This causes Iranian intentions to implement a certain plan to become perpetual, and this is true regarding their aspiration to destroy Israel. In the 12-day war, Israel dealt a severe blow (with US assistance) to Iran's nuclear program, but it appears that the intentions to return and achieve a deterrent nuclear capability have not left the minds of Iranian decision-makers. Both before the war and after it, there are generals of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or parliamentary representatives who promise the achievement of nuclear capability that will bring about deterrence of Israel, so that it will not attack Iran and its allies, terrorist organizations, again.

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Documents obtained by the Financial Times provide the first evidence of Moscow engaging Tehran on nuclear knowledge. Jim Lamson, a former CIA analyst, told the outlet that Tehran's experts were "seeking laser technology and expertise that could help them validate a nuclear weapon design without conducting a nuclear explosive test".

Iran insists its program is peaceful, while Russia opposes a nuclear-armed Islamic Republic. Before the US and Israel bombed Iran's facilities in June, Washington believed weaponization remained deactivated but noted shortened timelines for potential bomb construction.

DamavandTec, an SPND front company, arranged the St Petersburg travel for Iranian laser specialists last November, documents reviewed by the Financial Times show. They met with Laser Systems, a US-sanctioned Russian firm working on dual-use technology.

Ali Kalvand and DamavandTec had organized previous meetings using diplomatic passports, an August Financial Times investigation found. The US State Department sanctioned them in October for attempting "to procure items applicable to the development of nuclear explosive devices from foreign suppliers" and noting they had "facilitated travel for Iranian nuclear experts to Russia".

Kalvand arranged this second trip following an invitation from Laser Systems director Dmitry Vasilyev for "technological collaboration". While the invitation addressed DamavandTec employees, records reviewed by the Financial Times identify the visitors as physicists from defense-linked Iranian universities.

Andrey Savin of Laser Systems visited Tehran in February 2025 to meet SPND affiliates. Laser Systems holds FSB permits for work on state secrets. DamavandTec operates as a procurement broker for restricted components, according to the US State Department.

The Financial Times previously reported DamavandTec's attempts to acquire tritium for boosting warhead yields. Iran denies seeking weapons. Nicole Grajewski of Carnegie Endowment told the outlet the meetings offer "strong evidence that Russia was assisting Iran in its nuclear weapons-related research, with state-affiliated Russian institutions providing dual-use technology and knowledge transfer".

"This activity looks like it is state sanctioned at a high level on the Russian and Iranian sides," Grajewski added. These revelations follow US-Israeli strikes that damaged but did not destroy Iran's infrastructure, despite Donald Trump claiming the program was "obliterated".

Late September saw the enforcement of penalties after France, Germany, and the UK activated a "snapback" mechanism, referencing Iran's "significant non-performance" of its nuclear commitments.

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"Those who are left will be at the forefront of any Iranian attempt to reach a nuclear bomb, hence they will automatically become targets for Israel, as Israel has shown in the past. I have no doubt about it. Any scientist who deals with the nuclear issue will be eliminated or will be threatened with elimination," he stated.

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In January 2016, the Israeli Mossad discovered suspicious activity being conducted by the Iranian Defense Ministry. Intelligence information indicated that ministry personnel were diligently collecting documents from various sites throughout the country and secretly transporting them to a civilian warehouse in an industrial area in southern Tehran.

When Mossad tried to understand what these documents had in common, they concluded they were all related to the Iranian nuclear program. "Prepare to bring these materials home," ordered the then-Mossad director, Yossi Cohen, to his operatives.

It took only two years until the order, which initially seemed impossible to execute, was fulfilled with remarkable success. In January 2018, Mossad operatives broke into that warehouse in the heart of Iran and returned home with what became known as the "Iranian nuclear archive" – "half a ton of incriminating documentation about Iran's nuclear program," as described by a source who was exposed to the materials in their entirety.

Among the vast material stolen from the nuclear archive were documents that revealed intelligence previously unknown to Israel. Among other things, they revealed names and locations of several sites where Iran had previously conducted secret military nuclear activities. "These sites only came to our attention following the theft of the archive," the source says.

But the documents from the nuclear archive revealed even more. They contained unequivocal evidence of Iran's deception attempts regarding the supervision of its nuclear program. More precisely, the papers stolen from Tehran demonstrated, in black and white, how Iran did everything in its power to hide its activities from the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency of the UN, the international body supposed to monitor civilian nuclear programs worldwide and prevent the development of nuclear weapons.

The archive documents proved, then, what Israel had claimed for years – Iran repeatedly mocks IAEA inspectors and the entire world, submits false reports, forges documents, conducts deception exercises, destroys and cleanses nuclear sites to impair the ability to find incriminating evidence in them, and diverts nuclear equipment and materials from suspicious sites to hide their connection to its military nuclear program.

More than seven years after the Mossad's hair-raising operation, and with negotiations currently underway between Washington and Tehran regarding a new nuclear agreement, it's worth revisiting the Iranian nuclear archive. The information emerging from it leaves no room for doubt – for years, Iran has done everything in its power to deceive the monitoring mechanisms imposed on its nuclear program while advancing toward a nuclear bomb. There is no reason to think it will act differently this time.

Above and below the grass

One of the nuclear sites whose existence was revealed in the Iranian nuclear archive is located south of Tehran, near the city of Varamin. The stolen documents revealed that in the early 2000s, Iran operated a research and development center at the site for the production of "yellowcake" and its conversion to uranium compounds needed to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. According to the archive documents, at some point, some of the equipment and materials from the Varamin site were evacuated to an unidentified building in the Turquzabad neighborhood in southern Tehran, not far from the warehouse from which the nuclear archive was stolen. The documents revealed that the Turquzabad warehouse, which was presented as a carpet factory and was unknown to the intelligence community in Israel, served from 2009 as the secret storage of undeclared nuclear materials and equipment for processing them.

Additional information found in the nuclear archive concerned a site called Lavizan, which had already been identified by the Mossad as a nuclear site and had previously been investigated by the IAEA. Israel concluded that the site served as headquarters for the Iranian program to develop nuclear weapons in the late 1990s, and laboratories were established there to produce yellowcake, convert uranium, and enrich it. In 2002, the site was completely destroyed by the Iranians, the land it stood on was scrubbed and flattened, and a city park was established in its place. The nuclear archive contained pictures of the Lavizan site before and after its destruction.

In 2004, about two years after the site's destruction, IAEA inspectors requested to conduct tests at Lavizan to detect traces of enriched uranium. Among other things, the agency's inspectors demanded to sample two WBC devices for radiation safety checks for workers at nuclear sites, which were placed at the location before it was destroyed. Iran claimed then that the two devices were loaded onto containers and removed from the site. The IAEA managed to reach one container, but when it asked to sample the second container, the Iranians claimed it was sold and "no trace of it remained."

In a document from the Iranian Defense Ministry found in the nuclear archive, analyzing the ministry's involvement in issues investigated by the IAEA, concern is expressed about the agency's insistence on sampling the second device. This, according to Israeli assessment, was because the Iranians knew they would be implicated in undeclared nuclear activity if the container was examined.

Another document found in the nuclear archive revealed correspondence from 2005, in which parties involved in relations with the IAEA write that "if we are able to conclude this issue (of the IAEA investigation) through additional explanations, as happened with the destruction of Lavizan... the IAEA's excuses regarding the military center (the body in the Defense Ministry that dealt with nuclear weapons development) will end."

