Alaei made the remarks Saturday, stating, "If the country's intelligence service was properly focused on Israeli activity, it should have been updated on plans to assassinate Iranian commanders and scientists by aircraft."

According to the former IRGC Navy commander, the events of Operation Rising Lion demonstrated that Iran's government has not organized its intelligence apparatus "in a manner matching the intelligence and security efforts and operations of Israel."

He said he sees a need to "rebuild and deliberately focus" the Islamic Republic's intelligence organizations, adding that current institutions "do not respond to the type and level of threats" posed by Israel.

The former IRGC Navy commander continued his remarks by describing Mossad as "one of the world's strongest security and intelligence agencies." Allaei criticized the Islamic Republic's intelligence structure, saying, "In some cases, people who were known as Israeli targets all lived in the same tower, which allowed Israel to strike the building and be sanctified from the punishment of several people simultaneously."

He added that the two main institutions, the Ministry of Intelligence and IRGC Intelligence, are both involved in "internal security issues" and focus on Israel, while this model clearly has not borne fruit and has not shown the required effectiveness. Allaei proposed that one of these two institutions should focus entirely and exclusively on Israel. Earlier in October, he acknowledged the incompetence of the Islamic Republic's intelligence and security services against Israel.

These statements come against the backdrop of increased speculation in recent days regarding the future of the Islamic Republic's nuclear and missile programs and how the United States and Israel will respond to them.

This is not the first time that officials and figures identified with the Islamic Republic have recognized Israel's superiority in the 12-day war. On December 17, Masoud Pezeshkian, president of the Islamic Republic, announced that during the 12-day war, Israel had missile superiority.

He said in this context, "It is true that there were our missiles, but their missiles were more numerous, stronger, more accurate, and more convenient. It is the people who disappointed them."

On December 19, Ebrahim Azizi, chairman of parliament's National Security Committee, called the doctors' statements "unprofessional" and told them, "Weakening the country's defense capabilities is a mistake."

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A source familiar with the situation told the publication that Israel's intelligence service, the Mossad, is aiding the probe, which is a standard procedure for the agency regarding terrorist attacks against Jews abroad.

In August 2025, Australia identified the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) as the mastermind behind fires at a Sydney kosher restaurant and a Melbourne synagogue. "These were extraordinary and dangerous acts of aggression orchestrated by a foreign nation on Australian soil," Albanese declared during a press briefing at the time.

Iranian Ambassador Ahmad Sadeghi and three diplomatic staff were subsequently told they had one week to leave, a move unprecedented since World War II. Australia has also suspended its embassy operations in Iran to ensure staff safety and issued a travel warning for citizens to depart Iran promptly.

"They have sought to harm and terrify Jewish Australians and to sow hatred and division in our community," Albanese said at the time. Intelligence agency ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess detailed the IRGC's use of a sophisticated proxy network. "This was directed by the IRGC through a series of overseas cut-out facilitators to coordinators that found their way to tasking Australians," he stated.

"It would appear that this was motivated by Islamic State ideology," Albanese said Tuesday. "The ideology that has been around for more than a decade that led to this ideology of hate and, in this case, a preparedness to engage in mass murder."

According to The Wall Street Journal, police publicly identified the 50-year-old suspect, who died at the scene Sunday, as Sajid Akram for the first time on Tuesday, while Australian officials have not yet named his son, who remains in the hospital.

Law enforcement stated they were analyzing a trip the pair took to the Philippines last month as part of the inquiry, while authorities in Manila reported finding no conclusive proof the men connected with terror groups or received training there.

The Philippine immigration bureau recorded that the two individuals landed in the nation from Sydney on Nov. 1 and departed on Nov. 28, identifying the father as an Indian citizen residing in Australia and his son as Naveed Akram, an Australian citizen.

WSJ notes that both men listed Davao, located on the southern island of Mindanao, as their intended destination, and their return trip to Sydney originated from that city, according to immigration records.

For decades, the southern Philippines hosted various violent Islamist insurgent factions, most notably the Abu Sayyaf Group, which is infamous for a lethal ferry bombing and its involvement in the deadly 2017 Marawi siege, where many local terrorists forged ties with the Islamic State.

However, in recent years, Manila has claimed success in suppressing Islamist rebellions, a change from the era when the south was viewed as a haven for groups capable of instructing foreigners in the use of firearms and IEDs.

While Australian police found no indication that anyone beyond the two shooters participated in Sunday's violence, investigations remain active, and Albanese noted Australia is reaching out to international partners "to see precisely if there are any links there," according to the report.

Australia's domestic intelligence service had previously monitored the son for six months commencing in October 2019 due to his associations with two individuals who were subsequently imprisoned, yet the prime minister stated Monday that the agency found no proof he was radicalized or plotting violent or antisemitic acts, nor was he on a watchlist.

Albanese added that the father also underwent questioning during that inquiry. According to The Wall Street Journal, the prime minister characterized the Sunday assault, where two gunmen opened fire from a footbridge onto a gathering for the first night of Hanukkah, as a premeditated act.

"That they hired a place in Campsie to essentially stage this terrorist act in Bondi – clearly it was well planned," Albanese said. "They clearly had thought through the positioning of where they would be on that bridge to give them a higher position than the people that they were seeking to harm."

