In parallel, professional teams from both countries are working to establish clear, mutually agreed criteria defining what would constitute the practical disarmament of Hamas.

Israeli officials are concerned that Hamas will seek to retain most of the weapons and military capabilities currently in its possession. Both Israel and the US agree that such a scenario would be unacceptable.

It was also agreed that Hamas' disarmament and the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip would include the destruction of the its underground tunnel network.

If Hamas does not disarm, as is widely expected in Israel, responsibility for the next steps would revert to Israel and the Israel Defense Forces.

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This dynamic, which is fairly amusing when viewed honestly, repeats itself ahead of every meeting between Trump and Netanyahu. To the disappointment of the prime minister's critics, it becomes clear time and again that Trump is fully committed to Israel's security and needs, and does not take a single step or adopt any position that harms them. He also holds a nationalist, hawkish and conservative worldview that closely resembles that of most of the Israeli public, and certainly that of the right-wing camp. That, too, serves Israel well.

Moreover, Trump is a great admirer of Israel's prime minister. One can love Netanyahu or despise him, but the president is clearly and firmly in the camp of his supporters. Having declared early on that he rejects "political correctness," Trump makes no effort to conceal whom he likes and whom he loathes. He openly favors figures such as Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and openly despises Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Emmanuel Macron. Netanyahu belongs squarely in the first group. Even when Trump criticizes him with remarks such as "he's tough" or "he can be difficult at times," these are effectively compliments, both in Trump's own eyes and in the eyes of much of the Israeli public.

There was indeed a low point in the early months of the war. Netanyahu and Israel, and Trump does not distinguish between the two, were then perceived by him as losers. The horrific failure of October 7 was compounded by personal grievances Trump harbored toward Netanyahu following his loss to Joe Biden in the 2020 election. Yet Netanyahu, with political savvy, knew how to repair the relationship when he met Trump at Mar-a-Lago in June 2024.

What followed were the pager operation and the collapse of the Iranian axis, developments that once again boosted the standing of the Jewish state and its leader. Upon Trump's return to office, Netanyahu paid a heavy political price to enable the second hostage deal, thereby securing Trump's full favor as the returning president. Operation Rising Lion then followed, and afterward the agreement that ended the war. All of these, in Trump's view, were major achievements, which he credits to Netanyahu.

From his standpoint, the alliance with Israel's prime minister is strong, reliable and productive. Hence the warm personal embrace of Netanyahu. Hence the praise. Hence also the call for a pardon, which carries political weight in Israel no less than legal significance.

Trump wants Netanyahu to win Israel's upcoming elections and is working toward that goal with full force. This stands in contrast to presidents Biden, Obama and Clinton, who openly acted in favor of his rivals. It is worth noting that Trump himself was far more neutral during the series of election campaigns held in Israel between 2019 and 2021. This time, he is taking a side, and doing so unequivocally.

Is all this good for Israelis or not? The Israeli public will provide the answer in the 2026 elections.

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Officials briefed on Netanyahu's thinking told Israel Hayom that in several respects he views the situation in Gaza as a bigger problem for the Americans than for Israel, particularly given the lack of urgency, in his view, to rehabilitate the enclave.

This stance runs counter to the approach of Trump's close advisers, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, who are pushing to move quickly on Gaza's reconstruction.

As part of those efforts, Israel agreed to their request to conduct a "pilot" project establishing a neighborhood of temporary caravan housing for Gazan residents in Tel Sultan, intended to demonstrate what life could look like outside the control of Hamas. Netanyahu, however, insists that full-scale reconstruction of Gaza will not begin until Hamas is dismantled, disarmed and the strip demilitarized, as stipulated in the Trump plan.

Netanyahu is also expected to ask the president, during their meeting later today (Monday), the sixth between them in 2025, to publicly reaffirm his commitment to the return of the body of the last hostage in Gaza, Ran Gvili.