Meanwhile, in another document related to the uranium mine operated by the Iranians in Gchine and their yellowcake facility in Bandar Abbas, unequivocal evidence was discovered that Iran forged a document from the Iranian Ministry of Justice to support a false version given to the IAEA regarding these two sites. In another document found in the archive, the then-Deputy Defense Minister of Iran, Hoseini Tash, writes to the head of the nuclear project, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, "This (the sites in Gchine and Bandar Abbas) is one of the important issues that sooner or later they (IAEA personnel) will ask us about. Therefore, we need to have a comprehensive scenario for it." In other words, a cover story.

Secret tunnels

Iran's concealment efforts vis-à-vis the IAEA primarily relate to activities it conducted in the 1990s and early 2000s, particularly those related to its military program for developing nuclear weapons, which was named the "Amad Program." The program, led by atomic scientist Prof. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh (who was assassinated near Tehran in 2020), operated between 1999-2003 and was intended to produce a small number of atomic bombs that could be mounted on a ballistic missile.

For example, documents from the Iranian nuclear archive revealed that a uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, which Iran delayed reporting as a nuclear site until it was exposed as such in 2002, and which was dug for some reason at a depth of 66 feet underground, served as a model for Amad program experts, who visited Natanz and consulted with its managers regarding the establishment and operation of an additional secret enrichment site. During the visit, Amad personnel also examined centrifuges operating in Natanz.

The additional enrichment site is apparently the one exposed in Fordow in 2009. It was then discovered that for several years, the Iranians had been digging tunnels deep in the mountain and equipping them with infrastructure for uranium enrichment, with the aim of establishing a site that would not be reported to the IAEA. The Iranian intention was to continue enriching uranium to a low level in Natanz, which was placed under IAEA supervision starting in 2003, and to secretly enrich uranium to a high level in Fordow. Documents found in the nuclear archive indicate that the Fordow site was supposed to be used for enriching uranium to a level of more than 90% and in a quantity of 99 pounds per year, for the core of the nuclear weapon that the Iranians were developing as part of the Amad Program. Even after the program was frozen in 2003, Iran continued preparing the site for its original purpose, under the cover of the Atomic Energy Organization. Diagrams of the enrichment tunnels in Fordow were found in the nuclear archive, including the centrifuges planned to be installed there.

Traces of enriched uranium

When Israel considered what to do with the wealth of information that fell into its hands after stealing the Iranian nuclear archive, it was decided to share it, in its entirety, with the IAEA. "The archive was significant because it allowed us to tear the mask off the Iranian nuclear program," says a security source who was involved in the matter. "It contained a lot of previously unknown information, but such that could be brought out, and therefore we transferred it to the IAEA."

Israel also helped the IAEA locate within the archive materials the documents pointing to sites where secret enrichment of nuclear materials had previously been carried out, the area under the agency's supervision. "The IAEA only investigates fissile material activity, not weapons development, for example," explains the same security source. "Therefore, we had to sift through the materials to find violations related to fissile material within them. There are documents and signatures and leads there, which can be used to open investigations on this matter."

The IAEA, equipped with the archive documents and intelligence pointing to Iran's violations in the nuclear field, demanded that Iran allow it to conduct tests at several undeclared sites in the country, but these requests were repeatedly rejected with various strange excuses. Israel decided to apply diplomatic pressure – in April 2018, during his speech at the UN General Assembly, Netanyahu exposed the Turquzabad site to the entire world and criticized the IAEA, which he said refused to conduct tests at the site even after secretly receiving the Iranian nuclear archive materials.

The pressure apparently worked, and the IAEA increased its demands from Iran. In sampling conducted by the IAEA in Varamin in early 2019, traces of nuclear materials were indeed found, including processed natural uranium particles, low-enriched uranium containing the isotope uranium-236, indicating its irradiation in a nuclear reactor, and depleted uranium, which is a result of enrichment. This was conclusive proof that the nuclear archive documents were authentic.

The tests in Turquzabad were also conducted only after a lengthy period. In the IAEA's inspection of the site, traces of natural uranium were eventually detected, confirming the assessment that prohibited nuclear activity had taken place at the site. The explanations given by Iran, stating that the site was used to produce chemical compounds for civilian industry, were rejected by the IAEA because they did not match the findings on the ground. The explanations provided by Iran regarding the site in Varamin were also rejected by the IAEA.

The Iranian delays, designed to postpone again and again the visit of IAEA inspectors to the sites in Varamin and Turquzabad, were not in vain. In accordance with their known methodology, and as they did with the Lavizan site that became a city park, the Iranians used the time to completely destroy the suspicious sites. The site in Varamin, for instance, was flattened and currently serves as an agricultural farm.

These efforts, however, did not prevent the IAEA from finding traces of enriched uranium at both these sites. "The Iranians destroyed and turned over the soil and poured water on it, but it didn't help," explains a former intelligence community source. "It's very difficult to eliminate evidence of enriched uranium, which sticks to the smallest level of the molecule. You don't wash it away, and it disappears, and that's what happened to them."

The intelligence from the Iranian nuclear archive and the findings of the tests conducted by IAEA inspectors as a result became a breakthrough in Israel's diplomatic struggle against the Iranian nuclear program – in 2019, the IAEA, in an unusual move, opened four investigations against Iran for undeclared nuclear material, based on the archive materials and given the name "the open files." Israel could then mark a checkmark on the decision to transfer the archive materials to the IAEA. "Without the Iranian archive, it would not have been possible to obtain the information that the IAEA discovered in Iran," says a defense establishment source with satisfaction.

Every possible violation

However, the IAEA's activity around "the open files" ultimately ended in almost nothing. Israel did claim a diplomatic achievement when it exposed Iran's nakedness to the world, but in practice, two of the files were closed by the IAEA relatively quickly, and the other two remain open and do not seem likely to lead to definitive conclusions, let alone substantial actions against Iran. Meanwhile, Iran continued to sabotage the IAEA's monitoring capabilities, did not allow the agency to bring inspectors into its territory, and repeatedly rejected the agency's inspections with various claims.

All these led the IAEA Chairman, Rafael Grossi, to admit a year ago that "Iran is weeks, not months, away from a nuclear bomb," and that "the fact that we are not getting the level of access needed to nuclear sites in the country only makes the situation worse."

Grossi's words should echo in the ears of the Americans, who are currently negotiating with Iran about its nuclear program. The starting point in Washington must be that Iran will, again, do everything in its power to violate the terms of the agreement and continue to advance toward a bomb.

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In the realm of global nuclear politics, few topics are as contentious and shrouded in secrecy as Israel's nuclear capabilities. Despite widespread speculation and expert assumptions, Israel maintains a policy known as "amimut," or "deliberate ambiguity." This article delves into the intricacies of Israel's nuclear policy, its historical context, and the implications it holds for regional and global security.

What is amimut?

Amimut, the Hebrew term for "deliberate ambiguity," encapsulates Israel's approach to its nuclear capabilities. This policy is designed to keep both allies and adversaries guessing about the extent of its nuclear arsenal. Media outside Israel claim it could possess between 80 and 400 nuclear warheads, but Israel neither confirms nor denies these claims. This ambiguity serves as a strategic deterrent, particularly against hostile neighbors.

David Ben-Gurion, Israel's founding father, was reportedly obsessed with the idea of developing nuclear weapons. He viewed them as essential for the survival of the Jewish state. The early years of Israel were marked by a series of conflicts with neighboring Arab nations, which fueled Ben-Gurion's determination to secure a nuclear capability.

