Financial Times found that the five-person team included scientists affiliated with SPND, Iran's most secretive military research organization, which US officials have identified as "the direct successor organisation to Iran's pre-2004 nuclear weapons program." The delegation simultaneously requested tritium and other radioactive isotopes from Russian suppliers - materials that nuclear proliferation experts consider highly suspicious when sought by defense-linked entities.

At 9:40 a.m. on August 4, 2024, Mahan Air flight W598 from Tehran touched down at Moscow's Sheremetyevo International Airport carrying Ali Kalvand, a 43-year-old Iranian nuclear physicist, along with four associates he identified as employees of DamavandTec, his consulting company headquartered in Tehran. However, Financial Times investigation determined the business delegation narrative was fabricated.

The Iranian team had flown to Russia carrying diplomatic service passports - some bearing sequential numbers and issued on identical dates just weeks before their departure. The delegation included an Iranian nuclear researcher who Western officials told Financial Times works for SPND, the former chief executive of a company sanctioned for operating as a procurement front for SPND activities, and an Iranian military counter-intelligence officer.

Financial Times investigation found this Iranian team visited Russian scientific institutes producing dual-use technologies - components with civilian applications but which experts say possess potential applications in nuclear weapons research. Financial Times also examined a letter that DamavandTec sent to a Russian supplier in May 2024, in which Kalvand expressed interest in obtaining several isotopes - including tritium.

The Moscow journey took place during a period when Western governments were identifying suspicious Iranian scientific activities, including attempts to procure nuclear-relevant technology from international sources. Western intelligence services believe Iran previously operated a secret nuclear weapons program which Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei terminated in 2003.

"We consider that a type of nuclear weapons program – to shorten the timeline," David Albright, an expert on Iran's nuclear program who leads the non-profit Institute for Science and International Security, told Financial Times. "The leadership didn't want to make a decision to build a weapon for various reasons. This sort of research activity allowed the leadership to say there was no nuclear weapons program."

Iran has consistently rejected accusations of pursuing nuclear weapons, referencing a religious fatwa from Khamenei prohibiting their use. The Iranian government did not respond to Financial Times inquiries about the Russia trips. Russia's official position has always been opposition to an Iranian nuclear bomb.

Multiple non-proliferation experts contacted by Financial Times describe the delegates' backgrounds, the types of Russian companies they met, and the subterfuge employed during their travel as suspicious.

"It's disturbing that these types of people can have this type of meeting in Russia, given the state Russia and Iran are in," Pranay Vaddi, who served until January 2025 as senior director for non-proliferation at the US National Security Council, told Financial Times. "Regardless of whether the Russians are sharing components or technology . . . [SPND] is an organisation who would be applying that specifically to nuclear weapons work."

SPND represents one of the most controversial elements of Iran's nuclear activities. A top-secret research unit under Iran's defense ministry control, US authorities have described SPND as "primarily responsible for research in the field of nuclear weapons development." The organization was established in 2011 by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, widely recognized as the architect of Iran's pre-2003 nuclear weapons program, known as the Amad Plan.

In early 2024, Kalvand received a request from Iran's defense ministry to utilize his company DamavandTec for arranging a sensitive delegation's travel to Moscow. By May, Kalvand received correspondence from Oleg Maslennikov, a 78-year-old Russian scientist, inviting Kalvand and four named individuals for an official visit to one of Maslennikov's Moscow-based companies.

According to Iranian corporate records, sanctions designations and Western officials, members of the traveling party maintain strong connections to SPND. Copies of passports examined by Financial Times show that Iran's foreign affairs ministry issued two fresh diplomatic service passports on June 12, 2024, for two officials traveling with Kalvand to Russia.

One passport was issued to Javad Ghasemi, 48, who previously served as CEO of Paradise Medical Pioneers, a company US authorities sanctioned in 2019 for being a nuclear weapons-related procurement front under SPND control. Another was issued to Rouhollah Azimirad, who officials told Financial Times is known to Western intelligence agencies as a senior SPND scientist.

The most important delegate may have been nuclear scientist Soroush Mohtashami, an expert on neutron generators, which can be used as components that help trigger explosions in certain types of nuclear weapons. The co-supervisor for his 2023 PhD was Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani. "Neutron generators are key components for nuclear weapons," Ian Stewart of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies told Financial Times.

The final member was Amir Yazdian, a 35-year-old employee of Iran's defense ministry working in counter intelligence, according to Western officials contacted by Financial Times.

Once in Moscow, the Iranian delegation visited Maslennikov's Tekhnoekspert and Toriy, a research facility near the Polyus Science and Research Institute. These institutes specialize in dual-use technologies that can support nuclear weapons development. Experts say the Iranians could not have visited these sites without FSB approval.

According to Albright, Maslennikov's expertise suggests the delegation may have been pursuing information relevant to diagnostic tools for nuclear weapon tests. Maslennikov has co-authored papers on multi-beam klystrons – specialized vacuum tubes that support nuclear weapons testing by powering flash X-ray systems used to simulate nuclear blasts without detonation.

"Our best estimate is that the Iranian delegation was interested in high-powered X-ray tubes for flash X-rays," Albright told Financial Times. "Such systems are used for diagnostic tests of a nuclear weapon's implosion mechanism."

The documents also suggest the delegation's interest extended to radioactive materials. In late May 2024, Kalvand sent a letter to Ritverc, a Russian supplier of nuclear isotopes, stating that DamavandTec wanted to obtain tritium, Strontium-90 and Nickel-63 for research purposes.

Tritium is considered by experts to be a proliferation red flag due to its role in nuclear weapons. In large amounts it is a core input into creating modern nuclear warheads because it vastly amplifies explosive power.

"Anybody asks for tritium and I automatically assume weapons," William Alberque, a former head of NATO's arms control center, told Financial Times. "With the klystrons I think, 'You clever duck, it could be other things.' You throw in tritium and I say, that's a smoking gun."

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The Zaporizhzhia facility, which ranks as Europe's biggest nuclear plant and among the world's 10 largest, has remained under Russian control since March 2022. International Atomic Energy Agency personnel stationed at the site heard the blasts and witnessed smoke rising from the targeted area, according to Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi's statement to The Kyiv Independent.

Staff members at the nuclear complex informed the IAEA team that the auxiliary facility sustained damage from the bombardment, which coincided with military operations that agency personnel could hear from their position. The attacked buildings sit approximately 1,200 meters (0.75 miles) from the plant's main perimeter, yet smoke from the strike zone remained visible to monitors throughout the afternoon hours.

"Any attack in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant – regardless of the intended target – poses potential risks also for nuclear safety and must be avoided," Grossi stated, according to The Kyiv Independent. The IAEA chief emphasized the ongoing dangers, declaring that "once again, I call for maximum military restraint near nuclear facilities to prevent the continued risk of a nuclear accident."

The Saturday incident represents the most recent in a series of concerning developments that underscore the persistent nuclear safety threats arising from Russia's military campaign against Ukraine. The facility has experienced multiple security breaches and power disruptions since falling under Russian occupation more than two years ago.

Meanwhile, satellite imagery analysis suggests Russian forces are constructing new electrical infrastructure that could connect the Zaporizhzhia plant to Russia's power grid. The New York Times reported in May, citing a Greenpeace investigation, that Russian personnel have installed over 80 kilometers (50 miles) of high-voltage transmission lines along the Sea of Azov coastline since February 2025.

The newly constructed power lines connect the occupied cities of Mariupol and Berdyansk, according to the Greenpeace report cited by The New York Times. Nuclear energy experts believe this construction aims to link these transmission systems to a major electrical substation near Mariupol, which could then channel power from the Zaporizhzhia facility located approximately 225 kilometers (140 miles) away.

