A 2020 Kremlin propaganda broadcast showed a state television reporter walking through a doorway and appearing to emerge in a press conference, but the two spaces existed in completely separate cities. Investigators exposed the deception after detecting that door handle height varied between filming segments, confirming the material had been captured at distinct sites. While the existence of identical rooms had been speculated about previously, analysts had not successfully differentiated among them until researchers verified their conclusions through travel records from state television journalists and security personnel.

What a fantastic article.

"Almost every meeting said to have been filmed at Novo-Ogaryovo this year actually took place at Valdai as Putin has become increasingly concerned about security"

How tiny details expose Putin's location https://t.co/3pymMNjWhi pic.twitter.com/fe4o0ijrZi

— Ken Moriyasu (@kenmoriyasu) November 16, 2025

"It's obviously about security," Konstantin Gaaze, a Russian academic and autocracy expert, told RFL. "It would look unbecoming to put Pantsir [air defences] on the Kremlin towers… So, naturally, the main location now is Valdai." Systema's analysis determined that Putin has shown a growing preference for his extensively protected Valdai compound following the commencement of comprehensive warfare in Ukraine, with nearly every gathering described as filmed at Novo-Ogaryovo this year actually occurring at Valdai as Putin's security anxieties have intensified.

The isolated Valdai retreat, allegedly housing Putin's partner Alina Kabaeva and their two sons, occupies a peninsula considered substantially more difficult to strike with missiles or unmanned aircraft. Satellite photography demonstrates that 12 Pantsir-S1 air defense installations were positioned around Lake Valdai during summer 2024, as Kyiv escalated its unmanned aircraft strikes on Russian territory. In comparison, only 60 such installations protect the entire Moscow metropolitan region, which has over 20 million residents, according to The Moscow Times.

Ukrainian unmanned aircraft have appeared near Putin's Kremlin workspace and allegedly triggered a blaze close to his Black Sea palace complex – the facility once renowned for its aquatic entertainment space, exotic dancing chamber, water pipe lounge, and small-scale train system. Strike concerns have compelled Putin to modify his residential and working configurations, despite all his residences being equipped with underground shelters. Previous reports by opposition publication Proekt claimed Putin had demolished his Stalin-era Bocharov Ruchey summer residence, previously utilized for hosting foreign officials, amid worries it was susceptible to Ukrainian strikes.

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A few weeks ago, when news articles were published about Russia's attempts to undermine the government of a certain European state, by chance I met with the ambassador of that particular country. After having expressed my disdain with these events, he responded by telling me that Israel is the one that really should be concerned. "We at least are aware of the problem and are adopting measures to contend with it," he said earnestly, "you simply prefer to turn a blind eye."

But not everybody here in Israel is turning a blind eye to the situation. Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Daniel Rakov, an analyst at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS), recently published an illuminating study on the manner in which Russia, from early 2023, has been operating an entire setup to influence public sentiment and intervene in Israel's domestic scene, as well as the ensuing threat that this poses.

"During 2023, I began to receive screenshots of posts on Facebook, which at first sight appeared to be nothing more than an interesting anecdote: the posts were written in rather poorly-worded Hebrew and were seasoned with graphic language that the average Israeli would find it difficult to relate to, with the common denominator in them all being the attempt to promote pro-Russian messages. The longer this went on, the more it became clear that it involved an organized campaign, and then a growing number of indications showed that this campaign was not limited to Hebrew alone – it was being conducted simultaneously in an additional 12 languages. In late 2023, one of the European intelligence services that had decided to 'get to grips' with this issue, exposed the original documents used in the planning of the Russian campaign. An obscure Telegram channel then leaked another document, and this led to the uncovering of the Russian modus operandi and the scope of the entire operation."

Rakov, who served for 20 years in the IDF's Military Intelligence Directorate and is a former research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies' (INSS) Russia program, was naturally interested above all in the Israeli aspect of the Russian influence and disinformation campaign and just how it forms part of Russia's overall strategy in relation to Israel. He is now uncovering them for the first time, and these exposures should be of prime concern to both the public as a whole and the policymakers in particular.

The Russian campaign is based on the clone or doppelganger system – whereby they set up dummy websites that mimic websites of familiar Israeli media outlets (Walla, N12, Jerusalem Post, etc.) or those that do not exist at all, but whose names have a strong genuine ring to them ("Jerusalem Herald Tribune", for example) and then publish articles in them that are designed to promote the Russian agenda, on occasions these appear to be signed by renowned Israeli journalists and writers. The innocent reader, who has been led to these impostor websites via links or other forms of bait, probably has no idea that he was visiting a fake website rather than the genuine thing. He will then have read refined Russian propaganda in relation to the war in Ukraine, wrapped up in the apparent opinion of a highly esteemed Israeli columnist.

'Turning the screws' – applying forceful influence in Hebrew

In a similar vein to the dummy websites, the most popular social media in Israel – Facebook and 'X' (formerly Twitter) – were inundated with short posts, which were also allegedly written by Israeli users, accompanied by eye-catching graphics, usually involving a caricature. All of these used sophisticated methods to portray Russian messages, but obviously without any noticeable Russian signature. The Russians bought the posts via Facebook's online publicity shop, and an army of chatbots reverberated and shared them in order to afford them authenticity, Rakov explains. Due to Meta's transparency policy, it is possible to uncover this scheme, but only in retrospect. In real time, the posts appeared to regular web surfers to be authentic posts of other Israelis who simply sought to express their concern about our country, and so it is not surprising that many of them shared them and even helped some of them go viral, precisely in accordance with the plan concocted somewhere in the dark depths of the Russian security services' misinformation campaigns.

