Israel signed a three billion euro ($3.4 billion) deal on Thursday to buy three cutting-edge submarines from Germany, the Defense Ministry announced.

Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram

The Dakar-class diesel-electric submarines will be produced by German manufacturer Thyssenkrupp and are expected to be delivered within nine years, the ministry said.

The agreement also includes the construction of a training simulator in Israel and the supply of spare parts.

Israel's Navy operates five German-built Dolphin-class submarines, with a sixth under order and under construction in Germany. The three Dakar submarines will replace three of the aging Dolphins.

Defense Minister Benny Gantz said the procurement "will upgrade the capabilities of the Israeli Navy, and will contribute to Israel's security superiority in the region." Part of the cost of the ships will be covered by the German government, the ministry said.

Israeli and German officials inked the arms deal days before the Cabinet is set to vote on establishing a governmental committee to investigate the acquisition of submarines and other warships from Thyssenkrupp between 2009 and 2016, under then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The newly acquired submarines are not directly related to that scandal, known as Case 3000.

Several Israeli businessmen, including Netanyahu's confidants and a former navy commander, are suspects in a graft scandal surrounding the purchase of naval armaments from Thyssenkrupp. Netanyahu was not named as a suspect in that scandal, but is currently on trial in three other corruption cases.

Thyssenkrupp has said an internal probe found no evidence of corruption in its handling of the sales, and Israeli authorities have taken no action against the conglomerate.

Subscribe to Israel Hayom's daily newsletter and never miss our top stories!

The post Israel inks $3.4B submarine deal with Germany's Thyssenkrupp appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

Defense Minister Benny Gantz on Sunday submitted his ministry's resolution to the government secretariat, in conjunction with the Justice Ministry, to establish a state commission of inquiry to investigate the purchase of German submarines and other vessels several years ago.

Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook and Twitter

Gantz and Prime Minister Naftali Bennett agreed to present the resolution to the government following the ratification of the state budget. The resolution was also coordinated with the Finance and Foreign ministries.

The post Defense minister submits resolution for state inquiry into submarine deals appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

Iranian news portal Nournews, a mouthpiece of the ayatollah regime in Tehran, reported on Monday that an Israeli Dolphin-class submarine secretly entered the Red Sea last Wednesday, August 4, through the Suez Canal.

Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook and Twitter

Reports on the movements and whereabouts of Israeli submarines are typically uncommon.

According to Nournews, two Israeli Navy destroyers also crossed the Suez Canal at the same time, most likely as escorts for the submarine.

The Iranian news site interpreted the alleged naval deployment as being part of Israel's threat to respond militarily to Tehran's belligerence in the Persian Gulf, and claimed that the purpose of the move was to raise tensions in the region as a means of swaying public opinion in the US against a nuclear deal with the Islamic republic.

Nournews quoted the former chief of the IDF's Military Intelligence Directorate, Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Yadlin, who said last week that Israel should not act militarily against Iran in the Persian Gulf, where the Islamic republic holds an advantage, and should rather let the United States and Great Britain take the lead in that arena.

In the situation that has unfolded, the report said, "It seems that the new prime minister of the Zionist regime [Naftali Bennett], by intensifying his hasty and stupid actions, is getting more and more caught in a trap, the exit of which will certainly have very heavy costs for him and the inhabitants of the occupied territories."

Subscribe to Israel Hayom's daily newsletter and never miss our top stories!

The post Iranian report: Israeli submarine enters Red Sea via Suez Canal appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

When fighting erupted in Gaza last month and rockets rained on Israel, the men operating its navy submarine Leviathan knew next to nothing.

Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook and Twitter

Submerged for a drill, the crew were relayed only brief bulletins so as not to be distracted from their mission.

"We are by definition clandestine and, to a degree, isolated at sea. Our performance depends on our focus," a senior navy officer told Reuters aboard Leviathan during a training run, in the first such foreign media access to the vessels.

Speculation surrounds the role of the fleet of five Dolphin-class submarines, each costing some $500 million. A sixth is on order from the German manufacturer. Some analysts suggest these boats may be capable of launching nuclear missiles.

