Olabi noted negotiations continue, and their nature remains primarily security-focused, based on the agreement signed after the Yom Kippur War. "The focus of the talks is mainly on border checkpoints, the number of forces on each side, and similar matters," the ambassador was quoted as saying by the Syrian news site Al-Watan.

"The discussions address several issues and concerns of both sides. If Israel has security concerns, they can be addressed. If other issues are not security-related, they require a different approach," the ambassador said, apparently referring to the Druze issue in the Druze Mountain region, who were attacked by the Damascus regime.

The ambassador described Syrian President al-Sharaa's visit to Washington as a "historic opportunity" and stated that his country aims to establish "a space of peace, security, and stability on its southern border."

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Maj. Gen. Dan Noiman, commander of the military colleges, will coordinate the investigations in a secondary appointment as head of the Training Division, the military's training branch. This body was once a General Staff unit of the IDF, later becoming the Torah, Assessment and Training Brigade in the Operations Division. Now this body is being reestablished under Maj. Gen. Noiman, who will coordinate investigations of the numerous battles from the past two years, working with the Torah, Assessment and Training Brigade and the Operations Division.

The military is currently building the roadmap for conducting battle investigations, with plans to establish investigation teams. Sources involved in the details told Israel Hayom this investigation process will last at least several months, given the many battles IDF forces fought over the past two years.

The IDF plans to identify the main and primary battles, focusing primarily on those, and ultimately distributing the investigations and their conclusions across the organization to build the force according to the findings and learn from the key lessons for the future.

Since the IDF spent the past two years primarily on the fighting itself, preparations for combat and force refreshment, the battles have not been investigated in an organized and in-depth manner until now. However, immediate and clear lessons were extracted on the spot and distributed among forces to improve fighting methods in real time and protect troops.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Sami Turgeman is expected to present the findings Tuesday to the Chief of General Staff from the committee reviewing the October 7 investigations and the preceding period. The committee team comprised senior reserve officers, including Maj. Gen. (res.) Eli Sharvit, former Navy commander, Maj. Gen. (res.) Amikam Norkin, former Air Force commander, Lt. Col. (res.) Talia Lankri, and Brig. Gen. (res.) Yuval Bazak, who lost his son, Sgt. Guy Bazak, on October 7.

Lt. Gen. Zamir appointed Turgeman on his first day in the position to review war investigations conducted during the previous Chief of General Staff Herzi Halevi's tenure, aiming to classify investigations into three categories: sufficient investigations to be accepted, investigations requiring completions, and investigations to be opened and conducted anew.

After presenting the team's findings to the Chief of General Staff today, its conclusions will likely be presented to IDF General Staff members later this week, and subsequently to the public. It's important to note that Turgeman's team and Turgeman himself have no mandate to draw personal conclusions regarding officers – that exclusive mandate belongs to Lt. Gen. Zamir. However, the Chief of General Staff will likely consult with Turgeman regarding personal conclusions about officers.

Another committee Chief of General Staff Zamir has already announced establishing is a decorations committee. Currently, its members and head have not been appointed, and its operational mode has not been finalized, but it will be authorized to recommend to the Chief of General Staff and Minister of Defense on awarding decorations and citations – the Medal of Valor, the Medal of Courage, and the Medal of Distinguished Service. Since the state's establishment until today, only 40 courage citations have been awarded, the most recent given after the Yom Kippur War.

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"You know what I'd want most?" Almog asked those present without waiting for an answer. "For at least a million Jews to come here, a real ingathering of exiles. Send WhatsApp messages to friends and families, and tell them there's a country at war here and that we need as many as possible, to be big and strong. If any of you need help with Aliya issues with authorities and the Ministry of Interior – contact me, don't be shy."

M, a soldier who came to Israel from Miami, asked Almog why a decorated warrior like him chooses to deal specifically with Aliya issues. "Almost everything that happens with me is thanks to my son Eran, who was born disabled and never spoke or called me 'dad,'" Almog quickly answered. "Eran, who was completely dependent on the mercy of others, taught me what love, kindness, and Judaism are. Weak Eran, who was called 'retarded,' is the Jewish people during 2,000 years. With him, we discovered what racism and discrimination are: a child nobody wants. I once went with him to a country club in Nes Ziona, and someone shouted, 'Take him out of here.' My son taught me what it means to be weak and what tikkun olam is. Fighting in battle is important and existential, but tikkun olam is the most important thing."

Almog asked those present why they chose to come to Israel in the midst of war. M from Miami volunteered to answer, "On October 7, I was living in New York, and there were lots of demonstrations against the war and against the hostages. Every day, I crossed the Brooklyn Bridge, and sometimes they hung a huge Palestinian flag there. I felt helpless, and that pushed me to enlist."

S from New York also left his 14 brothers and sisters to come to Israel. "October 7 was the final push for me. Because of it, I got the courage to leave everything behind. There you can't contribute, here you feel you have a purpose."

P from Paris told Almog that for him, enlisting was always the goal. "I came to Israel for vacations, and when I saw soldiers, I wanted to be like them. From age 12, I started nagging at home about enlisting, until at 18 I studied for a year at a yeshiva in Israel and said, 'it's time.' After October 7, my mom was really worried, but I explained to her that if I don't do it now, I'll regret it all my life."

Asher from Sydney, "I'm 20, and I thought I'd come to Israel for a year at a yeshiva and then return to university in Australia. But here I felt I belonged. After I saw antisemitic videos from the university where I was supposed to study, I said, 'there's no way I'm going back.' My two sisters also immigrated, and after that my parents, who didn't want to stay alone."

Speaking of which, Almog recalled a visit he made to Australia recently with his wife, Didi. "Because of things I did as Southern Command General, 20 years ago, they issued three arrest warrants against me in England. When we arrived in Australia, someone caught on to this and asked the Minister of Justice there not to give me a visa. Fortunately, the minister didn't respond, but there were still protests against me. We met with the Jewish community in the major cities, and protesters followed our vehicle. Since October 7, more than 40,000 Olim have arrived in Israel, with assistance from the Jewish Agency and the Ministry of Aliya and Absorption, including 15,000 young people aged 18. Many enlisted, and unfortunately, some were also killed."

Who was Judah Maccabee?

D from Bnei Brak suddenly asked for permission to speak. "My family opposed my enlistment," he said. "I have brothers who protest against the army, and when I go home, I sleep at my sister's. My father doesn't like the idea, and my mother is also afraid, she doesn't think I should serve."

Almog: "If you get married, will your parents come to the wedding?" D: "Yes, even though I don't talk much with my father, because the conversation always ends with 'how bad the army is.'" Almog: "I'm sure your father loves you and is proud. Maybe not now, but one day he'll tell you that."

Later, when we parted from the soldiers, Almog explained, "Some of the stories are painful. Look at this, a child goes to fight, and maybe give his life to defend the country, and the parent sees him as a traitor to the faith."

Is this a problem that can be solved?

"Tears within the nation have existed throughout history. We must slowly persuade them, too, that for the only Jewish state, one must enlist, each in a different way. Take, for example, Judah Maccabee. Is he a yeshiva head? No, he's a warrior. Whose calls were 'Whoever is for God, to me'?" We need to hurry, because the army currently lacks manpower."

"We need to talk to them. David Ben-Gurion decided to give them exemptions: 'Torah study is their occupation.' He probably thought these would be few, maybe a few hundred, but didn't imagine the number would reach hundreds of thousands and that this would be a disaster for generations. It cannot be that an American Orthodox Jew works for a living, because he understands he lives according to US laws, and here there's a group that enjoys the benefits of government and doesn't serve. Why did I ask D if his parents would come to the wedding? Because this rift is in the deepest place."

Major E, commander of Company Chetz, gave a glimmer of optimism when he recounted that the company celebrated the last Passover together, despite all the limitations. "Every commander here understands that he has a professional and national responsibility to show that it's possible to recruit orthodox Jews," he explained. "As a secular person, I learned and understood new things, such as the differences between types of kosher certifications. We were used to sending the Chabad followers home, because of food restrictions, but this year everyone celebrated the holiday at the base in a great atmosphere. I learn from them what spirit is."

