This approach prevented his assassination until he was struck in his vehicle alongside three bodyguards on December 13, following multiple failed elimination attempts. One such effort unfolded in summer 2024, when the Israeli Air Force targeted a structure in the Shati camp – an area housing both a mosque and a school.

Saad handled diverse responsibilities within Hamas, spanning the organization's "civilian" infrastructure. Over three decades, he occupied a succession of critical positions directly linked to the October 7 massacre: operations chief, founder of the Nukhba (Hamas's elite commando force), naval force architect, and weapons production director. Throughout the war, he oversaw explosive manufacturing that claimed numerous IDF soldiers' lives. During the ceasefire, he orchestrated the restoration of the organization's strength.

"Generational transition"

Following his elimination, Israel Hayom has learned that Hamas is experiencing an accelerated "generational transition" due to dozens of senior operatives killed across two years. Today, scarce veteran figures populate the leadership, including "military wing head" Izz al-Din al-Haddad and intelligence director Mohammed Awda. They too face mounting responsibility portfolios. According to Asharq Al-Awsat, Awda was appointed commander of the northern Gaza Strip brigade. Al-Haddad himself managed the hostages dossier.

Consequently, the terrorist organization increasingly depends on junior terrorist commanders possessing minimal experience, restricted authority, and diminished capabilities. This dynamic threatens decision-making capacity and strategic planning.

Hamas has enlisted thousands of fresh terrorists throughout the conflict. Nevertheless, these recruits have only basic training, lacking experience and authority, and have marginal capabilities.

Yet alongside them, a hardened nucleus of veteran, proficient terrorists has endured. Therefore, Hamas sustains operations via emergency committees and apparatuses controlling the economy, transit, and education, while attempting to terrorize the population through executions and public prosecutions. Simultaneously, certain local clans demonstrate resistance.

Regarding the Palestinian population, Hamas' core supporter base has remained steadfast. Conversely, support for Hamas has declined according to multiple surveys. Furthermore, numerous Gazans exhibit passivity amid Gaza's humanitarian conditions, particularly during winter storms. Gaza has reported that at least 16 Palestinians have perished from weather-related damage thus far, including building wall collapses.

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The post appeared after testimonies emerged from flotilla personnel arriving from Europe. Hairston wrote, "Just as murderers and rapists possess a right to exist in prison, so the Israeli leadership deserves long lives behind bars." She continued, "The testimonies of the detainees from the flotilla are horrifying. The genocide state in full display – beatings, being held kneeling with hands cuffed behind the back for hours, denial of medical treatment, degrading treatment, and threats. Not to mention that abducting the people from the flotilla in international waters constitutes a violation of international maritime law."

Tel-Hai College issued a response, "The lecturer's serious statements were written on her personal account and do not represent the position of Tel-Hai Academic College as an academic institution. Tel-Hai Academic College stands proudly with Israeli Air Force soldiers and security forces and thanks them for their dedication and protection of the State of Israel and its citizens. Many of our students served in the reserves during the past two years. During this period, as we return with excitement to our northern campuses after more than two years, the opening of the academic year represents the resilience of the region and Tel-Hai's deep commitment to the Galilee community and Israeli society."

Professors for a Strong Israel issued a statement, "Israeli academia must not function as a sanctuary for lecturers who slander the State of Israel. Following Dr. Ilana Hairston's statements from Tel-Hai College, comparing the State of Israel to the Third Reich, Professors for a Strong Israel warns that this represents a serious and persistent phenomenon of lecturers in higher education institutions who abuse freedom of expression to damage the State of Israel and Israeli Air Force soldiers."

Shachar Yifrach, chairman of the Tel-Hai Student Union, stated, "Dr. Ilana Hairston's post crosses a red line both clearly and publicly. The union vigorously condemns these statements. Comparing the State of Israel to the Third Reich is a perilous comparison that damages Holocaust memory and harms reserve soldiers, including our students who risked their lives for the state. The union adopted the IHRA definition against antisemitism last year, and we invite the college and other institutions nationwide to adopt the definition as we have."

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The US president is in no way harming Israel. From his perspective, he sometimes saves it from itself. This occurred when he demanded halting the Israeli Air Force planes that were already over Iranian territory at the end of Operation Rising Lion; when he told Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that the Gaza war had run its course and pressured him to adopt the plan to end it; and when he demanded reversing Netanyahu's decision on cutting aid supplies to the Gaza Strip two days ago.

As of now, it appears that in all three instances he was correct, and indeed a responsible adult was needed to prevent us from acting against our own interests. Because indeed the war against Iran should have concluded on day 12, and it was correct to adopt the 20-point plan. Regarding eliminating Hamas in Gaza – the IDF was given two years to accomplish this, and particularly in the Rafah area the damage to the organization was the most severe. Nevertheless, Hamas fighters emerged from the tunnels there. In other words, before we make the ceasefire collapse we must formulate an orderly plan for how to achieve the war objectives that have not yet been reached.

In the grand scheme of things, Trump was and remains the most pro-Israel president ever, by a tremendous margin from all his predecessors. Therefore, even if here and there he makes things difficult for us, the matters must be put in their proper prespective.

We must also remember that he is not the first. All US presidents from time immemorial have demanded that Israel stop, restrain or reduce various military moves that we needed. Moreover, compared to his predecessors Trump has even expected Israel to be significantly more aggressive than it was. This happened with the famous sentence "the gates of hell will open on Gaza." And of course, in his first ten months in office, that same Trump opened the warehouses and gave the IDF all possible armaments.