The potential connection would enable Russia to redirect Ukrainian nuclear-generated electricity into its own national grid, effectively appropriating the energy production from Ukraine's most significant atomic facility.

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"No one exactly knows what has transpired in Fordo. That being said, what we know so far is that the facilities have been seriously and heavily damaged," Araghchi stated during a television interview with CBS News that aired Tuesday. The foreign minister's comments represent a departure from Tehran's typical practice of downplaying attack consequences.

Iranian atomic energy authorities are conducting comprehensive evaluations of the destruction, Araghchi revealed. "The Atomic Energy Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran... is currently undertaking evaluation and assessment, the report of which will be submitted to the government," he explained in the broadcast interview.

Intercepted Iranian communications have minimized the scope of destruction from American strikes against Iran's nuclear infrastructure, The Washington Post reported Sunday, citing four individuals familiar with classified intelligence circulating among US government officials, according to CBS News. President Donald Trump claimed the operations "completely and totally obliterated" Iran's nuclear program, though American officials acknowledge that forming a complete damage assessment from the weekend military strikes will require additional time.

Diplomatic leverage strategy

Tehran's president issued a directive Wednesday mandating the suspension of the nation's collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency following US and Israeli aerial bombardments targeting Iran's most critical nuclear installations, potentially further restricting inspectors' capacity to monitor Tehran's atomic program that had been processing uranium to near weapons-grade concentrations, according to AP. President Masoud Pezeshkian's directive, however, contained no specific timelines or details regarding what the suspension would encompass.

Pezeshkian's directive, nonetheless, offered no concrete schedules or specifics about the nature of the suspension. Iran has previously restricted IAEA oversight as a negotiating strategy with Western powers – although Tehran currently denies any immediate plans to restart discussions with the US that were disrupted by the 12-day Iran-Israel conflict, AP reported.

Tehran has previously constrained IAEA examinations as a bargaining mechanism in negotiations with Western nations – though presently Iran has rejected any immediate intentions to resume negotiations with Washington that were interrupted by the 12-day Iran-Israel war. Iranian state broadcasting announced Pezeshkian's directive, which followed legislation approved by Iran's parliament to halt that collaboration, according to AP.

The legislation already secured approval from Iran's constitutional oversight body, the Guardian Council, on Thursday, and presumably gained backing from the nation's Supreme National Security Council, which Pezeshkian leads. Iranian state media announced Pezeshkian's order, which came after a bill passed by Iran's parliament to suspend that cooperation, AP reported.

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The Israelis are all too familiar with the threat posed by rockets and missiles. Years of Katyusha rockets from Lebanon followed by Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip provided Israel's civilian population with the best possible schooling in how to prepare and protect themselves against these threats, while the State of Israel used this time to develop counter-missile capabilities and other protection measures. Although any full-scale war would clearly introduce a completely new dimension to this type of threat due to the incomprehensibly substantial number of missiles in the enemies' arsenal, mainly Hezbollah, nonetheless, this is still a familiar challenge.

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At the same time, but with much less of a PR hype, in recent years another threat has been gradually developing: unmanned aerial vehicles, usually referred to by their abbreviation as UAVs. Although there were some prior indications as well as a number of operational incidents that were publicized, and the war between Russia and Ukraine also struck a chord on this issue, but it is doubtful whether anybody in Israel – apart from the relevant professionals – is aware of the scope of this issue and the extent of the threat it involves.

This is a threat that is expected to pose a significant challenge to Israel in the future, both during routine and mainly in wartime. It is the result of an Iranian decision to make a dramatic investment in the development and production of UAVs, and their serial distribution, en masse, to a broad variety of key regional players, which have themselves turned to manufacturing UAVs based on the support and knowhow provided by Iran.

In practice, this is such a significant challenge that it has forced the IDF and Israel's defense industries to invest a parallel effort in order to be able to contend with it in a variety of ways – offensively, defensively and in terms of intelligence.

"We were surprised by the speed at which things occurred," says one military source, "In the world of missiles and rockets these processes go on for 30 years. Here, everything developed extremely quickly, including the option of decentralizing the production. Though we did pay attention to it relatively quickly and began to prepare for it accordingly, this is indeed a new and extremely challenging threat."

Simple but efficient

The Iranians' involvement in UAVs is nothing new. It began back in the 90s with an attempt to manufacture initial models with a view to diversifying the force employment capabilities of the various Iranian military units. Until that point, the Iranians had been focusing on the development and production of various types of missiles and rockets to a variety of ranges, including long ranges. Those readers with a sharp memory will probably be able to recall the headlines in Israel regarding the progress in the development of the Shahab missiles and additional platforms, capable of covering the distance between Iran and Israel and of carrying heavy payloads (including a potential future nuclear device).

The Iranians came to understand that unmanned aerial vehicles provide them with additional capabilities. In contrast to missiles, which fly openly and it is clear to see from where they were launched and where they are due to impact, a UAV flies at low altitude, slowly and with stealth, and can be operated for special, low-signature missions – from intelligence collection, attacking targets by dropping munitions, to suicide missions (often referred to as 'kamikaze" missions).

The manufacturing of UAVs is also much simpler than that of long-range missiles. An SSM (Surface-to-Surface Missile) exits the earth's atmosphere and must then reenter, and is subject to immense loads and structural pressures," explains Captain L., the officer in charge of UAV research at the Enemy Firepower Capabilities Technological Research Branch in the Research & Analysis Division at IDF Military Intelligence. A UAV flies in the atmosphere, it is based on a simple piston engine, and is much easier to manufacture."

From the very outset, Iran opted for a unique method to gain progress in its UAV program. In contrast to Israel or the USA, which develop their own systems, the Iranians based their effort on the 'catch-up' approach: using others in order to bridge the technological gap. They achieved this mainly by reverse engineering of US and Israeli UAVs that either fell or were downed during various missions in the region. Any such vehicle (or even its fragments) was delivered to Iran, analyzed down to the minutest detail by local experts, and then copied perfectly. This saved the Iranians many long years of research and testing during the production process, allowing them to rapidly progress to the stage of serial production of a variety of different types of UAVs for a whole spectrum of ranges.

"All the Iranian platforms are based on a prototype that came from somewhere else," states Captain L., "The Shahed-136, which is currently in the headlines due to the ongoing war in Ukraine, is based on an Israeli UAV manufactured by Elbit. Its brothers in this series, the Shahed-141 and Shahed-197, are based on the US-made RQ-170 UAV."

Until the last decade, Iran made only relatively slow progress with its UAVs. Though it did succeed in recording certain successes, it only managed to attain capabilities that were extremely far away from what it really wanted. The dramatic technological changes undergone by the civilian world enabled it to bridge the gaps with lightning speed. Components, which until then had been developed in secret laboratories and were the property of a very limited group of technological superpowers, suddenly became widely available and could be purchased 'off the shelf' from civilian sites – from onboard computers and communication sets to navigation devices and even encryption devices.

However, over the last decade, Iran was subject to heavy international sanctions, making the task of procurement an extremely difficult one. To circumvent this obstacle, it established a series of companies and entities specializing in the procurement of various components and their shipment to Iran. Once they arrive in Iran, these components are assimilated in the various UAV programs, and above all they enable the Iranians to engage in the serial manufacture of large volumes of UAVs.

"The Iranians' ability to purchase commercially available off-the-shelf products (known as COTS) and to then integrate them in these systems was simply not an option 15 years ago," recounts a military source who specializes in this field. "This enabled them to make a highly significant leap forward that we have witnessed in recent years."

Bundles of cash mixed with diplomacy

This progress was also possible due to an additional Iranian advantage: friction. Similar to Israel, it is also in a constant state of friction with its enemies in various theaters. Some of this, mainly in the Persian Gulf, is the direct result of its actions, and some – in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen – via proxy, forces operating on Tehran's behalf and under its guidance and instruction. This enabled Iran to gain constant experience with the various systems it developed, to learn lessons, and implement them quickly in the development and production processes.