"The Russians' expectations of profiting from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's return to office were not met. They really hoped that the Right would be an easy target for them, this however was not the case. Netanyahu even failed to phone Putin for two months to hear the Russian president congratulate him on being re-elected, and this was clearly an intentional move. Even later on, until after October 7, they did not speak to one another. Moscow had now come to grasp the fact that the golden era of the flourishing relations with Jerusalem had come to end, and so they decided to exert pressure on Israel via their aggressive influence and disinformation campaign. This will not stop and it will only expand and grow."

"They really do operate according to an orderly, detailed plan," Rakov stresses, and points out that he managed to lay his hands on the plan, or more accurately the proposed plan of action. The three campaign objectives, listed below, that appear in it constitute blatant intervention in Israel's internal affairs: to drive a wedge between Jerusalem and Washington, to cause Israel to adopt a policy that is more palatable for Moscow, and to force it to refrain from providing Ukraine with any diplomatic or military support.

Rakov admits that as a regular Facebook user, he himself was not subjected to the publicity of the Russian campaign by the algorithm. He imagines that his internet profile, as it is reflected on social media, is not appropriate for the target profile defined by whichever Russian figure is behind the campaign. Who then is an appropriate figure for being targeted? For example, marginal groups such as conspiracy aficionados. "These are groups that tend to believe in sensational news, and so they are much more gullible and prone to be influenced," Rakov claims and reminds us that during the Covid-19 pandemic, the Russians were involved in a relentless effort to promote opposition to the inoculations and they stirred up anti-vaccine feelings, with a view to increasing the sense of discontent and chaos in those countries singled out by them as rivals.

"Even prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russians were busy spreading conspiracy theories designed to create and intensify the opposition to the vaccines, and once the pandemic was already underway, this became much easier, as COVID-19 aroused genuine concern and strong emotional responses," he explains, "I began to take an in-depth look at the issue of the Russian influence on the web and its ability to spread disinformation some years ago already. At that time, I came across a number of figures who appeared to be pro-Russian influencers par excellence, but there were no unequivocal signs of an organized campaign, certainly not in Hebrew. The new element now is that they are exerting relentless pressure via the influence campaign in Hebrew: somebody is taking the trouble to operate it in a language that does not boast masses of users globally, to say the least. This might be the result of a combination of the need and the accessibility of the modern technology, the AI tools, which have made this subversive activity in foreign languages, such as Hebrew, into a much easier and mainly much less expensive method.

"The overall idea is to take advantage of the rapidly changing news agenda in Israel, both in relation to domestic and foreign issues – mainly pertaining to Israel's relations with the USA and Europe, and to fraudulently plant propaganda messages in the news. To forcibly forge a link between burning issues in Israel and the line that corresponds with Russian policy, so as to explain that it is worthwhile for Israel to engage in conduct that is in line with the Russian interest, and all of this is to be attained without even mentioning Russia at all."

Q: What are the messages being put forward by the campaign?

"One of the key messages, even prior to October 7, was that the entire world is against Israel, that everybody has abandoned us, leaving us to our own dire fate, and so we should concentrate our efforts on our own affairs alone rather than looking farther afield, in other words, Ukraine. Additional, supporting messages were added to this: 'Providing aid to Ukraine will cost Israel a lot of money,' 'Ukraine is a backstabber,' 'the Ukrainians are Nazis,' and so on. Following the October 7 attacks, the Russians began to strike on the most sensitive chords of Israel's raw and wounded soul, with a great degree of cynicism. For example, they used the campaign to disseminate a completely fake 'news item', claiming that the weapon systems supplied to Ukraine by the West had been or were to be transferred from Ukraine to Gaza, and in the initial days following the horrific October 7 massacre, they ran with this fake news story, pushing it extremely hard. The result of this concerted effort was so successful that it managed to ensnare many believers and was even echoed on the broadcasts of Israel's national Kan 11 channel, even though it didn't contain one iota of truth."

In other cases, the Russian campaign did actually base its stories on a grain of truth, but it distorted it to such an extent for its own needs that nothing remained of that original minutely small grain of truth. Rakov: "Take, for example, the popular grievance in Israel against the current US administration of President Joe Biden, that it is not providing Israel with sufficient support and thus in effect placing obstacles on Israel's path to victory over the enemy. This is a genuine claim and many Israelis share that view, and it is precisely because of that the Russians have 'jumped on the bandwagon' and are trying to exploit this as far as possible. Their message is both extremely Machiavellian and infuriating: it calls on Israel not to build any partnership with the 'double-dealing' Washington, that the Americans are 'betraying Israel and support the Palestinians,' thus subtly implying that Israel would do well to align with Moscow's interests – this is the very same Moscow that stands by Israel's bitterest enemies, arms them to the teeth, promotes staunchly anti-Israel resolutions in the UN Security Council and is continually trumpeting the false accusation that Israel is perpetrating genocide. The same Moscow that hosted the Hamas leadership, even after the October 7 massacre, and refuses to consider either Hamas or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) as terrorist organizations. If the Biden administration is two-faced, then the 2024 model Putin regime has only one face – an extremely ugly, anti-Israeli face."