Around a third the size of the nuclear-powered giants of the United States or Russia, and with diesel-electric engines that limit underwater durations to two or three weeks, the Dolphins are designed mainly to patrol the Mediterranean coast.

But in 2019 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also tasked the navy with tackling arch-enemy Iran.

In January, a Dolphin made a rare visit to the Red Sea, where several Iranian-linked ships have been sabotaged.

Leviathan's below-decks weapons section was off-limits to Reuters. So was any discussion of actual operations.

Swinging the periscope to peer at cargo ships above, the captain ordered a deeper dive and a simulated attack. A control-room display showed Leviathan's torpedo tubes as "flooded," or ready for launch.

The floor tipped, the control-room crew leaning against the incline. A few dozen yards down, Leviathan switched from diesel to electric power. To preserve the resulting quiet, crewmen passed along targeting and fire orders in murmurs, reinforced by finger taps on comrades' backs.

A speaker aired the torpedo's sonar signal: like the song of a cricket, rising in urgency then falling silent as the target was "sunk".

A Dolphin's core operational crew size is 45, with an average age of 22, the senior officer said. Ten or more people can squeeze aboard, for training or deployment as frogmen.

At their home port of Haifa, a fortified hangar shields the Dolphins from rocket strikes or hostile eyes. Crews are expected to put to sea at extremely short notice, the officer said.

Leviathan is named after the biblical whale. Dining, as elsewhere in Israel's military, is kosher. That means separate kitchenware for meat and dairy which, on Leviathan, resulted in spillover cutlery being stored in the corridor.

Prayers precede Sabbath meals, with blessings over grape juice instead of wine. Purified seawater allows for regular showers and laundry by hand. A static bike, board games and videos pass downtime.

Cramped quarters mean junior submariners rotate three-to-a-bed. On longer trips, some wear casual clothes, and everyone goes by first names except the captain and first mate.

The Dolphins are among a handful of Israeli military units whose personnel must forfeit any other citizenship they hold, a precaution against pressure to spy for foreign powers.

There is almost no "compartmentalization" during missions. The crew is kept apprised of secret plans to create a sense of common cause, the senior officer said.

Some analysts speculate the submarines may serve as so-called "second strike" platforms capable of launching nuclear missiles autonomously, a deterrent against a surprise attack.

Subscribe to Israel Hayom's daily newsletter and never miss our top stories!

"It would be far more difficult to be sure of destroying submerged submarines," said Norman Friedman, a scholar with the US Naval Institute. "If Israel were to deploy a submarine-launched missile, I would put my money on a cruise missile."

Israel, which does not confirm or deny having nuclear arms, aims to prevent Iran from acquiring such weaponry. Iran says its nuclear designs are peaceful yet the Islamic republic routinely calls for Israel's demise.

The post In the belly of the whale: Israeli sub simulates strike appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

Each month, IsraelHayom.com posts hundreds of news stories, magazine features, analyses, and op-eds. In our new monthly feature, we share some of the most popular items, as well as our personal favorites. Want to make sure you don't miss anything? Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook and Twitter and subscribe to our daily newsletter for a wrap-up of each morning's news, directly to your email inbox!

Click on the images below to read the full stories 

Middle East peace process

Middle East 

Defense and security 

Science and technology 

Startup spotlight 

Archaeology 

Amazing stories

Coming in December: Israel Hayom editors' Top 5 picks in news, culture, defense, and more!

The post Arab students, Saudi secrets, and submarines: Israel Hayom editors' picks for November 2020 appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

Political officials are saying that in the past few days, an avenue of dialogue has been established between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Blue and White leader Benny Gantz, with the goal of preventing the dissolution of the Knesset and another election.

For now, this dialogue will allow Netanyahu another grace period at the end of which he could call an election before having to implement the rotation agreement and step down as prime minister.

Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook and Twitter

According to the officials, shortly after Gantz decided to establish a governmental committee of inquiry into the submarines affair, the defense minister and alternate prime minister notified Netanyahu that the latter had no reason to worry about the committee's findings.

