed, according to AFP. "It's all over. From today, we are no longer responsible for you."

They were instructed to destroy or burn classified documents and extract hard drives from computers, AFP reported. The declaration came as Islamist forces secured massive gains, yet it still caught Syrian soldiers by surprise, he said, according to AFP.

"We knew things hadn't been going well, but not to that extent." They received advance payment covering one month and departed for home, AFP reported.

Within two days, Islamist forces captured Damascus without fighting after Assad escaped to Russia, according to AFP. Two Syrian staff members at Iran's Damascus consulate, requesting anonymity for security purposes, also recounted a hurried Iranian departure, AFP reported. The consulate stood empty by December 5 evening as Iranian diplomats scrambled across the border into Beirut, they informed AFP.

Multiple Syrian employees "who held Iranian nationality left with them, accompanied by senior Revolutionary Guards officers," one former employee stated, according to AFP. At Jdeidet Yabus – Syria's primary Lebanese border crossing – taxi operators and former staff documented enormous congestion on December 5 and 6, with eight-hour delays to cross the frontier, AFP reported.

Both ex-consulate workers said Iranians instructed Syrian personnel to remain home and compensated them three months' wages, according to AFP.

The embassy, consulate and all Iranian security installations were abandoned by December 6 morning, they said, AFP reported.

Throughout the conflict, forces under Iranian authority concentrated in critical Damascus zones and suburbs, especially Sayyida Zeinab district – site of a significant Shiite Muslim shrine – and around Damascus airport, plus near Lebanese and Iraqi frontiers, according to AFP.

Sections of northern Aleppo and other provincial sites also functioned as major deployment zones for personnel and combatants, AFP reported.

At a location that formerly operated as a crucial Iranian military base south of Aleppo, Colonel Mohammad Dibo said when the city fell early in the rebel campaign, "Iran stopped fighting," according to AFP.

Iranian forces "had to withdraw suddenly after the quick collapse" of Assad's military, stated Dibo, who participated in the rebel offensive and currently serves in Syria's new armed forces, AFP reported. On severely damaged walls at the deserted base, an AFP journalist observed Iranian and Hezbollah slogans plus a mural showing a sword slicing through an Israeli flag, according to AFP.

Israel – Tehran's foe – had conducted hundreds of airstrikes on Syria during the war, primarily claiming it targeted Assad's forces and Iran-backed organizations, AFP reported. The anonymous former Syrian army officer said that on December 5, a high-ranking Iranian military official known as Hajj Jawad and several Iranian troops and officers were transported to Russia's Hmeimim base on the Mediterranean coast, then airlifted to Tehran, according to AFP.

At the deserted site near Aleppo, Dibo said following the city's collapse, "some 4,000 Iranian military personnel were evacuated via Russia's Hmeimim base" where they had sought refuge, AFP reported. Additional personnel escaped overland through Iraq or Lebanon, he stated, according to AFP.

The departure proved so hurried that "when we entered their bases" in Aleppo province, "we found passports and identity documents belonging to Iranian officers who didn't even have time to retrieve them."

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