Police in India confirmed in a Tuesday announcement that Akram originated from Hyderabad and emigrated to Australia for employment in 1998, where he married and settled, fathering a daughter and Naveed, both born in Australia.

The statement noted that Akram remained an Indian citizen at the time of his death, had maintained minimal contact with his relatives in India through only six visits since leaving, and that police held no "adverse record" on him from his time living there.

Last August, Australia elevated its national terrorism alert level to probable, implying officials estimated a likelihood exceeding 50% of an attack occurring or being plotted on domestic soil within the year, citing extremism among youth turning to racially or religiously motivated violence with little warning.

Earlier in 2024, authorities alleged a religiously driven terrorist attack occurred when a teenager stabbed a Christian leader during a live-streamed service in Sydney's western suburbs.

The Wall Street Journal recalls that in late 2014, a self-identified Shiite cleric held people hostage at gunpoint in a cafe near the Sydney Opera House and Harbour Bridge, forcing them to display an Islamic banner in the window; two captives were killed in the siege.

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The Mossad is not a political posting. It is a profession. The same is true of the Shin Bet. Yet in both cases Netanyahu appears to have mistaken a senior army rank for professional suitability. Just as Zini lacked the qualifications to head the Shin Bet, Gofman lacks the qualifications to lead the Mossad. His IDF resume is impressive, but it has nothing to do with the work of the Mossad. He has never held an intelligence position, nor has he handled special or covert operations. Over the past year and a half he may have observed such missions as military secretary, but that is far from true expertise.

In the past, the Mossad has at times been led by commanders from outside the organization. Meir Amit, who previously headed the IDF Intelligence Directorate; Zvi Zamir, formerly head of the Southern Command; Yitzhak Hofi, former head of the Northern Command; Danny Yatom, a former head of the Central Command; and Meir Dagan, who had served as deputy head of Operations and as a corps commander. All arrived with far more relevant military experience than Gofman, whose current role is his first as a major general. Most of those external appointments were made in difficult periods when the Mossad lacked a natural internal successor.

That is not the case today. Since Meir Dagan stepped down, the Mossad has been led by three strong directors, Tamir Pardo, Yossi Cohen and David Barnea, each of whom strengthened the agency's standing and capabilities. Barnea cultivated three candidates to replace him, including two of his deputies. Netanyahu would have needed a very strong reason to overlook them. He had none, especially when several of them were involved in the very operations Netanyahu himself has touted over the past two years, from the pager operation in Lebanon to the elimination of senior operatives in terrorist organizations and various achievements in Iran.

Gofman's appointment is not only a slap in the face to the internal candidates. It is a vote of no confidence in the Mossad as a whole, despite Netanyahu's frequent praise for the agency. It is no surprise that tempers are boiling in the Mossad's headquarters, from the director general's office downward. Inside the agency, the feeling was that Netanyahu made this call brazenly, without even the pretense of a struggling organization that requires outside intervention, as he claimed with the Shin Bet. This was a purely personal appointment, rooted in the interests of one man rather than the interests of an entire country.

Anyone searching for a silver lining may find it in the IDF, where some breathed a sigh of relief. In recent weeks rumors circulated that Netanyahu was considering a reshuffle that would end with the dismissal of IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir, and Gofman being appointed in his place. That will not happen for now, but Zamir surely knows that nothing is final. The power base Gofman built for himself in the Prime Minister's Office will be something his successor is likely to preserve, knowing it could ultimately pave the way to a coveted position. All that is required along the way is personal loyalty, and everything else be damned.

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According to the Prime Minister's Office, Netanyahu interviewed several candidates before selecting Gofman for the position. "Maj. Gen. Roman Gofman is a highly accomplished officer," the statement said. His appointment as the prime minister's military secretary during what the government calls the Rebirth War demonstrated "exceptional professional capabilities," from his rapid entry into the job to his immediate and significant involvement across all seven fronts of the war.

The Prime Minister's Office added that Gofman maintained constant coordination with Israel's intelligence community, particularly the Mossad. It highlighted his "creativity, initiative, ingenuity, profound understanding of the enemy, complete discretion and absolute confidentiality." His leadership and courage were also emphasized, recalling that at the outbreak of the Rebirth War he "rushed from his home and fought Hamas terrorists in the Gaza border communities, where he was seriously wounded."

Gofman will replace current Mossad director David Barnea, whose five-year term ends in June 2026. Netanyahu's request to appoint Gofman is being submitted Thursday to the Advisory Committee for Senior Appointments.

Maj. Gen. Gofman has held a long list of operational and command positions in the IDF. He served as a combat soldier and commander in the Armored Corps, commanded Battalion 75 of the 7th Brigade, served as operations officer for the Gaash formation (Division 36), commanded the Etzion Brigade and later the 7th Brigade, led the Bashan Division (210), commanded the National Ground Training Center, served as Chief of Staff of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, and currently serves as the prime minister's military secretary.

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According to sources who spoke with The Telegraph, Iranian officials now face a dangerous situation where distinguishing genuine loyalty from Israeli infiltration has become nearly impossible. One senior Iranian official told The Telegraph: "Many officials, including within the Sepah [IRGC], are doing everything they can to convince the system that they haven't done anything wrong, since it's obvious to everyone now that the Israelis have massively infiltrated several agencies."