When Almog asked soldiers what was most difficult for them, besides being away from home, H from Raanana replied that the greatest difficulty actually lay in the fact that they "aren't fighting enough" on the northern border, which is currently considered calm.

Almog, the veteran warrior, immediately reassured him, "Don't worry, war doesn't run away, and it doesn't come by invitation. You can sit at an outpost, and suddenly they'll ambush you at 2:00 at night, when you're least prepared. I enlisted in 1969, two years after the Six-Day War, and I was angry because I thought the battles were over. You are a generation that unfortunately has many wars."

"This place is more precious than we are"

Almog, who next month will celebrate his 74th birthday, was born in Rishon LeZion and enlisted in the IDF in 1969. He was a company commander in Battalion 202 during the Yom Kippur War, and in the midst of the battles was informed that his younger brother, tank corps Lieutenant Eran Avrutsky, was killed in the Golan Heights, about 18 miles from where he now met with the soldiers of Company Chetz.

In Operation Entebbe, 1976, Almog led the Paratroopers Reconnaissance Unit. In the First Lebanon War, 1982, he commanded the spearhead force of the brigade that first reached Beirut. Among other roles, he commanded the Shaldag Unit, the Paratroopers Brigade, and the Southern Command. He admits it's a "great miracle" that he now stands in one piece and on two healthy legs.

Before joining the Jewish Agency in 2022, Almog was known for founding in the south in 2006 "ADI Negev – Nahalat Eran," a rehabilitation village for children and adults with disabilities, an idea that took shape inspired by his son, Eran, who was born with severe intellectual and developmental disabilities and passed away in 2007, at age 23. For his contribution to society and the state, Almog received the Israel Prize for lifetime achievement in 2016.

Almog, who spent 34 years in uniform, shared with the soldiers the personal and family pain he experienced in the military. "My brother Eran was a platoon commander 2 in Company D, Battalion 82 in Brigade 7. In the Yom Kippur War, he fought in the southern Golan Heights and was hit by a Syrian tank. He was thrown out, lay for a week next to his tank, begging for help, and no one came. My brother Eran was the reason for my long service, and to this day, I'm hurt that I wasn't with him. I always had the feeling I could have saved him. Until my last day, I'll live with guilt for not being beside my brother when he bled to death."

After the meeting with the soldiers, Almog suggested we conduct the interview near the memorial he built at the end of that war in memory of his brother, exactly where Eran's tank was hit. A few weeks after the Yom Kippur War, Almog took steel plates from the damaged tank, along with a mortar barrel he found among the charred armored vehicle skeletons, and brought them to Alex the welder from Moshav Ramat Magshimim. Alex created a modest memorial that stands intact to this day, not far from Tel Saki.

We sat on a rock by the memorial, in minimal shade, and Almog read a poem he wrote a few years ago in memory of his brother, "On Yom Kippur I am wrapped in a tallit of deafening silence / On Yom Kippur I lie with you next to the burning tank, wrapped in torn tanker overalls / And your screams cut through me, and your dying pleas are swallowed in the roar of war / I try to rescue you with all my might, clinging with my nails to basalt rocks, pulling you from the fire / And your voice grows weaker, growing cracked / And we are embraced together and your heart beats in my body / And our body is wrapped in a blood-soaked tallit, and around is deafening silence."

"Guilt isn't rational," he admitted after finishing the reading. "Eran was two years younger than me. I'm the eldest, the experienced fighter. He lay wounded, injured in his left leg, and could have been saved if someone had applied a tourniquet. This is a feeling I'll take with me to my last day."

Despite the 51 and a half years that have passed since?

"My brother Eran would say, 'you're right, but there's no one to justify you.' Yesterday, David Hodak called me, a prominent attorney. In a photo from the officers' course, my brother stands next to him. Eran remains a young man of 20, and Hodak is now 72. He has achieved great economic prosperity, and still tells me, 'We must influence democracy here, connect me to Jewish communities worldwide, I want to help, I want a liberal, progressive society here.'"

"You see, I'm bleeding from the Yom Kippur War, but the question is what do we do with the pain? Do we find formulas that will keep us together despite our differences – or do we want to highlight the differences and create rifts?"

We need to assure the soldiers we met a bright horizon.

"You can't promise anything. Do you know what will happen tomorrow? Everything is connected to something internal that drives, like salmon swimming upstream against the current. My family, Avrutsky, came from Ukraine in 1910 because of the pogroms there. Did someone promise them? They decided to buy land under Turkish rule. My parents were born here during the British period, and I grew up in a home where there was an understanding that this place is precious, even more than we are. That we need to be ready to give our lives to protect the only Jewish state."

That many feel is now being destroyed from within.

"The greatest danger is from within, and I hope we'll come to our senses and find what unites. That we'll understand diversity can be a promoter of hatred and division, as in the destruction of the First and Second Temples. The great danger is not from the Iranians or Hamas, but from the perception that the truth is only mine and only I am right. We are in a terrible place in terms of internal atmosphere. We must find a way to bring hearts closer."

We are closer, God forbid, to civil war.

"I'll do everything so it doesn't happen, but we must enter a period of healing and rehabilitation, so we need to act differently and calm things down. I hear terrible statements toward the hostages' families and toward kibbutz members who live near Gaza. What happened in the kibbutzim was their fault? I would expect them to embrace the hostages' families, and if they want to speak in the Knesset for 48 consecutive hours, then let them, because you don't judge a person in their grief. The children were kidnapped, raped, and murdered because the state failed."

You raise and educate about values and ideals. Does anything of them remain today?

"The reality is concerning. It's concerning that there's erosion and lashing out at state institutions, the Supreme Court, the army, and the Shin Bet. In the end, with all due respect to leadership, security comes from those willing to risk their lives. On October 7, there was a terrible failure, from the prime minister down, but who took responsibility without saying 'I am responsible'? The fighters.

"People were willing to give their lives, and showed heroism. Many other countries would have collapsed in the same situation. France in World War II, and Poland, which fell, because they didn't have a fighting spirit. We are in a terrible crisis – but it's not the only one we've gone through, and not the first time trust has collapsed."

You mean the Yom Kippur War in 1973?

"And also the First Lebanon War. I led the paratroopers then from the landing on the Awali River to Beirut. We were there for years. Friends were killed, and there were demonstrations in Jerusalem against the government. And what did we go to fight for? For a new order, like in Gaza. We thought we'd let the Christians rule and they would manage, but when we arrived, we discovered they were driving Mercedes and not fighting. They wanted us to fight for them. There aren't many countries that have successfully appointed a government in another country."

We need a radical change in Gaza for us to continue living here.

"I spent ten years of my life in Gaza. Hamas is a strong force. There's talk of implementing a civil administration that will bring civilian companies into the Strip, but what will they do? They'll take locals who will distribute bread and build houses. Who are the locals? Hamas."

"We can talk about continuing the military move. We can hit Hamas a bit more. But I was the commander of the Gaza Division, and there was always terrorism there. Today, there are more than 2 million residents in the Strip. I guarantee you that even if we kill another 200,000, there will still be 100,000 Kalashnikovs left, and we won't get to the last rifle. The question is whether we act wisely. I've long said we should have built a strong defense system, made a deal to return all the hostages, and stopped the war when the right of defense is on our side. Whenever we want, we'll enter based on intelligence. If we stay inside, we'll pay a heavy price. The main threat comes from Iran anyway."

Oath on the graves

The Almog family has known quite a few tragedies over the years. In the attack at Maxim restaurant in Haifa in October 2003, five family members were killed, Doron's uncle Zeev Almog, his wife Ruth, their son Moshe, and their grandchildren Tomer Almog and Assaf Shtayer. Two decades later, in the October 7 massacre, the family suffered another blow when Nadav Goldstein-Almog and his daughter Yam were murdered in Kibbutz Kfar Aza. Chen, Nadav's wife (and daughter of Doron's cousin), was kidnapped with their three children, Agam, Gal, and Tal, and all four were released in the first hostage deal.

