Almost a year after the ceasefire agreement with Lebanon took effect, and following clear indications that Israel was unwilling to tolerate Hezbollah's entrenchment efforts or the Lebanese government's inaction, Israel carried out a surgical and focused attack on the organization's most senior military operative, who had been charged with the task of rebuilding its strength.

Israel did not equivocate or apologize but instead took full responsibility for the action. Crucially, Israel maintained a normal routine on the home front, a move calculated to prevent the enemy from interpreting a change in policy as an acknowledgment of a necessary response equation, particularly for eliminations at this senior level.

This operation represents a significant intelligence and operational coup for the IDF, especially considering Hezbollah's adjustments over the past year and the lessons the group drew from the war. Israel is signaling that it retains the capability to track down terror operatives, locate their hideouts, and execute precise strikes deep inside residential areas of the Lebanese capital.

The willingness to conduct this operation, coming just weeks after Naim Qassem warned publicly that "the continuation of the aggression unacceptable and everything has a limit," underscores that Israel is not deterred by the possibility of its actions leading to renewed fighting.

Israel is conveying this message through the elimination of Tabataba'i not only to other Hezbollah operatives but also to Hamas in Gaza, the Iranian leadership in Tehran, the Lebanese government in Beirut, Ahmad al-Sharaa in Damascus, and the various countries involved in security arrangements in both arenas, from Turkey and Qatar to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. By taking this action, Israel is reaffirming its commitment to independently disarm its enemies should political arrangements prove incapable of doing so.

While Hezbollah leaders will undoubtedly attempt to leverage the strike to unite Lebanese forces against Israel, the operation could conversely bolster the Lebanese government's demands of Hezbollah, most notably its call for a state monopoly on weapons.

Finally, the Beirut strike shows that Israel's operational latitude remains intact under the current Trump administration policy. Although the administration prefers to avoid a renewal of intense fighting, it displays understanding, and possibly even support, for Israel's pinpoint operations after other diplomatic efforts to prevent its enemies' military expansion have been exhausted. It's plausible that the American administration believes such a strike will not impede the political track but may even accelerate progress toward a resolution.

Much like Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon is being forced by Israel's actions into a critical decision point where every available option is detrimental. If the group chooses restraint and de-escalation, Israel will continue to eliminate its operatives and further erode its tattered dignity. If it opts for a forceful response, it will incur a steep cost and bolster the arguments of its opponents within Lebanon. And if it settles for a symbolic counter-strike, it will demonstrate weakness against Israel and cheapen the value of its senior commanders' lives.

Today, neither Hezbollah nor Hamas possesses the leverage to constrain Israel's actions or impose a price that would compel it to hold back.

The enemy's attempts to inflame the Judea and Samaria arena and thereby complicate Israel's operations and extract a cost have persisted since the war began. The security establishment has learned how to manage this threat, and its ongoing operations have largely prevented the enemy from achieving its desired effect.

It is reasonable to assume that Hezbollah is also exploring the option of carrying out attacks abroad, potentially with or without the aid of other Iranian actors. This potential scenario is also a priority on the security establishment's agenda.

The most challenging scenario demanding focused attention from Israeli agencies is a kidnapping attempt. Hamas is acutely aware of the difference between the reality before the release of the living hostages and the current situation, despite existing agreements. The lure of a kidnapping is substantial. While conditions in the Gaza Strip may create opportunities, the threat is not limited to that front.

Now is the time to heighten vigilance and intensify intelligence and preventative efforts across all theaters. IDF forces must be permitted to adopt an aggressive fire policy to protect the areas under their control within the Strip's limits, thereby preventing Gazans from gaining access to those zones. Concurrently, offensive operations against terror operatives with relevant expertise in Judea and Samaria and east Jerusalem must be stepped up. The message must be unequivocal: Do not permit another kidnapping – at any cost.

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Whether these launchers were deployed as part of Hezbollah's broader effort to restore military capabilities or as preparation for shorter-term retaliation to potential IDF-initiated operations remains unclear. Recent weeks brought reports that Israel prepares for extensive operations in southern Lebanon, given the Lebanese Armed Forces' failure (or refusal) to secure the territory.