Officials fear Israeli agents embedded within security services may be filing false accusations to eliminate loyal personnel. An Iranian official interviewed by The Telegraph explained: "Trust is one issue, but what's becoming an even greater concern is the growing number of people who are, in one way or another, betraying the system."

The twelve-day Iran-Israel war in June 2025 exposed extensive Israeli Mossad penetration of Iran's security apparatus. Israel's operation killed several top IRGC commanders, including IRGC chief Hossein Salami and armed forces chief Mohammed Bagheri, demonstrating the depth of intelligence infiltration. Iranian officials now face growing paranoia as they struggle to distinguish genuine threats from false accusations designed to remove loyal insiders.​

Iran has reached record execution levels in 2025, with over 1,000 people executed by September – the highest figure in at least 15 years, The Telegraph reports. The death of Omid Sarlak in November, whose bullet-riddled body was found hours after he posted a video burning Supreme Leader Khamenei's image, sparked widespread protests with mourners chanting "Death to Khamenei" and burning images of the leader.​

Iran faces its worst drought in decades, with the Amir Kabir dam northwest of Tehran at only 8% capacity. Rainfall has decreased by 89% compared to long-term averages, and the number of dams below 5% capacity has increased from 8 to 32, The Telegraph reports. President Masoud Pezeshkian warned that Tehran residents may need to evacuate by mid-December if conditions don't improve. Severe air pollution has forced school closures across multiple cities.​

Despite these challenges, experts assess that the regime remains stable, largely due to nationalist sentiment generated during the war with Israel. However, Iran faces increasing international isolation following the collapse of the 2015 nuclear deal and reimposition of UN sanctions. The regime has begun emphasizing ancient Persian Empire imagery rather than revolutionary Islamic messaging to rally public support, as evidenced by the installation of a replica of a 1,700-year-old relief sculpture in central Tehran depicting Roman Emperor Valerian kneeling before Persian King Shapur I with the message, "You will kneel before Iran again," The Telegraph reports.

Public dissatisfaction with conditions in Iran has reached 92% according to polling conducted for the president's office, The Telegraph reports. The combination of intelligence failures, environmental crises, economic pressures, and domestic repression creates a volatile situation, though the regime's security apparatus remains capable of suppressing dissent through mass arrests and executions.

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The indictment alleges al-Halabi, 62, evaded capture for years in European cities with assistance from Western intelligence agencies – including Mossad, for which he allegedly served as a double agent while actively serving in the Assad regime.

Al-Halabi was arrested in December in Austria after a 12-year manhunt. Alongside him, Lieutenant Colonel Mua'sab Abu Ruqba, 53, who served as head of criminal investigations in Syrian intelligence in Raqqa, was also charged, though his custody status remains unclear. Both deny the abuse allegations through their attorneys.

This represents Austria's first indictment against senior Assad regime officials, joining similar prosecutions in Germany and Sweden. Prosecutors identified 21 victims tortured by al-Halabi and his team, many testifying about severe beatings and electrocutions carried out by his operatives at Branch 335 of Syrian State Security in Raqqa, which he commanded from 2008.

Al-Halabi, from Syria's Druze community, served extensively in the Syrian military and hails from Sweida near Damascus. He joined the intelligence services in 2001 and was appointed to lead Branch 335 of State Security in Raqqa in 2008. When anti-Assad protests erupted in March 2011 during the Arab Spring, his unit spearheaded activist arrests and interrogations designed to expose protest organizers and prevent documentation from reaching international media.

Dr. Obada Alhamada, a 39-year-old physician who helped organize protests and ran a secret clinic for wounded activists, said he was arrested at gunpoint in February 2012 and tortured throughout the night in al-Halabi's private office. "His mistake was removing my blindfold," Alhamada told The New York Times, recounting how he was stripped and beaten with a bat or pipe by Abu Ruqba, who demanded activist names from the uprising.

According to The New York Times report citing the indictment and Syrian organizations, Halabi operated as a double agent for Mossad before escaping Syria in 2013 to Paris, aided by Mossad and Austrian intelligence, who transported him by vehicle across Europe and sheltered him in a safehouse.

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At the conference, Cohen revealed cases where the Mossad during his tenure shared life-saving intelligence, including with Australia. "We gave the Australians probably one of the most critical intelligence items, which saved hundreds of lives, when a bomb was en route to an Etihad aircraft scheduled to depart Sydney for Dubai or Abu Dhabi. This was our intelligence, and what do we receive back from Australia?" Cohen asked, referring to Canberra's recognition of a Palestinian state.

Cohen indicated Israel provides life-saving intelligence to other Western intelligence agencies, primarily the American CIA and British MI6. Cohen emphasized Israel shouldn't stop intelligence sharing, explaining, "We need to trade this coordinated intelligence, which ultimately saves lives, for improved support. I'm not proposing the Mossad or Israel's intelligence forces cease collecting or sharing intelligence with our global partners to protect other people's lives [meaning non-Israelis], but I am proposing we trade it differently."

Earlier this week, the Mossad exposed an Iranian operative who planned attacks in Australia, Germany and Greece. Cohen officially stated at the conference he won't run in the upcoming elections. However, he didn't rule out entering political life later. When asked about running for office in elections a year away, Cohen responded, "The answer is no. Not now. We'll see what develops."