"When they were released from captivity, I cried," says Almog. "I was very worried they would kill them because of me. For 51 nights, I didn't sleep. I was constantly in touch with Major General (Res.) Nitzan Alon (commander of the intelligence effort in the area of prisoners and missing persons), and he used to tell me, 'Don't worry, they're fine.' I collapsed.

"Before the funeral of Yam and Nadav, I called the head of IDF Field Security and the then-IDF spokesperson, Daniel Hagari, and consulted with them about whether to eulogize, because I knew it would reach the networks. In the end, I eulogized."

At the open grave of his family members, Almog said, "We are not people of revenge and punishment. Here, in the Shefayim cemetery, next to the bleeding graves of Nadav and Yam, here I swear with you to rebuild Kfar Aza, together with all the communities near Gaza."

"What Golda did"

Next to the memorial for his brother, Almog continued, "In January, when they returned Emily Damari, Doron Steinbrecher, and Romi Gonen from captivity, they published the list of terrorists being released in the deal. Number 9 on the list was Sami Jardat, the terrorist who planned the attack at Maxim. I sent the news to Oren Almog, who was blinded in the attack and lost his father, Moshik, his brother, Tomer, and his grandparents. He was then 10, today he's 32. Oren wrote to me 'I saw, thanks. It's difficult, but the hostages can be returned, and the dead cannot. Let's hope they'll hold the terrorists accountable in the future, and that the released hostages will have happy lives.' I replied, 'I think exactly like you. A big hug, I love you very much.'"

As someone who fought in the Yom Kippur War, what's the situation today, in your opinion?

"Much more difficult, because the failure is greater. Then communities weren't captured. It's true that in the first 24 hours, the Syrians conquered the Golan Heights and reached the Sea of Galilee – but on October 9, we already went on the offensive, and very quickly, we reached 25 miles from Damascus. There were soldiers taken prisoner, but there weren't women who were raped. The failure of October 7 was much, much greater. Some of the components of pride are similar, including the feeling that the other side was deterred."

You didn't believe in the concept?

"I studied Gaza for ten years. In the First Lebanon War, we wanted a new order, and what? The Iranians and Hezbollah entered there. After the Oslo Accords, we met Arafat's seven brigades. One was called 'al-Quds,' the second 'al-Aqsa,' the third 'Kastel.' I asked what the names meant, and they answered, 'Until we get there, we won't stop fighting.' When I asked General Nasser Youssef why their families remained in Yemen and Iraq, he answered, 'Until you return Ashdod and Sheikh Munis to us – we won't bring them.' They said clear things, and we were somewhere else."

"I was there when the political echelon decided on joint patrols and offices, and they killed us. In 1994, IDF Chief of Staff Ehud Barak was with me when one of our policemen was killed by a Palestinian policeman's fire near the Erez checkpoint. Barak was the prime minister when I presented him with the investigation into the death of an officer killed in Khan Younis by a bomb planted by a Palestinian policeman. Yitzhak Rabin was the one who told Arafat 'fight Hamas' – and nothing happened."

"There's a common denominator of not understanding the Middle East. We stopped listening to what happens beyond the fence and what they talk about in mosques. Yahya Sinwar said 'destruction of the State of Israel,' and they continue to talk about it even today. Who strengthened Hamas? The IDF Chief of Staff? The Attorney General? It's a decision of the Israeli government. You can't boast and say 'the security echelons are subordinate to us' only when convenient."

This issue of taking responsibility pains you?

"It's a terrible breach, the ABC of leadership. I have quite a bit of criticism of Golda Meir, but a month and a half after the Yom Kippur War, she appointed Judge Agranat, and on April 1, 1974, the first report of the state commission of inquiry was already issued. IDF Chief of Staff Dado resigned, and Golda resigned.

"What the current government should have done, two months after October 7, was to announce 'we have failed the greatest failure of the state since its establishment, and therefore, 1 – we are appointing a state commission of inquiry, and 2 – we will soon go to elections and do everything to continue hitting Hamas and returning the hostages and achieving the objectives.' There should have been a different leadership statement."

Some have already taken the heat.

"I look at the IDF Chief of Staff who retired, Hertzi Halevi, who gave all his years, and at Shin Bet head Ronen Bar, who, despite all the failure,s brought successes and targeted eliminations. Did he betray all these years? He fought for the state. Is he free from mistakes? Of course not. There is no one who hasn't sinned. People made mistakes and said, 'I failed.'"

"Let's not forget that a leader's job isn't just to take credit for successes. And it hurts, because who brought intelligence for the targets? Who are the pilots? Those who care, and therefore there's no truth that belongs only to one side. Take Ben-Gurion. In the Declaration of Independence, he didn't want to write the word 'God,' so instead he wrote 'Rock of Israel,' which is supposed to satisfy everyone. We need to find formulas in the style of 'Rock of Israel' about how to continue living here together."

"We haven't missed the train"

Why didn't you go into politics?

"I don't want to be there. I thought I'd dedicate my life to the wounded and disabled, like my son, until I received a phone call asking me to be chairman of the Jewish Agency. I come from a connecting place, trying to fix things. You see, my son Eran had no place in a prayer quorum. Someone in his condition isn't included in the count of ten for a minyan."

"In contrast, in the synagogue we built in the 'ADI Negev - Nahalat Eran' village there can be nine people with severe disabilities, like Eran, and one more who will pray. Is this a religious ruling? No. But that's how it is with me, and I'll also give a moral rationale for it. Who are you praying for – for the strong and healthy? And you are ephemeral, who in a split second could be confined to a wheelchair. And then what? For me, the minyan is for the sick and the weak and the hostages."

And you call on people to come and immigrate to this conflicted place.

"We are in a great crisis, but we'll emerge from it, first of all, thanks to the excellent youth, and thanks to the fighting spirit and unconditional love that Jews who immigrate to Israel have, and millions who live here have. I hear the Religious Zionist people, how much they're pained by the heavy price they paid, and how much it hurts that others aren't willing to share the burden. Where does this come from? From love. Eventually, there will be a coming to senses here. When? I don't know, but I'm convinced we haven't missed the train."

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Israel marks the 50th anniversary of the 1973 war that brought the country to the verge of catastrophic defeat, but the wartime unity that helped it survive seems a distant memory to a generation increasingly at odds with the country they inherited.

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The war began with a surprise attack on two fronts by Syrian tank columns and Egyptian brigades that caught Israeli forces off guard at the start of Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar.

Completely unprepared and with many soldiers on leave, Israel's army buckled initially before regaining the initiative and repelling its enemies in a series of decisive encounters on the northern Golan Heights and in the southern Sinai desert.

"There was terrifying fear, but we had faith that ultimately we would overcome – we had to," said Uzy Zwebner, 69, who was rushed into battle against the Egyptians at the start of the war as a newly trained tank commander, before being wounded.

Video: The Yom Kippur War / Courtesy of the Jerusalem Cinematheque – Israel Film Archive

The 50th anniversary has seen a flurry of newspaper editorials, television documentaries, and features airing criticism of then-Prime Minister Golda Meir and her government for their failure to prepare.

Several of Israel's leaders fought in the war as young men, including conservative Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Labour Party premier Ehud Barak, and their experience helped solidify a determination to do whatever they believed necessary to protect Israel's security from outside enemies.

Increasingly, however, any sense of unity has been eroded in a climate of increasingpolarizationn over the internal dynamics of Israeli society, brought out most clearly this year in the poisonous battle over Netanyahu's plans to overhaul the powers of the judiciary.

The issue has exposed deep divisions between his nationalist-religious supporters and more liberal and secular sections of Israeli society, posing major questions about the constitutional foundations of Israel and its future direction.

Hundreds of thousands have taken to the streets in weekly protests against the changes, which the government says are needed to rein in overmighty liberal judges who encroach into politics, but which critics regard as an assault on Israel's country's democratic foundations.

Among the protesters, large numbers of military reservists have declared they would refuse to attend duty, prompting warnings from the military establishment that the country's security was potentially at risk.