The technological progress and the experience accumulated also enabled it to share some of the production processes with the proxies themselves. The savings are clear: not only the proliferation of military capabilities and a significant increase of the production floor space but also the change to open up the highly challenging bottleneck of shipping arms to the various operational theaters. This is especially prominent in the northern theater, where Israel has been engaged in a permanent campaign against the Iranian arms shipments (some of which have been recently exposed here in Israel Hayom).

Over the last decade, Israel has carried out thousands of strikes and other actions designed to disrupt these Iranian efforts to smuggle a variety of weapon systems and technological capabilities – from missiles and rockets to a variety of UAVs – and one of the methods that the Iranians came across in order to overcome the intensive Israeli effort was to transfer the manufacturing capabilities to their proxies – the Houthis in Yemen, the Shi'ite militias in Iraq and Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Although this process transformed the consumer into a manufacturer itself, it enabled the Iranians to become a key player in this field – and not only in relation to its own protégés. Iran has become a super-distributor of these advanced capabilities to a variety of countries, including superpowers. Russia is clearly the prime example of this, a global military superpower forced to seek aid from Iran in order to gain access to UAV-related capabilities. This began with procurement and has now moved on to the production process actually taking place on Russian soil. The Shahed-136, which due to the war in Ukraine has arguably become the best-known and most talked-about UAV in the world, has now been afforded the Russian title Geran (an abbreviation of the Russian name of the flower we know as a geranium).

In parallel, the Russians also operate other Iranian UAVs in Ukraine, such as the Shahed-131 and the Mohajer-6. To date, Russia has acquired some 1000 UAVs at an average price of 40 thousand dollars per unit, and in the future, it plans to produce thousands of UAVs in Russia, an issue of grave concern to the West and also to Israel, as this will be a solid connection between the global antagonist (Russia) and the regional antagonist (Iran).

Iran is also engaged in a similar process with China. Here too, a superpower was found to be lacking in this field and thus approached a much smaller and weaker nation than it to bridge the gaps. In the case of the Chinese, the Shahed-136 has been renamed, also after a flower, the Sunflower-200, and it too is due to begin serial production in China.

In both cases, with Russia and China, the Iranians are exploiting the process, not only to pump large volumes of cash into their dwindling coffers following many years of biting economic sanctions but also for a dangerous foray into the world of military and global diplomacy – increased proximity between the states and gaining support from Russia and China to obtain knowhow and various means, which until now had been well outside their reach.

A national-military project

Over the course of the last decade, the Iranian UAV industry has become a recognized global brand name, mainly due to the use to which the Russians have put the Iranian UAVs during the ongoing war in Ukraine. Iran, however, began to put the systems it has developed to use – either directly or via its proxy forces – many years previously. Even, during the Second Lebanon War way back in 2006, Iranian Ababil UAVs were operated by Hezbollah in their efforts to attack Israel. They were either intercepted by the IAF or crashed without succeeding in causing any damage or inflicting any casualties.

Later on, Hezbollah made a number of additional attempts to infiltrate various airborne vehicles into Israel – from UAVs to drones, another field in which a dramatic quantum leap has occurred in recent years in the civilian sector, enabling Iran to make significant progress in terms of the development and production of its military capabilities.

The Iranian UAV industry operates via two main channels in parallel: one takes place under the Iranian ministry of defense, or as it is officially known, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), and the second one under the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Within the MODAFL, there are two key industries engaged in UAV production. The first is called HESA, which was founded in 1976 and is located in Isfahan. Initially, this company was involved in the manufacture of light aircraft, but today it is also engaged in the development and manufacture of UAVs, mainly the Ababil variants, which serve the Iranian air force and also some of its proxies – from the Houthis in Yemen to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The two main variants, Ababil-2 and Ababil-3, are UAVs with a range of 100 km that are able to collect intelligence, attack targets and detonate themselves.

The other industry is called Qods. This industry was established in 1985, it employs hundreds of workers and is subject to US Department of the Treasury sanctions. Its flagship is the Mohajer. Mohajer-6 is an ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition & Reconnaissance) UAV with a range of thousands of kilometers and the ability to carry 4-6 guided munitions, and the Mohajer-10, which was exposed only two weeks ago, according to reports in Iran has a range of 2000 km and is capable of carrying a payload of up to 300 kg.

The other channel, run by the IRGC, is also in possession of two parallel industrial concerns. The first one is called KIPAS and is highly confidential. This industry operates under the auspices of the IRGC Qods Force, a special unit tasked with spreading the Islamic revolution outside Iran and which, among others, is responsible for leading the war against Israel.

The other industry is the Shahed Aviation Industries which was originally intended to provide the IRGC Aerospace Force with independent UAV production and operational capabilities, without the need to depend on the MODAFL or the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (Iran's regular air force). This was carried out as part of the process to gain power, led by the IRGC Aerospace Force Commander, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, who following the targeting of Qassem Soleimani, became the dominant figure in the IRGC in addition to becoming the bitterest and most dangerous enemy to Israel, the moderate Sunni Arab states and the West.

Shahed manufactures a broad variety of UAVs, all of which are marketed under the same name (though the model number varies). The Shahed-197 is a UAV with a 7-meter wingspan, a flight range of thousands of kilometers and a cruising speed of 200 km/h, which is capable of remaining airborne without interruption for 20 hours. The Shahed-141 is a kamikaze UAV that can be also used for transferring arms, it has a flight range of 1800 kilometers at a flight speed of 185 km/h. The Shahed-101 is a kamikaze UAV that can also be used for intelligence-gathering purposes, it weighs 10 kg and has a flight range of 700 km.

The company's flagship product is the Shahed-136. This is a suicide attack UAV with a range of 2000-2200 km, which flies at altitude and at a relatively low speed of 185 km/h, which makes it more difficult to detect and intercept. As a result of the use of the Shahed-136 in the war in Ukraine, the USA, Canada, and the EU imposed sanctions on the Shahed Aviation Industries; although, the deals concluded with Russia (and now with China) for procurement of the system, and later on for its independent production, have enabled the Shahed Aviation Industries to continue to prosper.

Sanctions circumventing UAVs

We can roughly split up the production processes as follows: the Iranians cast the wings by themselves in Iran into casts that Iran builds and then later dries and bakes, or in the country in which the UAV is manufactured (Yemen, Lebanon or in the near future in Russia); it purchases the engine (usually Chinese piston engines); the warhead is cast in Iran; and the technology it buys on the civilian market. The warheads vary according to the mission and fragmentation is often added to them in order to increase lethality and the extent of the damage.

The Russians, for example, have mainly been using 50 kg warheads in their combat in Ukraine. They purchase the UAVs in Iran and ship them to Russia mainly by air and recently by ship too across the Caspian Sea, and they pay Iran for them either in hard cash or in gold bullion in order to circumvent the sanctions.

This growing cooperation between the two states is a cause of serious concern to Israel, also as the Iranians are exploiting it to move ahead in a number of different areas – information on various fields, including the development and manufacture of hypersonic missiles and satellite launch vehicles, as well as promoting transactions (including Su-35 fighter aircraft) and culminating in intelligence and operational cooperation. According to the source, "They are trying to squeeze the lemon dry."

The first two industries, which operate under the MODAFL, focus on the domestic needs of Iran itself: they are the main suppliers of UAVs to the Iranian army, with the main objective being the defense of Iran's sovereign territory. In contrast, the two industries operating under the IRGC focus their efforts on foreign objectives: either by direct operation or via Tehran's various proxies.