In a message he sent to the Likud Party, Gantz stressed that his intent in establishing the committee of inquiry was to "placate his base," and said he had no doubt that the committee could not affect the prime minister or his stature. Gantz said he thought that Netanyahu would not be asked to testify before the committee, and stressed that the committee's mandate was a very limited, even "toothless," one.

Israel Hayom has learned that the team facilitating dialogue between the two camps includes Gantz's chief of staff Hod Batzar and Netanyahu associates Asher Hayon and Natan Eshel.

Officials also said that in the past few days, the two sides have been sending messages to each other about the state budget and other issues. The backdoor communication also reportedly included a demand by Netanyahu that Gantz remove Justice Minister Avi Nissankoren from his role and forgo the rotation, which is planned to take place in November 2021. Gantz rejected both demands outright.

However, the "dialogue team" is working on a compromise on the budget issue that would allow the Knesset to push the Dc. 23 deadline to pass the 2020 national budget back by three months. This could comprise a capitulation on Gantz's part, as it would allow Netanyahu another chance to pack it in and call an election, thus avoiding the rotation. Both sides are reportedly looking into ways of minimizing the damage and blunt expected criticism of Gantz if he decides to take that course of action.

Gantz is demanding a solid date for the passage of the 2021 budget as a condition for approving the 2020 budget, but Netanyahu has thus far rejected all proposals presented to him.

Meanwhile, Blue and White said Thursday that all reports about a compromise on the budget issue were "total, baseless lies" invented by "people with vested interests."

"No compromise on the budget has been cooked up," Blue and White said.

Responding to the reports about the committee of inquiry into the submarines affair, Blue and White said, "Another bunch of ridiculous babble and 'Arabian Nights' stories. This is a professional, independent committee headed by a judge that will thoroughly investigate the Defense Ministry's acquisition processes."

Subscribe to Israel Hayom's daily newsletter and never miss our top stories!

The post Is a 'secret' team working to prevent another election? appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

The submarines affair has been much written about and discussed, and it appears that there is a lot of confusion surrounding it. As the former bureau head of the IDF chief of staff and someone who spent three and a half years in charge of all oversight of the defense establishment on behalf of the State Comptroller, I would like to contribute to the discourse.

As part of my work, I held hundreds of meetings with high-ranking officials in the defense and security establishment, from the defense minister to officials in the field, and they never made any claims about anything problematic in Israel's submarines acquisitions. The same cannot be said for other kinds of vessels, about which claims were raised over the Israeli Navy's decision to switch from Korean to German boats.

 Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook and Twitter

The years-long debate about the submarines has to do with the question of whether Israel needs a fleet of five or six submarines. A submarine is a strategic tool, and defining the need for one is a matter of national security that is decided far above the head of the Navy, which is the one that actually operates them. There are a number of operational and logistic considerations that serve as the basis for the question of how many submarines are needed. But one thing is clear: at any one time, only some of the submarines can be in the water, due to a variety of reasons having to do with maintenance, refresher courses for the crew, and the length of operations. Therefore, every additional submarine is significant, and doubles Israel's operational power.

Because the acquisitions are made with Israeli money, rather than American military aid, and money is scarce, there is no doubt an inherent tension between members of the military top brass when it comes to the best use of budget money. An example would be the decision by former Defense Minister Amir Peretz, against the recommendation of the military, to purchase the Iron Dome system, or the prime minister's decision to build a security fence on the Egyptian border – after a long debate that cost us heavily in the form of tens of thousands of illegal migrants whose entry could have been prevented.

The question that needs to be asked in where the seventh through ninth submarines come in, and the answer is that those three are intended to replace Israel's three oldest submarines, which have lower capabilities than the new ones. The argument is about the timing of the replacement and the quality of the long-term contracts. I have not come across any discussion about expanding Israel's submarine fleet beyond six.

As for the sale of a submarine to Egypt, Germany – unlike the US – has no laws that mandate that Israel retain a qualitative edge over Arab states. Moreover, Germany does not need Israel's approval to sell its submarines to Egypt or any other country. However, the two countries are talking, and Israel is doing its best to restrict the sale of submarines to countries it does not want to see gain prowess. If it cannot ensure restrictions of that kind, it wants to secure some kind of benefit, either in purchasing terms or in areas unrelated to submarines but are of diplomatic importance.

