Initial findings point to an ISIS connection, not Iran, which has been proven responsible for torching synagogues and Jewish businesses in the country. The distinction between streams of radical Islam does not diminish the threat: The Iranian model is sometimes replicated in other influence networks, both state and non-state, and in any case, lays the "fertilizer" for attacks on Jewish life.

In August, Australian intelligence concluded that Iran stood behind two attacks: the arson of a kosher delicatessen in Sydney and the torching of a synagogue in Melbourne. The investigation revealed that the Revolutionary Guards recruited local criminals for the "dirty work" – attacking Jewish institutions. In response, Australia expelled the Iranian ambassador, closed its embassy in Tehran, and declared the Revolutionary Guards a terrorist organization. This marked the first time Australia has expelled an ambassador since World War II.

Tehran also operates "soft power" mechanisms, which allow it and Hezbollah to expand their influence in countries with a significant Shiite minority, among these mechanisms: control over the appointment of imams in religious centers, academic institutions like Al-Mustafa University, cultural centers of the embassy, and the media activities of the Iranian Broadcasting Authority.

In Australia, the influence has manifested in trips to Lebanon and meetings with Hezbollah officials, and even in money transfers through Qard al-Hassan (Hezbollah's banking institution) – as revealed in the breach of the organization's systems.

The disregard for Iran and Hezbollah's "enabling infrastructure" in Australia created a sense of comfort to operate in the country without interference. Similar to the Iranian operational pattern of recruiting Australian criminals for "dirty work" on behalf of the Revolutionary Guards, there has been evidence in the past of connections between criminal elements and Shiite religious institutions, and figures from the Australian underworld were linked to a money laundering network that operated for Hezbollah's benefit.

As a result, Shiite religious centers became the leaders of anti-Israel demonstrations after October 7, waving terror flags without any interference. Iranian Ambassador Ahmad Sadeghi did not hesitate to praise Hassan Nasrallah, while the embassy simultaneously intensified surveillance and persecution of Iranian dissidents in the country.

The battle is only beginning

But Australia is just one example. Iran operates similar networks around the world: Quds Force planning an attack from Venezuela against the Israeli embassy in Mexico, recruiting Swedish teenagers to attack the embassy in Stockholm, and attempting to harm Israel-Thailand relations through pressure on Thai workers. In Britain, Iranian accounts were exposed, pushing for Scottish independence to weaken the kingdom from within. In Italy, Iranian elements used the cultural center in Tehran to track exiles, and in Germany, the government admitted that the Al-Mustafa University branch in Berlin became a spy center.

The "Israel-centric" view of the Iranian threat causes Israel to miss an opportunity. While Israel focuses on the Iranian power structure – the nuclear program and missiles – Iran enjoys broad freedom of action far from the Middle East. But these developments also create fertile ground for cooperation with countries facing the same negative Iranian influence, and sometimes they are not even aware of the danger.

Western countries are dealing with large-scale immigration, exposing them to various types of foreign influences. Exposing the way Iran uses the Shiite diaspora and the religious power it holds within it could serve as a model for dealing with other radicalization networks: from ISIS's online and partisan networks, through mosque unions controlled by other Middle Eastern states, to non-religious state influences.

In the past year, there has been some awakening. Alongside Australia's moves, Germany closed the Al-Mustafa branch in Berlin and expelled the imam at the "Blue Mosque" in Hamburg, who was accused of receiving direct instructions from the Supreme Leader's office. The "hysterical" response of the regime to any damage to these mechanisms indicates their importance – and also that the battle is only beginning. Whether Iran is responsible for the Sydney attack or not, history proves the need to fight that same "enabling infrastructure."

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Learning from the 2022 election, when Iran was involved in a variety of influence efforts, and given Tehran's understanding of the importance of the upcoming vote, it should be assumed that Iranian interference will take place before, during and after the election.

Iran will apply the extensive experience it has accumulated through years of direct engagement with Israeli online discourse, using that familiarity to refine and upgrade its influence campaigns ahead of Election Day.