So even if he is mistaken, it is permitted and proper to respect his request. And let us tell the truth – apparently there is also no other choice. Against the Democratic presidents Barack Obama and Joe Biden, Netanyahu could fight because he received tailwind from their Republican rivals. On the other hand, when the MAGA president gives us a red card, we have no counterweight to hold onto. The reason for this is the severe damage to Israel's image in the US.

Our legitimacy oxygen has run out. In the situation that has been created, Israel and Netanyahu have no room for maneuver because we have been pushed into an PR corner. Extricating ourselves from it is therefore an urgent and critical mission. Because if we have a problem with Trump, how much more so will there be one with his successors, certainly if they come from the Democratic side but even if they arrive from the Republican camp.

Large and enormous forces from both left and right wings in the American discourse are working to weaken the alliance between the US and Israel. Unfortunately, they are playing against an empty goal.

From the prime minister down – everyone understands that a campaign for the gloal public opinion is required from Israel and the Jewish people. After all, our enemies in the world will only go and intensify their incitement against us, which will exacerbate the international legitimacy problem and further narrow the political room for maneuver. This, and not Trump's local "Don't," should therefore be Israel's central concern. If we do not open a campaign for consciousness now, in three years we will miss Trump's hugs.

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Based on current assessments, the Israeli hostages are held in at least three separate locations across the Gaza Strip, and uncertainty persists over whether Hamas will gather them for a unified release or transfer them to the Red Cross at multiple sites.​

Security sources indicate Hamas has not yet transmitted to Israel the names of the deceased captives it intends to return.​ Simultaneously, Israeli security officials are tracking closely the enforcement mechanism American negotiators are presently formulating. On Friday, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner addressed the matter with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and on Saturday the subject arose during discussions between the two senior American envoys and IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir.​

Israel's goal is for the developing mechanism to mirror the framework established in Lebanon, though substantial differences between the two theaters may hinder this objective.​

Who becomes the enforcer?

First, Lebanon functions as a sovereign state, allowing Israeli grievances relayed through the Americans to reach the Lebanese government and Lebanese Armed Forces, which bear enforcement responsibility. In Gaza, however, no governing authority exists apart from Hamas, leaving unclear whether and how Israeli complaints will be addressed and enforced.​

Second, Israel successfully imposed an on-the-ground enforcement doctrine in Lebanon against every breach – targeting not merely immediate dangers but also weapons accumulation. In Gaza, Israel may lack this capability given the commitments it made in the agreement, particularly as the deployment of foreign personnel from nations including the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Turkey and others may restrict Israeli actions.​

In the interim, until tomorrow morning, Israeli Air Force operational guidelines remain exceptionally stringent, as avoiding any risk to the hostage release remains paramount throughout Israel.​

Following their release and return to Israel, the nation will transition into a phase of establishing security arrangements with Hamas. Israel's fundamental priority is Gaza demilitarization and operations against any weapons buildup, regardless of scale. An additional unresolved matter will inevitably be determining Gaza's future governance.​

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If it turns out it was simply a deception exercise intended to gather senior Hamas leaders in Doha for a meeting (in this case, a last meeting), this would not be the first time: a similar deception exercise, involving the American president and Israeli media, was conducted before the surprise attack on Iran. There too, it succeeded.

The decision to target Qatar represents a milestone in Israel–US relations, or perhaps Netanyahu–Trump relations, but it also reflects another essential element in the prime minister's war management: over his many years leading the country, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acted moderately and cautiously regarding military force, avoiding breaking enemy balances. Since October 7 that approach has changed. It appears that now no operational plan reaches Netanyahu without his at least serious consideration.

What began as a deep and genuine trust crisis between Netanyahu and the security establishment reversed completely during the long months of war, at least in special operations (the effort to defeat Hamas in Gaza is a different matter).

The strike on Qatari soil likewise expresses Israeli and American frustration with the Gulf state, which mediates in negotiations on one hand but hosts Hamas' foreign leadership with royal honor on the other.

This frustration is also directed at Hamas's foreign leadership, which imposed difficulties on negotiation progress and steadfastly refuses to compromise. Israel has taken responsibility: it struck Hamas leadership in Qatar.

Israel previously eliminated people it negotiated with (Yahyah Sinwar, Ismail Haniyeh), and the sky did not fall. Hamas leaders in Gaza are now more isolated and pressured than ever before, and no one knows for sure how they will respond. Will they execute hostages? Surrender? Or attempt to squeeze Israel to the utmost, this time relying exclusively on Egypt to mediate?

It must be assumed that the Shin Bet – responsible for the intelligence in the operation and whose command center in central Israel ran the operation – seriously considered these questions.

The dynamics in this war are unlike anything else in history, and trying to predict would be pointless. History will judge whether the Qatar operation advances Israel's war goals.

One thing is certain looking back over the past 23 months: When Israel dares, surprises, and strikes with strength – it usually paid off.

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"The Hamas terror spokesman Abu Obeida was eliminated in Gaza, and sent to meet all the eliminated members of the axis of evil from Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen at the bottom of hell," Katz wrote in his message, which he published on the social network X. "Congratulations to the IDF and Shin Bet on the perfect execution. Soon, as the campaign against Gaza intensifies, he will meet many more of his partners in crime there – the murderers and rapists of Hamas."