Playing on the rifts

It is important to demonstrate just how the Russian campaign deftly maneuvers between the Right and the left in Israel, skillfully tailoring for each political camp those messages that it will readily identify with. "Prior to October 7, as long as the judicial reform and the attempts of its opponents to stymie it were still occupying pole position on Israel's national agenda, the Russian influence campaign compared the demonstrations in Israel with Kyiv's central square, Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square), in other words, it ostensibly picked sides and elected to support the Right," explains Rakov.

However, this is only an apparent, facade of support, as the main component of right-wing ideology in Israel – the Jewish people's absolute right to the land – is completely opposed to Russia's stance, and it is actually constantly working at full throttle against this, which should really define it as an ideological partner for Israel's left wing. Following October 7, this gap became substantially wider: The right wing in Israel is demanding to continue with the war effort until total victory is achieved over its enemies, while the Russians demand and are trying hard to stop the war and to save Hamas.

Rakov provides an explanation: "The Russians do not actually support any political camp, but they are simply seeking to increase and intensify the existing rifts and discord in Israel in order to exploit them for their own benefit. They did not seek to promote or prevent the judicial reform in Israel, but just hoped to push Israel further down the slope towards the abyss of internal conflict, so that it would not be able to adopt a foreign policy that is opposed to the will and whim of the Kremlin.

"This is how the influence campaign works – the Russians identify the genuine issues that are preoccupying Israeli society, and they then cunningly use these issues to promote the Russian interest, which is completely detached from Israel's affairs. Increasing internal schisms and fragmentation and fanning the flames of discontent are a typical mode of the subversive operations conducted by Russia in other places around the globe too. They fully appreciate that when a specific country is plagued by polarization, and there are significant rifts, the government of that state is forced to focus its efforts on addressing those rifts and thus finds it difficult to make any decisions that are subject to broad dispute, it then develops into a feeble government, which is always a valuable positive for the Russians. The overall atmosphere in a country torn apart by such strife turns it into easy prey for external intervention. Israel is thus a location that almost automatically invites such intervention, as we are a society dogged by dispute and strife, so that a foreign power has absolutely no need to make any effort to invent any rifts, all it has to do is to exploit the existing, authentic divisions, which generate strong authentic emotions. It is precisely these emotions that Moscow is trying to capitalize on in order to address its own needs."

It is in this context that Rakov presents his key scoop – the precise timing at which the Russians decided to begin their disinformation campaign in Hebrew, and the explanation for that timing: "The Russians' expectations of profiting from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's return to office were not met. They really hoped that the Right would be an easy target for them, this however was not the case. Netanyahu even failed to phone Putin for two months to hear the Russian president congratulate him on being re-elected, and this was clearly an intentional move. Even later on, until after October 7, they did not speak to one another. Moscow had now come to grasp the fact that the golden era of the flourishing relations with Jerusalem had come to end, and so they decided to exert pressure on Israel via their aggressive influence and disinformation campaign. This will not stop and it will only expand and grow."

Q: What are the metrics for the influence campaign's success as far as the Russians are concerned?

"The exposure of the original dashboards used by the organizers of the influence campaign by the European intelligence service gives us a rare glimpse into the Russian way of thinking. These dashboards portray, week after week, the real data that are of interest to them and which are measured on a permanent basis. First and foremost, these are the parameters that any marketing manager of a publicity campaign would be measuring and monitoring: exposure data and the number of visits, shares and clicks on links. On the next level, as is the case in any enterprise or plant – and as far as the Russians are concerned this is a plant that 'manufactures' influence – the quantitative results of production are measured and monitored: how many posts have been manufactured by one department, how many graphics have been manufactured by another department, and how any websites has an additional department built. We should not underestimate the seriousness of this overall apparatus, which includes a dedicated creative team, a team in charge of statistical data collection, and even a team whose job is to conduct research and polls.

"In addition, the Russians have displayed an extremely robust ability to learn, as they regularly check which posts work and which don't. The campaign is becoming more and more sophisticated and responds to changes or attempts to block it. Thus, for example, the Russians now prefer to use fewer caricatures, as the mechanism employed by Facebook succeeds in identifying them and thus turn them into suspect posts. In place of caricatures, they have opted for other graphic means. They are constantly improving the language they use and are perhaps even employing somebody here who is helping them with their efforts to write content. At least according to the document that I have, they are supposed to employ Israeli field correspondents.

Q: Dry quantitative data do not necessarily tell us whether an influence campaign has actually attained its political objectives.

"Correct. It is very difficult to isolate and measure the specific effectiveness of foreign influence. But the Russians firmly believe in this tool and they are convinced that it works when employed en masse and over the course of time. In a certain sense, this might make it easier for the designers of the Russian campaign and their managers to report mass successes up the chain. They can present the increasing viewing data and thus take pride in the fact that the campaign is achieving its goals. Is Israel supplying arms to Ukraine? The fact is that Israel is not doing so. Are the relations between Israel and the USA not at their best? That is indeed the current situation. There you are – we have succeeded, they will be able to tell their superiors."

Q: Who are those superiors?

