The Russian military's battlefield difficulties in Ukraine have increased the possibility that Moscow is about to expand the fighting in preparation for a long-term military campaign. This is expected to increase the scope of destruction and raise casualties on both sides, as well as push Ukraine to launch more attacks on Russian territory. This could raise the risk of strategic miscalculation and lead to a direct clash between Russia and NATO, a scenario the two have thus far tried to avoid.

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Meanwhile, Western leaders see the war as an opportunity to weaken Russia and do not want to be appeasers who allow Russia to take sovereign Ukrainian territory. US President Joe Biden hopes to bolster his low popularity by demonstrating strength against Putin ahead of the November midterm elections. However, the weapons supplied to Ukraine, the campaign to shame Putin, and the increased likelihood that Finland and Sweden will join NATO could push Putin to take more aggressive actions.

The war in Ukraine thus accelerates global trends towards more profound polarization, increased economic self-sufficiency, and fierce technological competition between world powers. As a result, Israel faces several dilemmas regarding its long-term relations with Russia:

As the Western camp moves to contain Russia, it will run out of patience with Israel's ambiguous policy on Ukraine. For the West, Russia ceased to be a legitimate partner after the invasion of Ukraine, and it expects Israel to limit its ties with Moscow – or at least draw them down – as Germany did when it cut back on its acquisition of Russian energy sources despite the high economic cost. While other countries also straddle the line between Russia and the West, Israel considers itself part of the Western camp and the West expects it to toe the line.

The war has reduced the potential for the expansion of bilateral Israel-Russia relations. Israel's usefulness for Russia as a gateway to Washington will continue to diminish. Israeli firms consider business ties with Russia a risk because of Western sanctions. The rapid mobilization of Russian society in a nationalistic and authoritarian direction and the claim that the Ukrainians are Nazis will make it difficult for Israel to cooperate with Moscow on World War II and Holocaust historical projects, which Moscow highly values.

Russia will continue to be an important player in the international arena and the Middle East in a way that will affect Israeli interests, particularly in Syria and Iran. Despite the negative signals Russia has been sending Israel in recent weeks, it still values Israel as a partner in the Western camp and supports Israel's campaign to weaken Iran's position in Syria.

Events in recent weeks have underscored these dilemmas. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's antisemitic remark that Adolf Hitler had Jewish origins triggered harsh condemnation in Israel. The Israeli criticism unleashed a wave of anti-Israel propaganda in the Russian media. However, Putin then called Prime Minister Naftali Bennett to calm the crisis, greet him on Israel's Independence Day and reportedly apologize for Lavrov's remark.

The profound differences between the readouts of the phone call in Jerusalem and Moscow underscore the persistence of tensions. The Kremlin version didn't mention the apology but emphasized the common ground between Russia and Israel on the issues of World War II and the Holocaust. The Israeli version did not mention the Holocaust issue.

The context of the call, however, shows that Russia is eager to maintain friendly relations with Israel. It was unusual for Putin to initiate the call. The Kremlin announcement was polite and a change of course after three days of bashing Israel by the Russian media and Foreign Ministry. Lavrov himself was more restrained during a public appearance that followed. The chairwoman of the upper chamber of the Russian parliament, Valentina Matviyenko, wrote a letter to Knesset Speaker Mickey Levy that stressed reconciliation.

Nonetheless, Israel's indecisive position on the war in Ukraine does not help Israel to maximize its interests. It forces Israel to pay a high long-term reputational price in the eyes of its Western allies. This raises a question: What is the right point of equilibrium in Jerusalem's relations with Moscow?

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Putin's call to Bennett proves that he deeply cherishes relations with Israel and is content with its neutral position. Israel is one of the few countries in the world that Moscow respects. Accordingly, Israel should leave communication channels with the Kremlin open in order to promote its interests and help deescalate the Ukraine crisis.

Yet Putin's call also shows that Israel has more room to distance itself from Russia and realign its position with the West. Since Israel seeks to limit its actions against Russia and refrain from sending lethal weapons to Kyiv, it is advisable for it to continue to give maximum humanitarian aid and accelerate the supply of non-lethal equipment to Ukraine. The recent closure of the Israeli field hospital, in particular when Moscow could be about to escalate the fighting, didn't send the proper signal to the world.

We cannot know the details of the Israeli mediation between Russia and Ukraine, but the optics are that it has faded away. This is especially the case in comparison to, for example, the proactive efforts undertaken by Turkey. Putin and Bennett didn't talk for more than six weeks before Putin's conciliatory phone call.

The Israeli position is not to condemn Russia, but to be taken seriously. It must increase the visibility and scope of its go-between activities.

 Reprinted with permission from JNS.org.

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While Tehran invests efforts to get closer to Russia, Israel should maintain a dialogue with Moscow to safeguard its military and diplomatic freedom of action in Syria, despite the intensifying standoff between Russia and the West.