The IRGC's need for instant solutions for its needs in the field is sufficient to prod the industries under its command to work at a much more rapid pace and produce results in relatively short time periods, while the industries working under the MODAFL tend to engage in more long-term projects. Just to what extent these industries share knowledge and capabilities is not fully clear, but they do share at least one common objective beyond the interests of the Islamic state itself: both of them are working full steam ahead to sell their UAVs anywhere possible around the world, both to inject cash into the system and also to increase their influence. All four of these industries are subject to a variety of different sanctions. Some of them entered the list as they were involved in attacking various elements in the region, while others have been sanctioned due to their involvement in the war in Ukraine. Though these sanctions do make the procurement processes more difficult for the Iranians, the large scale development of this field in Iran – and the growing demand for UAVs of Iranian manufacture – underscore the fact that the sanctions' effectiveness is extremely limited, especially when Russia and China top the customer list.

"As, for the most part, these are civilian components that can readily be purchased on the open market, the Iranians have little difficulty in overcoming the sanctions," says the military official. "Even if any specific procurement channel is blocked, they immediately find an alternative one."

Israel in the crosshairs

Over the years, Iran has considerably increased its use of UAVs in all theaters where it operates. The most intensive use of this type of weapon system – which in itself is perhaps the most effective test site for the Iranians – has been made by the Houthis in Yemen. Hundreds of aircraft were operated against a variety of targets, including the methodical attacking of Saudi targets, even in the capital Riyadh.

In the past, Iran itself tried to avoid the direct use of UAVs that it manufactured in order not to get involved in direct conflicts, leaving its proxies to fight with Saudi Arabia, Israel and even the USA. This Iranian hydra-like method of force employment – whose aim is to constantly challenge its adversaries while leaving Iran itself safe and off the battlefield – is all too well known, and provides its enemies, above all Israel, with a permanent predicament and a dilemma of whether to make do with an ongoing, bloody conflict with the proxies or to cause Iran to pay a heavy price itself, on its own soil.

This dilemma will probably be seriously intensified in a large-scale war such as any future Third Lebanon War, when Israel will have to deliberate the option of exercising its deterrence by striking at Iran and the concern that such a move might well draw Tehran directly into the fighting.

In recent years, Iran has begun to release some of these shackles, starting to operate UAVs also directly for its diverse objectives. The first such operational use against Israel was on February 10, 2018, when a Shahed-141 UAV was launched from the Syrian air force base of T4 towards Israel, in response to Israeli strikes on Iranian targets in Syria. Israel monitored the UAV throughout its flight and an IAF Apache combat helicopter intercepted it near the town of Beit She'an.

On September 14, 2019, Iran conducted its most famous and effective attack to date, when it launched dozens of UAVs and cruise missiles at the facilities of the Saudi Arabian national oil company, Aramco. This surprise attack caused significant damage to Saudi Arabia's oil production capability, sending shock waves across the region, mainly due to the American decision not to take action in defense of Saudi Arabia in the form of any offensive retaliation against Iran. The lessons of this incident are still echoing to this very day and form the basis, to some extent, of Saudi Arabia's lack of trust in the USA, and the extensive Saudi demands for various types of weapon systems (including unmanned systems) to enable them to defend themselves in the future.

On the verge of the threshold of escalation

The incessant hits that it suffered from the IAF strikes in Syria led Iran to look for a new medium via which it would be able to exact revenge on Israel. As part of this, commencing two years ago, a wave of attacks began in the Persian Gulf against ships, either wholly or partially owned by Israeli businessmen, but which sail under foreign flags and with foreign crews.

On March 25, 2021, Iranian UAVs hit the Lori, a partially Israeli-owned container ship that was sailing in the Arabian Sea. On April 13, 2021, a UAV hit an additional vessel under partial Israeli ownership, the Hyperion Ray, and on July 3, 2021, a third attempt was carried out, also against a ship with Israeli owners, the CSAV Tyndall.

The fourth attack in the series occurred on July 29, 2021. A Shahed-136 UAV hit a ship called the Mercer Street, killing a British and Romanian national. Britain was outraged and a severe diplomatic crisis ensued between the two states, following which the IRGC – apparently under the orders of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei – ceased its attacks on shipping in the Gulf region. The Iranians, who sought to remove the sanctions imposed on them due to their nuclear program, feared the intensity of the conflict with the West and thus decided to calm things down in this particular area.

But the Iranians did remain active in another theater of course – the fight against Israel. On March 15, 2021, two Shahed-197 UAVs launched from Iran to Israel were intercepted. This was the first operational interception by an IAF F-35I Adir stealth combat aircraft, and it was kept under wraps for a year until it was allowed to be made public. In another case, on April 2 this year, a Shahed-101 UAV was intercepted after crossing the border from Syria into Israel. This particular UAV was downed using electronic jamming and it crashed in the southern Golan Heights near the Sea of Galilee.

As the Iranian industries operate separately, there are a considerable number of figures involved in the development and production processes, and later on in the operation and dissemination of these systems to the various other elements. Some of them belong to the MODAFL and are responsible for HESA and Qods, others operate under the auspices of the IRGC and are responsible for KIPAS and the Shahed Aviation Industries, and some for the end users in Qods Force or the various proxy organizations.

As mentioned, Hajizadeh is the most dominant figure, mainly in view of the expedited operation and procurement processes carried out over the last year with Russia (and China). He is also responsible for the attacks on Saudi Arabia – including those against the Aramco facilities – and for the attempts to operate long-range Iranian UAVs to penetrate Israeli airspace.

Another senior figure in the IRGC who is active in this field is Abdollah Mehrabi, who is in charge of the UAV industries within the IRGC, including the Shahed Aviation Industries.

A third senior official is Sa'id Izadi, the Head of the Palestinian Branch in the IRGC-Qods Force Lebanon Corps, who is in charge of all the support provided to the Palestinian terrorist organizations and Iran's ties with them, including the transfer of funds, knowhow, and weapon systems to these various organizations (chiefly Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad). Izadi is also involved in the efforts to develop the UAV industry in the Gaza Strip, which encounters objective difficulties due to the fact that the Gaza Strip is a closed enclave and relies on independent development alone, and also as Israel tries to take advantage of every round of violence or strikes there to destroy facilities, weapons, and capabilities that these organizations try to develop.

There are two key figures working in this field in the Iranian MODAFL. The first one is Seyyed Hojjatollah Qureishi, the Head of the Logistics Branch at the MODAFL, who is in charge of arms exports and as such heads the security ties with Russia. Qureishi led the process of the UAV sales to Russia, reaping considerable praise for his success. He is also actively working to promote similar processes with additional states and is currently active in the establishment of a UAV production plant in Tajikistan, as well as the efforts to help Armenia in its war against Azerbaijan. An additional figure is Qassem Damavandian, who is in charge of the Qods Industries that manufacture the Mohajer series of UAVs.

Hundreds of workers and experts from diverse fields work under these figures – from the various engineering disciplines and technological worlds to intelligence and operations. Since this Iranian capability has made dramatic progress in recent years it has also facilitated a significant leap forward in terms of the broad variety of force employment options at its disposal. Against Israel, for example, this enables Iran to adopt offensive options using a variety of systems and ranges, beginning with its close proxies in Lebanon and Syria (and Gaza), via its more remote proxies in Iraq and Yemen, and culminating in the independent launching of UAVs from any location within Iran.

Any such attack requires meticulous planning. This starts from the selection of the appropriate aircraft (intelligence collection, attack, kamikaze), moves on to selection of the munition, and ends with planning of the flight path to limit the risk of exposure and interception. This presents Israel with a significant headache as it is then forced to adapt its defensive arrays to deal with the new threat: not only missiles arriving from a high altitude, but UAVs (and cruise missiles) that fly at a slower speed and a low altitude, thus presenting a thorny challenge to the radars that are supposed to detect them (and on the other hand, make it easier to intercept them due to their low flight speed, compared with the more complex task of intercepting missiles and rockets).