"The ability to manage a dispute is one of the signs of a healthy society, but a dispute that is followed by a deepening of polarization and division in Israeli society is dangerous," the army chief of staff General Herzi Halevi said in a speech last month commemorating the 1973 war.

"Saved the existence of Israel"

Although the war itself induced an immediate sense of national unity, many Israelis also felt a profound shock that the country had been left exposed, fighting for its life as Syrian and Egyptian tanks poured across the battlefield.

Coming a few years after the 1967 war in which Israeli forces defeated their Arab neighbors in less than a week, capturing territories where Palestinians now seek statehood, the cost in lives and the unpreparedness of the country in 1973 sparked recriminations that have continued to this day.

Israeli forces, helped by US airlifts of supplies and equipment, battled numerically superior Syrian and Egyptian formations backed by the Soviet Union before a UN-brokered ceasefire halted the fighting after some three weeks.

Over 2,600 Israelis including Zwebner's brother were killed, the largest loss of life Israel has ever suffered in a single war. On the other side, no exact casualty figures are known but estimates run as high as 15,000 Egyptian and 3,500 Syrian dead.

Five years later, Israel signed a peace deal with Egypt, its first with an Arab country, then with Jordan in 1994, followed in 2020 by normalization agreements with two Gulf states under the Abraham Accords.

For many front-line soldiers, the war remains a traumatic event but the feeling many express five decades later is pride in having helped save their country.

"I had a meeting with my friends this week which really made me emotional, but you feel very much like you saved the existence of Israel," Zwebner said.

For Zwebner, who himself opposed the judicial overhaul, a lesson of the 1973 war was that people had to be prepared to think for themselves rather than blindly accepting what leaders of any kind said.

"I think it's good ultimately so leaders don't think that whatever they do is just taken for granted and that they are allowed to do anything."

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I saw the helicopter from the Syrian commando helicopter twice. The first time was fifty years ago over the Golan Heights, during the first days of the Yom Kippur War. The second time was several months later, flying over Givatayim, not far from my house in Ramat Gan, only this time it was a nightmare that I had me wake up in sweat. I will never be able to forget this. Ever.

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In both cases, I felt that I was being targeted by people who had come to kill me but failed. I survived the war, but did I emerge with PTSD? Perhaps all of us – the cohorts of my generation who took part in the battles in the Sinai and the Golan Heights and came back alive – returned with a mental scar. The wailing sirens that disrupted the holiday of Yom Kippur 1973 caught me off guard, like everyone else. I was with my wife at her parents' house in Tel Aviv.

I had been preparing for my Latin exam in university, as part of the history major. But then everyone had their world turned upside down and we all found ourselves at a different kind of test: A war. But what were we to do? It had barely been a year since I was discharged, and I had not been assigned a unit for my reserve service. I was an artillery officer, but only a first lieutenant in the reserves, so apparently the IDF did see any urgency in placing me in the reserves The overall feeling was that Israel's security was in great shape, and there was even talk of shortening the period of mandatory service. But then, against this false sense of calm, the Egyptians crossed the canal and the Syrians breached the defenses; Mt Hermon was taken by the Syrian commando.

I tossed my Latin book to the side because no one could care less about Julius Caesar and his Gallic Wars. My wife and I quickly got back home to Ramat Gan, by foot. Hundreds of people walked and ran just like us. Inside the Kirya base housing the IDF headquarters and the Ministry of Defense, many cars and uniformed officers were moving. This was war after all. I was glued to the radio to hear the latest updates (which were, in fact, false) on what was unfolding on the front, I kept calling the reserves department in the IDF to get an answer about where I should go. It took them a while.

Eventually, they told me to go to the Pilon base near Rosh Pina. But how does one get there? My wife, who wanted to help me get there fast, called Arkia to see if there was a flight from Tel Aviv to the area. "Lady," they responded, "are you out of your mind? There is war. There are no flights." I arrived at the base by bus and with the help of various drivers realized that anyone they see with a backpack must be hitchhiking because they need to get to the front. Upon arriving, I was glad to see several officers from my service. They were busy getting their battalion – the 313rd Battalion – ready (it later got the number 7035).

I joined them and soon realized that I was in great company, with professional and friendly troops who were determined to do the job. The next day we went to the Golan Heights. The war was raging, but we went up to the plateau despite the incoming fire, the shells falling all around us, and smoke billowing everywhere. There were scorched tanks and vehicles. Occasionally, we could see Israeli Air Force jets flying low and then one of the aircraft being downed with a missile. There were also Syrian planes that were intercepted after being chased by our planes.

Video: The Yom Kippur War / Courtesy of the Jerusalem Cinematheque – Israel Film Archive

This was war 24/7, with no respite. And then I saw the Syrian commando helicopter flying north of where we were. But it was clear it was Syrian. There had already been rumors about what the Syrian commando was doing to the troops on Mount Hermon. Later we learned that on that day the Syrian commando carried out a widescale attack and sent helicopters to target the IDF troops in the rear. This included an attempt to conquer Mount Avital and various ambushes on the roads and intersections on the Golan Heights, as well as raids on various IDF units. The choppers were apparently sent to the IDF troops in the central and northern parts of the Golan.

They failed. Most were eliminated, but some ambushed troops from the 7th Armored Brigade's Reconnaissance Company. In this attack, the company commander was killed. He was promoted to captain posthumously.

During my compulsory service, as part of my officers' training, I was sent with one other artillery officer to get complementary training with the Armored Corps because the IDF wanted to replicate such units among artillery forces. This training was a great experience in which I crisscrossed the country to hone my navigation skills and above all – it was of great benefit socially. These were the salt of the earth, the finest men the IDF had, as they say. Several weeks ago, when reading a story on the war in another outlet, I suddenly saw a picture of one of them. His name was Uri; he fought in the war in the 7th Armored Brigade's Reconnaissance Company and was killed.

Seeing his picture brought back memories from that training especially that of Uri. He was one of the stars of the group – professional, easygoing, and smiled a lot. A natural leader. He was killed while fighting against the Syrian commando, along with many others from his unit. Ultimately, after the IDF sent more troops, the Syrians were mostly eliminated in that battle.

After the war, I did a master's degree in military history. A lot has been written on strategy and tactics; on good and bad leaders; on the art of war and how to win; on intelligence and logistics and on heroes and cowards; and on military leaders and ordinary soldiers. But it turns out that in reality, when you are in battle, you need luck first and foremost. I learned this right at the start of my service in the Artillery Corps, during what was later named the War of Attrition with Egypt.

During the 1969-1970 winter, I served as a deputy commander of a self-propelled artillery unit in the 404th battalion. The battalion was deployed along the Suez Canal. This is the first time I learned what counter-battery fire is. This was a dangerous thing. Our battery would get into possession and fire, and then within minutes, someone from the Egyptian side would retaliate with counterfire, with shells landing between our artillery pieces, forcing them to be relocated time and again.

One morning, as we were setting up our pieces, the commander showed up. He brought a new soldier who had just joined the battle. He told me I was in charge of him. I told him, "It's an honor, welcome." We didn't talk any further, we started firing at the Egyptians. The new soldier stood behind the howitzer and helped carry shells and propellant like everyone else. Then we were hit by counter-battery fire. I can't recall where the shells had fallen, but I do remember that the new soldier, who had just arrived that morning, fell on the sand. He had been hit by shrapnel in his head and sustained severe wounds. He died several days later. His name was Shmuel Hadad. He was the first dead soldier I had seen. I would later go on to see more of the war that erupted three years later. Many more. As noted, one needs to be lucky at war. How awful is it that the soldier who arrived that morning, who no one knew, who didn't have a conversation with anyone from the team, was the one killed in that Egyptian attack? Our commander leader, who started running toward us when the attack began, managed to reach us despite shells falling all over us and knocking him down several times.

Three years later, the battalion joined the fighting on the Golan Heights. As we made our way, we saw scorched IDF tanks, and burned bodies of IDF troops – and the same for the Syrians. We fired heavily on the Syrians as we made our way, as well as on the Iraqi and Jordanian reinforcements. We heard on the radio that we had made "good hits". We fired so much that the barrels were so hot we could not touch them. We kept running out of ammunition really fast, and in one case, when a truck arrived to replenish our supplies, we took the shells directly to the barrel.