Throughout the war, the prime minister repeatedly pledged to achieve "total victory," defined as dismantling both the military and civilian infrastructure of the Hamas terrorist organization. Those objectives were set by the cabinet immediately after the Oct. 7 massacre. However, they have not been achieved, and responsibility for Gaza's situation has now shifted to the US, as laid out in the Trump plan and a UN Security Council decision.

Difficulty in achieving the objective

Under the plan, an International Stabilization Force is supposed to disarm Hamas. The US has struggled to assemble such a force, leaving it unclear how this goal can be met. At the same time, a source familiar with the details said Turkey and Qatar are pressing Trump to demand that Israel move the so-called yellow line eastward, effectively reducing Israel's hold in Gaza. Netanyahu has rejected the demand, as has the IDF chief of staff, who also opposes it.

In the original American planning, the expectation was that six months would be needed to design Gaza's future and another six months to implement it. That timetable is already significantly behind schedule, and given the many obstacles, it is unclear how progress can be made. Israel has no interest in rebuilding Gaza under the current conditions, while the Americans are presently unable to deliver on the commitment to demilitarize the strip.

In Netanyahu's view, this deadlock poses a greater problem for the US administration than for Israel. The Israel Defense Forces continue to serve as a buffer between what remains of Hamas rule in Gaza and the communities of the western Negev, and Hamas' capabilities are severely limited compared with their prewar strength. Netanyahu is not satisfied with this outcome, in part because he has pledged dozens of times to eliminate Hamas. Yet under the current circumstances, it is hard to see how that objective can be achieved, at least in the coming year, which is an election year in both Israel and the US.

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Only four years younger than New York City's newly elected mayor, Fishback, 30, has just entered his fourth decade of life. Much like Mamdani, he has not been particularly successful in his career so far.

The investment firm Greenlight Capital, where he worked for three years, intended to fire him for "insufficient productivity." To get ahead of the move, he resigned and sued his employers in various legal claims. The company responded by accusing him of lying, and the countersuit it filed forced him to withdraw.

Earlier still, Fishback dropped out of international economics studies at Georgetown University at the height of his studies, without completing a degree. At the same time, he established his own investment fund as well as a training workshop for debate participants. In this field, the young Republican does appear to have some talent, as he knows how to deliver an argument effectively. The problem is that when it comes to Israel, these are precisely the wrong messages.

Florida's next gubernatorial election is scheduled for November 2026. The current governor, Ron DeSantis, has transformed the state from struggling to prosperous, and from a swing state into a solid Republican stronghold. In practical terms, the candidate who wins the Republican primary is almost certain to become the next governor. One of DeSantis' most prominent policy positions has been, and remains, unwavering support for Israel.

Enter Fishback, who until recently was virtually unknown, declaring himself a candidate in the Republican primaries and the "heir to DeSantis as Florida's Republican governor."

To win, however, Fishback needs attention. That is because he is facing a rival whom Trump has already anointed for the job, Congressman Byron Donalds. Donalds is a veteran and well known politician. Fishback, by contrast, emerged out of nowhere, Mamdani style. His method, therefore, mirrors that of his counterpart in the Big Apple: adopting a populist and extreme line, with a focus on the cost of living, the number one issue in US public opinion.

The first victim he identified along the way was, unsurprisingly, Israel. Last Friday, Fishback posted a pledge to "pull all Florida investments out of Israel's bonds on my first day in office. Over the past two years, Florida sent $385 million to the Israeli government through bond purchases on the open market. That money should have been invested in our communities," he wrote, in language designed to inflame voters unfamiliar with the details.

These claims are, of course, fake news. Florida's investment was made on professional financial grounds. In any case, a state law prohibits boycotts of Israel, meaning such a move would not pass. Even so, Fishback's post on X alone garnered 36,000 likes and two million views. By comparison, almost every other post he publishes struggles to reach even 1,000 likes. This was not his only anti Israel outburst. Fishback has also praised, among others, supporters of neo Nazi figure Nick Fuentes.

At present, Fishback enjoys virtually no support in internal Republican polling. However, there are still many months to go before the election. Moreover, primaries tend to be more surprising and more extreme than general elections. Either way, what should concern Israel is the audacity to float such a hostile proposal in one of the most pro Israel states in the US. This is further evidence of the strengthening negative trends within the party that has served as an anchor of support for Israel for decades, and of the speed with which this trend is spreading.