Cohen revealed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu previously told him he considered him his successor. "When I served as Mossad chief, Prime Minister Netanyahu suggested I was his successor. One day I approached him and asked if he genuinely said this, and he confirmed it, explaining his reasoning. This occurred in 2018 or 2019 I believe, and then my wife responded, 'No, absolutely not. We're not entering this.' But I believe everything shifted dramatically after October 7, and there's a need for fresh leadership. So the possibility can't be completely ruled out. I'm weighing everything, but my decision now is no."

Video: Yossi Cohen at the Shurat Hadin conference with Ariel Kahana / Credit : Ohad Kab

Regarding the war-ending agreement, Cohen stated, "This isn't the perfect agreement, but currently it's time for a ceasefire and this was a price worth accepting for freeing the hostages. I don't believe the US or other parties will block Israel from combating terror going forward. Israel should decide whether to cut all ties with Qatar once all deceased hostages return. We lack genuine relations with them, we merely used them as intermediaries for channeling funds to Gaza, ostensibly for the population's welfare, but actually they reached Hamas. This was an error, designed for humanitarian assistance, but concluded with the money financing terror."

Attorney Nitzana Darshan-Leitner, president of the Shurat HaDin organization and conference organizer, concluded, "The war isn't over yet. The policy threats to create a Palestinian state combined with The Hague court's hostility lead to an unprecedented surge in Israel hatred and antisemitism. We must consolidate all forces addressing this issue to push back. Let the entire world understand it's unacceptable to allow terror to gain strength. We must combat it on the battlefield, in courtrooms and also in the global public opinion sphere. If we work together, we can secure the future of the Jewish people in the Land and throughout the Diaspora."

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Following the increase in Iranian terror activity and the arrests of Sardar Ammar's infrastructure, law enforcement authorities in Australia and Germany took sharp policy steps against senior Iranian officials. Among the steps: the expulsion of the Iranian ambassador from Australia and his designation as an undesirable person, and the summoning of the Iranian ambassador in Germany for a reprimand. These unprecedented steps were intended to send a clear message of zero tolerance for terror activity.

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Approximately 60 years ago, on May 18, 1965, Syria executed the operative, "our man in Damascus," who ranked among the most accomplished spies the Mossad deployed in Syria. He had achieved legendary status through his extraordinary infiltration of Syrian leadership circles, becoming an advisor to senior decision-makers. Following his capture, authorities conducted a show trial, and despite Israeli attempts to negotiate an agreement with the Syrians to spare his life, he received a death sentence and was executed by hanging at midnight in Damascus's central square.

Video: Eli Cohen's personal items retrieved / Credit: PMO

The passing years transformed Cohen, a hero and legend both in life and death, into a recognizable figure in every Israeli household, including a Netflix series exploring his life. Nevertheless, all efforts to establish him as a legend did not diminish his family and friends' pain, nor did they provide answers to the questions surrounding his death.

In May, precisely 60 years following his execution, through a covert Mossad operation, Syrian archives concerning the late Eli Cohen were retrieved alongside thousands of additional materials held by the enemy army. The archives contain approximately 2,500 documents, raising fresh hope for locating his burial site after his execution in Syria.

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For years, the Israeli public was unaware of David Barnea's name, and even less so his face. The crossroads of his life allowed him to choose other paths; a small turn, and he would have remained in the world of finance and capital markets. Perhaps it was precisely that "ordinary" appearance that helped him stay under the radar. But at a certain point, the man who began his career as an investment advisor rolled into a completely different track – a track that led him to head one of the world's strongest and most sophisticated intelligence organizations. This image justified itself in the past year when Mossad, under Barnea's leadership, achieved astounding accomplishments that changed the Middle East.

Naturally, Barnea doesn't give interviews and doesn't even brief journalists. Mossad doesn't even have an official spokesperson. Still, uncharacteristically for sitting Mossad chiefs, he can occasionally be heard giving speeches. Through dozens of conversations with associates, journalists, and colleagues, we tried to trace his character.

David Barnea was born in Ashkelon in March 1965 to a religiously observant family. His paternal grandfather, Rabbi Yehuda Brenner, left Germany in 1933 following the rise of the Nazis, together with his wife Bina and their son Yosef, David's father. Yosef Brenner studied at a yeshiva in Bnei Brak and, at the age of 16, enlisted in the Palmach, also participating in the War of Independence. He later continued serving in the IDF and reached the rank of brigadier general in the air force, a role in which he was responsible for military procurement from the US. His wife Naomi was an educator and served as a school principal.

In David's early childhood, the Barnea family moved to Rishon LeZion, and he was sent to the "Ein HaKore" school. Already in his youth, he aspired to be a commander, and to that end, he attended the military boarding school for command in Tel Aviv. Those years were the golden age of military boarding schools, which produced a large number of senior officials in the security establishment. In Barnea's class also studied Zohar Dvir, later deputy chief of police; Deputy Commissioner (ret.) Kourosh Barnor; Brig. Gen. (res.) Ariel Karo, who served as chief intelligence officer, and five more boys who later reached the rank of major general or brigadier general. In the class above him studied Maj. Gen. (res.) Gal Hirsch, and in the class below him Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir, with whom he remains friends to this day.

His classmates describe a sociable and pleasant boy with extensive knowledge that helped him succeed in his studies. Yair Raman, who studied with Barnea both in elementary school and in the military boarding school, remembers him as "a person head and shoulders above others who always stood out and excelled, a beloved friend and excellent athlete."