In that context, it's obvious that there is, has been, and will be widespread, fruitful dialogue between the prime ministers and their teams, with each side trying to maximize the gains for their countries while eradicating possible dangers. You must understand – if Egypt budgets for a submarine, it will buy a submarine, and the one question is from whom.

The Navy patrol boats are a different matter. After intense background work, the Israeli Navy laid out operational demands to purchase the vessels from South Korea. These boats were smaller than the ones in use. After a time, the Navy changed its mind and made new demands, which entailed buying boasts from Germany that were significantly bigger than the Korean ones and much more expensive.

The reason for the change has never been probed, so even now it is unclear what considerations were behind the decision. The defense establishment should delve into this.

To sum up, there are three different issues here, all three of which have to do with aspects of the dialogue between the IDF, the Defense Ministry, the National Security Council, and the Prime Minister's Office. The world of defense acquisitions is a complicated one, involving vested interests and mediators who stick their fingers in the mix, and sometimes it can slip into criminality. In these situations, law enforcement should be allowed to investigate them in depth to improve oversight and control of the delicate and risky process.

Subscribe to Israel Hayom's daily newsletter and never miss our top stories!

The post Let's dive into the confusion about the submarines   appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

Despite ongoing allegations of corruption against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and some of his associates involving the acquisition of new submarines from Germany, a document obtained by Israel Hayom indicates that Israel never intended to maintain an order of battle of more than six submarines.

The document in question is a working paper prepared by top-level officials in the National Security council and the Defense Ministry ahead of a meeting Netanyahu held with German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Oct. 21, 2015.

Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook and Twitter

The paper served as a basis for a draft of a memorandum of understanding with the Germans that was presented to Merkel and her defense advisor Christoph Heusgen during another visit Netanyahu made to Berlin at the end of February 2016.

That draft was sent to the "red fax" in the Defense Ministry director-general's office, and the top ministry staff looked at it with "total amazement," as described in Ronen Bergman's investigative report on the affair in Yedioth Ahronoth.

The paper, which was recently cleared for publication, details the background for the understandings between Israel and Germany for the acquisition of submarines in the last few years and a few years to tome.

"The submarines make a very large contribution to Israel's security. The Israeli government puts great importance on ongoing security cooperation in the region, the goal being to keep the production lines in Germany and the number of submarines the same in the coming decades," the paper states.

Later, it reads: "The German government has supplied the Israeli government with six submarines (five already supplied, one in the future)."

The submarines cited in the paper include three Dolphin-class submarines, the oldest of which is slated to be decommissioned in 2028; two more of the most advanced Dolphin model, AIP, which were commissioned in 2014 and 2016; and a sixth submarine, which was originally scheduled to be delivered last year, but is now expected to enter use in 2023.

According to the second section of the paper, Israel and Germany would "sign an agreement for the supply of three additional submarines (a seventh, eighth, and ninth one) that would be sent from Germany to Israel between 2027 and 2031."

Subscribe to Israel Hayom's daily newsletter and never miss our top stories!

A sketch at the end of the paper makes it clear that submarine numbers seven, eight, and nine are not intended to be added to Israel's fleet, but rather to replace three of the submarines it already owns. For example, the oldest submarine, which is scheduled to be decommissioned eight years from now (in 2028) is slated to be replaced that same year by the first of the three submarines Germany has promised to supply. One will come in, and the other will go out. Every new submarine commissioned will replace an old one that is decommissioned. The two next-oldest submarines were scheduled to be replaced in 2030 and 2032.

All this means that at any one time, Israel would maintain a fleet of no more than six submarines.

When Israel Hayom asked for a response, former head of the National Security Council Brig. Gen. (res.) Jacob Nagel denied claims that the paper had been prepared secretly.

According to Nagel, the work on the paper was carried out in full cooperation with the Defense Ministry official in charge of submarines, whose identity is classified.

Nagel also said that prior to Netanyahu's visit to Germany, the draft MoU that was presented to Merkel and her staff had been approved by then-Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon and Defense Ministry Director-General Dan Harel, and that the changes they requested were included in the draft Netanyahu carried to Merkel.