In collaboration with France, Israel embarked on a nuclear program that led to the establishment of two research centers: Dimona and Soreq.

During a crucial meeting in 1962 with President John F. Kennedy, Shimon Peres, then Israel's deputy minister of defense, articulated a statement that would define the country's nuclear stance: "I can tell you most clearly that we will not introduce nuclear weapons to the region, and certainly we will not be the first." This declaration marked the formal adoption of amimut as Israel's nuclear policy.

Despite differing opinions among other prime ministers like Golda Meir and Levi Eshkol, the essence of Peres' statement resonated deeply. By maintaining a stance of ambiguity, Israel effectively communicated its intentions without revealing its capabilities, allowing it to deter potential threats without provoking an arms race.

In the decades following the adoption of amimut, Israel's Arab neighbors grew increasingly concerned about the possibility of Israel possessing nuclear weapons. The uncertainty surrounding Israel's nuclear arsenal led to a climate of fear and speculation. This ambiguity played a crucial role in altering the dynamics of conflict in the region.

As Peres noted in his autobiography, "We learned there is tremendous power in ambiguity... Doubt was a powerful deterrent to those who desired a second Holocaust." The fear of a nuclear-armed Israel led to a decrease in overt military confrontations from neighboring states, as they weighed the potential consequences of engaging with a nuclear power.

The Samson Option

One of the more dramatic elements of Israel's alleged nuclear policy is what is referred to as the "Samson Option." This concept draws upon the biblical figure Samson, who famously brought down the Philistines at the cost of his own life. In the context of nuclear deterrence, this option implies that Israel would resort to nuclear weapons only in an existential crisis, potentially taking down itself along with its enemies. This concept underscores the seriousness with which Israel views its nuclear capabilities, framing them not as a tool for aggression but as a last line of defense.

Pros and cons of amimut

While amimut has its proponents, it is not without its critics. Detractors argue that this policy allows Israel to evade international scrutiny regarding its nuclear program. As one of the few UN member states not to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Israel's position raises questions about accountability and transparency.

Critics contend that the lack of openness hinders global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation.

Supporters of amimut argue that abandoning this policy could lead to an escalation of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. They maintain that revealing Israel's nuclear capabilities could trigger an arms race, particularly with Iran, which has been a focal point of concern for Israeli security.

Israel's primary objective is to prevent nuclear proliferation at all costs. This often means taking proactive measures, including military actions against perceived threats. For instance, Israeli forces have conducted airstrikes on nuclear facilities in Syria and Iraq to dismantle emerging nuclear programs.

The Stuxnet Operation

In the early 2000s, it is believed that Israel collaborated with the United States to develop the malware known as Stuxnet. This sophisticated cyber weapon targeted Iran's nuclear facilities, causing significant disruptions and delays in their nuclear program.

Such actions align with the overarching goal of amimut: to ensure that nuclear weapons remain out of the hands of hostile nations. While cyber operations may not be as overtly aggressive as military strikes, they reflect a strategic approach to national security that prioritizes secrecy and deterrence.

Conclusion

Today, the global landscape of nuclear weapons continues to evolve. Many countries are engaged in research and development related to nuclear capabilities, and while the threat of nuclear war may not be imminent, the potential for conflict remains. Israel's approach to nuclear deterrence is characterized by a level of secrecy that sets it apart from other nations.

Israel's policy of amimut has been a deliberate strategy to maintain peace and stability in a volatile region. The question remains: what would happen if Israel were to abandon this policy and disclose its capabilities? Such a move could suggest a dramatic shift in the security landscape, either indicating a new era of trust and cooperation or a heightened threat of nuclear conflict.

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The assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah closes a circle for Israel. It's not just the precise execution in the heart of Hezbollah's stronghold in Beirut, the infamous underground bunker of Nasrallah's, supposedly impenetrable, or the additional surprise suffered by the terrorist organization, which perhaps didn't think Israel would dare to carry out such an operation. Beyond all these, the assassination is a move with profound significance in the long-term strategic view, which can also point to the next options open to Israel.

Since the IDF stepped up operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah, it has demonstrated superiority on all fronts, especially in intelligence – the main area where it failed last October. Who would have believed less than a year ago that these are the capabilities we would demonstrate today?

Looking back at the past year, some optimistic trends are nevertheless revealed: Hamas has been dealt a crushing blow. The Gaza terrorist organization has not been eliminated, but most of its leadership has been wiped out, its military structure dismantled, and it is no longer capable of harming Israel in the same way as before October 7. Israel, of course, needs to continue the pressure on it, advance the release of the remaining hostages held in Gaza by any means possible, and not let up until it succeeds in eliminating the entire threat posed by Hamas. However, the intensity of the fighting in Gaza has decreased and is not expected to return to the same scale as before. As Israel continues to carry out targeted operations, it will further erode the capabilities of the terrorist organization and its members, and the threat from it will continue to diminish.

In the northern arena, Hezbollah has been revealed in many ways as a paper tiger. Apart from rocket fire, it has not carried out significant actions so far, despite all the blows inflicted on it in the last two weeks. Although we shouldn't underestimate the Shiite organization and its capabilities, the elimination of many of its senior officials, including its senior military commanders, the head of the Southern Front Ali Karaki (who was killed with Nasrallah), the leader of the organization himself, and the heads of the Radwan force, greatly reduce its ability to carry out quality terrorist operations against Israel. This doesn't mean it can't carry out sporadic rocket fire – in recent days, we've seen only a trickle of rockets, though nothing close to the pessimistic forecasts heard here – but the motivation has been hit, the fear has increased, and the capabilities have decreased.

It's also worth taking into account the shock the terrorist organization has entered, its fear of using means of communication and the many surprises it has suffered within a few short weeks. In the absence of an orderly command structure, this is a blow that will be very difficult to recover from quickly. In these weeks, it should be noted, Israel has suffered almost no casualties at all, while Hezbollah counts its dead in many dozens, including almost all of its military leadership. May it stay that way.

It's also worth dwelling a bit on the implications of the organization leader's departure from the scene: Nasrallah is not just another senior commander of the organization. He is not one of many. Nasrallah is not ostensibly a military commander, not a field man who guides the soldiers, but he is the charismatic figure, the gifted orator, the supreme leader to whom the fighters of the Shiite organization look up. He is their absolute symbol.

But in many ways, Nasrallah is much more than that. He turned Hezbollah into the largest and most heavily armed terrorist organization in the world. Since he took over the position previously held by Abbas al-Musawi in 1992, who was also eliminated by Israel, Nasrallah managed to position the Shiite organization at the forefront of the struggle against Israel, drive it out of Lebanon, inflict a painful blow on it in the Second Lebanon War and establish deterrence against it. Nasrallah also armed his organization with tens of thousands of missiles and rockets, advanced weapons, explosive devices, and missiles, using his connections with Iran and the money his patrons from Tehran poured on him. His absence in Hezbollah will be felt greatly, and he leaves behind very big shoes to fill.

One thing can probably be said with quite high certainty: a large part of Israel's deterrence has been restored. The cheers of many citizens in Syria over the IDF's successes in recent weeks can be heard all the way to the northern Golan Heights, and it's hard to believe there are many in the Sunni Arab states who are now crying over the bitter fate of the arch-terrorist from Beirut. The leaders in Arab capitals are certainly looking at Israel with renewed respect after the last three weeks, even if they publicly expressed condolences over his death.