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Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi's visit to Moscow from Jan. 19-20 was his first significant diplomatic visit since entering office last August. At the meeting in the Kremlin with President Vladimir Putin, Raisi declared that there are no restrictions on the development of ties with Russia, which he described as being "permanent and strategic." He expressed his desire to "increase the level of trade and economic cooperation several times over." He also stated that a draft document on bilateral strategic cooperation for the next 20 years had been submitted to his Russian hosts. This was to replace the partnership agreement of 2001, which expired in 2021.

Putin's approach to cooperation with Iran and the desire to expand it was more reserved. The two also discussed ongoing talks in Vienna on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran's nuclear program. They also discussed the situations in Syria and Afghanistan.

In a speech addressing the plenary session of the Duma (the lower chamber of parliament), which was met with a standing ovation, Raisi forecast the dissolution of NATO and spoke of Russia and Iran's shared experience of having to contend with hostile US policy, accompanied by economic sanctions.

There was also a clear religious aspect to the visit. The head of the Russian Council of Muftis greeted Raisi on behalf of 20 million Russian Muslims and conducted a prayer session with him at the Moscow Grand Mosque. As a result, Raisi was the first Muslim leader to interrupt a meeting with Putin for 10 minutes for evening prayer at the Kremlin.

Raisi sought to reach a breakthrough in bilateral relations, which in recent decades have always been viewed against the backdrop of Iranian historical memory of Russia and the Soviet Union as an imperialist occupying power. However, Raisi's political opponents claimed that he was endangering Iran by entrusting its fate to the Russians.

The common objective of Russia and Iran remains opposition to US domination of international affairs. However, both states suffer from economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and security threats from Washington.

Therefore, the hasty pullout of the Americans from Afghanistan was perceived as a strategic gain both in Tehran and Moscow. Moreover, it undermined the global image of the Biden administration and removed an American presence near their countries.

During nuclear talks in Vienna, Russia plays an active role as a mediator. Russia, the closest country to Iran among the P5+1, has blamed the breakdown of the original nuclear agreement on the United States and favors the removal of sanctions. This would pave the way for Russian companies to work in Iran, and allow Tehran to buy Russian-manufactured weapons.

Nevertheless, Russia does not want Iran to go nuclear. Instead, it attempts to present coordination with the United States and the Europeans as an example of practical cooperation with the West, precisely in the middle of the current Ukraine crisis.

Over the last decade, Russia and Iran have tightened their military cooperation, defending Syrian President Bashar Assad's regime in Syria. On the eve of Raisi's visit to Moscow, three Russian warships anchored at the port of Chabahar in Iran and participated in a joint maneuver with the Iranian and Chinese navies in the Arabian Sea.

In recent years, Russian and Iranian fleets have conducted similar regular exercises, and China takes part from time to time. In October 2021, Iranian Armed Forces Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Mohammad Bagheri visited Moscow and announced that Tehran would purchase fighter aircraft and combat helicopters from Russia. Previously, both states had preferred a more discreet relationship.

Raisi had expectations that the visit might promote arms deals with Russia offering financing. Instead, when returning to Tehran, Raisi announced that important agreements were reached on energy and agriculture.

Russia benefits from the sanctions on Iranian oil exports. It cooperates closely on oil prices with Gulf states that the Iranians view as their primary external threat. Russian commentators have expressed doubts that Russia and Iran would succeed in upgrading bilateral ties, mainly due to Russian companies' fear of US sanctions. They also assessed that Moscow would not subsidize Iranian military procurement, especially as Tehran does not pay its debts.

Russian experts have also wondered how Raisi's charm offensive dovetails with Moscow's attempts to maintain good relations with Israel and turning a blind eye to its airstrikes on Iranian targets in Syria.

As a result, Russia will probably continue to adhere to its approach of maintaining a balance in its ties with the two countries while trying to ensure that the exchange of blows between Tehran and Jerusalem on Syrian soil does not boil over into a broader escalation, which might be detrimental to Russian interests.

In January, Putin's first meeting with Raisi, and his first meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett in October, show contrasting treatment. While the official photo of Raisi's visit contained a long empty table where the leaders sat far apart from each other (with the official explanation being COVID-19 restrictions), Bennett was photographed in intimate conversation with Putin at his summer retreat in the Black Sea resort of Sochi.

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Raisi's visit showed that Tehran is more eager for closer bilateral relations than Moscow. But, of course, Putin will gladly promote his country's economic interests. Still, he understands that Tehran lacks any real alternative apart from its reliance on China.

On the other hand, Putin has serious reasons not to emphasize Russia's support for Iran. Accordingly, any substantial expansion of Russian-Iranian trade, including any arms deals, is on hold until a breakthrough is reached in Vienna.