Eventually, the Syrians were repelled back. What next? The battalion made it to the Quneitra. We knew that the IDF planned to go into a counter-offensive. We found ourselves spearheading this, just next to the tanks. People often think that artillery stays at the rear, firing shells to hit some targets 10 miles away, while the tanks and infantry are fighting in forward positions. This is not true. Especially not for us. Our mortars had a short range and they were considered to be auxiliary to the armored units.

We were side by side with the tanks, and despite all the chaos, we found some time to talk – about the shock of how the Arabs caught us off guard on both fronts We didn't have real-time data but we wanted to know how this could happen. Where was the intelligence? Where was the government? Where were all the national security figures? How is it that the IDF, who only six years earlier, crushed all the Arab armies, found itself against an Egyptian force that took virtually all the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and repelled our counterattack? How come the Syrians made it almost all the way to Tiberias? How is it that people were talking about the end of the "Third Jewish Commonwealth? "All this was a shock, but above all, it was insulting. It meant that something was not right and that we were paying for that. Our battalion was relatively lucky, as we only had one fatality during the war and about 14 wounded.

Other units were wiped out, including my friend Ofer Neeman, whose battery came under heavy fire at the start of the war from Egyptian Katyushas that hit ammunition vehicles and killed many.

His good friend, Danny, was also from our course. He was severely wounded when he tried to help the casualties and later succumbed to his wounds. He was given the rank of captain posthumously. Another friend, Ilan, was a howitzer battery commander. One of the batteries – not his – was bombarded from the air and soldiers died. The picture of the aftermath, with the damaged 175 mm guns later became one of the iconic images of the war. Ilan and his battery crossed the canal as well under heavy fire.

One of his men was killed; others were wounded. We generally had counter-battery fire and various incidents with MiGs. When we were stationed near Quneitra, we got heavy fire that hit us right within the battery's premises. In one incident, the shrapnel almost killed us but we ducked on time. I had on my hand an Omega Speedmaster that I had received a year earlier as a present. My officer realized what I was wearing, and with his gallows humor said, "Just remember that if something happens to you, I get the watch."

I have not taken that watch off ever since. It is 52 years old. It is manually winded and it still works. Then, in the morning before the attack into Syria, we were hit by MiGs. Unlike the commando helicopter I saw from far away, these MiGs were very close. They flew right in front of us and then turned our way and divebombed us. It was scary – that was the scariest thing. It was a scene taken right out of World War II, as if I was targeted by Stuka bombers, with sirens blasting.

During that raid, one of our soldiers died. During the bombardment, I took cover under a boulder. I just glued myself to the ground and told myself that if I somehow made it back alive, I would have a child. It was just unthinkable, I thought to myself during those moments that will forever be seared in my memory, that I will end my presence in this world at the age of 22. Having grown up on the stories of my uncle – one of the fighters in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising who fought with bravery to his death, I was not going to let some random Syrian bomber take me out.

I was lucky. I wasn't killed. That's how my eldest was born. From what I heard after the war, my comrades had the same experience, as well as many other soldiers. That is how the term "the children of the winter of 1973" was coined. Our children were those born in the fall of 1974.

The battalion eventually advanced well into Syrian territory under heavy fire. In one case, we found ourselves on the highway to Damascus ahead of everyone else: An artillery battalion of heavy mortars that looked like shoe boxes had suddenly become the spearhead of the Israeli onslaught.

From the right, we had incoming Syrian fire. From the left, Israeli fire. In the interludes, we – the officers and the commanders – went to the narrow road on the side and instructed the artillery pieces to turn in various directions using the agreed-upon hand gestures. We eventually made it out of the area safely, but one Syrian unit spotted us and came for us with counter-battery fire. First with artillery rounds, then with Katyushas. I already said that we were lucky. We somehow survived and made it all the way to Syrian villages on the foothills of Mount Hermon. We fired a lot of rounds to help the infantry reconquer the mountain.

And then the ceasefire took effect and the war ended. We were comforted by the fact that we had passed through the deserted positions of the Moroccan auxiliary force that had come to help the Syrians. The troops had left behind great food from abroad: sardines, canned goods, and La Vache qui Rit cheese. We didn't know that this was not the end of our deployment – we stayed in the reserve call-up for another four months straight then went on leave for a month only to be redeployed for another two months. We didn't know that we would have to endure one of the coldest winters, with the artillery being covered with snow.

The continued deployment gave us more time to figure out what had happened. We didn't know that there would be an attrition war with the Syrians just after the war ended. We didn't know that we would have to spend Passover Eve on high alert because someone assessed that the Syrians might resume hostilities. They didn't, but by that time the true casualty figures had emerged: more than 2600 Israeli dead. We already knew who among our friends died, and who was wounded. Practically every street had a resident who had been killed or maimed. We knew that militarily Israel had won: The IDF had reached the 101st km from Cairo; the IDF's artillery had advanced to the point that its guns could threaten Damascus. We won, but the pain was unbearable. What had just happened? w

There was little credible information to rely on. Rumors were circulating about Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Prime Minister Golda Meir, about IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar, and the head of the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate Eli Zeira. Just after the war, the book "The Shortcoming" came out, written by several journalists. It was a big hit, as it was the first time that an answer had been given. The Hebrew title for the book – "Mehdal" – suddenly became an official word that everyone knew; part of our collective historical lexicon. And then the Agranat Commission investigated the war. While its findings were addressed at the military echelon, it also sealed the fate of Meir and Dayan's term in office, and the government resigned. It took another three years before Israelis decided to punish the Left with the 1977 electoral upset that brought Menachem Begin to power.

There were many reasons for the Right's rise, but the war was the main one. Israeli voters had realized that they could no longer trust anyone, except the fighters. As the years went by, more information came to light; the minutes from the meetings were published and even the picture of the spy that Israel had within Egyptian ranks had become known. All this makes the anger even greater. How could the leaders ignore the obvious signs? How come they were so wedded to their paradigm and had us forsaken?

While the conduct during the actual fighting was better, the actual shortcomings of the leadership before the war could not be forgiven, even as more information came to light on the "mehdal." The passage of time only shows how much worse it was than originally thought. What does all this tell us 50 years later? Somehow, during my military service, I discovered Mahler's symphonies. I went to war with Mahler's Symphony No. 2, known as "The Resurrection Symphony." it takes time for a young man to realize that despite Judgement Day being a key theme of that piece, its ending is a good omen: after Judgment Day, people come to life with a big victory. Yes, it was tough, and perhaps a bit cliche. But we proved ourselves.

Israel was attacked and it appeared to be on the verge of annihilation. We went to war to fight for our lives, our families, our wives, our children, and our friends. We heard the song Lu Yehi (Naomi Shemer's "Let it be") and we wished for the best. So, what did we have? I have written on the war and my experience over the years. Some of what I wrote here has already been published in previous anniversaries. I didn't think I had much more to write, but 50 years is indeed a big milestone. The war changed everyone's lives. It will stay with us. Al l the IDF troops, in all the wars and operations and routine security duty should be honored. But what should the Yom Kippur War get?

In the US, I have noticed a common tradition. When people see someone in uniform or with a shirt saying "veteran," they extend their hand and tell them "Thank you for your service." He usually responds, "Thank you for your support." This is mostly what I think the Yom Kippur veterans deserve, on top of the support for the bereaved families, the injured, and those suffering from PTSD. They earned the right not to be forgotten; even after 50 years we must not forget to say one word to those who were there: "Thank you."

Amos Regev is the founding chief editor of Israel Hayom. He fought in three wars: The Attrition War, the Yom Kippur War, and the First Lebanon War (Operation Peace for the Galilee).

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At first glance, a review of American-Israeli relations during the traumatic days and weeks that befell Israel following the surprise attack of October 6, 1973, reveals a beam of light shining in the darkness alongside a distilled expression of the resilience and strength of the alliance between Washington and Jerusalem.