Yesterday, Lebanese Armed Forces chief Rodolphe Haykal stated operations advance as planned, yet Israeli sources note Hezbollah rebuilds infrastructure faster than expected, forcing Israel to act independently. Israeli activity seems designed partly to pressure Lebanon's government – via the United States and France – while threatening war renewal.

In the Gaza front, IDF forces leverage Hamas ceasefire violations to impose costs on the organization. Initial responses targeted specific violations – operatives crossing the yellow line faced elimination – but now each incident triggers broader strikes (yesterday brought elimination of mid-level Hamas military wing operatives). Palestinian accusations that Israel seeks to destroy the agreement sound exaggerated currently, as Israel apparently pushes the organization toward full agreement compliance, while three deceased hostages remain in Gaza.

Israel won't risk combat resumption without explicit American approval. President Donald Trump currently embraces the agreement – he hosted released living hostages at his office last week – and actively promotes subsequent phases, including unprecedented economic deals with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, some carrying significant Israeli implications. Jerusalem exploits this to pressure Hamas and its Doha and Ankara sponsors, though unlike the Lebanese model, Israeli operational latitude appears limited.

The Judea and Samaria front currently appears most volatile, amid sharply increased Palestinian terror activity and violent incidents – some constituting actual terror – by Jewish extremists. IDF and Shin Bet forces must allocate greater attention to this theater, whose impact exceeds its geographic boundaries: developments there could affect all other theaters and ignite them, carrying extensive political consequences. Last week, the prime minister and defense minister vowed forceful action against Jewish violence, yet senior officials report field measures remain "insufficient and weak." They describe this as "playing with fire" risking loss of control.

Behind activity across these three fronts, Israeli concern about Iranian developments grows. Various international media reports suggest that five months after the first Iran war concluded, parties edge toward a second Iran conflict. Israel particularly worries about accelerated Iranian missile production (reports indicate Iran already possesses missile quantities matching pre-war levels), plus continued refusal to cooperate with the Atomic Energy Committee on its nuclear program.

This intense security activity won't diminish significantly soon. Intensity levels may shift, but challenges persist, requiring defense forces to maintain extensive, complex deployments. Against this backdrop, government efforts advancing the draft evasion law become more conspicuous, directly opposing IDF requirements and Israeli society's needs while spotlighting government preference for immediate interests over long-term state and citizen welfare.

A survey by the Israel Democracy Institute, highlighted by Lilach Shoval, reflects this dynamic. Results underpin low public government trust, with officials perceived as evading October 7 accountability. This contrasts with the IDF, maintaining high public confidence despite troubling declines in commander trust and investigation credibility. The Israeli public views the IDF as a protected institution: preserving this status demands internal reform plus insisting government halt efforts weakening military strength.

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Such fears persist regarding the three remaining fallen hostages in Gaza: Dror Or, Ran Gvili, and Sudthisak Rinthalak. Hamas committed in the deal to return them as well, but it's unclear if it can fulfill that. Senior officials said there are "certain indications" about the possible location of one of the three, though they admitted that for the other two "we're in total darkness."

Israel keeps up the pressure on Hamas over the hostages, mainly through the United States. But now it must also let Washington push forward with its plan for shifting to the next stage of the agreement. The UN Security Council is set to discuss on Monday the creation of a "stabilization force" in Gaza. The Americans are working feverishly to recruit countries that will join the force to be deployed in the Strip (initially along the Egyptian border in Rafah), and it could create several significant headaches for Israel.

The main headache concerns the force's makeup. In Israel, they claim it will get veto power to block soldiers from Turkey or Qatar, but the draft resolution that was published suggests only a "close consultation" with it. Beyond that, the security arrangements to be set opposite it also worry, since for the first time Israel's security will be "privatized" and handed over to foreign forces in a way that could even limit the IDF's freedom of action.

The Americans enjoy significant backing from leading countries in the Arab and Muslim world. Eight of them issued open support for the draft (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, and Turkey), which also explicitly addresses the issue of the Palestinian state.