The strike in which Abu Obeida was eliminated was a pinpoint strike on an apartment in the Rimal neighborhood of Gaza City. His family members and commanders in the terror organization confirmed his death. According to reports, at least 7 people were killed and dozens were wounded during the strike.

"Abu Obeida can no longer spread his lies, propaganda, and terror," the IDF said on Sunday on X. "Kahlout was one of the last remaining senior terrorists of Hamas' Military Wing from before Oct. 7, 2023. He led propaganda and psychological terror campaigns, spreading footage of abducted Israeli civilians & soldiers and atrocities of the October 7th Massacre. Additionally, he distributed incitement videos across the Arab world & among the Palestinian public encouraging them to commit similar acts of terrorism, and coordinating messaging across Hamas' military wing."

ELIMINATED: Hudahaifa Kahlout "Abu Obaidah", Head of Hamas' Military Wing Propaganda Apparatus

Kahlout was one of the last remaining senior terrorists of Hamas' Military Wing from before Oct. 7, 2023. He led propaganda and psychological terror campaigns, spreading footage of… https://t.co/5r4w1Wl2Px

— Israel Defense Forces (@IDF) August 31, 2025

Abu Obeida was regarded until now as one of the most senior figures remaining in the Strip, and certainly the most prominent among them after the senior operatives of Hamas were eliminated throughout the war. His propaganda releases, mainly messages on Telegram during the war, were widespread throughout the Gaza Strip, Palestinian Authority territories, and the entire Arab world, and he was highly significant to public opinion and Hamas's methodology.

The "presenter" of a terrorist organization, who was a central figure in its propaganda, has met his end. Abu Obeida, or Hudhayfah Kahlout by his original name, with the high-pitched voice and red-and-white keffiyeh that hid his face except for his eyes, was one of Hamas's most recognizable symbols.

During demonstrations in Gaza, Judea and Samaria, and Arab nations, Hamas supporters would chant his name and that of Mohammed Deif, the eliminated head of the military wing. His statements to the media, though rife with lies and falsehoods, became televised events. Courtesy of the Qatari channel Al-Jazeera and pro-Iranian media outlets, his words reached millions of Muslims worldwide.

This is genuinely how he became a symbol of the path of terror, "the resistance," as it is termed by our enemies. Conversely, he amassed a significant number of enemies, including within Palestinian society. Many justifiably viewed him as a propaganda mouthpiece for a cult of death-eaters, the very one that inflicted destruction and ruin upon the Gaza Strip.

Abu Obeida served for two decades as the spokesman for the "Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades military wing." He started issuing statements during the terror attacks of the Second Intifada. Based on details he gave the media 20 years ago, he comes from a refugee family that arrived in Gaza after the War of Independence and settled in one of the towns.

He was likely born in the 1980s and was around 40 years old on the eve of the attack. Since 2004, he had delivered announcements concerning the organization's terrorist attacks, mixing them with threats and psychological warfare. For instance, he announced the kidnapping of soldier Gilad Shalit in 2006, and the abduction of the fallen Oron Shaul, of blessed memory, during combat in Operation Protective Edge in 2014, even though Hamas never stated he fell in battle.

Periodically, Abu Obeida also commented on the fate of senior Hamas officials who were targeted or eliminated. In Operation Protective Edge, he announced that Mohammed Deif had survived an assassination attempt. In the current war, he was tasked with announcing utter fabrications to sow demoralization on the Israeli side.

The Telegram channel that bears his name has also frequently touched on the contacts for a hostage exchange. When Hamas sought to apply pressure during the most recent deal, Abu Obeida's channel published a demand to renew the humanitarian protocol, warning the release process would not proceed otherwise.

Meanwhile, Arab sources reported on Sunday that the apartment occupied by Hamas spokesman Abu Obeida in the affluent Rimal neighborhood in western Gaza City had been rented just a few days prior. This is a known bastion for senior Hamas officials that, during the war, endured extensive destruction and absorbed masses of evacuees and beggars.

Despite this, restaurants serving the Strip's wealthy – primarily various merchants who have earned a substantial profit in the past two years – continue to operate there. Following the strike, it was reported that Hamas terrorists sealed off the area and barred people from approaching. In total, eight fatalities were discovered. The Al-Arabiya channel noted his body was identified by relatives.

It is doubtful that Hamas will acknowledge Abu Obeida's death in the near future. On Saturday night, only after roughly three months, the terrorist organization finally provided an update on the elimination of Mohammed Sinwar, the former head of the military wing, and Mohammed Shabana, the organization's Rafah brigade commander.

The senior officials now remaining in Gaza are the head of the wing and former Gaza City brigade commander, Izz al-Din al-Haddad; chiefs of staff Mohammed Awda and Ra'ad Saad; and Tawfiq Abu Naim, who is in charge of internal mechanisms. The members of the "Political Bureau in Gaza" have been almost completely eliminated or exiled.

The death of Abu Obeida is yet another manifestation of the nadir the organization has reached, finding itself without a terrorist army, senior leadership in Gaza, iconic symbols, or smuggling routes.

Nevertheless, a successor will be found to deliver his statements, making his practical importance low. Moreover, the thousands of terrorists who remain in Gaza should not be underestimated, even if they are fragmented and divided into independent "guerrilla units."