In practice, the Iranians are so taken up by this new world of UAVs, which is rife with endless opportunities, that they are currently focusing their main efforts primarily on the development of unmanned aerial vehicles. The IRGC Aerospace Force has no airplanes, and its arsenal is made up chiefly of a broad variety of missiles and rockets, UAVs and diverse air defense systems, which it also disseminates to its various proxies. "This enables it to realize its policy – force employment underneath the threshold of escalation, in other words, to attack targets without risking becoming entangled in war itself," says the military official.

The challenge: Countermeasures and interception

In relation to Israel this is an especially dramatic change. "This is not a missile launch that is a clear red line involving a breach of the threshold of escalation that would certainly lead to war. UAVs enable Iran to operate with a relative degree of clandestineness, even from a great distance, though we do currently see a clear concern among them from a potential Israeli response to such action on Iranian soil."

This has occurred, among others, following strikes in Iran that have been attributed to Israel. Such a strike, which is attributed to the Mossad, was carried out using UAVs in March 2022 leading to the destruction of dozens of Shahed UAVs on the ground at a plant in the city of Kermanshah in Iran. An additional attack, in February this year (which too was carried out using UAVs and was also credited to the Mossad), hit a plant in the vicinity of the city of Karaj at which Iran manufactured UAVs.

These attacks caused a certain degree of damage to Iran and also evidently conveyed a strong message, but they have not put an end to the process. "The Iranians now boast a sufficiently adequate level of competency," says Captain Y, the Head of the I&W (Indications & Warnings) Section in the Iran Branch in the Research & Analysis Division at IDF Military Intelligence. "They know how to manufacture, how to launch and hit the target. Even if their capability is not of a global first-rate quality, their approach is to work with quantity: to launch en masse, and then some will fall on the way be downed, but some will eventually arrive at the target. As far as they are concerned, this is a sufficient means of implementing their force employment doctrine."

As far as Israel is concerned, this is one hell of a headache. The next war might not only bring with it a downpour of missiles and rockets but also an extremely challenging multi-theater UAV threat operated by a variety of forces – from the UAV units of Hezbollah and the pro-Iranian militias in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, to the Iranians themselves. The job of the intelligence is not only to provide advance warning in order to enable the employment of countermeasures or interception so that we are not forced to rely on a strong defensive posture alone, but also to collect intelligence designed to enable the IAF and the defense industries to become familiar with the various weapon systems and threats and their capabilities, and to develop an appropriately tailored detection and interception response using a broad variety of means.

The experts believe that the future will be no less of a challenge. "We live in a world where in no time at all we will be using drones to send deliveries, where systems are able to talk or transfer information and images from one to another," says Captain L. "At some point in the future, the endless diversity is bound to reach a point of saturation as each airborne system requires appropriate experts, technicians, logistics, and a different mode of operation, but the quantity will simply keep on growing – and consequently the challenge will not become any easier."

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Located in Iran's Semnan Province, the newly identified site is distant from the regime's known nuclear facilities. The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), citing intelligence from sources within the country, describes a vast complex spanning nearly 2,500 acres. According to Fox News, the facility, code-named the "Rainbow Site" by Iranian officials, has operated for over a decade under the guise of a chemical production company called Diba Energy Siba.

NCRI sources told Fox News that the Rainbow Site's primary role is extracting tritium, a radioactive isotope critical for enhancing nuclear weapons. Unlike uranium enrichment, tritium has few civilian applications, undermining Iran's claims that its nuclear program is purely for energy or peaceful purposes. This disclosure, as reported by Fox News, intensifies scrutiny on Tehran's nuclear ambitions.

The timing is critical as the Trump administration engages in delicate negotiations with Iran. President Donald Trump, speaking to reporters on Wednesday, addressed whether Iran could maintain a nuclear enrichment program short of weapons development. "We haven't made that decision yet. We will, but we haven't made that decision yet," Trump said.

Despite the alarming intelligence, optimism persists among senior officials. Vice President JD Vance, speaking Tuesday, told Fox News, "Without prejudging the negotiation, I will say, so far so good. We've been very happy with how the Iranians have responded to some of the points that we've made."

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Let's start with the conclusion: Very little time remains to address Iran's nuclear program. The Islamic Republic is placing its underground nuclear infrastructure so deep that even the American bunker-busting bomb will eventually be unable to penetrate it. "It will be so deep that conventional weapons won't be able to do the job," in the diplomat's words.

Meanwhile, the latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency determined that, "if Iran decides to produce weapons-grade uranium (90% enrichment) instead of 60% (currently), it could do so quickly... (and reach) enough stockpile to produce four to five nuclear weapons within about one month," as summarized by the Institute for Science and International Security based on the IAEA findings.

As is widely known, Iran's nuclear infrastructure is scattered throughout the vast country. This means "hit and run" scenarios involving a small number of aircraft, like those executed by the Israeli Air Force in Iraq in 1981 or Syria in 2007, are irrelevant. Against multiple sites, some of which are underground, many more aircraft would be needed, possibly in multiple waves of attacks.

How many? Zohar Palti, who has filled numerous key security positions, claimed in Nadav Perry's podcast that the United States is capable of neutralizing Iran's nuclear program in eight hours, but an American source I spoke with believes this estimate is too optimistic. According to the source, the question is how much damage one wants to inflict on the Iranian project. Secondly, there are likely softening and preparation operations needed before the eight hours of striking the system itself.

Therefore, according to this source, the Americans need two days to eliminate Iran's nuclear program. Either way, even if eight hours is sufficient for the Americans, the Israeli Air Force, lacking the bombs they possess, would need much more time.

Furthermore, a strike on Iran wouldn't begin and end with Israeli Air Force sorties, but would require such extensive regional preparations that they couldn't be concealed. This means Israel could send and return aircraft alone and by surprise, but both Israeli and American officials doubt the feasibility of such a scenario.

First, because if Israel wanted to surprise, the American detection and warning system would quickly discover Israeli activity. Indeed, if we don't update CENTCOM in advance, there could even be friction between our aircraft and their American counterparts. Second, even if the Americans don't participate in the actual strike, it would be very advantageous for Israel to receive real-time defensive assistance from President Donald Trump.

Reports in American media claimed that during Israel's operation in Iran last fall, American forces stood ready to rescue our pilots if, God forbid, any were shot down over Iranian skies. Additionally, Iran could respond in real time by firing missiles at Israel, at American bases in the region, or at US allies. And of course, Iran might respond later, and indeed has threatened to do so if the worst happens from its perspective – the destruction of its nuclear project.

Although Israel significantly damaged Iran's missile array, the ayatollahs still have quite a few left. They aren't resting on their laurels either, and according to international media reports, a Chinese ship carrying fuel used for cruise missiles recently docked in Iran. Additionally, the Houthis are fully engaged, as are militias in Iraq and Hezbollah. Yes, the organization has suffered a severe blow, but it still retains numerous capabilities.

Or take Azerbaijan, an Israeli ally and bitter enemy of the ayatollahs. Baku, which has already suffered terrorist attacks from Iran, is in its crosshairs if Israel acts. It's worth remembering that even between Iran and Pakistan, rounds of exchanges of fire and bombings occurred, indirectly related to the rivalry with Israel.

In other words, action in Iran could ignite areas much more extensive than a missile war between Tel Aviv and Tehran. To minimize the damage from such a development, a regional defensive deployment is needed, more extensive than the one in which the international coalition prepared to thwart previous Iranian attacks on Israel. On those two occasions, only Israel was bombed. The coalition's defense greatly minimized Iran's impact.