It's likely the topic will come up too in this week's meeting between President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, which will include another sensitive issue for Israel's security – the possible sale to Saudi Arabia of stealth fighter jets of the F-35 type, which could significantly erode Israel's qualitative edge in the region.

In Washington, they're trying to tie all these moves together, including normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel (which will involve additional countries). But it seems there's room for concern given the gap between Trump's ambitious vision and the reality on the ground, including in Gaza where Hamas still holds sway.

Over the weekend, The New York Times reported that Trump's envoy, Steve Witkoff, is set to meet again with the head of Hamas's political arm, Khalil al-Haya. The two met in Sharm el-Sheikh before the signing of the hostage return and war ceasefire deal, and it turns out Washington maintains a hotline with the organization it committed to dismantling.

Into this diplomatic-security focus also spills the reality in Judea and Samaria. In recent weeks, there has been a sharp rise in the number of violence incidents by Jewish extremists against Palestinians, some of which included harm to IDF forces as well. In the defense establishment, they explain the increase with the olive harvest season, but they warn that "we're a step away from a Duma 2," referring to the tragic Jewish terrorism that killed several family members in a Palestinian village several years ago.

These warnings were voiced in several situation assessments, and even passed on to the political echelon including the possible implications – from an outbreak of a broad wave of violence in Judea and Samaria, and up to a collapse of the Gaza ceasefire and broad clashes with the Muslim world.

Meanwhile, the political leadership maintains silence. The prime minister and the defense minister, who excel at commenting on every matter and issue, say not a word on this explosive topic, which also gets coverage in the international media and statements from foreign statesmen. The motives for their silence are clear – the fear of alienating the political base – but its meaning is a signal to the rioters that they have backing from the country's leadership to continue their actions.

This leadership cowardice, which contradicts the clear interest of the state, is a direct continuation of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Katz's conduct on the exemption from the Haredi conscription law issue being advanced apace, and to a slew of additional matters – the judicial legislation, the legislation against the media, the intense focus on a pardon for Netanyahu – in all of which the public interest is pushed aside. Don Corleone, seated as godfather, already pointed out that everything is personal: In Israel 2025, everything is personal, and also political.

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Savetsky's video caption articulated her intentions plainly as "In response to keffiyeh, I bring you the TICHEL. Styled by my settler queen. Should we bring the tichel to NYC and make it mainstream? I'm feelin it." the influencer wrote. Social media responses arrived swiftly and demonstrated strong support, particularly from female followers who flooded comment sections with enthusiastic reactions. Commenter Julia wrote, "The second style is so you!" while Angie added, "This is fascinating! Please teach us more!" Malka celebrated with "The Jewish queens have united," and Viti urged, "Yes, please make it mainstream, especially in New York."

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One central Hamas operative designated for release is Imad Qawasmeh (52), who has been serving 16 life sentences since 2004 for involvement in a suicide bombing that killed 16 Israelis. According to the Prisoners Organization Media Office, he is one of the "leaders" of the terrorists in prison.

The West Bank resident was involved in offenses including training terrorists, attempted murder, and conspiracy to cause death with intent. Qawasmeh is on the deportation list. During a 2004 operation, after the attack in which he was involved, he was captured by Israeli forces after his house was bombed and he escaped through a tunnel. He has a long history of attacks. He was first sentenced to five years in prison in 1994 when he assisted Hamas' "military wing" logistically. In 1999 he was released after completing his sentence, and eventually returned to terrorist activity in the Second Intifada.

Another Hamas operative designated for release is Qassem Aref Khalil al-Asafreh (36). In 2019 he was arrested after being involved in a stabbing attack in Gush Etzion, in which soldier Dvir Sorek was murdered.

Al-Asafreh was part of a terrorist cell with his cousin and another operative. The cell failed in two attempts before the attack. After the murder they planned another attack. Al-Asafreh is designated for deportation.

Muhammad Aref Samhan (55) is a terrorist who dispatched several suicide bombers, and is responsible for the attack on Bus Line 2, in which 23 people were murdered and 130 others were wounded. He is designated for deportation and belonged to the "Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades," from Fatah, during the Second Intifada.