"The Russian influence campaign is headed by an extremely powerful individual – the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia, Sergey Kiriyenko. Kiriyenko is a representative of the most powerful group in Russia today, which comprises both oligarchs, such as the Kovalchuk brothers, and the controlling figures in the security services, the atomic industry and the business world. Another representative from this group was recently appointed Chairman of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, a position akin to our State Comptroller. In slightly less diplomatic terms, via this mechanism they have both senior government officials and the business elite over a barrel."

They like to take risks

The damage incurred by Israel as a result of Russia's propaganda activity is often invisible, but it is definitely felt. Rakov: "Firstly, from my conversations with colleagues in other locations where Russia's disinformation machine have been put to work, we know that after they operate over a prolonged period of time, they tend to undermine the local population's trust in their state and its institutions. They become accustomed to not believing the official line at all. If this is not sufficient, then part of the Russian influence campaign across the international media is really capitalizing on Israel's tragedy. When the Russians daub the Holocaust Memorial in Paris with graffiti depicting bloodied hands in the style of the terrorists who conducted the lynch against Vadim Nurzhitz and Yossi Avrahami – may God avenge them – in Ramallah in 2000, or they mark houses in France with the Magen David, as if this were in preparation for carrying out a pogrom, and then the influence campaign reverberates this, it could easily lead to attacks on Jews. Beyond that, it is important to remember that the current influence campaign is not a lone-standing, isolated tool. In addition to it, there are numerous other weapons available in Russia's arsenal of subversion, and Russia is not afraid to use them.

"For example, they operate a number of TV channels in Russian and other languages, and millions of people in other countries watch them and are highly susceptible to the disinformation broadcast by them, which may shape their way of thinking and their view of reality. I, for example, can see my father-in-law and mother-in-law, both of whom are Israelis of Ukrainian descent, opposing the Russian invasion, but avidly continuing to consume the propaganda broadcasts of Russia's state TV channel as part of their cable TV package. Something from these broadcasts certainly manages to permeate and take root. Finally, we know from other spheres that the Russians are perfectly capable of working together with organized crime in order to generate provocations. This is currently a clear and present danger, as the Russian security services feel extremely confident and perhaps even untouchable after two years of upheaval and restructuring."

Q: What are Russia's other MOs?

"There are a multitude of them. One of them is the tendentious use of statements made by well-known senior Israeli figures. The Russians take clips of retired senior IDF commanders, they then subject these clips to 'heavy editing', they remove parts that are either irrelevant to the context or even oppose the overall context, and thus in effect they create a propaganda product under the compelling title of 'Israeli general recommends that Ukraine should surrender.' Another trick is to phone Israeli experts and ask to supposedly interview them. In this case too, the 'interview' is edited to provide a 'slanted' or 'loaded' product and is then later presented as an authentic clip of the interview in support of the Russian stance. The editors of these interviews are usually investigative journalists working for Russian media outlets, and alongside their day job they also work for the Russian influence and disinformation campaign.

"Many have fallen into this trap: a reserve IAF brigadier general who participated in the strike on the nuclear reactor in Iraq back in 1981, Israel's former ambassador to Moldova, another former security official who appears on the media on numerous occasions. You would expect that such people, with their experience and background in the security establishment, would be equipped with a heightened sense of caution as second nature, but such an expectation is clearly too much. Afterwards, go and look for the person who interviewed you. By the way, on more than one occasion these clips have turned up in Russian campaigns in other theaters and countries too, as a statement made by a senior Israeli caries considerable weight. On the whole, the Russians invest efforts to study the Israeli theater – if and when they elect to expand their operations and to intensify them, they will readily be able to do so."

Q: When is this likely to occur?

"If and when we carry out actions that the Russians are particularly not fond of, especially if Israel is in a crisis that makes it much more vulnerable. If we decide to wage war on Hezbollah in the north and we hit the Russians, then their entire influence and disinformation mechanism will be turned against us. Israel is not currently at the focus of the Russian campaign, and only 5-6 percent of its products are directed at the Israeli population. Based on our experience in other locations, election campaigns tend to lead to a rise in Russian intervention. This doesn't mean that the Russians are necessarily constantly trying to promote a candidate or a party list. The very fact that they are engaged in this effort causes damage to the country that they have chosen as a target. Just take a look at the USA: former President Donald Trump was forced to spend the four years of his term of office under constant investigation and with a large cloud looming over the legitimacy of his administration, only because the Russian influence and disinformation machine, which was then headed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder of the infamous Wagner Group, who has since died, and the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, the SVR, leaked the documents of the Democratic Party, creating the impression that the Russians were aiding the Republicans.

"The Russians take clips of retired senior IDF commanders, they then subject these clips to 'heavy editing', they remove parts that are either irrelevant to the context or even oppose the overall context, and thus in effect they create a propaganda product under the compelling title of 'Israeli general recommends that Ukraine should surrender.' Another trick is to phone Israeli experts and ask to supposedly interview them. In this case too, the 'interview' is edited to provide a 'slanted' or 'loaded' product and is then later presented as an authentic clip of the interview in support of the Russian stance. The editors of these interviews are usually investigative journalists working for Russian media outlets, and alongside their day job they also work for the Russian influence and disinformation campaign.