When talking about a new regional architecture, whose promotion in the form of normalization with Saudi Arabia may have been cut short with the outbreak of the war, this is the kind of behavior that Israel needs to adhere to in order to rehabilitate this opportunity. In the Middle Eastern neighborhood, alliances are not made with the weak and fearful, but with the strong. Israel is restoring its status and, incidentally, the possibilities for true normalization from a correct position of strength, facing countries that will see it as equal to them and even more powerful, one that has the ability to assist them in times of trouble. Thus, for example, the statement published this week and attributed to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, that he's not really interested in Israel's actions in Gaza – didn't come in a vacuum.

That's why Israel must not fold now, must not stop. We need to continue pressing the pedal in Lebanon as well to bring about a new reality for the border residents. We must continue to act in Gaza and in other arenas.

Now we must also set our sights on the one big problem that still hovers over Israeli heads, which has not been dealt with since the beginning of the war: the Iranian nuclear program. In addition to the many reports in recent years about the accumulation of highly enriched uranium in quantities sufficient to build several bombs, recently, it has also been claimed that the Iranians may have begun to restart the activities of the "weapons group" – the group responsible for turning the fissile nuclear material into an actual bomb, and then assembling it on a missile.

Now is the most appropriate time to act against the Iranian nuclear program for other reasons as well: The Iranians are looking at the close election system in the US and fear another term of Former President Donald Trump in the White House. Despite his conciliatory words in recent days in favor of reaching an agreement with Tehran on the nuclear program, they know that he is not a predictable person and that he sometimes also advocates using force to achieve his goals.

Therefore, they understand that the few weeks remaining until the elections themselves, and also the weeks between the elections and the entry of the new president into the White House, are critical to presenting the Americans with a reality in which an Iranian nuclear bomb is a fait accompli. Now, they must push forward in order not to reach a situation where there will be another option in the White House to do something about it.

From Israel's perspective, a strike on Iran would now come at a convenient time from an international perspective as well. The Americans may not be pleased with the Israeli moves and the escalation against Hezbollah, but President Joe Biden also doesn't want to be recorded in the annals of American history as the president who allowed Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. The fact that the president is a lame duck until after the elections means that he will find it difficult to stop significant moves that Israel chooses to make.

If Israel knows how to "sell" the attack to the president correctly, it can also paint it as something that will give the Democratic candidate, Kamala Harris, an electoral boost. Instead of an agreement with Saudi Arabia or a ceasefire in Gaza, eliminating the Iranian nuclear program can be perceived in Washington as a first step towards truly shaping the new regional architecture. It is certainly much more significant than a ceasefire agreement in Gaza, which will lead to nothing in the long run, and it will greatly increase the Israeli standing in the eyes of the Saudis, for example.

Moreover, the Iranians are also in an inferior position vis-à-vis other Western countries after being caught transferring UAVs to the Russians for the war in Ukraine and connecting to the "bad guy" of the neighborhood. They suffered sanctions and lost a lot of the legitimacy they might have had before. In addition, the IAEA declared publicly that it is unable to know what is happening in Iranian nuclear facilities and monitor them, and in fact, has made any possibility of cooperation now meaningless.

But the most important fact from Israel's point of view is that the most powerful "whip" that Iran held over our heads, Hezbollah, is now perceived as something that can be dealt with. Even before that, following the attack in April, Israel understood that Iran is not a significant threat to its security – even when it launched hundreds of missiles and UAVs towards us. At the same time, the Lebanese terrorist organization is not what it was three weeks ago, and along with it, Iranian deterrence towards us following a possible attack on nuclear facilities has decreased greatly.

Perhaps the fact that should most indicate this is the claim that Iran's leader, Ali Khamenei, was taken to a "hidden and safe" place following Nasrallah's assassination. Even in routine, the Iranian leader is certainly tightly secured, with the best defenses Iran has to offer, but his concealment indicates that the Iranians don't know exactly what to expect now. These things are added to the publication that even the Revolutionary Guards stopped using their communication devices following the operation against Hezbollah, which indicates their fear of Israeli penetration.

Now is the time to act. Israel has already proven in April that it can attack in Iran, and later did something similar in Yemen. The IDF and security forces have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to operate in distant arenas and Israel's excellent intelligence. The rise in Israeli morale and reconnection following recent successes can increase internal legitimacy for an attack now. In addition, our defense arrays are on high alert and in immediate readiness.

However, we must not act alone. We must convince the America and our other allies to join the struggle against the Iranians before it's too late. We need to emphasize to them how the region might look if Iran has nuclear weapons and what could have developed after October 7 if Tehran had a nuclear umbrella sheltering the head of Hamas and Hezbollah. This reality must be prevented now.

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Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps fired more than a dozen surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, the official IRNA news agency reported on Friday.

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The report said the IRGC fired 16 missiles during an ongoing major military exercise across the country's south. It said the name of missiles were Emad, Ghadr, Sejjil, Zalzal, Dezful and Zolfaghar and that their range is from 350 to 2,000 kilometers (220 to 1250 miles). The short-range and medium-range missiles, Iran has said, can reach US bases in the region as well as archenemy Israel.

It said the missiles successfully hit one target at the same time as 10 drones simultaneously hit their targets. State TV showed missiles launching in the desert.

State television showed missiles flattening a target which resembled Israel's Dimona nuclear reactor at the conclusion of the exercises on Friday.

"Through a simulation of the Dimona atomic facilities, the Revolutionary Guards successfully practiced attacking this critical center of the Zionist regime in its missile exercise," the semi-official news agency Tasnim said.

"These exercises had a very clear message: a serious, real ... warning to threats by the Zionist regime's authorities to beware of their mistakes," IRGC chief Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami said on state TV.

Maj. Gen. Mohammad Hossein Bagheri, the chief of staff of Iran's Armed Forces, said the planned drill was an answer to Israel's recent "massive but pointless threats" to Iran.

Bagheri said, "This was a tiny part of hundreds of missiles that can hit any hostile target simultaneously."

Israel has long seen Iran's nuclear program as a threat and seeks a harder line by the US and international community. Iran insists its nuclear program is peaceful.

During the second day of the drill on Tuesday, Iran launched cruise missiles, too.

The IRGC in the past has said it has cruise missiles with ranges of 1,000 kilometers (620 miles). It also has missiles that range up to 2,000 kilometers (1,250 miles).

From time to time, Iran holds military exercises, saying they are aimed at improving the readiness of its forces and testing new weapons.

The five-day annual exercise that began on Monday came days after the breakup of talks to revive Tehran's nuclear deal with world powers. Iran has accelerated its nuclear advances as negotiations to return to the accord struggle to make headway. The talks will resume on Monday.

Former US President Donald Trump pulled the United States out of the nuclear deal and re-imposed crushing sanctions on Iran in 2018 . Tehran has since started enriching uranium up to 60% purity – a short technical step from the 90% needed to make an atomic bomb.

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European negotiators in talks to salvage Iran's 2015 nuclear deal with world powers presented no "new practical initiatives" and were not constructive in the last round that paused on Dec. 17, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian said on Thursday.

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The negotiations are slated to resume on Dec. 27, Russia and the European Union's foreign service said earlier on Thursday, a day after the US national security adviser warned the troubled talks with Iran could be exhausted within weeks.