An analysis of Iran's previous attempts, particularly during the last election cycle, makes it clear that Tehran has no intention of waiting for Election Day. Iran is likely to try to disrupt the political system's "pre-election alignment" among both Jewish and Arab voters, seeking to shape internal political organization in a way that promotes its strategic goal of political chaos.

This would then serve as preparation for Election Day itself. Iran is expected to activate hidden assets in selected online communities to spread fake news and disinformation designed to disrupt the proper functioning of the election. This would set the stage for a third phase: undermining the election results afterward.

The US model

A relevant example is Iran's involvement in the 2020 US presidential election. Iranian operatives used the name of the far-right Proud Boys movement to intimidate potential voters and discourage them from casting ballots, intentionally seeking to disrupt the voting process in the US. Iran could replicate this pattern in Israel by attempting a series of moves aimed at harming the integrity of the election.

Another important point to consider is the possibility that Iran will use its online assets to persuade individuals, whether through political impersonation or financial incentives, to carry out actions not only in cyberspace but also in the physical world, all with the aim of harming the voting process in Israel.

Past experience shows Iran has become highly effective at recruiting individuals inside Israel to act on its behalf, knowingly or unwittingly. Tehran leverages its deep familiarity with Israeli society to make such recruitment easier.

Recent revelations indicate that Iran's influence apparatus enjoys significant resources from the regime. Dozens of operatives work under special Revolutionary Guard units whose sole purpose is to run influence campaigns not only in Israel but also in the US and the UK. It must be assumed that some of these operatives are already preparing their systems for Israel's Election Day.

To counter these efforts and safeguard the integrity of the vote, relevant Israeli authorities must prepare for Iranian influence operations that are aimed specifically at the election. The understanding must be clear: preparations are already underway or about to begin.

The primary goal must be to identify all Iranian assets that have been deployed, are currently being deployed, or will be deployed to influence the upcoming election. This will not be easy. Iran has significantly improved its methods in recent years and now designs its assets to be distinctly different from one another, making them harder to detect.

A related challenge is the expected use of AI tools by the Iranian regime to improve the credibility of these assets. Iran may even use Israeli influencers, manipulated without their knowledge, to amplify its content. In parallel, Iranian cyber units are expected to cooperate with influence-operation teams to flood social media with information obtained through planned hacks of Israeli websites, all aimed at damaging the election process.

Beyond Israeli government agencies, civil society organizations also play an essential role. These groups must work daily to keep online discourse free of foreign manipulation. Combined efforts between government bodies and experienced civil society monitors, who can identify suspicious activity on social networks, will greatly improve Israel's ability to detect and disrupt Iranian interference.

This is a significant challenge, and Israel's limited success in recent years in curbing Iranian influence operations proves it. But given the potential damage Iran can cause, it is crucial to invest the necessary resources to counter these efforts. Iran's capability to harm Israel's election process must not be underestimated.

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Clearly, Israel must preserve its edge over Iran, making current preparations justified. However, the IDF's massive budget deficit from the war, combined with serious questions about Israel's capacity to swiftly repair extensive home front damage from Iranian missile strikes, highlights that even in a war Israel launched with significant superiority, the economic cost remains unprecedented.

Staying "one step ahead of Iran" and maintaining optimal offensive and defensive capabilities against a massive nation with sophisticated technological capacity costs enormous sums. Perhaps facing an "existential threat" as the government frames it leaves no alternative, but Israel's rejection of any US-Iran agreement that would substantially distance Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons compels Israel to prepare constantly for the next Iranian confrontation – preparation that demands substantial resources.

It's already evident that despite Israel's campaign achievements, Iran is rebuilding strength, and knowing the Iranian adversary, it will attempt to learn and extract lessons from the latest confrontation, substantially upgrading its offensive and defensive capabilities in ways that will force the Israeli security establishment to develop optimal countermeasures, especially driven by that fundamental anxiety that one day Iran will mount a nuclear weapon on a missile and launch it toward Israel.