"Having said that, we cannot rule out the possibility that under certain scenarios, they will try to help whatever political party they deem to be of use to them, and then all the resources will be channeled into that particular objective. They like to take risks, for example, to have somebody run who is sufficiently desperate to accept their help. I have come across an individual who made aliyah about six months prior to the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, after working in the Kremlin in the field of political influence. He was traveling around Israel, captivated by the dream of establishing a list here that would unite the entire 'Russian street', and he became obsessed with the idea that this would be able to either throne or dethrone a government."

Q: Why has Israel not yet opted to take action to curb these Russian attempts to sow disinformation?

"The security authorities did approach the Russians with a demand to cease their activity, but the Russians ignored this and they continue to operate here full steam ahead. Although Facebook does remove the Russians' propaganda posts, as this in breach of its policy (the paid publisher of the post must declare its political content, which of course the Russians fail to do), but then new posts reappear in no time at all. The Chinese, the Iranians, Hamas and other Sunni groups too are all engaged in efforts to operate propaganda machines, but countries such as Russia have greater power and resources. In Israel, in contrast to other countries, the authorities have yet to attribute the appropriate degree of gravity to this threat. In France, for example, there is a dedicated government agency tasked with fighting against disinformation, and in other countries too this issue is afforded priority treatment by the local security establishment. In Israel, unfortunately, this is not yet the case."

The post Exposed: How Russia tries to exert influence on public opinion in Israel appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

Last Monday's edition of the Novaya Gazeta newspaper was perhaps one of the most festive ever. It was the first edition following the announcement by the Nobel Prize Committee, which suddenly transformed the newspaper's editor, Dmitry Muratov, into an international star.

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He became the third Russian to win the Nobel Peace Prize, joining the scientist and human rights activist Andrei Sakharov (1975), and the last leader of the Soviet Union Mikhael Gorbachev (1990). Surprisingly, however, the entire front page of the historic edition was devoted to the joint winner of the prize, the Filipino journalist Maria Ressa.

"You see that? You didn't guess!" Muratov joked over the telephone from Moscow, during an exclusive interview with Israel Hayom. "We thought about that front page at the editorial meeting on Saturday morning and decided to go with it. For us, it's a matter of principle: our faces aren't the story, our workers aren't the story, and especially not my face either.

The story is the wonderful face of Maria Ressa, because she is really a courageous woman: a person who on her own set out to destroy the dictatorship in her country. I'll tell you more: we invited her to Moscow to be hosted by us at the newspaper and so she can give a talk to students and the newspaper staff."

This neatly summarizes the Novaya Gazeta ethos: absolute self-awareness of public service rooted in an extreme sense of professional modesty. Even in the era of social media and journalists who are too focused on themselves, as chief editor of Novaya Gazeta and even as winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, to never forget one basic principle: the journalist isn't the story.

Ironically, however, and even tragically, over the years the Novaya staff became the focus of coverage as six of them paid the price with their lives: Igor Domnikov was murdered in 2000 after he criticized a regional vice governor; in 2003 Yury Shchekochikhin was probably poisoned by radioactive materials after a series of threats; Anastasia Baburova and Stanislav Markelov, who investigated the extreme right in Russia, were murdered in the center of Moscow in 2009 by a Neo-Nazi activist and his girlfriend; that same year, Natalya Estemirova, an investigative journalist in Chechnya, was abducted and shot dead near the Kavkaz federal road in the Republic of Ingushetia; and, of course, Anna Politkovskaya, who was already a legendary journalist in her own lifetime, and was almost synonymous with the newspaper.

Despite being editor of Novaya Gazeta for 25 years (apart from a short break), Muratov is careful to clarify that, from his perspective, he is only the emissary. "The prize was not given to us, and definitely not myself, and therefore I relate to its award coolly," he says. "I am extremely grateful to the Nobel Committee. Thanks to them it can be said openly that the fallen and the living won one of the most humanistic prizes in the world."

Without doubt, Politkovskaya is the central figure in the burden of grief that the newspaper carries. Close to the entrance of the office at Potapovsky Alley 3 in Moscow is a large monument embossed with her face. The garden close to the entrance plaza carries her name. So does the annual prize that the newspaper awards to outstanding journalists.

Politkovskaya was a legend in her own lifetime, when she became the first journalist to expose the horrors that took place during the Second Chechen War – including and perhaps mainly those perpetrated by the Russian Army itself. In the incomprehensible hell that was the North Caucasus republic, Politkovskaya became the address for hundreds of Chechens whose authorities – both federal and local – didn't care about the kidnapping, murder, and rape of their loved ones.

In the newspaper's editorial office in Moscow the staff knew she was in her office if the corridor leading to it had 30-40 Chechen adults – injured, exhausted, crying. In 2004 she interviewed Ramzan Kadyrov, who was then deputy prime minister and is today the republic's "Sultan," in which he menaced her.

"I was expecting them to shoot me in the back at any moment," she said. Politkovskaya was also a known human rights activist, and since her name preceded her, she tried to negotiate – in vain – with the terrorist group that had taken control of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow in October 2002. It is no surprise that, over the years, she accumulated many enemies in the corridors of power, for whom her uncompromising struggle – in the spirit of the newspaper's work – for human rights, was a spoke in their wheels.

In 2004, while she was on a flight to independently negotiate at Beslan, where Islamist terrorists held more than 300 hostages at a school, she was poisoned, but survived.