Ya'alon and Harel, as well as other high-ranking defense officials, are claiming that they witnessed improper conduct that demands that the submarines deal be investigated, and Ya'alon is even making claims about "massive corruption."

In effect, the working paper reported here would appear to dismantle many of the allegations of corruption directed against the submarines acquisition deal. First of all, it was prepared before the first meeting between Netanyahu and Merkel in October 2015, a full four months before Ya'alon "discovered by chance," as he put it, that Netanyahu was about to make a second trip to Berlin to discuss the submarines; and second, it states clearly that Israel would maintain a fleet of no more than six submarines at any one time.

Rather than acquiring "three more submarines" and expanding the fleet to nine, as Ya'alon claimed the deal was intended to do, the three new submarines would replace three that would be decommissioned.

The post Declassified paper torpedoes allegations of corruption in submarines affair appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

In the months leading up to that meeting, there were discussions in Israel and Germany about the possibility of signing a memorandum of understanding with the German government. The document was supposed to define what kind of naval vessels Israel would purchase from Germany over the next few years. Nagel and Netanyahu, who had studied the matter ahead of the meeting with Merkel, provided a clear answer. Nagel told his German counterpart, head of national security Christoph Hausmann, that Israel would not be acquiring anti-submarine ships. Netanyahu updated Merkel that Israel did intend to acquire three new submarines.

That agreement would eventually turn into the "submarines affair," which is the focus of Case 3,000. But Nagel, who saw for himself how things played out, does not believe the claims being made against Netanyahu.

In an interview to the Israel Hayom weekend magazine, Nagel says that "to the best of my professional understanding, the process of acquiring [Israel's] seventh, eighth, and ninth submarines – from the moment I learned of it in October 2015 – was one of the cleanest, most orderly acquisitions there has ever been."

'We need a Palestinian Sadat'

Nagel, 62, lives in Rosh Ha'ayin. He is married and a father of four, a grandfather of five, and a brigadier-general in the reserves. He started his defense and security career on a special track out of high school with the 8200 intelligence unit. After 17 years there, he transferred to the Mafaat – the Defense Ministry's Research and Development Agency – where he served in a number of roles until he joined the National Security Council in 2011. He made his mark with the Nagel Commission ("there were a lot of Nagel Committees, but I'm proudest of that one," he says), which recommended that Israel develop the Iron Dome missile defense system. Then, too, he and his partners – Mafaat head Shmuel Keren and Director-General of the Defense Ministry Pinchas Bucharis – felt the pressure the system knows how to exert when it opposes the political echelon's instructions about acquisitions or developments.

"We were the target of insane attacks," Nagel said in an interview two years ago.

Nagel stepped in to head the NSC after his predecessor Yossi Cohen was appointed head of the Mossad. The appointment of Avriel Bar Yosef, who had been selected to replace Cohen, was cancelled when he came under suspicion of criminal activity. Later on, those suspicions were linked to the submarines affair. Netanyahu was satisfied with Nagel's performance and asked him several times to take on the job permanently, but Nagel declined for personal reasons.

In effect, Nagel was head of the NSC and national security advisor from January 2016 to April 2017. He led the talks on the U.S. aid package to Israel for the decade to come (and was even the Israeli signatory to it); the reconciliation agreement between Israel and Turkey; and several issues that lay at the core of diplomatic-security activity. Since leaving the post, he has been a guest lecturer at the Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, where he lectures on policy and strategy in research and development and directs the Center for Defense Information and Technology. Here and there, he talks to the media about what he knows about the submarines affair, but after several instances in which his comments were twisted, decided to keep quiet until the election was over. Now that his version of events cannot be accused of being used to influence voters, he is ready to speak.

This week, Israel Hayom revealed elements of an article on Netanyahu's defense outlook Nagel is writing for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

"They always say things here are a mess. So here, for the first time since [Israel's first Prime Minister David] Ben-Gurion, a prime minister who apparently intends to remain in office for several years to come, says 'This is what you should aim for.' A defense outlook affects force-building in the IDF 20 or 30 years down the road. A big part of the outlook document is classified, and it includes instructions that cannot be revealed," he says.