Netanyahu is the architect of the alliance between Israel and the Republican Party. In his conversation with the president, he must address the need to stop a phenomenon that, at the end of the road, endangers US support for Israel.

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The divide pits Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner against Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who has the support of Secretary of War Pete Hegseth.

Witkoff and Kushner, who are effectively managing the contacts on behalf of the president, are pushing for rapid progress on all fronts, including progression to Phase 2 and compelling Israel to reopen the Rafah crossing while preparing for the second withdrawal. According to these sources, they have pursued workarounds to Hamas disarmament requirements, potentially considerably extending the timeline.

Rubio, who leads the department that historically pressured Israel toward concessions during Democratic administrations, has adopted the opposite approach. According to the sources, his positions emphasize caution and adherence to Trump's 20-point framework. Specifically, he insists on stripping Hamas of weaponry and transferring governance authority before any complete Israeli pullback.

Rubio has also exercised restraint on the Turkish question (Turkey's role in regional security frameworks), endorsing Israel's position against incorporating Turkish forces into the International Security Force (the multinational contingent envisioned for Gaza). Hegseth, who receives intelligence from Central Command chief Brad Cooper and the Kiryat Gat Civil-Military Coordination Center, recognizes Hamas violations, aid theft, and the necessity of maintaining IDF presence in the Strip. The Palestinian Authority's involvement in weapons collection and future Gaza Strip governance represents another unresolved dispute.

The Iranian challenge

Regarding Iran, the Defense Department and Hegseth validate intelligence Israel provides about reconstituted missile arrays and air defense networks, aligning with Rubio's firm position on Iran and issuing an ultimatum before entertaining negotiations.

Witkoff maintains that preventing Iran's nuclear resurgence remains achievable while objecting primarily to warfare resumption, citing risks to additional Gulf nations and their petroleum infrastructure from Iranian retaliation. Notably, this stance enjoys near-universal administration support, particularly since Israeli actions including settlement expansion undermine normalization prospects. Trump administration factions advocate applying Israeli sovereignty over West Bank territories within comprehensive agreements, resembling proposals from the Deal of the Century (Trump's 2020 Middle East peace initiative) unveiled six years ago.

This internal debate has not escaped Israeli attention. An Israeli official acknowledged that certain administration figures brief against Israel, manufacturing pressure for compromises and expedited yet perilous war-ending arrangements. Witkoff will join the presidential meeting with Netanyahu, while the prime minister separately consults Rubio, whose positions apparently kindle optimism in Jerusalem.

Meanwhile, applying Israeli law throughout Judea and Samaria will surface among numerous discussion topics during Trump-Netanyahu deliberations, Israel Hayom confirmed from multiple involved sources. Surprisingly, American pressure for advancing such initiatives exceeds Israeli momentum, following senior evangelical figures expressing determination to pursue it.

Northern arrangements

Trump and his team prioritize advancing two initiatives during Netanyahu meetings: civilian discussions with Lebanon's government and security arrangement negotiations with Syria's al-Sharaa administration. The administration perceives opportunities for launching positive developments potentially transforming the entire region. A regional diplomat noted that Syrian disagreements permit bridging while Lebanon presents abundant mutual interests forming foundations for eventual agreements.

Netanyahu himself responded to Israel Hayom inquiries this week that Israel envisions sovereign, stable Lebanon. He simultaneously emphasized addressing Hezbollah operatives directed from Iran.

Militarily, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) has achieved merely partial success exposing Hezbollah's southern bunkers and arsenals, with Washington meetings addressing operational approaches following expired deadlines for Hezbollah's southern disarmament, minimally.

Syria introduces an additional dialogue partner: Turkey, al-Sharaa's benefactor, pursuing comprehensive protectorate zones while constraining Israeli aerial and terrestrial operations inside Syrian territory. Israel requires this airspace critically for Iranian approaches, with Turks reportedly deploying radar batteries into Syrian territory capable of detecting Israeli Air Force movements, according to unconfirmed accounts.