While Hamas circles abroad warn against expanding the operation in the city and broadcast an air of fear, their objective is to push for greater international pressure.

Meanwhile, the remnants of Hamas inside Gaza are preparing to attempt attacks against our forces, all while concealed within the civilian population and booby-trapping buildings and pathways with explosive devices. Their stated aim is a war of attrition for as long as possible, hoping international pressure will compel a ceasefire without an agreement to release the hostages.

The post The man behind the mask: How Israel silenced Hamas' notorious voice of terror appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

Based on foreign reports and Israeli assessments, the raid was likely meant to counter the Syrian army's activity of trying to dismantle the installed Israeli listening devices. Six Syrian soldiers were killed in Israeli strikes on Wednesday in the same area after they attempted to dismantle the IDF's listening posts, according to reports.

Video: The alleged Israeli strikes in Syria on Wednesday August 28, 2025 (Credit: Social media)

In the al-Kiswah region, the Iranians have been active in recent years, establishing weapon and armament depots alongside the weapon depots of the Syrian army's 1st Division. Approximately two years ago, the Israeli Air Force struck Iranian targets in the region.

A pro-Syrian communication network that broadcasts from Turkey reported unusual IDF activity shortly before midnight, lasting for about two hours. The IDF, it said, conducted about 15 strikes in the Tel Manea and al-Kiswah area in the southern Damascus Governorate, where Syrian army headquarters were attacked, presumably to soften the area before IDF helicopters landed troops in the Sweida Governorate and in al-Kiswah.

The strikes by Israeli Air Force aircraft stopped Syrian forces from approaching the site where the listening equipment was located. The Al-Jazeera network also confirmed through its sources that IDF forces had landed in the al-Kiswah area.

According to assessments, the prolonged presence of the commandos on the ground was designed to gather documents and additional findings to better understand Iranian activities and intentions in the region.

Official Israel has not issued a formal response to the operation, but Minister of Defense Israel Katz boasted on the X network Thursday morning with a message that could be interpreted as a hint about the operation, stating, "Our forces are operating in all combat zones day and night for the security of Israel."

The operation is occurring against the backdrop of the continuing collapse of the Syrian regime and Israel's efforts to reinforce its strategic foothold in Syria, while preventing renewed Iranian entrenchment in the region.

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The Israel Defense Forces acknowledged awareness of reports regarding damage to the Holy Family Church in Gaza City and casualties at the scene, stating that the circumstances surrounding the incident remain under review.

Israel's Foreign Ministry released a statement expressing deep sorrow over the damage to the Holy Family Church in Gaza City and over any civilian casualty. "Israel never targets churches or religious sites and regrets any harm to a religious site or to uninvolved civilians," it said on X.

The Foreign Ministry indicated that the IDF is examining the incident, noting that the circumstances remain unclear and promising that investigation results will be published transparently.

Vatican News reported that the church was hit by tank fire, with Cardinal Pierbattista Pizzaballa, Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, confirming that two of the wounded individuals remain in life-threatening condition following the strike on the religious facility.

"What we know for sure is that a tank, the IDF says by mistake, but we are not sure about this, they hit the Church directly, the Church of the Holy Family, the Latin Church," Cardinal Pizzaballa told Vatican News. "There are four people seriously wounded, among these four, two are in very dramatic conditions and their lives are in serious danger."

Father Gabriel Romanelli, the parish priest, was among those wounded in the attack, along with other individuals who were present inside the church building at the time of the strike, according to Vatican News.

"There are also other injured but less problematic, among them also the Parish Priest, because they were all in the Church," the Cardinal explained during his interview with Vatican News.

Communication challenges in Gaza have complicated efforts to gather complete information about the incident, Cardinal Pizzaballa noted, explaining that he would attempt to obtain additional details as soon as possible.

"We don't have complete information about what has happened in Gaza today because the communication in Gaza is not that simple," he said.

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Saudi Arabia possesses a well-equipped air force, based primarily on American-made systems and aircraft. In 2017, during President Donald Trump's first term, an extensive arms deal was signed with Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, and this deal was further expanded during his recent visit to the region.

Saudi Arabia hasn't officially confirmed involvement in the interceptions and even condemned Israel for launching the offensive against Iran. Israel, the United States and European countries demonstrated close operational cooperation, through which Iran's image as a regional threat was damaged.

The political significance is broad – the very fact that a leading Sunni state, perhaps the most central one, is acting in ways that lead to thwarting Iranian threats even without public declaration indicates a deep regional shift. However, Saudi Arabia emphasized it won't allow use of its airspace for striking targets in Iran.

12-day international coalition

During the 12 days of fighting against Iran, several countries acted to defend the region's skies, including Jordan, which operated mainly through its air force in its airspace; Britain and France, which also operated in the aerial arena; and the United States military, which alongside the IDF was the most active – through aircraft, ships, Patriot and THAAD air defense systems and more.

Iran launched over a thousand drones toward Israel. Most were intercepted far from the border, and a minority were shot down by the Israeli Air Force over Israeli skies. This joint operation wouldn't have been possible without years of exercises and simulations with international partners – including Greece, Italy, France and Britain.

At the center of activity stood US Central Command – CENTCOM – commanded by General Mike Kurilla, who's credited with a significant contribution to the cooperation mechanism that operated here. Since the IDF joined CENTCOM, a well-connected military system has been built and developed, including Israel and European countries like Britain, France, Greece, Italy and Cyprus.