"We do not see the position of some European countries as constructive, specifically that of France," Iranian state media quoted Amirabdollahian as saying.

"When they say they are concerned about the progress of Iran's nuclear program, we say out loud: 'If you want to have your concerns addressed, then all sanctions must be lifted.'"

The talks have made scant progress since they resumed earlier this month after a five-month hiatus following the election of hardline Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi.

Tehran has sought changes to an outline of a deal that had taken shape in six previous rounds of talks, leaving them largely deadlocked while Western powers warned that time was running out to rein in Iran's fast-advancing nuclear activities.

Senior British, French and German diplomats offered a pessimistic assessment of efforts to revive the deal under which Iran had limited its disputed nuclear program in return for relief from U, European Union and UN economic sanctions.

Amirabdollahian said Iran had "managed to get [our] views orally approved by all parties in the draft that will be discussed next week." He did not elaborate.

Meanwhile, Iranian media on Thursday reported that Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein has called for direct negotiations between Iran and the US.

Hussein spoke at a news conference after meeting his Iranian counterpart in Tehran, stressing that heightened tension between Iran and the US – Baghdad's two powerful allies – directly affects his country's stability.

While Iraq remains a pillar of Washington's security policy in the region, Iranian-backed militias wield extensive power in the country.

"Any opening in Tehran-Washington relations will positively impact Iraq's internal situation from political, economic and security perspectives," Hussein said.

"We think it's time for direct talks between Tehran and Washington so that the two countries reach a common understanding not only on the nuclear issue but also on sanctions imposed on Iran," he said.

Hussein also touched on the hasty evacuation and sudden death of Iran's top diplomat in war-torn Yemen, Hassan Irloo, whom Washington has identified as a member of Iran's powerful paramilitary Revolutionary Guard. He said the US cooperated with Saudi Arabia and Iran to transfer Irloo on an Iraqi plane from Yemen to Tehran, where Iranian authorities said he died of COVID-19.

There was no immediate comment from Washington on its reported assistance. Yemen's Houthi rebels had sought permission for his transfer from Saudi Arabia, which maintains an air blockade on Yemen's capital of Sanaa.

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Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps staged a major military exercise across the country's south on Monday amid heightened tensions over Tehran's nuclear program, state TV reported.

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The IRGC aerospace division, ground troops and naval forces joined in the five-day drill, the report said, with maritime forces set to maneuver in the strategic Strait of Hormuz, the narrow gateway for 20% of the world's traded oil.

The exercise comes days after talks to revive Tehran's tattered nuclear deal with world powers broke up in Vienna. Iran has accelerated its nuclear advances as negotiations to return to the accord struggle to make headway, alarming Israel and other regional rivals. Israel has repeatedly threatened unilateral action against Iran's nuclear program.

Gen. Gholamali Rashid, a top IRGC commander, vowed a harsh response to any Israeli military action against Iran.

Iranian forces will launch "a crushing attack on all bases, centers, paths and space used to carry out the aggression without delay," the semi-official Mehr news agency quoted him as saying.

"Any threat to Iran's nuclear and military bases by the Zionist regime is not possible without the green light support of the United States," he said.

Earlier on Monday, residents in Bushehr, some 700 kilometers (440 miles) south of Iran's capital, Tehran, reported seeing a light in the sky and hearing a loud explosion near the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

It was the second time this month that sudden anti-aircraft firing erupted the middle of the night near an Iranian nuclear facility, which Iranian forces hours later described as drill for its surface-to-air missile defense system.

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A lot of words have been devoted in the past few weeks to the possibility of an Israeli attack on Iran. One after another, senior officials in the defense establishment and the political echelon have made it clear that as far as Israel is concerned, "all the options are on the table" when it comes to stopping Iran from developing nuclear weapons. 

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There is a clear purpose to these threats: to push Western powers to take a more aggressive line on Tehran. They are mostly aimed at the US administration, which has consistently declared that it will not allow Iran to nuclearize, but in effect, is taking a passive stance. To put it simply, Israel is telling the world that if it won't stop Iran, we will have to take military action. 

Israel made a similar threat a decade ago, one that was backed up by practical plans for an attack: Israel wanted the world to see that its air force was drilling long-range flights and strikes, and wanted it to know that it was discussing the optimal timing for an attack. US intelligence – and that of other countries, obviously – did not miss the IDF's announcements of high alert ahead of a possible imminent attacks. 

All this did the job. The world was pressured by the possibility of an Israeli strike, and took action. The US launched secret talks with Iran, which led to the signing of the JCPOA in 2015. Iran stopped enriching uranium and got rid of the stocks of enriched uranium it already had. The possibility of an Israeli attack was taken off the table, followed by accusations back and forth between the political leadership (Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak) and the military leadership (Gabi Ashkenazi and Meir Dagan) at the time about what the correct course of action had been, and who torpedoed whom. 

While the Iran nuclear deal was in effect, Israel fell into a certain complacency. Assuming that as long as the deal was valid, there would be no military action against Iran's nuclear program, the plans for a strike were shelved, and never underwent the necessary updates and adjustments needed to keep them relevant in light of the changes of the past 10 years. 

Even after the US withdrew from the nuclear deal in 2018, Israel was still asleep at the wheel. The assumption was that one of three scenarios would play out: The Tehran regime would collapse under the crippling sanctions the US applied after it pulled out of the deal; the Iranians would beg to sign a new deal, and it would be possible to make it a better, stronger, longer-term one; or Donald Trump would be reelected and order an American strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. 

None of these came to pass. The Iranians proved impressively determined, and today – despite a terrible economic situation that includes 30 million people living below the poverty line, crumbling infrastructure, and the Iranian rial at an unprecedented low – they aren't blinking when it comes to their nuclear program. 

This hardline policy is being led by a brutal regime that has not been destabilized, and apparently won't while US President Joe Biden is in office (and most likely wouldn't have happened even if Trump had been reelected). 

The American withdrawal from the deal prompted the Iranians to hit the gas on their nuclear development. It didn't happen immediately, but in the past few years they have made impressive progress, not hesitating to skip over their commitments under the deal, especially in everything having to do with a ban on installing advanced centrifuges and enriching uranium to a high rate, in large quantities. Recently, they also started enrichment at an underground facility at Fordo, which is much better-defended against a possible attack. 

Israel is following this all closely, but took too long to respond. For example, to attack Iran, it will be necessary to refuel mid-air. Currently, the IDF depends on 50-year-old aircraft that need to be replaced immediately. At the end of 2018, then-Defense Minister and IDF Chief Avigdor Lieberman and Gadi Eizenkot approved a broad equipment acquisition plan that included the purchase of new fueling aircraft. But the new IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, wanted to delay the decision so it would fall in line with his multi-year plan. Then Israel found itself in a political maelstrom of repeated elections and no state budget. The result: a two-year delay to the decision (which was finally approved at the end of 2020 and inked in early 2021) and therefore to the acquisition of the equipment. 

The IDF was waiting for a budget from outside (a "box," as it is termed in the military) to start preparing again for the possibility of an attack on Iran. Kochavi preferred to channel funds to other things, like the multidisciplinary Tnufa unit he set up as part of his multi-year plan. When other high-ranking IDF officers, primarily Israeli Air Force commander Maj. Gen. Amikam Norkin disputed his decision, Kochavi responded that that IDF would be given a "box" like it had previously to deal with the Iranian issue and other matters, like air defense and the construction of security barriers. 