Military service and early career

In 1983, Barnea enlisted in the Paratroopers Brigade, and in April 1984, joined the chief of staff's reconnaissance unit. His team commander for three years was Elad Magal, brother of presenter Yinon Magal. "David stood out as a principled guy, someone pleasant to work with, and also an excellent soldier in all parameters that make a person a good commando fighter: weapons proficiency, demolition, first aid, navigation," Magal describes. "In the operational company, he was responsible for a supremely important area and performed this role excellently. He signed on for an additional year to continue filling this role in the next cycle as well. He's a modest guy, the style of 'still waters run deep.' A person who doesn't chase honor and doesn't try to impress, speaks pleasantly and gives others space to express themselves. An organized and cool-headed type, even when needing to function under pressure."

Magal says Barnea maintained contact with him and team members throughout the years, and even in recent years he makes sure to come with his family to celebrations and gatherings of unit alumni.

An additional detail Magal notes is Barnea's love of gardening. "When I would visit him at home over the years, I always saw a well-maintained garden. Despite having very busy periods, he found time to invest in garden care. In general, he's a person who does everything well," Magal concludes.

After his military discharge, Barnea went to the US and completed bachelor's and master's degrees in business administration. Upon his return to Israel, he worked as a senior manager at an investment bank and later at Clal company. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's assassination in November 1995 deeply affected him, and following it, he decided to leave the banking world and move to a position with national significance. With the help of an acquaintance, he found his way to Mossad.

Barnea is married with four children, and the family lives in a community in the Sharon region. Several of his acquaintances described him as a family man despite the difficulties and limitations the position creates. Zohar Barnea, the Mossad chief's younger brother, is a Breslov Hasid. "David is a person of many virtues, with exceptional determination and understanding. We don't understand heavenly calculations, but from several cases known to me, and he prefers I not elaborate, even great rabbis have assured me that his merits are many," Zohar told me. The two maintain good contact, and Zohar has even visited his brother in his office at the organization's headquarters.

Without noise and fanfare

"David Barnea is a good execution man," diagnoses Yossi Melman, the veteran intelligence and security affairs analyst and author of ten books on these subjects. "He doesn't have the sparks of Yossi Cohen, the bastard cunning of Meir Dagan, or the seriousness and depth of Tamir Pardo. If I had to define him briefly, I'd say he's a good field man, a good operator, and very target-focused. A determined person who knows how to ignore background noise and overcome side mines he sometimes encounters. They loved him in the organization, and he quickly began advancing."

Barnea grew up in the Tzomet division, the unit responsible for operating Mossad agents worldwide. Most of his career he served as a case officer, responsible for recruiting and managing agents. These are foreign civilians who are recruited and operated by Mossad, and in some cases serve as "turned agents" – those who don't know for which organization they're working. In Tzomet, Barnea served under the command of Yossi Cohen. In 2003, the two even won Israel's Security Prize for an operation that remains classified to this day. Barnea's path to the top was similar to Cohen's, alongside deep character differences between them.

Former Mossad senior David Meidan knew Barnea when his Mossad career was still in its infancy. Meidan served as head of the Tevel division, responsible for maintaining intelligence and diplomatic relations on behalf of the organization. "Already then they saw that David is someone who comes to work without noise and fanfare. Speaks little, is precise in details, industrious, diligent, very concentrated and focused. His quietness radiates reliability," Meidan describes. "He's a principled person, a family man. At his core, he's shy, modest in his lifestyle, someone who would distance himself from confrontations, gossip, and purposeless conversations. His appearance might be deceiving," Meidan adds. "There's stubbornness in him, and if necessary, he knows how to make difficult personal decisions."

After a period serving as a case officer abroad, Barnea was appointed head of a station in Europe. From there, he moved to serve as deputy head of the Neviot unit, responsible for gathering intelligence through electronic means and handling surveillance, penetrations, observations, and the placement of listening devices, among other tasks. After about two and a half years in the position, in 2013, Barnea returned to the Tzomet division, this time as head of the unit. He dedicated most of his time in this role to dealing with the Iranian threat. As head of Tzomet, he was involved in planning and executing the theft of Iran's nuclear archive in 2018, and during his tenure, the organization won four Israel Security Prizes as well as commendations.

In 2019, his longtime commander, Yossi Cohen, appointed him as his deputy. In this role, Barnea was responsible for overseeing the division of special operations, which included planning assassinations. When Cohen was required to recommend candidates to replace him, he presented the names of Barnea, then his deputy, alongside that of his previous deputy, Ehud Lavi. Lavi was then on sabbatical, and some believe this decision cost him the position. In December 2020, Netanyahu announced David Barnea as the next Mossad chief.

Y., a former senior Mossad official who worked under Barnea for a long period, says: "He has an unusual work ethic; he's capable of dealing with long hours on a large number of tasks simultaneously. He's like a machine."

Former Mossad chief Efraim Halevy, who today serves as president of the organization's retirees association, remembers Barnea's conduct favorably from various periods. "In 2000, when I was Mossad chief, we had brain drain," Halevy recounts. "The head of one of our European stations also decided to leave suddenly. His departure created a major crisis at the station. I flew there to resolve the crisis and spent many hours with our people, including David. He took responsibility and helped calm the situation, and together we weathered the crisis."