Iran dominates discussions both specifically regarding reconstituted missile capabilities and broadly concerning Israeli demands for fundamental Iranian problem resolution. Israeli delegations will present evidence documenting Iranian involvement stoking regional terror organizations and independently initiating terror operations.

The objective demands recognition that addressing Iran requires comprehensive treatment, otherwise regional conflicts persist or cyclical confrontations recur monthly. Assessments suggest minimal agreement on intensified, severe sanctions regimes surpassing current measures, systems producing additional economic weakening of Iran's collapsing economy.

Two additional subjects emerge. First, the MOU (Memorandum of Understanding), the bilateral security understanding expiring 2027, requiring foundational preliminary negotiations currently. Concurrently, bilateral trade relations, and technology and economic matters surface, spanning tariff questions through elite technology research collaborations.

The agenda's breadth will probably necessitate subsequent meetings between both leaders, with alternatives including delegating certain matters to ministerial and professional echelons.

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Einhorn demanded that this relationship be disclosed in the response segment, which Assenheim indeed read out in full and did not deny. It is also reasonable to assume that Feldstein chose to give the interview specifically to Assenheim because he trusted him. Still, that personal connection did not prevent Assenheim from posing tough questions, nor did it spare Feldstein from giving answers that were, at times, embarrassing.

On the interview

1. The lengthy conversation with Feldstein shows the enormous pressure Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faced to stop the war prematurely. He insisted on continuing, even after six hostages were murdered by Hamas, and it is important to once again give the prime minister substantial credit for that resolve. That very stance ultimately led to the successful deal that secured the release of all the hostages, except for Ran Gvili, for whom we are all still waiting.

2. The original sin of this affair was the decision to keep Feldstein employed within Netanyahu's circle, despite his failure to pass Shin Bet security screenings. According to Feldstein's testimony, this stemmed from the desire of Netanyahu's aides, specifically Jonatan Urich, to continue using Feldstein's media services. That is how the workaround was devised: paying his salary through a third party.

3. Instead of resorting to such a maneuver, the proper course of action would have been to thank Feldstein for his work and send him home. That is precisely why such security screenings exist. This is what proper governance looks like.

4. Feldstein's statements, along with other evidence, fundamentally contradict the version put forward by Netanyahu's associates, who claim that Feldstein was removed from the prime minister's environment in April 2024 after failing the Shin Bet check. The six hostages were murdered in August 2024. Netanyahu's press conference in which he pledged not to withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor took place on September 3, 2024. The publication of the so-called "Sinwar documents" in the German newspaper Bild, material that Feldstein passed on to the paper, appeared on September 6. It was intended to shield Netanyahu, and Urich sent Feldstein a message afterward saying, "The boss is pleased." In other words, long after he had been disqualified, Feldstein was still deeply involved, and there is additional evidence to that effect.

Who paid Feldstein?

5. It is hard to believe Feldstein's claim that he was "naive" and that he "made a mistake" by not clarifying for many months who this individual, Gil Birger, was who paid his salary and why. This explanation is even less credible given that Feldstein sat in a three-way, face-to-face meeting with Birger and Jay Footlik, a lobbyist for Qatar. Feldstein is neither stupid nor naive. Either he knew the source of the funds and is lying, or he did not ask because he did not want to know, as Assenheim suggested. What is certain is that anyone who receives a salary knows who is paying them and for what reason, especially someone as sophisticated as Feldstein, and especially when serving as a spokesman connected to the prime minister.

6. It is telling that in Netanyahu's response on Monday night, he said only of Urich that "there is no offense here." In other words, legally, his loyal adviser was cleared. Substantively, however, even Netanyahu appears to understand the problem. Ultimately, one of his closest confidants ventured at least into a gray area by attaching to him a spokesman whose salary was paid by an external actor. That may be legal, but it certainly stinks. And all this is before we even utter the word Qatar.