Ibrahim Muhammad al-Raai (46) is a terrorist belonging to a Tanzim cell of Fatah. He is responsible for a bombing attack in the Casbah in Nablus, in which Osher Damari fell in 2006. Al-Raai was only arrested in 2022. He was recruited remotely by a terrorist from Gaza and worked to recruit additional terrorists. He was also involved in shooting attacks in the area of Joseph's Tomb. From the Shin Bet investigation it emerged that he participated in dozens of shooting attacks against Israeli forces and planting explosives.

One of those designated for release to the West Bank, who is not designated for deportation, is Rashid Mahmoud Omar (48). He was convicted of causing death with intent, membership in a Fatah terrorist cell, shooting at people, attempted murder, and involvement in hostile actions. He was arrested several months after the end of the Second Intifada (summer 2005) in the village of Faraoon in Samaria. He was convicted of the murder of a Palestinian whom he accused of "collaboration with Israel."

Another Fatah operative is Raad Abd al-Aziz (45), who was convicted of offenses including causing death with intent, possession of firearms, attempted murder, and conspiracy to cause death with intent. He is a resident of the Ramallah area who has been in prison for approximately 20 years for terrorist activity in the Second Intifada. Al-Aziz is designated for deportation abroad.

From PIJ, Omar Mahmoud Bassis (60) is designated for release. He is a terrorist convicted of planting explosives, membership in a terrorist organization, shooting at people, and attempted murder. He was also captured during the Second Intifada, in 2004. Also from PIJ, Arafat Hamid Zir (43) is expected to be released to the West Bank area. He was convicted of membership in a terrorist organization, aiding murder, and incitement to murder, and entered prison in 2003.

Faisal Mahmoud Abdullah Khalifa (43) is also set to be released to the Samaria area and not be deported. He is a Hamas operative who has been in security detention since December 2024. He is accused of offenses including membership in a terrorist organization, providing shelter to wanted persons, storing weapons, and conspiracy to cause death with intent.

On the deportation list is Firas Sadiq Muhammad Ghanem (51). He is a security detainee from Jerusalem, who was captured during the Second Intifada. He is accused of offenses including state security, causing death with intent, possession of firearms, attempted murder, conspiracy to cause death with intent, and more. According to the Prisoners Organization, he is accused of participating in attacks when he belonged to the "Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades," the Fatah branch in those years. It was also noted that these attacks led to nine murdered Israelis.

Another person designated for release in the deal is Ibrahim al-Hani (54), a Popular Front operative sentenced to multiple life sentences for involvement in attacks in the Second Intifada. He has been in prison since 2006 and survived an assassination attempt in the past.

Another Popular Front operative is Ibrahim al-Qam (53), who is supposed to be released. He is serving two life sentences for involvement in terrorist activity. He is one of those designated for deportation.

Another Fatah operative designated for deportation is Atiyah Abu Samhadana (56), from the Gaza Strip. He was captured in 1996 for offenses including murder and use of dangerous drugs. He is one of the veteran prisoners, a Rafah resident arrested for terrorist operations. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison, which is supposed to end this month.

From PIJ, Iyad Muhammad Abu al-Rub (51) is designated for release, a senior figure in the organization and "head of the military wing" in Jenin. He is responsible for planning a series of suicide bombings. He was involved in attacks at a club in Tel Aviv and a mall in Netanya. He is designated for deportation.

From Hamas, Alaa al-Din al-Karki (52) is designated for deportation. He is accused of causing death with intent, possession of weapons, throwing Molotov cocktails, attempted murder, and more. Al-Karki has been in prison since 1993.

Ghufran al-Zamel, fiancée of senior Hamas figure in prison Hassan Salameh, whom Israel refuses to release, appealed to Hamas leaders Khalil al-Hayya, Zaher Jabarin, Khaled Mashal, and Muhammad Darwish. "We, the families of veteran prisoners and those sentenced to life imprisonment, demand that you not give up on them. Abandoning them would be breaking a covenant that has lasted more than three decades. Do not abandon Sinwar's will and Muhammad Deif's commitment," she declared.