"Two years ago, ahead of marking fifty years since the Yom Kippur War, David invited me and additional figures who worked at Mossad in the past and participated in the war to a ceremony where he thanked us for our contribution and awarded us an honored certificate. We didn't expect such a thing, and I appreciated the fact that it was important to him to express gratitude to people who contributed. He's very humane," Halevy concludes.

Alongside these praises, some paint a slightly different picture. M., a former senior Mossad official, says about Barnea: "David is less daring compared to previous Mossad chiefs; he's a rather boring guy, doesn't have many friends. He was intelligent, energetic, patriotic, and good at what he did, but there were better ones than him."

Intelligence in a transparent world

Alongside the IDF, Mossad is perhaps the brand most identified worldwide with Israel, more than cyber, cherry tomatoes, or Gal Gadot. The daring operations, sophistication, creativity, and coolness have made Mossad one of the most esteemed and famous intelligence agencies in the world, perhaps one of the most threatening. Mossad is exceptional not only in its quality but also in its size. According to global estimates, the organization directly employs over 7,000 employees, making it the largest intelligence body outside the US, China, and Russia, roughly twice the size of the British intelligence agency MI6. "Mossad has countless position holders," notes Melman. "They once even advertised that they were looking for a tailor."

On June 1, 2021, Barnea began serving in his position as Mossad chief amid an escalation in the ongoing confrontation with Iran. Six months earlier, in November 2020, the head of Iran's nuclear program, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, was eliminated in an assassination near Tehran. In April 2021, a cyber attack was carried out at the Natanz nuclear facility. Israel didn't take responsibility in either case, but Iran pointed the finger at it. On June 19, 2021, just two and a half weeks after Barnea took command, the hardliner Ebrahim Raisi was elected president of Iran, an appointment that raised additional concerns in Jerusalem.

According to one version presented in the book "Mossad in Tehran" by Yonah Jeremy Bob and Ilan Evyatar, Naftali Bennett, as prime minister, pushed Mossad and Barnea to show greater creativity and adopt a more aggressive approach toward Iran. According to an opposite version, "not only is Barnea endowed with a sufficiently developed aggressive instinct, but he was actually the one who pressured Bennett to show greater boldness."

Either way, in Barnea's first months in office, Mossad continued the offensive line from the end of Yossi Cohen's period. In July 2021, a cyber attack was carried out against Iran's transportation system, and in October, electricity was shut down at all 4,300 gas stations in the Islamic Republic. Again, Israel didn't take responsibility for the attacks. According to the authors of "Mossad in Tehran," "the match between Bennett and Barnea gave birth to one of the most intensive periods ever of Israeli operations against Iran, aimed at reshaping the strategic status of the nuclear program."

New operating methods

The elimination of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in January 2010 on Dubai soil, in an operation attributed to Israel, became an event that dramatically influenced the entire intelligence world. The assassination of the Hamas senior while staying at a hotel proceeded smoothly, and authorities caught no member of the elimination team, but it presented intelligence personnel with a challenging new reality: the proliferation of cameras everywhere, combined with digital databases, made the world transparent.

Mossad chief Meir Dagan, at the time, understood that a way needed to be found to carry out operations abroad and obtain information while minimizing risk to Israeli agents. Already during his tenure, the organization began relying more on operations by foreign agents. Incidentally, contrary to widespread claims globally, Mossad maintains a clear and rigid line of avoiding using Jews in the diaspora to avoid endangering them.

Toward the end of the previous decade, the challenge multiplied dozens of times with the widespread adoption of biometric identification technology at airports worldwide, and subsequently in the broader public sphere. This technology enables identifying a person anywhere he is located, even within a crowd. Countries even share this information among themselves, so that details of a person who landed in Paris are available to officials in Brussels. In such a world, sending an Israeli fighter on an operation outside the country's borders became an almost impossible mission.

Former Mossad chief Yossi Cohen significantly expanded the line Dagan began in relying on foreign agents, including operations that went beyond obtaining information. An additional avenue was expanding the use of innovative technological solutions that enabled achieving remotely what previously required operations beyond lines. The move that began with Dagan and expanded under Cohen reached its peak under Barnea.

Fear of abandonment

The achievements on the international arena were impressive, but underneath the surface, troubles were brewing from within. In January 2022, the commander of Mossad's Caesarea division and his deputy announced their retirement from the organization due to professional disagreements with Barnea. This was an earthquake within Mossad, as the Caesarea division is the flagship of special operations in the agency, which also includes the assassination unit Kidon. Together with the five seniors, several mid-level employees also left. The changes Barnea made in the methods of operating agents, and transferring a larger volume of Mossad activity to a kind of outsourcing, were perceived as a real reform. The departure of the prestigious division's people was attributed to this move.

Two months earlier, in November 2021, three additional senior Mossad officials announced their retirement – the head of the technology division, the head of the counterterrorism division, and the head of the Tzomet division. The reform might have had a part in the matter, but their departure was attributed specifically to an organizational and technical change Barnea made when he ordered the splitting of a certain Mossad division into three. According to D.'s assessment, a former Mossad source, this change creates difficulties for daily operations in those split divisions and harms internal cooperation and efficiency. However, even in his opinion, this isn't a dramatic change.