Q: Did Netanyahu write his defense outlook by himself?

"He wrote it along with the military leadership, the NSC, and his closest associates. The document was presented in sub rosa forums in the defense establishment and the Knesset. People close to Netanyahu, like the former head of the NSC, read it and gave him notes."

Q: What are the main differences between Netanyahu's defense outlook and Ben-Gurion's?

"Ben-Gurion, for example, decided that we had to be ready for an outbreak of violence against us every few years, which is indeed what happened. Netanyahu says that we need to be ready for an ongoing war. Secondly, today we need to be prepared for all kinds of enemies. Nations, demi-nations, political terror organizations like the International Criminal Court in The Hague and BDS. Netanyahu also added the need to defend Jewish communities worldwide. These are things that didn't exist in Ben-Gurion's time."

Q: If there is constant war, doesn't that mean that the security situation has gotten worse?

"Not at all. Overall, in terms of security, Israel's situation is very good, and has maybe never been better. The glass is a lot more full than empty."

Q: Many people are disappointed that the IDF has not defeated Hamas. What are we missing?

"The Gaza Strip is a problem for which I don't currently see a solution. The biggest concessions we would make don't meet their minimum demands, so there's no one to talk to, or anything to talk about. Will we occupy Gaza? Will we beat Hamas? I'm in favor of it, but what will we do then? Who will replace them?"

Nagel says that the only solution is for a figure like former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to arise, who would change the Palestinians' thinking.

"They used to think that [Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud] Abbas would be someone like that, but he isn't doing the job – not in Gaza and not in Judea and Samaria. They need someone from inside."

'Get China out of Haifa Port'

Q: You were in the NSC for six years. For years, it was the poor cousin of the defense establishment. Is it now doing its job as the prime minister's diplomatic-security brain?

"The NSC serves as the prime minister's right hand in all areas of security and diplomacy. The head of the NSC prepares every diplomatic conversation the prime minister holds with world leaders, and is on the line while it takes place. There are situations in which the talks would get into politics, and then I, for example, would get off the line or stop listening.

"The NSC is not meant to supplant the Defense Ministry, and it doesn't. The NSC looks at the macro, makes observations, and presents alternatives. The way I see it, the strength of the NSC is tested by how far the NSC head sits from the prime minister. Today, a single office – the chief of staff's – separates us, and the military secretary sits across from us. These are the people closest to the prime minister, and that's how it should be."

Q: For quite some time, there has been talk of the Chinese investing in sensitive fields in Israel. This week, the issue was raised in discussions your successor, Meir Ben Shabbat, held in Washington. What is your opinion?

"Of course, I don't know what was discussed by my excellent successor at the NSC. It's important to me to make it clear that I have no problem with China or with any other country that wants to invest in Israel, but we need to demarcate what is open to them and what is not. As head of the NSC, I discovered to my amazement that problematic deals could go through without the NSC or the Defense Ministry being aware of them or expressing an opinion. Today, the situation is that if we want to sell something security-related, we need approval from the Defense Ministry. In other words, there is oversight. On the other hand, when it comes to civilian products, anyone can do what they want. The Tel Aviv light rail, Phoenix insurance, Bank Leumi or a port – every ministry decides based on its own considerations. That's not plausible.

"When we're talking about vital national infrastructures, or harm to our close allies, there needs to be oversight – and it doesn't matter if the country is China, Japan, or anyone else. Everyone knows about the cyber threat. Imagine a state of emergency in which a foreign country has control of our traffic lights."

Q: Should we cancel the construction of the new Haifa Port by a Chinese firm?

"In my opinion, we should consider a change, or even a cancellation, of that plan, if it's possible."

The submarines affair, in five acts

Q: Many people, including former Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon, say that Netanyahu and his people wanted to purchase the submarines and other vessels to line their own pockets, and what Netanyahu did approaches treason. What is your response?

"I don't intend to address remarks by officials I greatly respect, some of whom were my commanders and even gave me my stripes. I can only lay out the facts as I know them, and it could be that I don't know everything. I can say that at no stage was there any intention for Israel to be in possession of nine submarines simultaneously. That was never an option, and anyone who says differently is either making things up or doesn't know the facts."