A nuclear deal, despite its challenges, would considerably push Iran away from bomb acquisition (assuming its leadership even pursues this), thereby substantially diminishing Iran's threat capability toward Israel. Admittedly, Iran will retain advanced missile capacity as an asymmetric power (with serious doubts that any agreement would restrict this), but even such a capability, however sophisticated, still falls short of an existential threat.

Against this backdrop, the economic crisis that engulfed the Israeli government after October 7 demands attention, making dramatic Iranian-focused investment inevitably harm routine security operations while primarily damaging government services to citizens in welfare, education, healthcare, and beyond. Third-circle warfare costs staggering sums. Beyond the campaign itself lie all its preparations, as well as implications for rehabilitating damaged infrastructure and developing advanced technological capabilities to surpass whatever enhanced capabilities Iranians create post-war.

The Iran-Israel confrontation parallels the Russia-US Cold War rivalry in numerous ways, directly recalling the "Star Wars" initiative – a program that contributed (certainly economically) to Soviet collapse. Israel possesses a strong economy, but without caution could suffer a similar "Star Wars effect" – massive expenditures developing grandiose programs meant to address future Iranian threats, yet actually burdening the Israeli economy dramatically while it still staggers under the Irons Swords War's weight.

Worth noting: during the war Israel deployed unique capabilities costing, per various reports, many billions. Given ongoing "friction" with Iran, Israel will undoubtedly need to develop new offensive programs and capabilities alongside defensive systems, adapting to Iran's evolving force structure. True, Iran's economy faces severe structural challenges and would struggle in such competition, but interceptors typically cost more than missiles, particularly since Iranian development for numerous arsenal missiles is already complete.

Looking ahead, Israel will dramatically increase security investment, raising defense budgets independent of Iranian considerations. Generally, Israel requires more tanks, armored vehicles, soldier equipment, logistics, bases, vehicles, and more. If simultaneously the security establishment pursues massive Iran-focused force-building (seemingly necessary given no current agreement and Iran's expected strengthening), then either funds for other military programs addressing first-circle threats vanish, or citizen services across all domains suffer (or both).

Concerning quality-of-life versus survival debates, remember this represents infinite warfare's price, especially in the "third circle." Diplomatic solutions aren't flawless, but certainly can substantially set back Iran's nuclear program. Without agreement, and with Iran likely rebuilding strength, confrontation becomes merely a timing question, consequently demanding unprecedented preparation investments and dealing with resulting consequences.

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In the past year, and especially following the Gaza War, these efforts have accelerated. Iranian and Hezbollah terrorist cells have been exposed across the globe—from Greece and the Nordic countries to Germany and Australia—aiming to attack Israelis and Jews.

Latin America, which suffered devastating bombings in Buenos Aires in the 1990s, has once again become a target for attacks on Israelis and Jews. In the past year, Iranian and Hezbollah networks were uncovered in Peru and Brazil, including a plot to assassinate Israel's ambassador in Brasília.

It remains unclear how Iran attempted to carry out the attack in Mexico, but past experience suggests it likely relied on proxies—probably local criminals—to obscure its direct involvement. Ironically, that very method may have contributed to exposing the plot.

Why Latin America?

Beyond the region's relative ease of operation, where local security forces are preoccupied with drugs and immigration, Latin America offers Iran favorable conditions through its sizable Shiite communities in Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia. Venezuela, under the ideologically aligned regime of Nicolás Maduro, serves as Iran's operational hub on the continent and as a logistical backbone for its activities.

The past year, however, has been particularly challenging for Iran's influence in the region. Tehran traditionally cultivates ties with leftist governments opposed to US influence—such as Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Chile, Colombia, and Brazil. Despite ideological differences, Iran eagerly cooperates with anyone willing to counter Washington. Yet recent political shifts, such as the right-wing victory in Bolivia, a country once very close to Iran, have weakened Tehran's foothold. A potential military confrontation between the US and Venezuela could also bring an end to Iran's strategic "base" on the Caribbean coast.