In October 2006 Politkovskaya's luck ran out. An assassin was waiting for her in the elevator of her building and shot her at point-blank range, killing her. Her murder became a shadow that clouds the Novaya Gazeta in particular, and the relationship between the Russian authorities and the free media in general.

The reason: for 15 years, every effort has been made to cover up the affair, maybe because it became clear – only thanks to an investigation by the newspaper itself – that one of the organizers of the murder was the head of the Moscow police surveillance department, who assisted the assassins in exchange for a bribe.

Following Politkovskaya's assassination, Putin had remarked that "her killing had caused greater damage to Russia than her writings."

Oct. 7 marked 15 years since her murder and the statute of limitations has now expired.

"The unsolved murders of our colleagues made clear that one can deal with journalists as one wishes if for any reason their work is inconsistent with the interests of the authorities," Muratov says in the film This is How They Murdered Anna, which was released last week. "What do the authorities care about public opinion? And also, for society itself it doesn't matter what happens with journalists. This lack of punishment only increases the feeling of subjugation; it transforms [Russian] journalism to a profession that is incompatible with everyday life."

Later, the officer in the Moscow police, who ran the surveillance division, pleaded guilty in the framework of a plea bargain, and was sentenced to 12 years in prison. The murderer – a Chechen youth – and his uncle, a senior figure in the underworld, were sentenced to life imprisonment. The uncle later died under unclear circumstances in jail. The big question remains open: who ordered the murder, which was a watershed moment in the annals of the newspaper and Russian journalism?

Q: Fifteen years have passed since the murder. Do you believe that the person behind the murder will still be uncovered?

"It's not a question of faith," Muratov responds. "I can tell you that there is the official Kremlin position, according to which there is no expiry date [to the case]. That's good. The investigatory committee told us that the investigation is ongoing. They didn't even bother telling us who the investigator is. But we found the main witness in the case. And we will certainly discover him [whoever ordered the murder]."

Even today Novaya Gazeta is under threat. In March a motorcyclist wearing overalls came to the newspaper's offices and sprayed chemical materials at the entrance. After publishing another investigation about the horrors of the Chechen dictatorship, commanders of the Akhmat Kadyrov Battalion – for all intents and purposes the private army of the Chechen president – recorded a film with explicit threats to the newspaper, which according to them is slandering the battalion. The reason: a series of exposés about how members of the division are involved in torture in Chechnya.

Q: Six of your journalists have been murdered over the years. Have you been threated? Are you yourself not worried?

"We don't answer the question about whether or not we are worried. 'Not frightened,' an idiot would say, while 'Frightened' is how a stupid person would answer."

Muratov, 59, is part of a group of journalists who founded Novaya Gazeta in 1993 with the aim of exposing corruption, illegal detentions, torture, fraudulent elections and human stories, with an emphasis on the suffering of patients with incurable rare diseases who find it nearly impossible to get funding for medicines.

Over the years the newspaper – where 76% of the shares are held by the staff and the remainder are divided between businessman Alexander Lebedev and Gorbachev – exposed outrageous scandals in Russia: from the money laundering of 20 billion dollars to the rape and murder of a young Chechen woman by a colonel in the Russian army, from the failures of the authorities during operations to free hostages to the persecution of homosexuals in Chechnya.

The newspaper and its staff have won more than 40 professional and international prizes, including the US State Department International Women of Courage award, and now the Nobel Prize joins its ranks. An amusing anecdote there is that The prestigious Women of Courage award was given to the newspaper's Head of Investigations, Yelena Milashina, with whom Muratov was having an intense professional argument when the phone rang last Friday morning.

"I saw three calls from Oslo, I thought it was an unwanted call and I continued to talk," said the chief editor, who screened the call without knowing that it was from the Nobel committee.

The committee explained that, despite the oppression and the murder of its journalists, Muratov "has refused to abandon the newspaper's independent policy. He has consistently defended the right of journalists to write anything they want about whatever they want, as long as they comply with the professional and ethical standards of journalism." The committee also lauded their efforts "to safeguard freedom of expression, which is a precondition for democracy and lasting peace."

Novaya's independence and freedom of expression became even clearer over the past year, in light of the tightening chokehold on the rest of the independent Russian media. Some of them were blocked on the internet, another was classified as an undesirable organization and was closed, others were classified as "inciting organizations," but most were classified with a stroke of a pen as "foreign agents" – a status that limits the financial possibilities of the media and is designed to sentence them to a slow death.

It's no surprise that, in the eyes of many, the awarding of the prize to a Russian journalist – and on the day after the anniversary of Politkovskaya's murder – is seen as a sign of protest against the Kremlin and a sign of support for the free media in the country.

The Novaya is also seen as a candidate for the blacklist, but it seemingly has two factors in its defense – the fact that six of its journalists were murdered for doing their job, and now its editor-in-chief boasts a Nobel Prize. Still, earlier this week, the Russian president noted that while Muratov was not considered a foreign agent, no achievement will help him escape said definition if he broke the law.

Muratov himself jokes that, if they are required to carry the fictitious "Mark of Cain" of "foreign agent" and attach the disclaimer required by the law to the newspaper's articles, he will be happy to add the words "Nobel Prize Laureate" to the official formulation of "This material is presented by a foreign agent."