Q: So what did happen?

"When people talk about the naval vessels, there are essentially five different stories, some of which have nothing to do with each other. The first story is the sixth submarine. There was an argument for years about whether Israel needed five or six submarines. The defense establishment said five were enough; the political echelon, which by the way included former Defense Minister Ehud Barak, decided back in 2010 that six were necessary. The political echelon has the full authority to force its opinion on the matter to be accepted, as happened with many battles over weaponry, such as Iron Dome, satellite development, and other things.

"Every submarine has an 'expiration date,' which is determined the day it is launched and after which it cannot be used. Secondly, 10 to 12 years pass from the moment the contract to purchase a submarine is signed until it arrives in Israel. In other words, theoretically, a replacement for a submarine that is decommissioned in 2027 should have been ordered in 2015, so we were behind schedule for some of the submarines. Practically speaking, when it comes to submarines, there is no country other than Germany to buy them from, and in Germany, you buy from ThyssenKrupp."

Q: What is the second story?

"The second story, which I know from NSC documents, is about the patrol boats to defend the natural gas rigs. There is not and never was any dispute about the need for those boats. There was a question about whom to buy them from, because unlike submarines, there are alternatives."

Q: Ya'alon contends that the prime minister stopped an international tender for the patrol boats put out by the Defense Ministry. He sees it as more proof of corrupt conspiracy.

"I don't respond to things someone says. This is a lengthy process that took several years. The Defense Ministry put out a tender for the boats, and did so against the instructions of head of the NSC at the time, Yossi Cohen. The tender was published in the morning, and the written orders not to put out a tender apparently arrived that afternoon."

Q: If there are alternatives to the German patrol boats, why not publish a tender?

"The entire time, Israel was making attempts to get Germany to give it a discount on the boats. The Germans dragged their feet and tried to link the discount to the Palestinian issue. At one stage, the Defense Ministry thought they couldn't wait any longer and decided to put out an international tender. But then the prime minister spoke with Merkel by phone, and he convinced her to give Israel the discount. By the way, the finance minister at the time, Yair Lapid, and the defense minister at the time, Avigdor Lieberman, were both involved in these negotiations. The Defense Ministry still wanted to see the Germans put in writing their willingness to give us the discount, so they put out a tender. The NSC, as I said, opposed it, and the tender was stopped."

On the matter of the patrol boats, there is no dispute between Nagel and Ya'alon about the facts. They agree that the tender was issued and then canceled, and in the end the Germans gave Israel the discount. The dispute has to do with the reason for the cancellation. Nagel explains that the discount and the importance of maintaining ties with Germany prompted Netanyahu to stop the tender; Ya'alon claims that the decision was motivated by financial interests.

Q: But what about the anti-submarine warships? According to Ya'alon, no one wanted them and there was no need for them.

"That's not accurate. The anti-sub warships apparently have to do with the third scandal, which is the sale of the German submarines to Egypt. Despite countless reports and comments, the Germans did not need Israel's approval to sell submarines to the Egyptians. In contrast to what people say I said, I never contradicted the prime minister on this matter. What I said was that I was not aware of any Israeli approval for the sale of German submarines to Egypt, because the Germans don't need any."

"For years, when the Germans would ask our opinion about selling submarines to Egypt, we would object. The Germans, as a friendly nation, listened to our position, but they were under no obligation to accept it. For example, in a meeting Netanyahu held with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in November 2014, he told him that Israel objected to the sale of submarines to Egypt, but in March 2015, when he was asked again, Netanyahu didn't object."

Q: What changed?

"Apparently something happened that I prefer not to discuss."

Q: You're referring to what Netanyahu calls "the secret." Do you know what it is?

"Today I know. At the time, I didn't, because I still wasn't in the job [at the NSC]. When I took over as acting NSC head, before that meeting with Merkel in February 2016, I became aware of the subject."

Q: Did the defense minister, the chief of staff, and other senior officials know?

"In hindsight, it turned out that everyone knew. There was a process in which the Germans decided to sell submarines to Egypt, and the Defense Ministry no doubt knew about it."