In the message she also mentioned the names of arch-terrorists Abdullah Barghouti, Ibrahim Hamed, and Abbas al-Sayed, whom she calls to release along with Salameh.

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For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the American president's decision marks a moment to feel relieved. He now possesses a devastating answer for the right-wing sector of the coalition and members of the Likud who continually press for sovereignty. As is recorded in the Book of Esther: "For a writing which is written in the king's name, and sealed with the king's ring, may no one reverse." What Donald Trump determined is now fact – and nothing can be done about it.

The Yesha Council, which managed a very successful and sophisticated campaign both domestically and in Washington, was able to elevate the idea of sovereignty high in public opinion, but it appears the council failed to accurately pick-up the broader diplomatic mood. It was evident in recent weeks that in light of the international anti-Israeli sentiment sweeping countries, it was just unthinkable to further antagonize the international community with that move.

Instead of insisting on sovereignty until the very end, the Yesha Council could have proposed a wise compromise to Donald Trump, Emmanuel Macron, and Benjamin Netanyahu: We will forgo the idea of sovereignty, and in return, the French president will withdraw from the initiative to recognize a Palestinian state. As this did not occur – the bitter outcome now is that Israel both received the international recognition of a Palestinian state and forfeited the sovereignty option – without any compensation. The missed opportunity is unfortunate.

However, there is also a somewhat positive angle to Donald Trump's decision. The American president effectively saved Israel from itself. Sovereignty at this juncture would have exacted extremely heavy political and economic costs, primarily in the form of European sanctions even more severe than those still anticipated to arrive. It is highly questionable how successfully Israel could have practically implemented sovereignty on the ground, given that it has more than enough critical issues on its plate to deal with these days.

Sovereignty will absolutely come eventually – but gradually, at a more appropriate time and under better circumstances. Sometimes the truest friend is the one who understands when to say "no."

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The strategic settlement response

The appropriate response is a Jewish return – strategic, goal-oriented, with the declared purpose of disrupting the feasibility of establishing a Palestinian state, which represents the ultimate threat: damaging our rights, our security, and rewarding the Hamas Palestinian-Nazis and terrorism.

Israel possesses a rich toolbox for on-the-ground action to thwart a Palestinian state. The first settlement plan in line is E-1, the connection plan between Jerusalem and Ma'ale Adumim, which previous US administrations blocked to prevent Israel from severing the building continuity Palestinians seek between northern Judea and Samaria (Ramallah area) and southern Judea and Samaria (Hebron area), and to prevent Israel from creating its own settlement continuity from Jerusalem eastward toward the Dead Sea.

Critical urban development projects

Second in line is the construction of the Jewish neighborhood on Jewish-owned land in Atarot in northern Jerusalem. This construction will determine whether Jerusalem's "northern finger," which Levi Eshkol and his colleagues annexed in 1967, will remain part of the Israeli-Jewish settlement fabric, or whether Palestinians will take control of it and even sovereignly disconnect it from Jerusalem, as they aspire, for their Palestinian state dream.

But this is insufficient. There are additional plans in the pipeline that must be implemented immediately. Declarations won't suffice. The Jordan Valley Regional Council has plans to establish Date Palm City, a large Haredi urban settlement near Jericho, as well as a settlement in the northern valley connecting Shadmot Mehola and Bekaot to Argaman. Currently, the vast area between these settlements is empty of Jewish settlement.

Strategic settlement positioning

Rehavam, scheduled according to the recent Jerusalem Day government decision to be established in the Shilo bloc, is a strategic settlement that will deepen Israeli presence near Route 505, in the section between Kfar Tapuach and Migdalim in Samaria. The same applies to Ma'alot Halchul, also known as Givat Asher, near the Al-Aroub bypass road, where initial settlers have already arrived, but which needs to be established, strengthened, and expanded to become a significant settlement point between Kiryat Arba and Gush Etzion.

Investment in this point, and in similar additional points whose role is to create Jewish settlement continuities in places currently lacking such continuity, will have no less benefit – perhaps even greater – than sovereignty declarations.