This time, even if Israel strikes alone, Iran promises to retaliate throughout the region. Therefore, a regional defensive setup is required, led by the US of course. Its preparation takes weeks, and that can't be hidden either. So in any case and scenario, advance coordination with the Americans seems necessary.

Israel would like to see American partnership in the attack, not just in defense. But the question is how interested President Trump is. Due to fears of a regional war, former presidents Obama and Biden didn't want Israel to bomb Iran. Trump is less risk-averse than those two, but he's also not eager for battle.

At the opening of his meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House a month ago, I asked the president, "Now that Iran is at its weakest, isn't it time to take military action against its nuclear program?" Trump disputed the premise of the question. "You say Iran is weak, but it's very strong. Biden strengthened it by transferring billions to them. We'll impose sanctions on it," the president replied. Indeed, at this stage, Trump is again trying "maximum pressure" through economic sanctions on Iran and its officials. Military action isn't in his cards right now, apparently. At the same time, he's asking Russia to mediate between him and Iran to reach a new nuclear deal. So currently, his focus is diplomatic, not military.

The issue is that there's no chance sanctions or a renewed agreement will cause the ayatollahs to stop their nuclear program. If they refused Biden's concessions, they certainly won't bridge the gap with Trump's tougher demands. As for sanctions, history teaches that only rarely have they caused countries to retreat from what they saw as serving their national security. Iran itself has been under economic and other sanctions for 40 years. This hasn't really affected it. There's no reason to think that now, when they're on the threshold of a bomb, something will change.

It's possible that before turning to the military option – or authorizing Israel to do so – Trump wants to exhaust diplomatic tools. Stopping wars around the world was one of his campaign promises. In other words, he'll give sanctions and negotiations a few months. When these fail, he'll make decisions.

This is the assessment of Dan Shapiro, who held a senior position in the Pentagon during the Biden administration and was previously US Ambassador to Israel. According to Shapiro, the preparations themselves (for military action) will signal to Iran that we're serious. There must be a credible military threat on the table. The moment of truth (whether to act or not) will come this fall. Shapiro made those comments at an Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) conference.

He added that Iran is in its weakest position as a result of the severe damage to its air defense system last fall by Israel. In his assessment, the US has significantly better capabilities than Israel, but Israel can cause significant damage to Iran's nuclear infrastructure. In any case, it will need US assistance, as happened in Israel's attack on Iran in October.

Among professionals, opinions are divided on whether Iranian skies are completely exposed or whether Iran retains significant defensive capabilities. Here, too, we must assume Iran isn't wasting time and is using every day to place new radars and anti-aircraft missile batteries.

What, then, will be the practical outcome of all these discussions? Very senior officials in Israel repeatedly say at every opportunity that they "aren't taking their eyes off the ball," meaning they're aware of the opportunities, risks, and urgency.

Senator Lindsey Graham said Tuesday, in response to reports that Russia would mediate a nuclear deal between Iran and the US, that "there is zero chance there will be a nuclear agreement. The Nazi ayatollahs want to destroy Israel. President Trump needs to give Israel the tools to destroy Iran's nuclear program." The day before, Prime Minister Netanyahu declared in the Knesset that "there are things better left unspoken, better done quietly." He is, of course, right, provided that this time they finally get done.

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President Vladimir Putin has announced significant changes to Russia's nuclear doctrine, a move that comes just two days after President Joe Biden authorized Ukraine to use US-manufactured weapons for strikes within Russian territory, CNN has learned.

The updated doctrine, released on Tuesday, establishes that Moscow will treat any aggression from a non-nuclear state that involves a nuclear-armed nation as a combined assault against Russia.

Speaking to reporters on Tuesday, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov explained that "the Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of aggression using conventional weapons against it and/or the Republic of Belarus."

The revision appears to expand Russia's definition of what constitutes aggression against the nation, with nuclear deterrence remaining a fundamental component of Russian military strategy, according to CNN.

"An important element of this document is that nuclear deterrence is aimed at ensuring that a potential adversary understands the inevitability of retaliation in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation or its allies," Peskov told reporters, as reported by CNN.

The Kremlin's announcement of nuclear policy modifications arrives as Russia responds to the Biden administration's decision permitting Ukraine to employ advanced long-range American weaponry within Russian borders. Russian officials have previously indicated to CNN that such a move would represent a dangerous escalation of the conflict in Ukraine.

According to Bloomberg, Ukraine has conducted its first strike within Russian territory using American-provided missiles, coinciding with Moscow's announcement of broader nuclear weapon usage criteria. According to RBC Ukraine, citing military sources, Ukrainian forces targeted a facility in Russia's Bryansk region using ATACMS missiles, marking the first such deployment since Washington authorized their limited use against Russian targets.

Ukrainian military leadership confirmed striking an ammunition depot in Karachev, located approximately 71 miles from the Ukrainian border, resulting in the detonation of stored munitions. Military officials declined to specify which weapons were employed in the operation, citing security protocols.

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Russian media sources reported Tuesday the start of serial production of mobile shelters engineered to protect against multiple threats, including blast waves and radiation from nuclear detonations. The Russian Emergency Ministry's research institute revealed that the shelter, resembling a reinforced protective unit, designated as "KUB-M," is designed to sustain occupants for up to 48 hours.

The developers explain that the "KUB" comprises two distinct modules: a main shelter accommodating 54 civilians and a technical facility. The unit can be enhanced with water desalination systems, diesel-powered generators, and additional equipment.

"The mobile shelter serves as a multipurpose protective structure against various threats, from natural disasters to man-made catastrophes," developers stated, characterizing it as "a crucial advancement in civilian protection measures."

The announcement follows the Biden administration's decision to permit Ukraine to deploy long-range US missiles within Russian territory - a move the Kremlin condemned as reckless, warning it would trigger a Moscow response.

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Nuclear fusion propulsion, offers 1,000 times more power than current ion thrusters, potentially enabling trips to destinations like Jupiter's moons and Alpha Centauri.

Nuclear rockets have the potential to drastically cut travel times to Mars. It could also allow for quicker return trips due to operations being carried out in time for Mars-Earth alignment.

Nuclear thermal rockets (NTRs) have been envisioned as a revolutionary propulsion technology since the 1950s, promising faster and more efficient by using nuclear reactors to heat liquid hydrogen and expel it through a nozzle, achieving much higher temperatures and speeds than chemical rockets.

The development of NTRs began with the US Air Force's Rover program in the 1950s and was advanced by NASA's NERVA program (1961-1973) and projects like Rover at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Manufacturing fuel rods and materials resistant to high temperatures and corrosive hydrogen remains a challenge. The Phoebus 2A, tested in 1968, was the most powerful space nuclear reactor ever built. It was not utilized due to its size, and cost.

Sources: Ars Technica, Interesting Engineering, Techbox, The Daily Galaxy, Digital Chew, NewsBytes, Greek Reporter.

This article was written in collaboration with Generative AI news company Alchemiq.

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Around 1,500 kilometers (930 miles) more or less, separate Israel from the sites of Iran's nuclear program. These facilities are scattered across the distant enemy nation, fortified and protected. In recent weeks, reports have repeatedly surfaced that the nuclear program continues to progress: The International Atomic Energy Agency warned in late May that Iran possesses enough material to produce at least three nuclear warheads. On the other hand, senior Israeli officials assert that the IDF knows how to deal with this threat. The claim that Israel is capable of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons has been heard for many years, including from the country's prime ministers.

"A big clock is ticking over us," said Prime Minister Menachem Begin in June 1981, during the cabinet meeting that approved the destruction of Iraq's nuclear reactor. Even today, a big clock is ticking over us. Military experts estimate that in recent years, the Israeli Air Force has been training for long-range missions, among other things, to prepare for traversing the vast distance; but from a technical and operational standpoint, it's unclear whether an effective strike on the nuclear program is indeed a feasible mission. Destroying Iran's nuclear program requires simultaneously hitting numerous fortified sites, an unparalleled complex challenge. Is there substance to Israel's assertions? Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert estimated just four months ago that Israel cannot destroy Iran's nuclear program because it lacks suitable bombs and aircraft with sufficient operational range.