"We will use the prize to fight on behalf of the Russian media, who they are trying to suppress. We will try to help people who have become 'foreign agents,' and are being persecuted and expelled from the country."

Q: You said that a portion of the prize money will be used to support persecuted journalists.

"Yes, we discussed this in the editorial meeting," Muratov says. "We've divided up the money that we haven't received yet. In relation to our colleagues who are being illegally censored and illegally persecuted, there will be two things. One of them is still a secret. The other is that the money from the prize will increase the amount that will be given to winners of the Politkovskaya Prize. This prize is awarded to a journalist chosen by the prize committee."

Q: How do you explain the increased pressure on Russian journalists? The number of "foreign agents" has tripled in the last year.

"I have an unpopular theory. The issue is this: In our parliament we don't have legislators who represent people with different positions about the future of the country. And people like that, with a different point of view, number 10-15 million, maybe 20 million. It's the minority. Because there are no legislators to represent this minority, the independent media will represent them.

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"The small and independent media, which increased, expressed different positions. But because the authorities stopped cooperating with this minority, they tried to liquidate their independent media, so that the positions of the representatives of this minority won't be expressed in public."

Q: One of your colleagues recently said: "In Russia, journalism that doesn't defend human rights is not journalism at all."

"I support her, of course. You have to understand, the controversy over whether journalism is just observation or an intervention in life has continued for over 100 years. We are totally convinced that journalism is intervention in life. That before taking a picture of an injured child you dress his wounds. That's our position."

Q: So a journalist in Russia is more than a journalist? He's a public figure?

"I don't know; I don't like the expression 'public figure.' Simply put, the journalist has to change the world for the better. And for the sake of this he needs not only to write but also to change the world. It's true, it contradicts objectivity, it contradicts the perspective of the observant journalist. But I can tell you that this newspaper participates in events and we will help sick children with serious illnesses, and we will demand that people who poisoned the Arctic Ocean will pay a fine."

Q: What's does "for the better" mean? How do you decide what issues will improve the world and what to be involved in?

"Everything that's connected to human rights, the rights of human beings to live, to breathe clean air, for pure water, for the same living conditions that we call human – that's the whole criterion."

The humanistic approach has been a part of the newspaper since its founding and it isn't coincidental that most of its staff also work in the area of defending basic human rights, that are so easily trampled on in Russia. But from Muratov's perspective, this approach has another clear anchor. "It's the humanistic tradition of Russian literature. For example, in his travel diary to the island of Sakhalin, Chekhov writes that he isn't merely conducting a survey of the population but he is also a nobleman who aids those who toil in backbreaking labor. That's us. That's our story."

Q: Do you see yourselves as continuing in the tradition of Dostoyevsky, Chekhov, and Tolstoy?

"Yes, that's the line and essentially even more than that: we share a common field. Look, until now we have placed – and maybe we are outdated in this regard…do you remember what the title was of the Nobel Prize speech given by Andrei Sakharov? 'Peace, progress and human rights.' That was the main thesis of the speech. Progress and human rights. There is a point of view that thinks it is possible to have progress without protecting human rights, and that's the totalitarian version, while we think that progress and human rights cannot be disentangled."

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Russia's daily coronavirus infections soared Thursday to their highest level so far this year as authorities have struggled to control a surge in new cases amid a slow pace in vaccinations and few restrictions in place.

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The daily coronavirus death toll topped 900 for a second straight day, with 924 new deaths reported Thursday – a day after reaching a record 929.

Russia already has Europe's highest death toll in the pandemic – topping 213,000 – and a conservative way of calculating the number suggests the actual number could be even higher.

Despite surging infections, the Kremlin has shrugged off the idea of imposing a new nationwide lockdown, delegating the power to tighten restrictions to regional authorities.

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About 500 demonstrators, many of whom wore face masks branded with the word "no", chanted calls for Putin to resign and held up banners against the reforms.

Police surrounded them and began making arrests late in the evening after participants started a march down one of the city's main boulevards, with officers in riot gear forcefully rounding up protesters and placing them in vans.

Over a hundred people were detained, according to the rights monitoring group OVD-info. There was no immediate confirmation from police or the government on numbers of arrests.

A vote earlier this month amended Russia's constitution, handing Putin the right to run for two more presidential terms, an outcome the Kremlin described as a triumph.

Opposition activists say the vote was illegitimate and that it is time for Putin, who has ruled Russia for over two decades as president or prime minister, to step down.

"I came here to sign the petition against the constitutional reforms because I am a nationalist," said one 40-year old man in a black t-shirt as protesters chanted "Putin is a thief."

Fourteen-year old Vasilisa said she also signed the petition because Putin "is to blame for the poverty in our country".

"Gay people are killed here, women are beaten up here, and no one is ever held accountable," she said.

Two Russian activists involved in the campaign against the constitutional reforms were detained last week and the homes of five others were searched, ahead of the scheduled protest, which had not been sanctioned by authorities.

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Mass gatherings are banned in the capital because of COVID-19 restrictions. Even in normal times, protests of more than one person require the authorities' advance consent.

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A Russian court rejected Issachar's appeal on Thursday to mitigate her sentence of seven-and-a-half years in prison on drug offenses after a small amount of marijuana was found in her luggage at a Moscow airport in April. On the same day, 15 Israelis disembarking their plane in Moscow were taken in for questioning by Russian authorities; a similar incident involving 40 Israelis occurred earlier this week.