When Biden was elected US president, the option of an American attack on Iran was dropped, and then the penny dropped for Israel. At the start of this year, Kochavi revived the military option in an aggressive speech at the Institute for National Security Studies. Once the new government was forced, he got the "box" he had been hoping for – special funding of over 5 billion shekels ($1.6 billion) for three years for preparations to attack Iran. 

As a result, for the past six months the IDF has been working feverishly to make the military option a relevant tool. The Israeli military currently has plans and capabilities, but the attention and resources allow it to improve them with every month that passes. This, incidentally, is why many senior Israeli officials support a return to the previous bad deal; it might not keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons, but it will keep it farther away from them, and will allow Israel time, after which – in another three to five years – it should have an effective battle plan against Iran, of which attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities are only one element. 

Still, Israel could find itself having to decide on a strike before that, for a number of reasons: the nuclear talks could collapse, leading to Iran continuing its nuclear program until it reaches the nuclear threshold; a temporary deal that Iran will constantly challenge; or a return to the original nuclear deal, which Iran would secretly violate. And there could be other reasons that have nothing to do with its nuclear program, like an Iranian attack on Israel using cruise missiles fired from Yemen or Iraq in response to some Israeli action or other. An attack of this type, especially if it results in wounded, could lead to an Israeli strike on Iranian turf. 

According to Sima Shine, former head of the Mossad's research division and now a senior researcher at the INSS, "No Israeli prime minister will allow Iran to become a nuclear power on his watch. The question we need to ask ourselves is what we want to achieve by an attack, and how capable we are of doing it." 

This question is not part of the public discourse in Israel, which is limited to whether there will or will not be an attack. For the Israeli public, an attack means that planes will suddenly appear in the Iranian sky, drop bombs that will send Iran's nuclear facilities up in flame, after which our heroic pilots will return home and be greeted with cries of joy, which is what happened after the strikes on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and the Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007. 

"The Iranian project is farther away, better defended, and more compartmentalized than the projects attacked in the past," says Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Yadlin. 

"In Iraq and Syria, we had the advantage of surprise, and here, we don't. Israel has already proven that it can find creative ways of overcoming these obstacles, but it's a much more complicated event," Yadlin says. 

The dramatic change is not only in comparison to the destruction of the Iraqi and Syrian reactors, but also to the situation that existed in 2010, when the option of an attack was first raised. Then, the Americans controlled Iraq and there was a need to coordinate with them, and Iran's nuclear program was much newer and less protected. Since then, Iran has started using the Fordo facility, scattered sites related to its nuclear program throughout the country, and tripled its air defenses, adding dozens of batteries – including Russian S-300 systems as well as systems the Iranian military developed based on Russian and Chinese systems. Iran's air defenses are much more advanced than those of Syria, which the IAF is able to handle in the strikes it carried out there. 

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The planning stage for an airstrike on Iran is longer than you might think. A senior IDF official told me this week that "There won't be a situation in which someone makes a decision and 24 hours later there are planes in Tehran. We'll need a long time to get the system ready for war, because our working assumption needs to be that this won't be a strike, but a war." 

This definition, war, is part of how the IDF's thinking has evolved in the past few months. It is no longer looking at a localized strike on nuclear facilities, but preparing for war. This will be a different war from any we have known – no 7th Division or Golani or shared borders, but multiple different fronts in which battles are waged in multiple ways. One need only watch the maritime battles being waged between Israel and Iran in recent months to understand the potential, which extends far behind Iran's borders to the missile and rocket systems its satellites maintain in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip. 

Attacks like these require models – mock training on identical targets at similar distances, to get the system used to what is expected of it on the way to Iran and back. In the past, the IDF would train relatively easily; the enemy was always behind technologically and unable to detect the preparations. Anyone who did, like the Americans – in the case of the strike on Syria's reactor – would have been in on the secret anyway. 

Today, the world is equipped with sensors everywhere that will not allow a large contingent of aircraft to take off without alerting the enemy. To obscure the preparation, the IAF will need to create an ongoing routine of drills, which comes at an immense expense – money, fuel, replacement parts, flight hours, and reservist days. 

At the same time, Israel will have to make sure all its systems are operating at full capacity. First and foremost, air defense, which will react to anything that looks like a response on any scale, and the Military Intelligence Directorate and the Mossad, which will have to make an unprecedented effort ahead of any strike, collecting not only information about the Iranian nuclear program but also tactical and operational intelligence that will allow it to strike effectively. 

While all this is happening, Israel's ground forces will have to be on the highest alert, ready for the possibility of a war in the north or with Gaza, or both, all without leaving any signs. They will have to up the preparedness of various units, step up drills, and supply missing equipment. It's not easy to do all this in secret. Leading up to the attack on Syria's reactor, the army was forced to adopt trickery in order to prepare for a possible Syrian response. Syria opted not to respond, but the Iranians might behave differently. 

It takes time to make all these preparations. The IDF is waiting for four Boeing KC-46 Pegasus aerial refueling aircraft, but it could take years for them to arrive, and the Americans are refusing to let Israel jump the line and deliver them sooner. It will also take months to refill the warehouses with Iron Dome interceptor missiles and other IAF precision equipment. 

A decade ago, the IDF would have needed a few years to get ready. Then, too, it was impossible to shift the military into a state of immediate readiness, and when it was put into attack mode – and that happened a few times – the directive was for it to be ready within 16 days of the moment the political leadership gave the green light. At the time, the IDF wanted to cut down the preparation time as much as possible, because it kept it from other activities and also because it came at a heavy cost to the economy. Ashkenazi would say that "In every round of preparations, El Al is half-grounded, because its pilots are on reserve duty with me." That was true for other systems, as well, some of which have been bolstered since then – namely, military intelligence and cyber. 

All the preparations will have to be done in secret. "The issue of information security is dramatic in an event like this," said a high-ranking reservist officer. "We've never handled a challenge like this, and it's not clear if it's even possible to keep a secret like this for long." 

Keeping things secret will be a problem not only for the IDF and the defense establishment (the Mossad is an integral part of this mission, as well as the Israel Atomic Energy Commission and parts of the Defense Ministry), but also – and mainly – the government. Such a dramatic decision would need to be approved by the cabinet and the Opposition leader would need to be informed. This is what Menachem Begin did prior to the attack in Iraq when he informed Opposition leader Shimon Peres of the plan. Ehud Olmert also informed Netanyahu ahead of the attack in Syria. 

In this case, the cabinet will be frequently updated about preparations, and give the IDF authority to prepare for the operation. Only when the attack is imminent will the cabinet be asked to approve it. A very small group will decide on the final timing – the prime minister, the defense and foreign ministers, and possibly another minister, Lieberman, as a nod to his seniority and his status as a former defense minister. 

Anyone let in on the secret at any stage will be asked to sign draconic confidentiality papers. All officials will be ordered to keep it secret and it will be made clear that anyone who lets it out will face severe punishment. 

Even before a final decision on an attack, Israel will have to decide on its red lines. It will have to define them not only for itself, but also for the world. It will have to build international legitimacy for action. Without that legitimacy, a strike could have negative results and put Israel in the position of the aggressor, while giving Iran legitimacy to return to its nuclear project. In this case, Iran will argue that because its "nuclear research project" was attacked by a nuclear nation, it has to develop nuclear weapons to defend itself from similar attacks in future. Israel would find it difficult to thwart that a second time. 