Another significant achievement of this framework is establishing a joint American command and control center, connected in real-time to all involved militaries. Kurilla himself sat in this center during many stages of the fighting, leading coordination between intelligence, warning, activation and interception elements.

Years of preparation

In the IDF, the International Planning Division in the Planning Directorate is responsible for managing relations with CENTCOM and other partner countries. International Planning representatives have a role in every command and corps – ensuring continuous contact with counterparts in foreign militaries. The frequency of dialogue with American commanders has risen dramatically in recent years – from ceremonial conversations every six months to daily dialogue, joint exercises, coordinated flights, and even intelligence cooperation.

The chiefs of staff – the recently retired Chief Herzi Halevi and current Chief Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir – have also maintained close relations with senior commanders in the US military. The US serves not only as a bridge between Israel and regional countries but also as a coordinating factor with Arab countries with which there are no direct relations.

This cooperation was tested not only now but also in previous waves of Iranian attacks on Israel in April and October 2024. Then too, the United States and European countries operated in various arenas – some through interception means, others through location and information sharing. Now, during the 12-day campaign, the operation was much broader in scope.

Jordan, unlike others, publicly acknowledged interception operations and even emphasized that drones fell in its territory causing damage – which required a response. France also explained its participation as defending its interests in Jordan, while avoiding public mention of Israel.

The results that received impressive expression in the current war could form a basis for much larger political moves – perhaps even for the comprehensive regional move that President Trump is planning as part of his "mega-deal" for the Middle East.

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Six months later, the synergy between the eighth and 14th floors – the political and military echelons – enabled the launch of a preemptive strike on Friday, June 13. The military option against Iran, which had been on the table for at least a decade, came to fruition with perfect timing and political approval. Boom.

As the IDF finalized the details of the impending attack on Iran, planners realized they needed to replicate the Lebanon strategy – a concentrated, surprising blow to throw the enemy off balance, a sort of "Dahieh Doctrine 2.0," referring to the systematic bombardment of the Hezbollah stronghold in Lebanon during the 2006 war and later. "In the military, they call it a 'decapitation operation,'" said an official in the know. "The difference is that with Hezbollah, it took ten days; with Iran, we did it in the opening strike, within one hour."

Plans for a confrontation with Iran, specifically targeting its nuclear facilities, had been in development within the defense establishment for years, shaping the IDF's force buildup over the past two decades. Yet, in typical Israeli fashion, those plans were discarded at the last moment to make way for a bold, creative, and swiftly crafted new strategy.

"In reality, we began the operational planning for the strike in its current form only in October 2024," said an official privy to the details. "That's when we realized the IDF needed to prepare not just for a pinpoint strike in Iran but for an entire campaign."

Video: IAF planes launch toward Iran / Credit: IDF Spokesperson's Unit

Until recently, even senior defense officials considered the idea of attacking Iran far-fetched, a plan destined to remain theoretical. However, three months in the fall of 2024 completely changed that perspective.

In September, "Operation Pagers," the air campaign to neutralize Hezbollah's rockets, and the successful eliminations of the group's leadership, including Hassan Nasrallah, turned Hezbollah into a weakened force. "We always said Israel doesn't share a border with Iran, but Iran has a border with Israel – Hezbollah, standing at the fences, ready to respond fiercely if we attacked," said a former military official. "Once that border was erased, a new game began."

In October, the Israeli Air Force executed "Operation Days of Repentance," which included widespread strikes on Iran's air defense systems for the first time, fueling the pilots' appetite for more. In November, Donald Trump's election to a second term in the White House further emboldened strike advocates, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. By December, Israel's top echelons no longer debated whether the strike would happen – only when.

As the IDF finalized the details of the impending attack on Iran, planners realized they needed to replicate the Lebanon strategy – a concentrated, surprising blow to throw the enemy off balance, a sort of "Dahieh Doctrine 2.0," referring to the systematic bombardment of the Hezbollah stronghold in Lebanon during the 2006 war and later. "In the military, they call it a 'decapitation operation,'" said an official in the know. "The difference is that with Hezbollah, it took ten days; with Iran, we did it in the opening strike, within one hour."

From the shift in the Military Intelligence Directorate's approach to the Israeli Air Force teams crafting the attack and the politico-media deception that lulled Iran before zero hour, this is how Israel prepared for war with Iran.

The hard nut to crack

The IDF indeed trained for striking Iranian nuclear facilities for years, but simultaneously also reached the understanding that such a strike would delay the Iranian bomb by only a few years and would drag in its wake a complex war against Hezbollah.

Accordingly, during Gadi Eisenkot's tenure as chief of staff, intelligence engagement with Iran was relatively sparse, and Military Intelligence Directorate directed most of its resources northward, to Lebanon.This approach was also aided by the Obama administration's nuclear agreement, which was signed half a year after Eisenkot entered his position and made it somewhat difficult for the Iranians to break through to the bomb. "Eisenkot's conception was that the nuclear agreement would delay the Iranian nuclear program, so there was no need to hurry," said a former senior officer.

Trump's withdrawal from the deal in mid-2018 brought Military Intelligence Directorate back to the drawing board. "Six months after the deal's cancellation, when Aviv Kochavi became chief of staff, the IDF began an intelligence shift from Lebanon to Iran," said the same officer. One of Kohavi's first decisions was establishing the Strategy and Third Circle Division, tasked with focusing on non-bordering states, namely Iran.