Q: So why did the prime minister tell Channel 12 news that they didn't?

"That's not exactly what he said. Take note of his words. He said, 'Not everything that the prime minister does the chief of staff or defense minister has to know about.' Everyone took that sentence to mean that he had kept the defense minister and chief of staff out of the loop. But he didn't say that, and what's more, in an interview later on he said that it became clear to him that they did know."

Shouting matches between Netanyahu and Ya'alon

Q: Again, what about the anti-submarine boats, the ones Ya'alon said "no one wanted"?

"That's the fourth story, and here it's possible that part of the process was not entirely in good order. But it has almost nothing to do with the prime minister. From the moment it turned out that the Egyptians were about to receive submarines, the Navy or the NSC thought it could be an opportunity to get anti-submarine warships from the Germans, cheaply. It's a reasonable thought, but apparently, the proposal was not submitted to the NSC from the Defense Ministry in an orderly manner. In October 2015, the prime minister went to visit Merkel, and in the meeting, the request to acquire three new submarines to replace the existing ones was brought up, as well as two anti-submarine ships. The Germans responded with a request that we prepare a document and discuss it at the next meeting.

"Ahead of the next meeting with Merkel, in February 2016, and after submitting a draft of the deal with the Germans to the Defense Ministry, I updated the prime minister that the Defense Ministry objected to the anti-submarine boats. He responded by asking me, 'Remind me what an anti-submarine warship is?' I explained, and he said, 'If they don't want them, take it out of the draft document.' This shows you how minor the issue of the anti-submarine ships was. It was dropped as quickly as it came up, and that was it."

Q: What's the fifth story?

"The fifth story is about the seventh, eighth, and ninth submarines. Like I said, in the meeting with Merkel in October 2015, it was agreed that Israel would prepare an orderly paper on which the request would be presented. At the same time, the IDF's Gideon multi-year work plan was being assembled. The plan included general instructions from the prime minister that were passed on to the NSC and the IDF, according to which Israel should prepare to acquire three more submarines. It was clear to everyone that this meant submarines that would replace the old ones, not that we'd have a total of nine."

Q: Ya'alon says he had shouting matches with the prime minister, and he stopped the submarines deal.

"It's true there was shouting, but nothing was stopped. Netanyahu thought that we were behind schedule and we needed to make a decision about the new submarines. The cabinet gave the green light to sign the MoU [memorandum of understanding] to purchase the submarines in October 2016, and everyone was in favor of acquiring three new submarines, including [then-IDF Chief of Staff Gadi] Eizenkot, because it was obvious the old ones had to be replaced."

Q: If everyone agreed that there was a need for new submarines, why did the Defense Ministry and Ya'alon object?

"I think, and this is a guess, that they were afraid it would hurt the budget for the Gideon plan, so they wanted to put off the matter for a year. But everyone agreed about the need. The argument was about the timing and the final number of submarines we would have a decade on – five or six. So I say that the acquisition of the seventh, eighth, and ninth submarines was the cleanest one there has ever been."

Q: You know some of the suspects in the submarines affair. Do you think they did what the police suspect them of doing?

"I won't address anything that is under investigation by the police. As far as the MoU for the acquisition of the submarines, I dealt with it myself and I can say that no one intervened or tried to intervene, other than the relevant experts. David Sharan (Netanyahu's former chief of staff, who is suspected of taking bribes from Miki Ganor) was sitting in the room next to me and never said word about it. Others didn't, either. I said hi to David Shimron (a former Netanyahu advisor, who represented Ganor) in the hallway once, and beyond that, I never had any contact with him. I know Sharan, [former NSC deputy director] Avriel Bar Yosef, and [former minister] Modi Zandberg, and it never occurred to me they did what they are accused of. The prime minister's decisions on the submarines and the boats were, in my opinion, correct and clear of any outside influence. I accepted those decisions."

Q: What about the possibility that Sharan and the others steered him toward making those decisions?

"That makes no sense, and there is nothing to back it up. I've spent many hours with the prime minister. If he says he never talked about the submarines with Sharan, I believe him, and everyone else should, too."

The post 'The deal for the submarines was clean' appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.