Former Israeli Ambassador to the UN Ron Prosor says, "Building legitimacy in the world is complicated, because it's hard to do without exposing the operations, which would put the attack at risk." 

"We need to explain to the world not only why it's vital to stop Iran, but also that an action like this could hold it back for years," he says. 

"It requires precise diplomatic preparatory work, which is also hard to do without giving anything away. The diplomats at the Foreign Ministry need to be in the loop, but none of them will know why, and certainly not when. The Mossad, the IDF, and the National Security Council will be responsible for delivering information. We can only work in full coordination with the Americans, both in terms of the military and diplomacy," Prosor adds. 

"With everyone else – the Russians, the Chinese, the Europeans, the Gulf States – we need to prepare the background. Take them step by step, explain why Iran is so complicated and warn them about what will happen if Iran becomes a nuclear threshold state, or heaven forbid, a nuclearized state." 

This process will have to work differently in every country. With the British and French, for example, Israel has intelligence agreements that allow a certain amount of material to be shared. It's likely that Israel will share some information with the Gulf states, as well, especially to enlist its new partners (and the ones that are still in the closet) to stand by its side on the day of the attack and during whatever follows. 

"Coordination with the Americans is strategic, it's at the core of our interest," says the senior IDF official. "They can give us lots of help in the attack itself – for example, intelligence or radar support, which are deployed in Iraq and the Persian Gulf, and even search and rescue capabilities, and of course, in providing us military protection after the attack." 

As part of the new plans being drawn up now, the IDF is also preparing for the possibility to attack without coordinating with the Americans. 

"We don't need a green light from them, but it would be good if there were an understanding, an amber light, mostly so we don't surprise them," a former senior defense official says. "So this attack should come after the Americans despair of ever reaching a nuclear deal with the Iranians." 

As noted, the Americans controlled Iraq in 2010, and Israel needed to coordinate with them down to the smallest details in order to carry out a strike in Iran. This is no longer the case, but the Americans still have a significant presence in the region that could help Israel. It's unlikely that they will offer Israel use of their air bases in Qatar or their naval base in Bahrain, and there's no chance that any Arab state would agree to openly cooperate with Israel, exposing itself to a retaliatory attack by Iran. But localized, secret cooperation is a possibility, from helicopters to search and rescue services, to setting up various detection and interception systems. 

Because of the Arab boycott, until the start of this year Israel fell under the US European Command (EUCOM), even though it operated in the Central Command's territory, which necessitated complex coordination. After the Abraham Accords, Israel was moved to CENTCOM, which makes things simpler and creates a space for cooperation – starting with ongoing updates about strikes in Syria, to joint military drills. 

Preparations for an attack will require Israel to carry out frequent war games. It will have to practice every possible scenario on every front, and make sure that the political leadership is present. Our leaders don't like this, as they would prefer to leave themselves as much room to maneuver as possible and not show ahead of time what they will do in any given scenario. So the drills used various "former" officials to play the role of prime minister. When it comes to Iran, our political leaders would do well to show up in person and prepare for the day they will have to give the order and the ramifications of them saying "Go." 

The stage of the attack itself requires, first of all, a decision about what the targets are. The range of possibilities is almost endless – localized strikes on uranium enrichment facilities, strikes on any facility linked to the nuclear program, or an all-out attack that would also target missile launchers and Shahab missile manufacturing sites, cruise missile launching sites, facilities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, and more. 

"The backbone of the [Iranian] nuclear program is the enrichment facilities at Qom [Fordo] and Natanz," says the senior IDF officer. 

Aside from these sites, Israel can also attack factories around Tehran that manufacture centrifuges, the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan, the heavy water reactor at Arak, and the experimental site at Parchin. It will also be necessary to destroy the air defenses around all of these sites. 

Most experts think that the operation will have to focus only on the core of the nuclear program and its enrichment sites: "Make it clear to them that this is what we insist on, and that we have no interest in a full-scale war," the former defense official says. "But if they respond – we'll take the rest, too." 

Israel would prefer to carry out a strike like this in a single shot, which is why it would prefer that the Americans do it. They could attack, assess the damage, and go back the next day and the day after if necessary. Israel, however, is extremely limited because of the distance, its number of planes, and its need to defend itself against a response from multiple fronts the moment it attacks. 

Some officials think that Israel should take advantage of the opportunity of an attack to eradicate as many of Iran's capabilities as possible – and especially try to destabilize the regime through an attack on the IRGC. But that scenario is unlikely. Conversations with many defense officials past and present leads one to conclude that Israel would prefer a more focused action. 

In the future, Israel should have additional capabilities, but in the near future, it will depend on its abilities to carry out an airstrike on Iran. It would be a complex strike involving hundreds of aircraft. Presumably, the first planes to arrive in Iran would be the F35 stealth fighters, which would destroy Iran's air defenses. Then F15s and F16s would arrive, with the various weaponry they can carry and fire. 

The main factor is what each aircraft can carry for the requisite distance: the more fuel the plane is holding, the less weapons it can carry, and vice versa. So there will be a need for mid-air refueling, as well as decisions about what plane to send in to leave enough to defend Israel's own skies. There will also need to be precise plans about the kinds of ammunition to be used, the angles of attack, and the strikes on targets, especially underground ones. Of course, the selection of the combat pilots to fly the mission will be especially careful. 

"Everyone dreams of taking part in a mission like this. There will be a war between the pilots about who gets to be there," a veteran pilot says. 

We can assume that the airstrike will be accompanied by search and rescue forces in helicopters and on the ground, who will have been flown in secretly ahead of time or moved in on ships. Naval forces will also be moved toward the Gulf. Other aircraft will have to provide air coverage over a distance of 1,300 km. (807 miles) or more. 

There is no expectation that this attack will go smoothly, like the ones in Iraq or Syria. It's not only that Iran is much better defended, but also that an operation like this will inevitably face problems because of the enormous number of aircraft taking part in it. Planes could go down because they are hit or malfunction, and pilots could have to abandon their planes over enemy territory and be taken prisoner. 

Pilots will have to undergo complicated mental preparation, far beyond the usual, as will those who send them on the operation. The political leadership will probably ask the IDF for a probable casualty count, as well as the projected number of wounded in Israel as a result of an Iranian response. But even if the numbers are high, it's unlikely that they would cause any leader in Israel to ignore Iran's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. 

It will be complicated to reach Iran by air. You don't need to be an expert to analyze the flight routes and possibilities: supposedly, all of Iran's neighbors – including Turkey – have an interest in working with Israel, given their common concerns about Iran. But it's doubtful they will want to be exposed as having allowed Israel to use their airspace to attack Iran. This is particularly true of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states, and to a lesser degree Azerbaijan, which also shares a border with Iran. The IAF will know how to overcome this difficulty from an operational perspective and fly unseen (certainly on the way out), but this is another reason why extensive diplomatic preparations are necessary to create legitimacy and understanding so Israel can use a certain country's airspace en route to attack without having problems with it later. 

An airstrike will probably not be able to destroy Iran's underground nuclear facilities. It's possible that some will require ground forces, which would go in secretly and plant materials that would make it possible to target the sites in the strike. This element significantly adds to the planning and problems of execution. There are a number of ways into Iran, but it's a huge country, difficult to get around, certainly when one has to do so covertly. The Americans will testify to this – they learned in 1980 when they landed for their failed attempt to free the hostages being held in Tehran. 