7. Both Urich, in a post on X, and Feldstein claim they did not know that Feldstein's salary came from the Qatari lobbyist. To the best of my knowledge, as of now there is no positive proof that they had such knowledge. But, and this is a big but, the circumstantial evidence shows that they acted in Qatar's interest.

8. As exposed by Avishai Grinzeig in a report on Sunday, Feldstein systematically worked to advance Qatar's interests. This was reflected in the briefings he planted with commentators and reporters, as well as in other actions he took. These moves were carried out in coordination, or at least with updates, involving Israel Einhorn, and in close contact with Jonathan Urich. This is the same Urich who, as noted, devised the distorted arrangement under which Feldstein's salary was paid by an external entity working for Qatar.

9. In other words, Feldstein promoted Qatar while also receiving money from Qatar, all under an arrangement stitched together by his associates, Einhorn and Urich. Their claim is that this happened without their knowing that Qatar was the funding source. That is like saying there is smoke without fire, or a cause without an effect. It is very hard to accept this feigned innocence, especially from such a seasoned group of operators.

10. And of course, all this took place during the most difficult war since Israel's founding, from the very heart of the Prime Minister's Office and the Kirya military complex in Tel Aviv, right under the prime minister's nose. If he knew about the crooked arrangement and or that the money was coming from Qatar, that is appalling. If he did not know, that is no less appalling. In light of these revelations, Netanyahu must at the very least give testimony in this affair.

11. Netanyahu's associates are defending him, as expected. For me, this chain of actions recalled a famous line by Richard Nixon about the Watergate affair: "People whose zeal exceeded their judgment and who may have done wrong in a cause they deeply believed to be right." Nixon, as we know, was ultimately forced to resign over Watergate.

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"They hurt my son at the hotel entrance in Cyprus – and everyone disappeared," the young man's father wrote on social media. "My son, a young Israeli, was violently attacked at the entrance of the hotel where he was staying in Cyprus. Not on the street. Not in a bar. At the hotel entrance – a place that's supposed to be safe and secure.

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Netanyahu is expected to lay out the threats Israel faces and the possible courses of action, including with regard to Iran, Syria, Lebanon and Gaza. For dessert, if he does his job properly, he will remind his host that Egypt is systematically violating the peace treaty and playing a double game not only with Israel but also with the Americans.

Trump, for his part, will likely tell Netanyahu that his own military is fighting as well. In neighboring Syria, US forces carried out a wide-ranging airstrike on Saturday. At almost the same time, the US Navy seized an oil tanker that had sailed from Venezuela. This was another step in tightening the American stranglehold on the dictator who rules there, Nicolas Maduro.

Trump has taken these offensive actions while repeatedly declaring that he has no interest in wars. In this term, as the whole world knows, he sees himself as a global peacemaker. But Venezuela, he says, is flooding the US with lethal drugs, leaving no choice but to work toward toppling its president.

As for Syria, a soldier loyal to President Ahmed al-Sharaa, who remains affiliated with the Islamic State terrorist organization, killed three Americans there last week. Trump did not direct his anger at the Syrian president, his new friend. Instead, he sent the US Air Force to vent its fury on the Islamic State's renewed activity in Syria's desolate regions.

These developments, particularly given their timing, greatly ease Netanyahu's task. Start with Syria: Trump would like to reach some form of arrangement between Israel and the al-Sharaa regime. In theory, Israel would like that as well.

However, when "three American patriots," as Trump described them, are murdered on Syrian soil, Netanyahu will not need to labor the point about instability there. If Trump is forced to act in Syria, 10,000 kilometers (about 6,200 miles) from Washington, to protect his country, then all the more so Israel, right next door, must preserve its freedom of action there. It is that simple.

The same logic applies to Venezuela, which is also a friend of Iran. If Trump rightly defines drugs shipped to his country from 5,000 kilometers (about 3,100 miles) away as a threat, what would he say about Iranian cruise missiles stationed just 1,500 kilometers (about 930 miles) from Jerusalem?

The answers are obvious, and that is why Netanyahu will likely not need to deploy his famed powers of persuasion. Senior administration officials are already convinced. Consider the clear and important remarks made on Saturday by Marco Rubio, Trump's secretary of state and national security adviser, regarding Gaza's future.