The question of whether it is possible remains relevant, as the Iranians are also preparing for the US presidential election. In Tehran, they remember the tense relations with the Republican candidate Donald Trump during his presidency and understand that if he is elected, it may be more difficult for them to continue developing their nuclear program. Perhaps they will decide that now is the time to break out for the bomb. Experts estimate that the breakout time is a matter of just a few months or even weeks. If Tehran wants to present the next American president with a fait accompli, it may act now. Accordingly, if Israel wants to thwart the nuclear program, these very days could be the last opportunity.

Iran's plan to acquire an atomic bomb is not an end in itself but a means. It is part of Tehran's vision of wiping Israel off the map. Along the way, Iranian proxy forces, an existential threat in every respect, are being deployed. A lack of Israeli initiative will only bring us closer to war.

Much is hidden from view on this sensitive issue. Israel does not disclose its capabilities, so one can only assess the situation based on informed individuals, publicly available data, and analyses of the mission requirements. In a sense, one can also consult the Iranians: The IAEA chief reported in April, shortly after the Iranian missile attack on Israel, that fearing an Israeli response, Tehran had closed its nuclear facilities – an indication that from an Iranian perspective, Israel may be able to attack them, perhaps even successfully. One can always hope that Israel has a few cards up its sleeve that we don't know about and that there are more surprises in store.

An Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, in any case, would not be the result of a spur-of-the-moment decision. It is reasonable to assume that all preparations for such a large-scale operation cannot be completed in a short time. Moreover, since such an attack could only be the opening salvo of a much larger war, Israel will likely want to improve its defenses ahead of the moment of truth. Perhaps precisely now, with the IDF already on high alert, is a good time for such an attack.

What might it look like? In general, one can assume that we will need to send dozens, perhaps hundreds, of aircraft into the air to successfully hit targets deep behind enemy lines. To do so, we must have accurate and up-to-date intelligence on all of Iran's nuclear sites and the locations of equipment and materials; reach Iran undetected, without being shot down by other countries en route or having the attack exposed; deploy aircraft capable of making the entire distance or refueling them in the air and on the way back, and provide the pilots with a support and protection envelope; and also use bombs capable of causing damage deep underground. Such an operation would require coordination with several countries, including the United States, so that Israel does not receive a "Don't" while the planes are in the air or a cold shoulder after the attack.

A senior officer who previously discussed the issue noted that preparations for such an operation require a high level of secrecy, and it's unclear whether Israel's security forces can indeed keep such a secret for an extended period.

A senior officer who previously discussed the issue noted that preparations for such an operation require a high level of secrecy, and it's unclear whether Israel's security forces can indeed keep such a secret for an extended period.

The circle of those privy to the secret is relatively wide: the IDF and Mossad, members of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, cabinet members, and perhaps even the opposition leader. This was the case in the past with the attacks on the reactors in Iraq and Syria. The legitimacy challenge, both domestically and internationally, is also particularly significant: Most nations will not look favorably upon such an attack, and even some Israeli citizens may not support it. These days, everything is political; it's hard to see how even this issue could escape being divided into "pro-Bibi" and "anti-Bibi" camps. Our strength lies in our unity, and our weakness in its absence. To prepare for such a major move, which could drag Israel into a protracted and difficult war, we must do much to increase our shared sense of destiny at home.

Bunkers inside the mountain

The targets Iran's nuclear program, unlike Iraq's reactor and Russia's, is not located at a single facility. Iran has disclosed to the IAEA 21 sites related to the nuclear program, and there are also other sites where the agency has reported finding traces of highly enriched uranium. It is almost certain that there are additional sites that Iran does not declare. It is also possible that Iran has transferred some of the technology or materials to secret, fortified sites, which Israel needs to use its intelligence capabilities to uncover. Preserving some of the equipment and materials would allow Iran to restart the nuclear program at a relatively advanced stage, even if Israel achieves more success than anticipated.

The large number of sites raises the possibility that Israel may only be able to preemptively attack some of the most critical facilities, which form the core of Iran's nuclear program and its nuclear strike capabilities. The best-known sites are Natanz and Fordow, and others that can be listed include the conversion facility in Isfahan, the heavy water reactor in Arak (ostensibly closed under the 2015 nuclear deal), and the testing site in Parchin.

Even if focusing solely on the most critical sites, attacking them is a formidable challenge. The facilities are located in fortified bunkers: Satellite imagery showed that in Natanz, an underground uranium storage facility was built at a depth of around 100 meters (320 feet) – a depth that even bunker-busting bombs may not be able to penetrate, it seems. Since the above-ground portion of the site was damaged in an explosion in 2021, Iran has accelerated the construction of the underground facility there. The enrichment center in Fordow was built from the outset into the side of a mountain to protect it from attack. At the Parchin research center too, concrete trenches and bunkers lead into the mountain's side, where testing is conducted. This site, too, appears to be protected from a simple attack.

Getting there is also a complex matter. There are three main routes from Israel to Iran: through Turkey, through Jordan and then Iraq, or through Saudi Arabia. The last option would extend the route and fuel requirements. The first option does not seem feasible, given Turkey's defense capabilities; the Turks would not cooperate with Israel on a security issue, even though Ankara, too, fears Iran's ascendancy. A fourth possibility is to take off from Azerbaijan, which borders Iran. According to foreign reports, Baku cooperates with Israel in many areas, including intelligence and security, but the likelihood that it would allow a large-scale operation against its neighbor's nuclear facilities from its territory is not high. It would not want to get embroiled in such an adventure, which would invite great Iranian wrath – and perhaps even the risk of war.

The aircraft not only need to reach the target but also return from it. In other words, they must exit Iran, even if not through the same route. Additionally, it is impossible to dispatch bombers alone on the mission. An escort envelope is required, including aircraft to attack Iran's air defenses; fighter jets to accompany the bombers and protect them from airborne threats; jamming and electronic warfare aircraft; reconnaissance and signal intelligence, relay, and command aircraft; and of course, rescue forces in case of casualties. To attack just a few sites would require dozens to hundreds of aircraft, all operating at a distance of over a thousand kilometers from the State of Israel.

This entire operation must pass through or near the airspace of foreign countries or enemy states, and the entire force must return safely. The assessment is that the air force knows how to reach the target undetected, but it must still be vigilant.

Moreover, countries that are in direct contact with us (unlike Iraq, for example) would need to receive advance warning – even if brief – that Israel is using their airspace for an attack, to prevent severe diplomatic damage, and also to eliminate the possibility of our planes being shot down if detected. Even the US, Russia, and even Turkey have intelligence assets and radar stations across the Middle East, and they too could detect Israel and expose the attack prematurely.

Technical challenges: fuel, munitions, and defense

We have already mentioned the need for refueling. Except for taking off from Azerbaijan, any other flight path would require the Israeli Air Force aircraft to refuel in the air. The maximum weight limitation that a plane can carry would even force F-35s to refuel if they carry their full munitions load and take off with full fuel tanks, making the whole story much more complex. After considerable delays, Israel has acquired the KC-46 refueling tankers from the US, but they are only supposed to arrive in Israel next year. Israel has asked to expedite their delivery; it is unclear if this has indeed happened. In any case, the air force has older refueling tankers, and it can also use externally carried fuel tanks, but using them would make the already complex mission even more intricate and risky.

Upon reaching Iran, our pilots would encounter the air defense forces. Iran is not an air defense superpower, and according to foreign reports, Israel has managed to overcome its defenses in the past. Nevertheless, Iran does use the advanced Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile system, which could make things difficult for the pilots and perhaps even down our planes.