The former defense official notes that "If we attack and delay Iran's nuclear program by a year or two, it's as if we did nothing. We need to be sure that significant damage is done and we'll put them off [nuclear weapons] for many years." 

There are many officials in Israel who think that given the state of Iran's nuclear program, the mission is too much for Israel, and only the Americans (or the Americans with Israel) can pull it off. Others think that Israel can carry out an effective localized strike that will deal a blow to one aspect of Iran's nuclear program, but won't destroy it entirely. In making the decision, Israel will have to weigh not only the results, but also the ramifications: "the day after." Here, too, the range of possibilities is nearly endless, from the Iranians ignoring it to an all-out war in the Middle East. 

In 2010, the US warned that an Israeli attack on Iran would lead to a world war. The Americans were mostly bothered by the price they would pay, which they claimed would entail a US ground incursion into Iran to stop it. 

Yadlin says, "I thought then, and I think now, that there won't be a world war, or even a regional war. Even if there is an Iranian response against Israel, it will be moderate, and even if it causes damage, it won't be the end of the world. We certainly won't see another sack of Jerusalem here." 

Supposedly, the Iranians have three possibilities: a full-out response, a partial response, or no response. Middle East scholar Professor Eyal Zisser of Tel Aviv University thinks that there will be a response from Iran. 

"If they don't respond, it will send Israel a message that it can keep attacking them without interference, like it does in Syria. The attacks on oil tankers in the past two years proved that the Iranians aren't sitting quietly. They respond. Otherwise, why have they been making threats all these years and building their forces? They can attack us, or our allies, or both," Zisser says. 

The Iranian decision will to a large extent be dictated by the extent to which the Americans back the attack. 

"Iran can't risk a war with the US," the IDF official explains. "Even after Qasem Soleimani was killed, they made due with a symbolic firing of 16 rockets at the American base in Dir a-Zur, and that was only after they made certain that no soldier would be killed." 

Shine also thinks that the Iranians will respond, "but if the US is behind us, it will be completely different. This isn't the Syrian nuclear reactor, which was built secretly and no one knew about. Everyone knows about Iran, and it won't go unnoticed. Iran will have to decide whether or not to respond from its own territory, on its own, or through its satellites." 

Thus far, Iran has avoided launching open attacks from within its borders. It's not that it doesn't – the massive strike on Saudi Arabia's Aramco oil facility in September 2019 was secretly launched from Iran. Recently, Defense Minister Benny Gantz revealed cruise missile bases that the Iranians maintain at Kashan, north of Isfahan. That facility and others are operated by the IRGC Aerospace Force under the command of Ali Hajizadeh, whom Israel has already marked as the most problematic official in Iran after Soleimani was killed in a US drone strike two years ago. 

Iran can act on its own, even fire Shahab missiles at Israel. It has hundreds of them, and some might even have been fitted out with chemical warheads. It can also take action via its satellites: the Houthis in Yemen have precision capabilities, including long-range attack drones, as do some of the militias in Iraq, which have already used drones against US military bases. 

Israel's main concern will be how Hezbollah will respond. Will it launch a war, be satisfied with a symbolic response, or sit on the fence? This is a critical issue, and experts don't agree about it. 

"Hezbollah was built up and prepared precisely for this, and we can assume that it will use everything it has against us," Shine says. Zisser, on the other hand, thinks that Hezbollah will want to avoid a full-scale war. 

"[Hezbollah leader Hassan] Nasrallah will try to stay out of it. He might respond here or there, but it will depend on how much pressure the Iranians put on him. He might be satisfied with a symbolic response, to do his duty, and nothing more," Zisser says. 

The other side isn't the only one that will face tough decisions. Israel, for example, will have to decide whether or not, after an attack on Iran it will want to carry out preemptive strikes against Hezbollah's various sites, especially those linked to the group's precision missile program. The advantage of strikes like these is that they can take out specific capabilities that threaten Israel. The disadvantage: it will surely start a war with Hezbollah, and turn the strike on Iran into a war in the north. 

Most experts think Israel will avoid doing that. It will send Hezbollah clear warnings that the attack was directed at Iran's nuclear program, and if Hezbollah keeps quiet, that will remain its only goal. 

"If we do otherwise, if we take massive action in Lebanon, Hezbollah will respond significantly," Zisser says. "But if we act wisely, even its responses will be moderate, because they have no interest in the IDF taking a few divisions and invading Lebanon." 

The senior IDF official also thinks that Hezbollah won't rush to demolish Lebanon for Tehran's sake. "Nasrallah is a Lebanese patriot. He'll respond, but moderately. Assuming that the main target of the whole event is Iran's nuclear program, Israel should even accept some 'stings' from him, even a few casualties, and ignore it, to avoid a widespread conflict in the north." 

Yadlin also thinks that Hezbollah will keep itself in check, "But if it chooses to respond, it would be better for us to take action now, before it's defended by Iranian nuclear weapons." 

A war in the north, on any scale, will require Israel to call up massive forces, which will hinder its ability to wage an ongoing battle against Iran. It will certainly need to equip itself ahead of time with tens of thousands of Iron Dome and David's Sling interceptor missiles, only a small part of which have been agreed on and are due to arrive bit by bit in the next few years. This is in addition to the need for Arrow missiles to intercept long-range missiles. All this will cost billions, and only part of it is in place (and that was thanks to special US aid). For years, the IDF has been screaming that the country's air defenses fall far short of what is necessary, given the threats, and need massive restocking. 

It's likely that Iran will also prod Gaza to respond. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad already cooperates with it, and so does Hamas, to some extent. It could also try to attack Israel's weaker allies, like the Gulf states, or Israeli interests there. It will certainly try to attack Israelis, and Israeli and Jewish interests all over the world.

At the same time, Iran will take diplomatic action. "It will turn to its allies, especially Russia and China, and argue that Israel is the aggressor and ask for protection," Zisser says. "It might also use [the attack] as an excuse to try and return to its nuclear project, this time in the position of the one who needs protection against Israeli aggression." 

Therefore, Israel has to do everything so that the attack is as effective as possible, and if the first wave doesn't succeed – attack again, despite all the complications this would entail. This comes as a possible cost of an open war with Iran in which the two countries trade blows every so often. The IDF is also preparing for this possibility as part of its new plans. When they are in place, Israel should be ready for an all-out war with Iran, and not only isolated strikes on its nuclear project. 

None of this is expected to happen in the next few days or weeks, and probably not even the next few months. As long as the Iran nuclear talks are underway, and the US is reaching out to Iran diplomatically, an attack would be out of bounds because Israel would be accused of torpedoing the talks and its allies would turn on it, including Washington, which has already made it clear that it expects "zero surprises" at this time. Israel has no commitment to this, but won't act without coordinating with the Americans. That's what it did a decade ago, to avoid a conflict with the US that could have ramifications much broader than the Iranian issue. 

This "down time" is good for Israel. It can use it to try and influence the American (and European) moves and the nascent deal, while at the same time stepping up its military preparations, completing its plans, building models and equipping itself in order to reach a higher level of operational readiness. 

And when all this is done, if it turns out tomorrow that Iran lied to the world and is closer to a nuclear bomb than we thought, the decision-makers will have to decide whether or not to attack immediately. As always, it would be better if the Americans – who promised that Iran would never have nuclear capabilities – did it. But if the IDF takes charge, it will take several long weeks of preparation before an operation like this can get off the ground, less than optimally ready and with less certainty of success. 

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