"Everyone wants peace. No one wants to go back to war," Rubio said. But he made clear that if Hamas, a terrorist organization, is ever in a position to threaten or attack Israel, there will be no peace. He said it is impossible to persuade anyone to invest in Gaza if there is an assessment that another war will erupt in two or three years.

Rubio said the focus must be on the types of weapons and capabilities Hamas needs in order to threaten Israel, and that these should form the basis for defining disarmament. He stressed that if Hamas in the future launches rockets, kills Israelis or, God forbid, carries out another terrorist attack like the one on October 7, there will be no peace. Who would invest in rebuilding a place that will only be destroyed again in the next war, he asked, adding that this is why disarmament is critical. The secretary of state also said that no move would be taken without Israel's consent.

There is not an Israeli who would not sign on to Rubio's statement that "disarmament is critical." That is true for Gaza, for Hezbollah, and for every other challenge. The Americans were the first to understand that.

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The understandings between Israel and Egypt on the gas deal do not include an Egyptian commitment to withdraw prohibited forces from the Sinai Peninsula. Israel Hayom has learned that accompanying understandings include dialogue on mechanisms to address Egyptian violations. The US has promised to promote handling of the issue, but there is no clear commitment to rectify the situation.

In Israel, officials believe that once gas deliveries begin and Egypt becomes energy-dependent on Israeli gas, this dependence will serve as leverage to deter Cairo from violating the peace treaty. They also argue that had Israel not supplied Egypt with gas, its southern neighbor would have turned to Qatar. According to information gathered in recent years, Egypt has introduced forces into Sinai far beyond what is permitted under the security annex of the peace treaty. It has also built tunnels deep inside Sinai for storing weapons and has suspiciously extended runways at airfields.

A security achievement

As far as is currently known, none of these problems has been fully resolved. The excess Egyptian forces will remain in Sinai, but Egypt has given commitments to limit their activity. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hinted that Israel achieved several gains on the security front.

Despite the agreement, efforts to politically warm relations with Egypt have so far failed because of the war in Gaza, which has yet to end, and the tense atmosphere between the presidential palace in Cairo and the Prime Minister's Office in Jerusalem. The Americans examined the possibility of holding a summit meeting between Netanyahu and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, with US President Donald Trump participating, but the Egyptians rejected the idea.

Alongside these issues, the gas agreement enables Israel to achieve several strategic objectives. The first is Egypt's dependence on Israeli gas, which it uses both for domestic energy needs and for liquefaction and export to Europe, a vital source of foreign currency without which Egypt's economy would collapse. Egypt has gas fields of its own, but they are insufficient for these purposes. This dependence constitutes Israeli diplomatic and security leverage over its southern neighbor, though its impact is limited to major strategic issues, chiefly reducing or even eliminating concerns that Egypt might cancel its peace treaty with Israel.

An energy powerhouse?

Israel is consolidating its status as a regional power in the energy sector. It supplies gas to Egypt and also to Jordan, which uses it for a significant portion of its energy consumption. The agreement with Israel comes at Qatar's expense. Doha had been in talks with el-Sisi on building a new gas pipeline from Qatar's giant gas fields to Egypt. Laying such a pipeline would take years, and Egypt did not have the time to wait.

The agreement opens the door to additional energy projects in cooperation with Gulf states, projects that have been on the table for a long time and are expected to advance once an agreement is reached to bring Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords, likely not before elections and the formation of a new government in Israel.

In the energy sphere, under the agreement Israel will build an additional gas pipeline between Ramat Hovav and Nitzana, enabling further increases in exports to Egypt. The deal is expected to restart tenders for exploration of new gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean, and the Energy Ministry is set to renew preparations for those exploration bids.

Another reason for the delay in the agreement with Egypt was the Energy Ministry's demand that remaining reserves in existing fields be sufficient for Israeli domestic consumption and remain priced at the current low levels. According to the Energy Ministry, these demands were fully met.

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