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In the face of the existential challenge that Golda Meir's government was suddenly faced with, it was Nixon's government that provided her with significant military support in the form of the Operation Nickel Grass airlift, and a diplomatic security network in the face of the Egyptian and Syrian assault and the Kremlin's escalating threats.

Video: Biden speaks on America's commitment to Israel's security / Credit: Reuters

However, after 50 years, a deeper look at relations between the countries after the tectonic shock that Israel received on 6^th October 1973, reveals a far more complex and antagonistic picture. The key to understanding this picture can be found in the appointment, on 22 August 1973, of Henry Kissinger to the role of secretary of state following the resignation of William Rogers, in addition to his role as national security adviser.

And indeed, it was the new secretary of state and national security adviser, Kissinger, who led the diplomatic efforts during the war and following its conclusion, with the aim of excluding the Soviet Union (who led a hostile, nationalist, and - during the War of Attrition – even aggressive line towards Israel) from any involvement in the region. The main significance of this appointment, especially after the outbreak of fighting, was the entry of a new secretary (who, apart from Black September in 1970, had until then avoided getting involved too closely with the Arab-Israeli conflict) who was now focusing on the Middle East with all his prestige, status, and power. The fact that President Nixon was then up to his neck in the Watergate scandal allowed Kissinger wide margins of maneuver and freedom of action, almost totally free of any presidential or congressional constraints.

In this way, in one fell swoop, the new secretary became the exclusive architect of American strategy. The dramatic events that took place on Yom Kippur were for him a catalyst for the practical implementation of his political, global, and regional worldviews.

During Nixon's first presidency, and at the beginning of his second presidency, as mentioned, Kissinger the adviser was careful not to get too close to the polarized Middle Eastern arena. This approach was anchored in the assumption that the asymmetrical situation that had been formed in the arena following Israel's stirring victory in the Six-Day War prevented from the outset any diplomatic initiatives based on mutual concessions and compromises.

However, in Kissinger's view, a new situation arose following the great explosion of October 6. This is because he believed that a new window of opportunity had been opened to create a completely different regional and global balance of power.

One must remember that the inter-superpower context played a central role in Kissinger's order of priorities. He strove to prevent any attempted takeover by the Soviet Union in any arena, both via the stick of deterrence and the carrot of economic temptation. In the Middle East, after Anwar Sadat became Egyptian president on  October 15, 1970, he broadcast signals and took steps that made it clear he intended to disengage from Moscow and move closer to the United States. In this way, he consolidated the infrastructure for producing a new and more conciliatory era between Cairo and Washington.

Striving for a balanced finale  

After his appointment as secretary of state and the outbreak of war, for Kissinger, the conditions were right to completely fulfill his vision. Against this background, one can understand the reasons for the steps that were taken during the war, and which nurtured unavoidable friction with the threatened Israeli partner. At the heart of this policy was Kissinger's aspiration to bring an end to the conflict in as balanced a way as possible, and without Egypt ending it was defeated and insulted like in 1967.

This strategic balance, he believed, would prevent a horrific scenario in which Cairo would revert to the era of extreme, Nasserite anti-Western radicalism. It would facilitate a symmetrical end to the fighting that Sadat would be able to market as a strategic victory (with exclusive American mediation), opening a diplomatic front that would lead to a gradual advance towards a settlement, while pushing the Soviet Union to the margins.

Heavy pressure on Jerusalem

In the years prior to the outbreak of war and during it, President Sadat didn't hide his intention of abandoning Moscow's patronage (despite its military support and the airlift that it operated for Egypt after the war began), and the secretary of state had no choice but to establish his position vis-à-vis Egypt. At its foundation was a policy that was consolidated to prove to the Egyptian president that only Kissinger could grant the Land of Pharaohs the necessary incentive to advance his preferred strategy – the establishment and fostering of relations between Washington and Cairo.

In this lies the roots of the crisis, which began to cloud American-Israeli relations while the artillery blasts could still be heard in the background, and reached its peak in the spring of 1975 when Kissinger revealed his (and President Gerald Ford's) "reassessment" and national policy to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and his government. Specifically, the meaning of this incentive was to demonstrate America's ability to apply effective pressure on Israel and to force it to make real concessions after the revolution on the battlefield.

For example, during the final days of fighting, when Kissinger was determined to prevent Israel from achieving a dramatic and crushing resolution on the Egyptian front and prove to Sadat his ability to force his will on Israel, the secretary of state placed heavy pressure on the Meir government. His goal was to ensure that her forces ended their encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army, which was besieged on the east bank of the Suez Canal. The surrender of the large Egyptian forces would clearly illustrate the extent of the Egyptian defeat, and in doing so would prevent efforts to turn the war into a lever for Israeli-Egyptian negotiations mediated and directed by the American patron. Indeed, following this pressure, which found expression, among other things, in the explicit threat – attributed to the president himself - "to disengage from Israel," the Israeli government surrendered and decided to end the siege.

The timing of the ceasefire agreement, which was achieved on October 22, 1973, was also intended to prevent the IDF, which had great momentum, from utilizing its military advantage in the face of the apparent defeat of the Egyptians. This was so Kissinger could preserve - at any price - the status and prestige of the Egyptian president, Sadat, for whom the pendulum of battle was now tipped against him.

Saving for a rainy day

The essence of Kissinger's strategy was seen in the strategic airlift Operation Nickel Grass, which began on 14^th October and continued until November 12^th. Paradoxically, although this operation was burned into the Israeli public's consciousness as a daring move and brave support for its Israeli partner during its fateful hour of need, in practice the picture was far more complicated. Not only did the operation start more than a week after the Egyptian-Syrian attack, but the weapons were inspected and included far less than Israel had requested. By the next day, it had become clear that Washington's intention was to provide Israel with a total replacement of the weapons systems that were damaged in battle, but without changing the overall balance of forces on the Egyptian front.

Kissinger worried that agreeing to Israeli demands for massive and even more far-reaching assistance would perpetuate an asymmetrical and frozen political situation and would also frustrate the rapprochement of Egypt and the United States. The American patron was also convinced that Israel wanted to store at least some of the weapons in a warehouse for a rainy day, without committing to the apparent reality on the battlefield. As a result, there were soon mutual grudges and suspicion between Jerusalem and Washington, which reached their peak with the "new assessment" that Kissinger initiated in the spring of 1975.

A word about the architect's own operating code: There's no doubt that the portrait of Kissinger that arises from his strategy during the war was of a skilled and sophisticated diplomat who succeeded in quickly identifying – in the middle of a complex and chaotic arena – the opportunities created by the great explosion of 6^th October for the United States, particularly with regards to Egypt, and moved steadily forward to advance them. This, while constantly striving to identify a balancing point between contradictory goals, like the goal of rapprochement with Egypt without undermining the basic principles of the alliance with Israel. The fact that, despite this sophistication, Kissinger didn't succeed in making peace between the two countries (despite creating the infrastructure for this to happen) is another story that is worthy of a separate discussion.

Professor Abraham Ben-Zvi and Dr. Gadi Warsha's upcoming book, published by Lamda-The Open University Press, is called "Knock of every door: Israel's foreign policy 1948-2018" (Hebrew).

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Guy Nattiv does not really have time to speak with me. Four years after the globally successful Israeli director won an Oscar for the English short film "Skin" (and released his first Hollywood feature film, also called "Skin"), he is once again about to enter the eye of the storm.

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In a few days, Nattiv will leave his home in Los Angeles, the city in which he and his family have been living for the past decade, and go on a busy and intensive PR tour of the United States' East Coast to promote his new and highly anticipated international movie - "Golda", a biographic war drama starring the legendary actor, Helen Mirren, following Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir during the dreadful days of the Yom Kippur War.

But before he leaves, he needs to finish the sound work on his next and very intriguing film, "Tatami," which he co-created with two Iranian partners and is about to have its world premiere at the upcoming Venice International Film Festival.

"It's quite a crazy time," he tells me over the phone as he makes his way to the soundstage at Sony Studios, where his sound technicians are waiting for him so that they can do some final touchups on "Tatami." "Not only is 'Golda' coming out now in Israel and Europe, but next week it's also being released in 1200 theatres all over the United States – which is completely insane when you consider the fact that we are living in an era where almost all the movies that are not big box office hits go straight to streaming.