By late 2021, when Kochavi appointed Aharon Haliva as head of Military Intelligence Directorate, the first discussion Haliva held was on "Iran's nuclear program." "Even then, we realized our intelligence approach wasn't on track," said a participant in that meeting. In the following years, Military Intelligence Directorate underwent a structural shift, redirecting resources and personnel toward Iran. The "Northeast" arena in the Research and Analysis Division, covering Iran, Syria, and Iraq, was split, creating a dedicated Iran arena led by a colonel. This joined an existing Iran-focused unit in the Operations Division, and later, the Israeli Air Force established its own Iran arena.

The deeper intelligence delved, the clearer it became that the "bottleneck" was the scientists themselves. "We realized we needed to focus on the human factor," said the source.

"What you're seeing now is the result of those years of effort in the Iran arenas of Military Intelligence Directorate and the Israeli Air Force," said a source we spoke with. "A lot of money went into it, and those units proved their worth."

The target validation process in Iran carried out by Military Intelligence Directorate and the Israeli Air Force focused on three legs of the nuclear program – the missile array, enrichment facilities, and the "weapons group" (mounting a nuclear device on a ballistic missile). Accordingly, Military Intelligence Directorate collected more and more intelligence on launchers, warehouses, and factories in the Iranian missile array, and the Israeli Air Force planned focused strikes against enrichment facilities. At a fairly early stage, the IDF reached the understanding that it was possible to effectively strike from the air the enrichment facility in Natanz, but not the one in Fordow, which was dug much deeper.

Missile systems and enrichment facilities presented their own difficulties, but the intelligence community identified the weaponization group as the toughest challenge. "Unlike enrichment facilities and missile factories, which operate in large complexes, the weaponization project uses smaller facilities and doesn't require extensive infrastructure," explained a knowledgeable source. "Plus, with weaponization, you're fighting knowledge. How do you eliminate knowledge accumulated over years?"

The deeper intelligence delved, the clearer it became that the "bottleneck" was the scientists themselves. "We realized we needed to focus on the human factor," said the source.

In 2021, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, head of Iran's nuclear program, was assassinated in a sophisticated operation on Iranian soil. "A beautiful operation," said someone familiar with many such missions. "The problem is, Iran has many scientists and scientific knowledge. Eliminating one, no matter how senior, doesn't stop the program." Indeed, Iran pressed forward. Military Intelligence Directorate, seeing this, devised a new plan – targeting multiple nuclear scientists simultaneously.

The idea of assassinating scientists sparked healthy competition between the IDF and the Mossad. The Mossad proposed using drones, while the IDF advocated striking the scientists from the air with advanced munitions launched from long distances. Initially, the plan was to target the scientists during a joint meeting, but it later shifted to striking them individually at their homes in Tehran.

When the IDF's plan, a joint effort of Military Intelligence Directorate and the Israeli Air Force, was presented to Netanyahu, he was enthusiastic. "The surgical and simultaneous nature of it sparked his imagination," said someone present in the room.

Consequently, Unit 8200 began constant tracking of numerous Iranian nuclear scientists, knowing their locations at all times. In the past six months, work on the operation intensified, with Military Intelligence Directorate's Research and Analysis Division nuclear experts meeting twice weekly to narrow down the target list. "It was like playing 'Super Goal,'" said a military source. "From a large pool, they selected the top scientists in each field – the ones Iran's weaponization program couldn't function without. The Research and Analysis Division honed this plan day and night."

By early 2025, with the "dream team" of targets finalized, a joint Military Intelligence Directorate–Israeli Air Force team turned the ambitious plan into an operational one. Then, someone in Military Intelligence Directorate had another idea.

"All of Them at Once"

The success of the September 2024 strike on Hezbollah, which destabilized the group and effectively decided the campaign, inspired Military Intelligence Directorate. Weeks later, those working on Iran began discussing replicating the Lebanon strategy in Iran.

"Taking out their entire military leadership in one blow," said a source in the intelligence community.

Unlike the scientist operation, where the target list was narrowed over time, here Military Intelligence Directorate expanded it. What began as a plan to eliminate one or two senior Iranian officials grew to include the commander of the Revolutionary Guards' air force, the Guards' overall commander, Iran's chief of staff, and his deputy.

"When the idea came up, no one believed Military Intelligence Directorate could pull it off simultaneously," said a knowledgeable source. But Military Intelligence Directorate persisted, forming a dedicated team that worked around the clock. The team's findings were presented to the head of Military Intelligence Directorate, Maj. Gen. Shlomi Binder, and later shared with Israeli Air Force officials.

In recent months, Binder, Israeli Air Force commander Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar, and operations chief Maj. Gen. Oded Basiuk held numerous meetings to synchronize the operation down to the smallest details. Over time, the three generals and their teams grew confident that the ambitious plan could succeed.

Unlike the scientists, targeted in their homes, the "generals operation" was planned for a joint meeting of Iran's security elite. To ensure they gathered in one location, a sophisticated deception operation – details of which will remain classified for years – was executed.