As far as Israel is concerned, the result of this visit was a mixed bag. There was no Russian public pressure on Iran to adopt greater flexibility on the nuclear issue. Also, no criticism was leveled at Israeli attacks in Syria.

As Tehran invests efforts to improve relations with Russia, Israel will have to maintain a dialogue with Moscow to safeguard its military and diplomatic freedom of action in Syria, despite the current growing tensions between Russia and the West.

Featured on JNS.org, this article was first published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

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New satellite images show Russia continuing to gather its forces near the Ukrainian border in recent weeks. Reuters reported on Friday that it could not independently verify the images from US-based Maxar Technologies, showing new deployments of hundreds of armored vehicles and tanks in annexed Crimea. Meanwhile, a high-ranking Ukrainian official claimed his country is in control of the situation, and that escalation is not imminent.

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Moscow has put forward a series of public demands, focusing on reaching legally binding agreements to halt NATO expansion and the deployment of weapons systems in neighboring countries that Russia perceives as a security threat. It has also demanded that the approval of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia to Germany and its diplomatic representation vis-à-vis the United States be dealt with.

On Thursday, President Vladimir Putin said Russia had received an initial positive response from the United States on its proposals to tone down tensions and was hopeful for the success of negotiations. However, he also said that NATO had "brazenly tricked" Russia by expanding since the end of the Cold War, and that Moscow needed "guarantees," reported Reuters.

The negotiations underway between Moscow and Washington on nuclear weapons control and cyber weapons are expected to resume on Jan. 10, with a focus on the new Russian demands regarding NATO expansion and offensive weapons deployment.

If Russia invades Ukraine, the United States and Western countries are threatening unprecedented political and economic costs for Moscow. Still, there is no Western intention to enter a military confrontation with Russia.

Israel is far from the Ukrainian arena and is incapable of accurately assessing Russia's intentions of invading. So far, the Israeli government has avoided dealing with this crisis, which has the potential to deepen its dilemma regarding relations with Russia, and more broadly, its approach to competition between the major powers.

Jerusalem has forged a unique path in international relations in recent years. It does not confront Moscow publicly on the Ukrainian issue and refrains from joining Western collective punitive measures against Russia (sanctions, political isolation and deportation of spies). But, on the other hand, the West also shows an understanding of Israel's need to talk to the Kremlin, especially considering the neighborly relations between Israel and Russia following Moscow's military intervention in the 2015 civil war in Syria.

Israel-Russia relations are at an all-time high, having developed considerably since the Soviet period. Russia allows Israel military freedom of action against Iran and its proxies in Syria. It makes gestures, such as returning the remains of US-born Israeli soldier Zachariah Baumel, who went missing in the battle of Sultan Yacoub. Russia expects Israel to help it reach political agreements in the Middle East in cooperation with the United States.

Israel has a population of over one million Russian speakers, serving as a cultural bridge between the countries. Bilateral trade is two to three billion dollars a year. Russia also values ​​Israel's positive stance on the role of the Red Army in World War II and its fighting against Nazi Germany.

If the crisis between Russia and Ukraine escalates, Israel will be compelled to adjust its current policy. The Biden administration and its Western allies could pressure Israel more rigorously than in the past to publicly take a side and join the Western camp condemning Russia. Israel's refusal to do so would add to a series of disagreements with Washington, on the Iranian nuclear program, the Palestinian issue, offensive cyber exports and more.

At the same time, Israel must constantly examine and balance its policies between the United States and Russia. While the United States is focused on the Chinese threat, it is withdrawing from the Middle East. As a result, it suffers from an image of weakness among the region's players. Meanwhile, Russia and China are gaining leverage to affect important issues for Israel, such as Moscow's role as a moderator between Iran and the West and Russia's influence over Israel's freedom of action in Syria.

Russia is not expected to disappear from Israel's northern border in the foreseeable future. Therefore, Israel's leadership must pay close attention to escalation scenarios between Russia and the United States and adapt its position accordingly.

A new and uncomfortable status quo may soon be established in relations between the global powers. Israel will likely prefer to chart a vague position between Russia and the West. However, Israel should not wait for a crisis to break out, but take advantage of the situation to formulate a national strategy, which is required even if Russia does not invade Ukraine. Such a strategy should balance adherence to the historic alliance with the United States and the need for Jerusalem to retain freedom of maneuver vis-à-vis the other powers.

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Israel must initiate consultation mechanisms with its Western allies and position itself as a possible power broker with Russia on regional issues. Israel should also have a clear position regarding where to develop its cooperation with Russia and where to restrict it.

Despite other pressing issues on the Israeli agenda, failing to engage in policy planning concerning Russia might lead to unnecessary improvisation and hurt Israeli interests.

Featured on JNS.org, this article was first published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

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