Video: The trailer to Golda

"But due to the actors' and writers' strike that has been paralyzing Hollywood for the past few months – all the PR is on me. Understand: there is no Helen or anybody else. So, I am going to eight different states alone.  It's my first time doing something like this, but I do not have a choice. I must do everything possible."

As for the timing of "Golda's" release in Israel, Nattiv actually believes the film "could not have come out at a better time," and not just because this coming Yom Kippur marks 50 years since the war.

"There is no doubt that there is a resemblance between 1973 and today," he says. "It is more than a resemblance. Fifty years after the failure of 1973, we are once again seeing a disturbing spectacle of a detached government ignoring the warnings it is being given. The commander of the Israeli Air Force says, 'We are in danger.' And Bibi and his partners completely ignore this whole thing and continue to charge like a bunch of crazies toward a revolution that will bring disaster upon us. This is far greater than the Yom Kippur failure. The one who will be held accountable for this at the end of the day is the Prime Minister. Who knows what will happen in a few months? It's frightening to think about."

"I wanted to film in black and white"

"Golda," which had its world premiere at the Berlin International Film Festival (and opened the Jerusalem Film Festival last month), is one of the only narrative films to date that depict the trauma of the Yom Kippur War.

The script, written by British producer and writer Nicolas Martin ("Florence Foster Jenkins"), takes viewers back to the events of October 1973, focusing on Golda during those fateful days when it seemed that the IDF was facing a crushing defeat at the hands of the Egyptian and Syrian armies.

"Due to the actors' and writers' strike that has been paralyzing Hollywood for the past few months – all the PR is on me. Understand: there is no Helen or anybody else. So, I am going to eight different states alone. It's my first time doing something like this, but I do not have a choice. I must do everything possible."

The film also paints an intimate and deeply human portrait of the first and only woman (so far) to serve as Prime Minister in Israel. It presents parts of her testimony at the Agranat Commission that was established to investigate the war's failures, shows her receiving secret radiation treatments to combat the leukemia she was suffering from at the time, and lingers on her unique relationship with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

This film is impressive in every aspect. Helen Mirren delivers an outstanding performance and fully embodies Golda's character. The directing is accurate and devoid of unnecessary embellishments, and the sound work stands out for its effectiveness. With the constant presence of clouds of cigarette smoke (back then, apparently, everyone was a chain smoker, especially Golda), Nattiv succeeds in creating a suffocating, oppressive, claustrophobic, and nerve-wracking atmosphere.

The Israeli supporting actors surrounding Mirren – including Rami Heuberger in a chilling appearance as Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Lior Ashkenazi as IDF Chief of Staff David ("Dado") Elazar, Dvir Benedek as head of the Military Intelligence Directorate Eli Zeira, and Rotem Keinan as Mossad director Tzvi Zamir – all do a fantastic job.

Secretary of State Kissinger is portrayed by the Jewish-American supporting actor Liev Schreiber ("Ray Donovan"), and the high-quality cast is complemented by French actress Camille Cottin (from the popular series "Call My Agent!") playing Golda's personal assistant and confidante, Lou Keidar.

"Golda" began its journey on the Amazon streaming platform long before the COVID pandemic.  Interestingly, the one who was in the advanced stages of negotiations to direct it before it was decided to entrust the reins to Nattiv was none other than Barbara Streisand.

"Barbara was friendly with Golda, and there is a YouTube video of her interviewing her affectionately," explains Nattiv. "Originally, it was a very different film. When I first joined the project, it already had a script, and there were other directors I had to compete with for the role. But it was also supposed to be an enormous war epic—an incredible three-hour saga. There were battle scenes with exploding tanks in the style of "Saving Private Ryan," and the budget was something like USD 70 million. In fact, even then, they spoke with Helen Mirren because Golda's grandson, Gidi Meir, said that she reminded him of his grandmother. But Golda was a much smaller part of the story."

"In the original version, the characters in 'Golda' spoke in a kind of 'British' manner, like in 'The Crown.' It was not believable and not authentic. I told the producers that I needed to get into the depths of the script and change it, put the war inside smoke-filled rooms and hallways. They loved the idea."

After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the project left the Amazon platform, moved to the hands of independent producers, and experienced a noticeable budget cut. Meanwhile, to Nattiv's delight, the discussions with Streisand did not materialize, and another competitor for the role, director James Gray, decided to pivot and make a science fiction film with Brad Pitt instead.

But surprisingly, before Nattiv chose to accept the role, he chose to present some rather strict conditions for the producers.

"I said to them: 'Listen, I cannot do this movie without delving into the depths of the script and changing it.' Initially, it was a very inflated script, and all the characters spoke in a kind of 'British' manner, like in 'The Crown.' It wasn't believable, and it wasn't authentic. I wanted to incorporate dialogues from the official protocols of the war, and I wanted to focus on Golda."

"The idea was to make a character piece, to really get under her skin. I told the producers: 'Let's bring the war into smoke-filled rooms, bunkers and hallways. Let's get rid of all the battle scenes and just use the real sound of what happened there.' And they liked this idea.

"Besides that, I had three more conditions: Israeli actors would portray Golda's military entourage, the film would be in Hebrew, and it would be in black and white."

Q: Are you serious? Where did you get the courage to make these demands? Were you not worried they would tell you, "Okay, bye," and simply move on to the next person on the list of candidates?

"On some level, maybe I wanted them to tell me 'No' so that I could tell myself, 'This is not my movie, this is not my journey.' Because under no circumstances was I willing to make a propaganda film like 'Exodus.' I did not want the film to have 'romantic fluff.' I wanted to do a more personal and less national film. I wanted to present Golda to the audience from a different place, a place we do not know. So, I piled up difficulties for the producers to see how open they would be to my ideas.

"They did not agree to do the movie in black and white, and in the end, we decided not to do it in Hebrew either. But they did agree to other things. We cast Israeli actors, for example, and in the deal I made with them, they did give me the right to veto, which is super rare. The second I had this right to veto, I felt much more protected and secure. I felt like they really wanted my authentic Israeli voice. I was very happy that they had to courage to go to a darker and less flattering place and do a film that does not try to suck up to the audience."

Makeup and sacks on her legs

Despite the widespread agreements Nattiv reached with the producers, he had one more hurdle to jump through before he officially got the job: he needed the approval of the lead actress, Mirren – something that didn't turn out to be a significant problem.

"Helen simply came to my home in the middle of the pandemic, wearing flip flops and with her hair up," Nattiv recounts his first meeting with the iconic actress. "We sat and talked for three hours and had an incredible connection. She's one of the cinema legends, no doubt. On the level of Meryl Streep, in my opinion. A woman without an ego. She speaks to you at eye level, without pretenses or a chauffeur or anything like that. Yet, you can sense how strong she is. There is something very British and regal about her. I was very impressed with her readiness and openness. She said to me: 'Listen, I'm not an Israeli. So, I'm counting on you to lead me.'"

Q: How much did the script change after you joined as the director?

"As I mentioned, it was an entirely different film before I joined. If you read the previous script, you will be shocked. There is no similarity whatsoever. Nicolas Martin's original idea was to make a war movie par excellence. But that did not interest me much. For example, Golda's battle with cancer was not in the original script. The walk through the hospital's morgue was not in the original script. Even the scenes from the Agranat Commission were not in the original script."

"Helen came to my home in the middle of the pandemic, wearing flip-flops and her hair up. We sat and talked for hours, and we had an incredible connection. She is a woman without an ego. She speaks to you at eye level, without pretenses or a chauffeur. Yet, you can sense how strong she is. There is something regal about her."

Q: What was Mirren's familiarity with Golda and the story of the war?

"Helen was very eager to portray this character. She has a warm relationship with Israel and Israelis and amazing memories of Israel. She toured Israel from north to south with her Jewish British boyfriend after the Six-Day War. She volunteered in a kibbutz and worked in fruit picking. Even during our most difficult times, she always stood with us.