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Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has vowed to bring Issachar home.

"I am not a magician, but one thing I assure you. I will bring Naama Issachar home," he said at a recent rally in Haifa. Her imprisonment by Moscow has sparked widespread outcry in Israel and remained in the headlines for months.

In what appears to have been meant as a not-so-subtle message to Israel, the Russian embassy in Israel stated in a tweet on Wednesday that many Russian tourists had been refused entry to Israel in 2019, including 569 in November alone. Both issues were being addressed in a Thursday meeting between Russian and Israeli diplomats in Jerusalem.

"This is not a consular matter. The Russians are sending us a message. They are not pleased with us, and this has been going on for a long time," said Micky Aharonson – former head of the foreign-relations directorate of the National Security Council in the Prime Minister's Office and an expert on Russia at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security – referring to both cases. The Syria arena has also created tensions between the two countries, he said.

According to Aharonson, these cases involve "so many other things, such as the growing anger of the Russian military and security establishment towards Israel."

For instance, after foreign-media reports emerged earlier this month that Israeli fighter jets carrying out a mission in Syria had to flee Russian Su-35 planes, Russia came out in the media aggressively, stating that Israel used Iraqi and Jordanian airspace to carry out the mission. Since this was secret and not reported by Israeli media at the time, Russia's tattling was perceived in Israel as revenge.

Aharonson also pointed to the incident of the Russian airplane that was shot down by Syria in September 2018 as a major point of tension between Israel and Russia, which appeared to have been resolved.

Regardless, Aharonson said the Russians are "discontent with our behavior."

"They perceive themselves as having a positive approach to Israel, and they believe Israel is not reciprocating," he said.

'Standard negotiation tactics'

Emil Avdaliani, a Eurasia analyst at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, told Jewish News Syndicate that Israel's detentions of Russians is what seems to be the real motivation behind Russia's actions.

"Overall, the crisis was instigated right before the meeting of the two diplomatic missions planned for December 19," Avdaliani said. "However, contrary to many opinion articles in the Russian media, the 'manageable crisis' is unlikely to turn into a showdown. The Russians simply generated a 'manageable crisis' to have an advantage before the talks start."

Regarding the case of Issachar, Aharonson said that "it is a tragic humanitarian case, but it has no impact on the strategic relations between the countries." Her detention is a sign that Russia is displeased with Israel, he added.

Avdaliani pointed to major Kremlin-related media outlets saying that indeed Issachar is a part of negotiations. "It is standard negotiation tactics," he said. "Releasing Issachar is not in Russian interests; they would do so in exchange for concessions from Israel."

Russia reportedly had been pressuring Israel to release Aleksey Burkov, an IT specialist arrested in 2015 on US charges of credit-card fraud, in exchange for Issachar, but last month he was extradited to the United States.

As for the relationship between Netanyahu and Russian President Vladimir Putin, Aharonson said that they have a "positive and respectful relationship, but none of this would hold if Russian interests were at stake. The gestures are there, and it is not to be taken for granted. Netanyahu treats him with a lot of respect, and we see reciprocity in that sense, but it is only until Russian interests are involved."

Reprinted with permission from JNS.org.

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The pledge, made in a phone call, came after Turkish presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin said American legislation to impose sanctions against Turkey will not affect Ankara's use of the Russian S-400 missile defense system even if it passes the US Congress.

A US Senate committee backed legislation on Wednesday to sanction Turkey after its offensive in northern Syria and its purchase of S-400s.

It was the latest move by lawmakers to push US President Donald Trump to take a harder line against Ankara.

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Naama Issachar, who was arrested in Russia during a layover, after 9.5 grams (0.3 oz) of cannabis were found in her luggage is facing 7.5 years in prison. Israel is trying to negotiate her release. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Reuven Rivlin asked President Vladimir Putin to commute her sentence.

"The Russians tried, and are constantly trying, to arrest Israeli citizens," Magen told Israel Hayom in an interview this week.

Magen, who served both as the Israeli envoy to Russia and Ukraine, said that there was nothing Israel could do but wait. "Everything that can be done to free Issachar, Israel has already done," he added.

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"Now, the question is, What does Russia want? Whoever started this offensive maneuver is of course Russia. The relationship is experiencing some tension, there are other occurrences of Russia using insults against Israel."

According to Magen, one such example was when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited President Vladimir Putin in Sochi last month, "and he had to wait a long time until President Vladimir Putin finally met him ... If we connect the dots, we get the picture that not everything is as calm as it seems."

Issachar's punishment "is not a legal decision, it is a political-diplomatic decision that was given to the court. The Russian court is not even a player in this scenario. ... The public in Israel is furious, and the Russians know this, and they are essentially 'poking us in the eye.'"

Magen stresses that "Issachar is a hostage to be used as a bargaining chip in any future exchanges," warning Israel should expect more such provocations.

"Russia's foreign policy strategy is based on taking advantage of a situation and creating crises," he continued.

According to Magen, "sooner or later they will release her. They will not drag out the situation past the necessary minimum time. Most likely it will happen within the coming days or weeks, or even months."

But the tensions will remain, he insisted.

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