Y., the former senior Mossad official, suggests seeing things in proportion. "There wasn't a wave of departures," he determines. "There were those who weren't satisfied with David's decisions, people who were stuck in conventions. He knew what he wanted and where he wanted to take Mossad, and whoever decided to leave because of this – let them leave, it's not to David's detriment. At the time, it was still possible to argue whether he was right in the changes he brought, but today this has already proven itself. By the way, there were already groups of seniors who left under strong previous Mossad chiefs. The most extensive wave of departures I know was under one of the greatest among them, Meir Dagan."

M. sees things in a different light and believes the background to the departures was personal considerations on Barnea's part. "Many seniors left, division heads, including basically all the natural candidates for heading the organization," he says. "These are people David decided he didn't want, and in their place, he promoted much less capable elements. He brought back all sorts of weirdos from retirement, people who retired because they weren't suitable for promotion, and today fill central positions contrary to the opinion of very senior elements in the system. This isn't reform; this is a coup, a dictatorship."

According to M., additional seniors have recently left Mossad, including one person whom Barnea himself appointed.

Are you concerned about the Mossad's future?

"Certainly. The Office (as Mossad personnel refer to it) lost much of its diversity and became one-dimensional. The two that Barnea is expected to recommend as his replacements for heading the organization worry me greatly. These are people who would never have reached such positions under other Mossad chiefs. This is doubly concerning because Military Intelligence also failed to update its work plans. I know that Military Intelligence is aware of the issue, and a few months ago, there was a discussion there dealing with this."

Melman, for his part, refuses to get excited: "Always when dismantling a unit, there are people who aren't satisfied, and he, too, had those who weren't satisfied. This is the nature of a dynamic organization that must adapt to changing reality. New units were established and others were split to adapt them to changed circumstances."

Closing the circle

On September 7, 2023, exactly one month before Hamas's attack, Mossad published in an unprecedented manner a file of documents and investigations from the archive relating to the Yom Kippur War, in a book titled "Once When It Will Be Permitted to Tell..." At the launch event, Barnea said: "We must not underestimate the enemy and his capabilities. We feel the powerful intelligence capabilities, but we must not fall into conceptualization; the order of the hour is humility."

Unlike figures who led the IDF and Shin Bet during the massacre, who have since ended their tenure, Mossad and its leader aren't perceived by the public as bearing responsibility for October 7th. There's considerable justice in this, as the Gaza Strip wasn't under their responsibility but under the General Security Service. However, they're also not completely free of responsibility. Mossad also maintains a prestigious research division that didn't provide assessments regarding an expected attack and maintains cooperation with intelligence organizations in Arab countries, thus exposing itself to relevant materials. The organization's responsibility for the intelligence failure is also related to the fact that it operates against Hamas personnel abroad and missed the transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars from Iran to Hamas, as revealed in documents captured in the Strip.

However, Mossad's deepest involvement regarding Gaza was in the flow of funds from Qatar to Hamas, which continued until October 2023. Melman: "As long as Israel is a democratic state, the political echelon determines, but the security establishment has great influence on the decision-making process, and the Mossad chief has an important role in shaping government policy. The criticism of Barnea is that he didn't oppose, or at least didn't sufficiently voice his opinion, on certain issues, such as transferring funds from Qatar, setting national priorities, and vital intelligence requirements. Additionally, during the war, he also failed to express his opinion on the issue of hostages. Bottom line, Mossad has some responsibility for October 7th, but it's marginal."

The pager operation marked a moment of closing the circle for Barnea: under his leadership, Mossad delivered a crushing blow to a threatening entity that had been feared for years, and restored to Israel the deterrence and security-intelligence prestige lost on October 7th. "The pager operation is the most successful operation in the history of intelligence organizations worldwide," D. determines.

The operation that began in the previous decade matured into action under Barnea. According to reports, the decision to time the attack came after suspicions arose within Hezbollah, and the organization began checking the devices. However, in an interview with the "Hayeda" podcast, A., presented as a former head of Mossad's intelligence division, claimed that Mossad in general and Barnea in particular pushed to act against Hezbollah, including exploding the pagers, regardless of these circumstances.

After the success of the pager operation, Barnea used Mossad's capabilities in complex coordination and multi-layered intelligence activation – human, electronic, and visual – to lead additional reality-changing moves, primarily the elimination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. As part of the operation, Mossad agents operated in the heart of Beirut to obtain the required intelligence and even planted devices that enabled the elimination of Nasrallah's secret bunker. The agency's part in the operation included components reflecting Barnea's management concept: broad vision, precise timing, and the ability to combine operations with symbolic value with those having strategic value. The ability to operate dozens of foreign agents within Iran's borders, alongside the use of innovative technology, also relied heavily on the changes Barnea made upon assuming his position. Naturally, elements of the Iran attack were laid during Cohen's period and even before, yet at the moment of truth, Barnea's professional concept proved itself.

"Before the changes David made, Mossad wouldn't have been able to carry out so many operations simultaneously," believes Y. "Mossad reached its peak glory. What we saw from Mossad after October 7th is a product of the structural changes he led. This is what enabled carrying out something like seven operations in Iran on the first night." According to reports, the agency operated over one hundred agents in Iran with optimal coordination.

"Mossad's heavy achievements in the war also came thanks to David's capabilities and personality; his functioning is most impressive," agrees Efraim Halevy. "David's success was expected for me; he's an excellent planner and excellent executor," joins David Meidan.