"She read books on Golda and did research, and after reading the new script, she told me that although she does not understand everything, she is very glad we are abandoning the war scenes and are instead focusing on Golda and her pain. Slowly, while working, she was exposed to more layers of the character's personality. She told me from the beginning: 'Do you realize we are entering a minefield, a highly controversial place?' I told her that I do, and she said: 'If you are ready, then so am I.'"

Q: Her performance in the film is so incredible that while watching it, there were several times I almost forgot it was her. What was it like to see her in full makeup as Golda for the first time?

"It was absolutely bizarre. It took us two weeks to get the right look in terms of makeup and prosthetics because Helen wanted it to be clear that it was her, that it was 'her Golda,' and it took time to achieve that exact balance. But from the moment we started filming, I no longer saw Helen. I only saw Golda. Every day, she was in the makeup trailer for three and a half hours – from 4:00 to 7:30 in the morning – and left it as Golda. She ate lunch with us as Golda. She went to the restroom as Golda. She took a nap as Golda.

"She walked around with these sorts of sacks on her legs because Golda had swollen legs. She wore a fat suit on her body. She enveloped herself in Golda and never took her off. Understand we are talking about a 78-year-old woman. We all get up at 7:00 in the morning, and she wakes up every day at 4:00! You would not hear a peep of complaint out of her. Nothing."

Q: What did you learn from working with her?

"A lot. First and foremost, seeing her work is incredible. Lior Ashkenazi came to me and said that what she does is like a school for acting. Her nuances, the way she moves, how she gets into character, the way she speaks – everything is so precise. Just wow.

"She taught me behavioral codes, and I was exposed to a level of professionalism I have never known. She has a saying she tells everyone: 'Don't be an ass, and be on time.' That is her motto. Very simple. Another thing I learned from her is power naps. She has a habit of taking an hour-long power nap at noon to reset herself. This is something I adopted. It is so right to shut everything down in the middle of the day. Without shame, without feeling like you are doing something wrong. And boom – you wake up like new and function much better."

"There is no doubt that there is a resemblance between 1973 and today. Fifty years after the failure of the Yom Kippur War, we are once again witnessing a disturbing display of a detached government ignoring the warnings it is being given. On the other hand, in 1973 – Golda resigned. Can you imagine a Prime Minister today resigning due to a failure?"

But not everyone supported the casting of Mirren, a non-Jewish actress, for the role of Golda. Some even accused the film's production of "Jewface" – a derogatory term coined by Jewish-American comedian Sarah Silverman, referring to cases where a non-Jewish actor portrays a Jewish character.

In an interview that made headlines online last year, British-Jewish comedian and theatre actress Maureen Lipman said that Mirren's casting was inappropriate because Golda's Jewishness is an inseparable part of her identity. "Ben Kingsley will never be allowed to play Nelson Mandela," she added.

"All the headlines following Lipman's comments were published while we were in the midst of filming," Nattiv recalls. "There is no doubt that they were very surprising and disappointing. Personally, I do not think Lipman's arguments have any teeth to them, but I do believe that this discussion on casting, in general, is good. Today, for example, Tom Hanks would probably not be cast as Forrest Gump. They would try to cast an actor with disabilities.

"However, this pendulum is taking things to the extreme, to the point that it is beginning to harm the art of acting. Because what will really happen if only a Jewish actor can portray a Jewish character? Does it mean that tomorrow, a Jewish character will not be able to portray a non-Jewish character? This debate creates a very dangerous situation. On the one hand, it cannot be ignored or silenced. But on the other hand, when I first met Helen, I saw Golda before my eyes.

"Helen also said: 'Listen, if I do not do a good job, I will be able to understand the criticism.' But she is doing an excellent job. She is the most Golda one can be. So, apparently, you cannot please everyone."

"It was very surprising and disappointing to hear the criticism against Helen Mirren's portrayal of a Jewish character. This debate is taking things to a very extreme and dangerous place. Because if only a Jew can portray a Jewish character, does that mean that tomorrow a Jew will not be able to play a non-Jewish character?"

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Israel on Sunday declassified a sizable cache of documents and images from the 1973 Yom Kippur War, a conflict whose 50th anniversary falls later this year. Some of the revelations offer insight into intelligence failings that made the conflict one of the most painful episodes in the state's history.

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The comprehensive new site, created by the Defense Ministry, features some 15,000 photos, 6,000 documents, 215 films, 170 maps and 40 tape recordings.

The attack on the Israeli-held Golan Heights and Sinai peninsula by the Syrian and Egyptian militaries on October 6, 1973, famously came as a nasty surprise to Israel's top intelligence and military brass. The entire state apparatus was seized with a nearly fatal complacency that ended the glittering political careers of Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. Israel neutralized the two invading forces after nearly three weeks, at great cost.

The ministry said in a statement that the site "was established to tell the story of a generation, to immortalize the bravery of the fighters, and offer an official platform for passing down the war's legacy to future generations."

One of the documents featured on the website is an infamous intelligence file marked with the serial number 433. Circulated an hour and a half before the war's outbreak, it said that intelligence had "recognized signals" that Egypt and Syria were planning "to a initiate war in the near future."

Fatally, the authors refused to credit the possibility that a decision to launch the war had already been made, writing that Egypt and Syria were "aware that there is no chance of succeeding in a war." The newly opened archives show that hours before this misleading brief was fired off military intelligence received concrete warnings that the invasion was impending.

This article was first published by i24NEWS.

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A special ceremony was held Sunday to commemorate the 48th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War. Officials and bereaved families gathered at Jerusalem's Mount Herzl to remember the victims of one of the nation's deadliest wars.

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"Something within us changed 48 years ago," Prime Minister Naftali Bennett said in his address. "The Yom Kippur War proved how dangerous complacency and arrogance can be. It taught us a lesson in humility, but also the importance of being prepared and organized.

"The heavy toll of the war was unbearable … But what many perceived as a failure, I see as a victory, for the difficult challenge of losing one's lofty status, but gaining victory nevertheless, both on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts, is remarkable."

Bennett also referred to the capture of the last two of the six Palestinian fugitives that occurred earlier in the day. "The escape itself reflected a serious intelligence, operational and systematic problem," he said, but praised how the forces mobilized and came together quickly to apprehend the escapees.

President Isaac Herzog also gave an address at the ceremony.

"The Yom Kippur war was a national event that taught us about inflexibility and arrogance. We must do our utmost so that a surprise like that does not happen again – we must always be prepared for war as well as never miss an opportunity for peace.

"Besides being vigilant, politically and security-wise, we must also learn the lessons on an internal level, within Israel, of unity and national resilience. We must stand up to polarization and rifts in Israeli society. To unite, come together, make connections and prevents division – that is the best and only way to deal with internal and external threats."

Addressing the bereaved families, Defense Minister Benny Gantz said: "Every day you remember their last sentences, etched in your heart, the hug, the last meeting. We must remember the fallen, and remind ourselves that the responsibility to make sure their deaths were not in vain rests on us."

"We owe the fallen our existence today, in a prosperous and strong country. It has been 48 years, but the pain continues and we miss them no less. These were Israelis from across the country who came together on the holy day to stand up to the enemy. The victory came about, first and foremost, thanks to the commanders and the soldiers on the battlefield."

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Forty-eight years after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, never-before-seen images of the IDF's 8200 intelligence unit at work during the fighting in the Sinai Peninsula have been made public.

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IDF forces were battling to stop the Egyptian army's advance. Israel suffered heavy casualties.

They received help from the 8200 personnel stationed at Babylon Base, located 40 km. (25 miles) from the Suez Canal. The unit was charged with listening in on the Egyptian military, locating anti-aircraft radars.

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The 8200 base operated around the clock to provide rapid, high-quality intelligence for Israel as the fighting continued. The technology was cutting-edge for its time, and Israel did not want to reveal its qualitative edge. For decades, the images now being published were classified.

The pictures show a team of wireless operators who were fluent in Arabic and had been briefed on how to tune in and analyze Egyptian military communications. The base also recorded reports which were transferred to the IDF's Southern Command.

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