Upon reaching Iran, our pilots would encounter the air defense forces. Iran is not an air defense superpower, and according to foreign reports, Israel has managed to overcome its defenses in the past. Nevertheless, Iran does use the advanced Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile system, which could make things difficult for the pilots and perhaps even down our planes. Iran is also seeking to acquire the more advanced S-400 systems from Russia, but for now it does not appear to have them, and their deployment would also require additional time.

The same applies to the Iranian air force. Currently, it has outdated aircraft such as the MiG-29 or F-14s purchased before the revolution, and it is unclear how successful it has been in maintaining their operational readiness given the international sanctions, the arms embargo, and the fact that this is aging technology suffering from a shortage of spare parts and technicians. A few weeks ago, Tehran announced that it had completed a deal to purchase advanced Sukhoi-35 jets from Russia: This would increase the airborne threat to our planes, but they would likely be able to overcome it, and in any case, it would take time to fully integrate the modern aircraft into operational service.

The most technically challenging component is the bombs. To strike sites like Fordow or Natanz, and especially the deep bunker that Iran has begun building there, Israel needs the most powerful bunker-busting bombs – and even those may not suffice. We are referring to the GBU-57 type bombs, which weigh over 13 tons and are capable of penetrating to a depth of up to 60 meters, according to the US military. Israel has other types of bunker-busting bombs, the GBU-72 and GBU-28, which are much lighter – around 2,000 to 2,500 kilograms (4,000 to 5511 lbs) – and have lower penetration capabilities. During the war, the US supplied some additional bombs, and Israel's defense establishment has also developed its own bunker-busting bombs weighing hundreds of kilograms each, but it is unclear whether they would cause damage at great depth.

Another problem is that even if Israel had the heaviest bunker-busting bombs, it would be difficult to deliver them to the target. According to estimates, Israel may be able to modernize F-15s to carry GBU-57 bombs, along with additional fuel and munitions. This is a technically complex task, but sometimes even the impossible gets done. Other aircraft, in any case, would likely be unable to carry these large bombs, and the F-15s too would need aerial refueling to do so.

Even if we overcome all the obstacles mentioned here, it must be remembered that this is a high-risk mission for the lives of dozens or hundreds of pilots, and an unprecedented logistical challenge. The economic cost of such an operation would also be immense, although it would probably be just a fraction of the total cost of the war that could ensue.

In addition to an air strike, Israel is estimated to have other potential courses of action. According to foreign reports, Israel could use conventionally armed ballistic missiles like the Jericho 2, which can carry 750 kg (1650 lbs) warheads over a range of 2,500 km (1500 miles). These missiles are highly accurate. A Turkish researcher previously estimated that using several dozen such missiles could destroy or severely damage the above-ground facilities at Natanz, Arak, and Isfahan. The logistical and safety advantages are clear, but there are also downsides: The accuracy is not perfect, and it's unclear whether the missiles can cause damage to the deeply buried sites.

Another possibility, according to a Financial Times report, is firing missiles from Israeli submarines or using drone swarms for the attack. It is unclear whether these vectors would achieve the objective, and it was previously noted that Israel may not have enough submarines for such an attack. Of course, an air strike, ballistic missile launches, submarine missile attacks, and drone swarms could be combined, but the bulk of the mission would fall on Israeli pilots' shoulders. In any comprehensive attack of this nature, Israel would expose most of its strategic arsenal, depleting the element of surprise; on the other hand, if it is not used to neutralize the greatest threat facing us, what is its purpose?

Strategic Considerations: Failure risks, success, and inaction

Our military and political leadership is aware of all these considerations and is deeply familiar with the capabilities, advantages, and shortcomings. Even after the construction of the deep tunnels in Natanz was revealed, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel would know how to deal with the threat. "We are confident and sure that we can deal with any threat on our own, and by other means as well," he said exactly a year ago. Netanyahu has committed many times that Israel will not allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons. Since this seems to be of paramount importance to the prime minister, these statements should not be dismissed or taken lightly. Perhaps Israel will ultimately pull the rabbit out of the hat. But even if we succeed in the mission, before setting out we must add strategic dimensions to the tactical and operational considerations.

An Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities would almost certainly mean a broad, regional all-out war. Hezbollah – Iran's proxy – would undoubtedly attack with all its might in such a scenario, launching hundreds and thousands of missiles and rockets towards Israel daily, especially in areas adjacent to the Lebanese border, some 40 km away. And how would the world's nations react? Would they defend Israel, or would it face even more severe international isolation? Would sanctions be imposed on it? Another possibility is that the "aggressive action" would grant legitimacy to Iran's nuclear program, this time with approval rather than a wink.

The worst-case scenario is a failed attack. In such a case, Israel would not only expose its capabilities but also lose assets and lives while failing to achieve its objective. It would lose its deterrence, and could even provide the Iranians with justification to accelerate the program, saying that no one can stop them now. We would eat the rotten fish, get whipped, and be banished from the city.

Even a success would not necessarily achieve the ultimate goal of the attack. If Israel manages to destroy all facilities and fissile materials, the Iranian know-how would likely be preserved. The facilities would go up in flames, but the plans stored on numerous Iranian computers would remain intact, and many scientists (who have not been eliminated) could restart the program – with much more knowledge and experience. At most, Israel would delay the completion of Iran's nuclear project by a few years; and next time, Iran would be more prepared and poised, building all capabilities with much higher security levels from the outset.

What is the point of such an attack?

One could consider the deterrent and psychological aspects. An attack would show that Israel is willing to go to the brink and do whatever it takes to prevent the threat. It is a statement of casus belli, a red line, an act that must not be committed. This is what Israel has declared for years would happen, and if at the moment of truth it does not act – it would be caught with its pants down. Its deterrence, already severely eroded these days, would be further damaged. It is even possible that the declarations were intended from the outset to entrap ourselves, leaving us no choice but to fulfill our statements, whatever may come.

On the other hand, one could argue that a successful strike on the nuclear sites would shift the international community's attention to Iran's actions, strengthen global recognition of Israel's commitment to preventing an Iranian bomb, and of course bolster Israeli deterrence. The air force would demonstrate its capabilities and resolve, making absolutely clear what Israel's red line is. In the Iranian attack on Israel on the night of April 13-14, Tehran spoke of a "new equation" it had created vis-a-vis Israel; a successful strike on the nuclear program would erase any other precedent and truly set a new equation regarding Iran and Israel's tolerance for its actions.

There is also the matter of the alternative cost. If Israel does not attack, it is likely that within a few years it will face the existence of an Iranian bomb. This would ostensibly mean a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, and perhaps the loss of Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity.

Above all looms the existential threat to the State of Israel: A nuclear umbrella for the array of terrorist organizations that Iran supports in the region. It is important to remember that Iran's plan to acquire an atomic bomb is not an end in itself but a means. It is part of Tehran's grand vision of war against Israel and the West, and an important part of that vision is wiping Israel off the map. Along the way, Iranian proxy forces surrounding Israel, an existential threat in every respect, are being deployed. The more Israel waits and does not act, even out of fear of a regional war, the more it indirectly boosts the Iranians' self-confidence, making them believe they are immune. A lack of Israeli initiative will only bring us closer to the very regional war – at a time when Iran is getting ever closer to a rapid nuclear breakout.

It is clear that deciding to bomb is not easy. The implications are fateful, the demands enormous, the preparations extensive. It is no wonder that such an attack has not materialized so far. It poses a logistical, operational and diplomatic challenge of the highest order, and entails the risk of many lives. But if not now, when Israel's leaders see this program as an existential threat to the State of Israel, then when?

Elie Klutstein is a researcher at The Misgav Institute for National Security & Zionist Strategy

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