The Trump administration's campaign against the Maduro regime has further compounded Tehran's difficulties. Maduro remains Iran's most important ally in the region, and without him, Tehran would lose its ability to threaten the US in its own backyard.

The attempted assassination in Mexico only proves Iran's global reach and determination to use the continent as a platform for terrorist operations. Israel should leverage this exposure into a diplomatic campaign to alert Latin American nations, and the international community at large, to the danger posed by Iran. Despite this latest revelation, as long as Iran's "open account" with Israel remains unsettled, another attempt is only a matter of time.

Moreover, the case illustrates the urgent need to dismantle Iran's enabling infrastructure in Latin America: its Spanish-language propaganda channel HispanTV; its influence over the appointment of imams in Shiite communities; and academic institutions such as Al-Mustafa International University, which serve as tools of indoctrination. The so-called religious centers attached to Iranian embassies are in fact hubs of espionage and terror. A concerted effort to confront this "soft power," combined with political change in the region and the eventual fall of the Maduro regime, could deliver a serious blow to Iran's presence in Latin America.

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As expected, the louder the echoes of the massive success of Operation Midnight Hammer, the strike in which the nuclear facilities in Fordo and Natanz were supposedly "completely destroyed" by heavy bombs dropped from B-2 bombers, the more convinced Trump seems that Iran cannot restart its program.

According to Trump, several sources have already approached him, claiming that Iran is rebuilding its nuclear program, but he simply did not believe them. "Someone told me: 'Mr. President, they're starting up their nuclear program again.' I told him: Listen carefully. They're not starting anything. They want to survive. The last thing they want is to start digging holes again in the mountains that were just bombed," Trump said.

However, recently published satellite images indicate that Iran is not only rebuilding but also testing activity at a new site south of Natanz. The facility, known as "Mount Mattock," is located about one kilometer south of the Natanz enrichment site and has been dug deep into the mountain, even deeper than Fordo.

Deep divisions

It is evident that Trump is pursuing an agreement with Iran contrary to Israel's stance. Official Israel may take some comfort in the fact that there are major differences, especially regarding the US administration's view that Iran is weak and can therefore be forced into unprecedented concessions. But that perception does not align with Iran's position, as Tehran may be willing to make concessions, though certainly not of the scale Washington expects. In any case, it can be assumed that efforts to renew negotiations between the sides will resume soon.

Against the backdrop of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's comment — "We're on it" — it seems there may be a widening gap between how the two sides currently view the Iranian issue, one that could deepen further if Iran expands its reconstruction efforts or if the US returns to the diplomatic track with Iran.

The question arises as to who is briefing Trump about Iran, since the claim that Iran was "two months away from a bomb" does not even align with Netanyahu's own statement in an interview with Fox News, where he said Iran was a year away from developing such a weapon. In any case, with the ceasefire in Gaza now in effect, the Iranian issue has returned to the forefront, and in a big way.

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A collision course with Iran

Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran appear to be on a path toward renewed confrontation. Tehran's ongoing buildup of ballistic missiles and drones, along with growing suspicions that it intends to restore its nuclear capabilities, have raised serious concern in Jerusalem. Satellite images have revealed what analysts believe could be preparations for a new uranium enrichment facility south of Natanz.

These developments, combined with stalled nuclear negotiations between Iran and the US, tensions with Europe over the reimposition of sanctions under the "snapback" mechanism, and Iran's fear of another Israeli strike, the risk of escalation only grows. With the Gaza campaign now over, Israeli decision-makers are free to focus on the Iranian threat.

Israel's defense leadership now faces a difficult choice: whether to resume military action, likely under less favorable conditions than in the recent "Lion's Roar" operation—or to opt for "containment," which would effectively allow Iran to rebuild its capabilities. This dilemma comes amid widespread skepticism that Washington and Tehran will reach any new nuclear agreement.