"David sharpened what his predecessors began, refined and developed it," says Melman. "Ultimately, he brought Mossad to this achievement, and we're talking about a most impressive operation that required determination, mission adherence, and worthy planning. Actually, the lion's share of Mossad activity in Iran was on the first night and in the days preceding it, because this required extensive preparations and everything was timed and precise. It's not simple to command an operation like Operation Rising Lion, but Barnea is very cool-headed in operational actions."

A point that came up in conversations I held with two different sources was the great importance Barnea assigns to public relations and receiving credit for the organization's achievements, including through speeches he occasionally gives. Some claimed that even publishing videos from Iran with Mossad's logo – an exceptional act compared to the standard operating method of intelligence bodies in general and Mossad in particular – was a PR action, though this can also be seen as a capability display meant to deter the enemy and damage its morale. After Operation Rising Lion, claims even arose that Mossad was trying to "steal credit from the IDF."

"Mossad and the IDF worked in close cooperation in Operation Rising Lion. While there's always a bit of ego in the way, they work well together," says Melman. "The 'credit war' between the IDF and Mossad, as this matter is framed in some media outlets, wasn't really serious; it was inflated for rating considerations and desire to create interest."

M., however, refuses to be impressed by Barnea's overall functioning, even given the operational achievements. In his eyes, Barnea receives excessive credit for Mossad's achievements, as the infrastructure for these achievements didn't stem from his initiative. He defines the first two years of his tenure as "very bad." According to him, achievements in various arenas were accomplished despite the changes Barnea led in the organization.

Not a yes-man

The position of Mossad chief entails close collaboration with the prime minister and the political establishment. Barnea's relations with Netanyahu are considered good, unlike his colleagues heading other security bodies. "Unlike Ronen Bar and Herzi Halevi, Barnea was appointed by Netanyahu, and Netanyahu's view of people he didn't appoint himself is more suspicious," says Ariel Kahana, Israel Hayom's political analyst. "He understands the political game and is careful not to get between the political echelon's intentions. There's understanding between him and Netanyahu, and Barnea knows Netanyahu well, understanding what to do and what not to do when working with him. He praised Netanyahu publicly, for example, on the decisions he made in the pager operation and the Iran attack, and Netanyahu liked this. Unlike Ronen Bar, David Barnea isn't confrontational, and their relationship is completely different."

Some describe Barnea as a kind of yes-man to Netanyahu. Is this the case in your opinion?

"No, and the disagreement between them over the Qatar attack isn't the only example. Mossad is Netanyahu's baby, and not everything happening between them is perfect – I know it isn't – but overall the joint work is good and produces results, and Barnea does his work in a businesslike and proper manner."

Contrary to talk about a rift between the prime minister and Mossad chief around the Qatar attack that Barnea opposed, Kahana believes this incident actually shows how good relations are between the two: "Netanyahu allowed Mossad not to carry out its part in the attack and transferred it to Shin Bet. He didn't force Barnea to do it, despite being able to do so. Barnea opposed decisively, and Netanyahu went along with him. Whoever works with Qatar in its capacity as mediator is Mossad, and it might have been easier for Netanyahu to let Mossad relinquish its involvement in the attack and transfer its role to Shin Bet, so the Qataris would continue working with it. But this is just my speculation."

How much influence does Barnea have on decisions made in the cabinet?

"He has influence, especially in cases of disagreement within the system. He brings a more hawkish approach, certainly compared to Ronen Bar and Herzi Halevi. There were also junctions where Netanyahu leaned on his position to establish his opinion."

M. describes a different picture, where Barnea shows weakness toward the political echelon and doesn't know how to stand his ground. He also claims that "counterparts" (the code name in Mossad for international intelligence organizations it works with) aren't impressed by Barnea. In this context, Melman is actually impressed that Barnea managed to improve relations with the CIA, American intelligence agency, "despite work relations being good on a regular basis," he clarifies.

Government Secretary Yossi Fox, who by virtue of his position works directly with the Mossad chief, says: "David Barnea is the best Mossad chief Israel has ever had. Brave, creative, modest, doesn't belong to conceptualization, and understands the importance of trust and full coordination with the prime minister, especially in a period where he led strategic change in the Middle East." A political source I spoke with conveyed similar sentiments: "The Mossad chief is determined and offensive. In Operation 'Rising Lion,' we saw how his boldness and planning come to expression in the field."

In days when Mossad operates at an almost non-stop pace – from eliminating seniors in Iran, through thwarting arms smuggling in Syria and Lebanon, destroying economic infrastructure in Yemen, and building quiet alliances with Arab countries – David Barnea remains a generally beloved figure, but not free from criticism. His critics claim he avoids pushing the political echelon toward long-term strategy and settles for the status of execution contractor. On the other hand, some view an advantage in distancing the Mossad from the political sphere and limiting its involvement to a professional level only.

Since October 2023, Barnea has carried on his shoulders not only Mossad's missions but also public trust in the security establishment. In many ways, restoring Israelis' sense of security is the most difficult test. Barnea is currently in his fifth and perhaps final year in office, and Mossad, under his leadership, continues recording achievements. Alongside these achievements, his future legacy will also be determined by whether he succeeds in shaping a flexible, innovative, and resilient Mossad for the long term, and whether he will leave for those coming after him an infrastructure similar to what his predecessors left him.

The post 'Works like a machine': The man who led Mossad to unprecedented success appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.