In 2021, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, head of Iran's nuclear program, was assassinated in a sophisticated operation on Iranian soil. "A beautiful operation," said someone familiar with many such missions. "The problem is, Iran has many scientists and scientific knowledge. Eliminating one, no matter how senior, doesn't stop the program." Indeed, Iran pressed forward. Military Intelligence Directorate, seeing this, devised a new plan – targeting multiple nuclear scientists simultaneously.

Remarkably, the scientist and generals operations matured almost simultaneously. The small team of three generals, fully aware of both plans, realized this in the final weeks. The opening strike was ready.

"A series of complex operations"

Beyond the "decapitation operation," Israel's war plan included other components. The most discussed recently is air superiority. This, too, was addressed only recently.

As plans to strike enrichment facilities developed, it was clear the Israeli Air Force needed a clear path to Natanz and Fordow. The Iran arena in the Research and Analysis Division allocated vast resources to mapping Iran's air defense systems, which were plentiful.

At one point, Unit 8200 established a dedicated team focused solely on achieving air superiority, comprising Military Intelligence Directorate and Israeli Air Force personnel. "The mission of 'paving the way' to Iran took priority over everything else in Military Intelligence Directorate in the three years before October 7," said a source familiar with the Intelligence Directorate. 

As Iran's air defenses were mapped, Military Intelligence Directorate and the Israeli Air Force concluded they could not only clear the path to nuclear facilities but also to Tehran and beyond. The phrase "air superiority in Iran" began as a whisper and grew into enthusiastic discussion.

From late May, two weeks before the strike, a "perception operation" began to lull Iran into believing Israel wouldn't attack soon. Orchestrated by the Prime Minister's Office, it included feeding information to Israeli journalists, particularly those not aligned with Netanyahu. The operation centered on nuclear talks between the White House and Tehran, creating the appearance of a US-Israel rift.

Six months before October 7, 2023, the Israeli Air Force formed a small team of aircrew, mostly reservists, to plan the path to air superiority. The team received an ever-growing list of air defense battery locations and critical intelligence from Unit 8200's secret unit. "Israel put all its intelligence efforts into this, and when Israel focuses on something, it delivers incredible results," said a source in the know.

Previous Israeli Air Force plans for Iran were scrapped and rewritten. "Iran has dozens of surface-to-air missile batteries in a first layer along its borders and a second layer around high-value targets," the source continued. "It required a phased approach, a series of highly complex operations to neutralize the defenses, hoping it would work."

The air superiority team presented the plan to the air force commander, who understood the risks but was willing to lose a few planes to achieve the mission. "The goal was no losses, but the air force commander's policy allowed for some losses while continuing the plan," the source said.

"Fortunately, we succeeded far beyond expectations, with no planes lost. I think it worked because the enemy didn't expect Israel to strike like this. They lacked drills that prepared them for the moment."

Skeptics in Military Intelligence Directorate doubted the air force's ability to achieve air superiority without losses. "When we started, it seemed impossible," said another source familiar with the operation. "Iran's air defenses are both high-quality and numerous. You need to neutralize them quickly, or Israeli pilots start falling in Iran."

Ultimately, the mission was accomplished in just 36 hours with no losses. On the first night, 30 Iranian air defense batteries and a double-digit number of radars were destroyed. "The greatest air superiority operation in history," said someone familiar with the details.

The Mossad joined in recent months, deploying drones operated by local agents to target additional air defense batteries.

While the scientist and generals operations could have proceeded without air superiority, the air force's control of Iran's skies greatly facilitated strikes on Natanz, missile sites, and other nuclear facilities. It also enabled extensive hunting of ballistic missile launchers, as dismantling Iran's air defenses allowed more drones to operate freely from Israel to Tehran.

"This means you can strike munitions wholesale, from Tehran westward, drastically reducing missile launches toward Israel," said a knowledgeable source. "Instead of hundreds of missiles on day one, we faced dozens. That's a game-changer, reducing pressure and strain in Israel."

Another component, built meticulously over time, was defense. "You can't attack without defense," said Brig. Gen. (res.) Ran Kochav, former air defense commander and Arrow unit head in 2006. "Preparations for war with Iran on the defensive side began 20 years ago. That was the reference threat we trained for, building a multi-layered air defense system and conducting joint exercises with US Central Command."

Indeed, Israeli Air Force officials confirm that both air defense and air superiority are two components that could not have been achieved without full cooperation from Washington. Which brings us to the last component in Israel's war plan against Iran. "The Americans," said an official well-versed in the war plan. "The plan was indeed built without them, but it was impossible to execute it without getting tailwind from them."

Deep in the know

Shortly after Trump's January 2025 inauguration, messages from his circle reached Netanyahu, indicating he wouldn't strongly oppose turning the "military option" operational if nuclear talks with Tehran stalled. Trump reportedly lifted restrictions on intelligence sharing, including access to US satellites and radar systems.

While Trump didn't commit to joining the strike, several Israeli officials confirm he was "deep in the inner circle." "Full coordination," one described it. Trump also participated in the deception operation in the days leading up to the surprise attack.

From late May, two weeks before the strike, a "perception operation" began to lull Iran into believing Israel wouldn't attack soon. Orchestrated by the Prime Minister's Office, it included feeding information to Israeli journalists, particularly those not aligned with Netanyahu. The operation centered on nuclear talks between the White House and Tehran, creating the appearance of a US-Israel rift.