A clear message to the world

Unlike in the past, this strategic settlement should not be carried out in the dark or underground. Quite the opposite: Let the world see, understand, and know that the people of Israel have returned to their land, to their ancient homeland; that this homeland is not political currency for trade, and that beyond our security concerns (which are obviously very important), we have an interest in fulfilling the return to Zion, the return to Zion itself. And what is more Zion than Jerusalem and its surroundings, the ancient homeland regions and biblical landscapes of Judea and Samaria?

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@mnor41♬ الصوت الأصلي - منور هرشه

Regavim movement's mapping division was surprised to discover an airplane in aerial photos at the end of 2023 in northern Samaria, adjacent to Qaffin village in the seam zone region. Field coordinators reached the site, documented a structure under construction that resembled an airplane in every way, and reported it to enforcement authorities.

We note that in the entire region, there are many encroachments and hundreds of unauthorized structures.

Over nearly two years, Regavim approached authorities repeatedly, while the location simultaneously developed and transformed into an events and hospitality complex. A reply was received from the Civil Administration, affirming that this is indeed unauthorized construction and stating that enforcement steps were implemented by posting four stop-work orders. The deconstruction will be enforced in accordance with a priority order.

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Israeli military forces under the leadership of the Benjamin Brigade initiated an operation with the goal of targeting terror infrastructure in the vicinity of the villages, Qatana and Qubayba, from which the perpetrators who executed the deadly assault in Jerusalem came.

Throughout the operation, IDF troops encircled multiple villages, surveyed the two residences of the perpetrators who executed the assault, detained over 20 suspects accused of terror activities, searched over 700 objectives, and seized 38 combat items, including firearm components, ammunition clips, and ISIS banners.

Furthermore, in the villages of Qubayba and al-Mughayyir, from which perpetrators recently emerged, buildings and structural elements that were constructed in violation of the law were razed by the Civil Administration. The Manasseh Brigade conducted a simultaneous comprehensive brigade operation during the week in the Sanur Valley, Qabatiya, and the Jenin vicinity.

Brigade troops neutralized multiple terrorists, detained various terror operatives, and seized dozens of thousands of shekels derived from terror financing along with combat weapons. Within the framework of the operation in the Manasseh Brigade, three terrorist residences were razed, and in the Ephraim and Judah brigades, two more terrorist residences were razed.

Throughout operations in the Etzion and Samaria brigades, 21 suspects were detained, among them perpetrators who hurled rocks. The suspects who were detained and the arms that were seized were handed over for processing by the Judea and Samaria District Police and the Shin Bet.

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Video: Twenty years after they were forcibly evacuated, families from the expelled residents of Sa-Nur and young couples have coalesced as a nucleus preparing for return and rebuilding the settlement / Credit: Samaria Regional Council

Dagan said at the meeting, "We are beginning a historic step today, the first session lasting two and a half hours of the founding nucleus of the renewed Sa-Nur settlement. The Government of Israel, led by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, made a strategic and historic decision to return Jewish settlement to Sa-Nur in an official, state-sponsored, and complete manner. This step is not only a correction for the expelled families or for this nucleus of families, it is a national correction," Dagan added.

According to him, "What enabled the Holocaust of October 7, which led us to horror and the continuing war, is directly the expulsion from Gush Katif and northern Samaria. The nucleus here is consolidating in the coming months, to create settlement work, community work, together with all government ministries, and the State of Israel will rebuild northern Samaria and with God's help, also Gush Katif."

Religious Zionism party chairman and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who led the government decision, blessed the move and said, "Historic correction, the return to Sa-Nur – Zionism at its best. Twenty years after the expulsion and this year is a peak year in which we established 50 new settlements in Judea and Samaria."

"We re-established Sa-Nur, and establishing this return nucleus is truly good news. We are correcting the injustice in northern Samaria, and God willing, we will also correct the injustice of the expulsion from Gush Katif. I feel the fruits of the terror that sprouted in Gaza with enormous pain – the time for correction has come," he added.

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