On May 28, Ben Caspit reported in Maariv that Dermer and Mossad chief David Barnea traveled to Washington in a "desperate last attempt to block a dramatic announcement of an interim nuclear deal between Iran and the US." Caspit noted his sources were "quite insistent." In reality, their discussions with US officials focused on final strike preparations.

On June 9, Moriah Asraf reported on Channel 13 that Dermer and Barnea were preparing another trip to meet Steve Witkoff. In the following days, "insistent" sources continued to push the narrative to Israeli journalists that the US nuclear deal was a done deal, that Dermer and Barnea were desperate for US attention, and that Trump firmly opposed an Israeli strike. "This information was spoon-fed to journalists, unlike similar cases in the past," said one journalist.

On June 10, Channel 12's Yaron Avraham reported that in a call, Trump told Netanyahu he "hadn't given up on negotiations" with Iran and demanded he "take the strike off the table." Two days later, as air force jets headed to Tehran, Asraf reported that Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir and air force commander Bar "stood on their hind legs" and told Netanyahu Israel couldn't act alone against Iran.

Trump, for his part, issued vague statements, insisting, "I don't want Israel to attack Iran." He sent his ambassador in Jerusalem, Mike Huckabee, to tell Yedioth Ahronoth that "the president would be pleased if the Iran issue ends peacefully." This headline appeared on the newspaper's front page on Friday, June 13, after the strike had already begun.

Other newspapers that morning highlighted Trump's supposed opposition. Even the Haredi paper Hamevaser,, the Agudat Yisrael outlet, reported Trump saying, "As long as there's a chance for a deal, I don't want Israel to attack."

These headlines, printed before but published after the strike, testify to the success of the media perception operation. It was so effective that even unusual moves, like evacuating American diplomats' families from Middle East embassies in the days prior, didn't alert Iran to the impending attack.

"Perception Maneuvers"

An Israel Hayom investigation found that some misleading messages to the Israeli media came directly from Netanyahu's spokespeople. The Prime Minister's Office didn't deny quotes attributed to Trump-Netanyahu talks, aiming to project a US-Israel dispute. An Israeli official familiar with the office said, "Israel surprised Iran with psychological maneuvers." He added, "The goal was to make Iran's leadership think there'd be no attack, or if there was, it wouldn't be imminent."

"Deception, as a rule, doesn't turn black into white. For that you need an operation on the scale of decades, like what Iran did to us with the concept of 'Hamas is deterred.' Within the timeframe for the attack on Iran, there wasn't time for such an operation. Therefore, the deception exercise was activated under the classic principle of taking a gray area and then as needed clarifying or darkening it."

Were the misleading, some might say false, messages from the Prime Minister's Office a step too far? Was it manipulative use of journalists, violating Israel's media ethics? Schleifer responds with a marriage analogy: "If all men and women told 100% of the truth 100% of the time, there'd be no married couples left. Each side has its interests, but there's also a shared interest in cooperation. Whoever executed this deception knew how to exploit that."

"In the past five years, lying has become a legitimate tool for politicians," said Avi Benayahu, former IDF spokesperson. "When Trump, Putin, Erdogan, or Bibi lie, we're no longer shocked. Yitzhak Shamir once said it's permissible to lie for state security. If a leader feels it's okay to lie for political matters, it's certainly okay for matters at the core of state secrets. Still, Netanyahu didn't exactly lie this time – at most, these were white lies."

Former minister Nachman Shai, also a former IDF spokesperson, said, "I tried not to use the media for my purposes, but it's been years since I was in that role, and there's been some decline. With fake news dominating, lying has become routine. What was once taboo is now standard. Truth is a lower priority. Can I say no one in the Prime Minister's Office manipulates journalists or media players to spread disinformation? I wouldn't rule it out. The media is more open to these influences than ever."

In this context, it should be emphasized that from all our investigations, the "influence operation" that preceded the attack on Iran did not come from the direction of the IDF spokesman or any other element in the military.

"The Stack Model"

Contrary to media reports claiming a "golden intelligence" tip about Iran assembling a nuclear bomb within weeks prompted the strike, military sources say the "stack model" – a convergence of circumstances – enabled it. "It was a maturation of military capabilities and US support," one said. "We reached the best historical conditions for a strike. It was the optimal timing."

Another source familiar with the military and diplomatic arenas added, "No Hamas, no Hezbollah, Trump in office, Iran isolated, and Israel mentally prepared for destruction and killing. It was right to strike now because the geo-strategic and domestic conditions allowed it."

Someone who apparently wasn't very bothered by the accumulation of these circumstances is Argentina's President Javier Milei, who landed in Israel for a state visit last Monday. On his last day here, Milei visited the Western Wall with Netanyahu. Netanyahu used the opportunity to insert between the stones of eternity a note with a quote from Psalms: "Like a lion shall rise and as a lion shall lift itself up." Several hours later, President Milei would take off back to Argentina, and Israeli Air Force aircraft would take off toward Iran.

The next morning, Friday, June 13, Netanyahu ensured his note was publicized in the media. "He understands perception operations," smiled a source familiar with his media tactics. "Netanyahu gave himself PR for 'I knew before everyone,'" added Benayahu. "That's fine – a prime minister can do PR. By the way, I think this is the first time a prime minister, not the IDF or its computer, named a military operation."

An Israel Hayom investigation confirms that, unusually, the operation's name, "Rising Lion," was set by the political echelon.

The post The untold story of the Iran war: How Israel did the unthinkable appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.