The Houthi threat persists

Yemen also remains a major source of concern. Senior officials in the Iranian-backed Houthi movement have made clear that the "Houthi genie," unleashed during Israel's "Iron Swords" campaign, cannot be forced back into the bottle. The Houthis now see themselves not only as defenders of the Palestinians in Gaza but of the entire Iranian-led axis.

Houthi leaders have warned that they will target Israel not only if it violates the cease-fire but even if it continues airstrikes in Lebanon against Hezbollah positions. Despite Israel's successful strikes on Yemen's economy, power grid, and maritime infrastructure, and the elimination of most members of Houthi government, Jerusalem has yet to establish an effective deterrent that would stop Houthi attacks on Israel or vessels passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

A glimmer of diplomatic hope

Nonetheless, progress on the diplomatic front could help Israel navigate these challenges. Advancements in the Israeli-Palestinian political process, improved international standing, and deeper normalization with Arab states could strengthen Israel's position, both by applying pressure on Iran and by building a regional coalition, led by the Gulf states, to counter the Houthi threat from Yemen.

Either way, Israel faces a challenging period ahead, even without factoring in the ongoing instability in Lebanon and Syria.

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But in Iran too, a narrative of "victory" has taken root. While no one in Tehran denies that Israel scored major achievements, officials there point to the regime's survival and rapid recovery, replacing assassinated senior figures within 24 hours, as proof of resilience. From their perspective, simply holding their own against Israel and the US in a direct confrontation was itself a dramatic accomplishment.

Do not dismiss Iran's sense of victory

That sense of victory should not be underestimated. With the nuclear negotiations at a dead end, further complicated by the E3 decision to trigger the "snapback" mechanism and restore all sanctions lifted in 2015, Iran appears less fearful of another war. Its leaders believe they can achieve gains that eluded them in the last round.

Tehran still prefers a diplomatic path that could lead to sanctions relief. But given the Western stance, which Iran views as a "demand for surrender," its leadership recognizes that military escalation is increasingly likely. This is especially true in light of repeated Israeli warnings of renewed strikes if Iran attempts to rebuild its capabilities, particularly in the nuclear field.

Learning from its mistakes, Iran is now focused on upgrading its missile arsenal and fortifying its defenses. Reports of missile tests and boasts by senior officials about new systems are issued almost daily. At the same time, Iranian leaders declare they will not hesitate to launch a preemptive strike if they believe Israel is about to attack. They are also courting Moscow and Beijing for advanced air-defense systems to replace the ones that collapsed during the last conflict.

Iranian readiness, American support

In Operation With a Lion's Heart, Israel enjoyed the advantage of total surprise and deployed cutting-edge capabilities that inflicted heavy blows on the ayatollahs' regime, all under a US security umbrella that included unprecedented military support. Washington even deployed $800 million worth of THAAD missile interceptors to protect Israel.

Israel is unlikely to enjoy such ideal conditions in the next round. Whether Iran strikes first out of miscalculation or Israel launches another attack, Iran's readiness will be on a different level. At the same time, with President Donald Trump increasingly preoccupied with other crises, from Venezuela to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it is unclear how much US backing Israel will receive in another war.

The combination of Iranian preparedness and doubts about American involvement could leave Israel facing challenges far greater than in the previous round. If Washington is less committed this time, questions will arise about how a future conflict could be brought to an end, and how to avoid sliding into a prolonged war of attrition that could exact a heavier toll on Israel than on Iran, given Iran's geographic depth and its experience from the devastating 1980-88 war with Iraq.

Above all looms the question of purpose, of what would the next war actually achieve, especially given the growing consensus that air campaigns alone cannot topple the regime in Tehran.

Tensions at a peak

If the recent war taught Israel anything, it is that the Iranian regime is more resilient than it appears. There are no "moderates waiting in line" to replace Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, even if Israel were to eliminate him.

On the nuclear front, it is doubtful that another campaign could do lasting damage to Iran's enrichment facilities. Such a war would not erase the knowledge possessed by Iranian scientists, nor the nuclear materials already stockpiled, leaving the Islamic Republic capable of working toward a bomb, if it so chooses.

And if the next war begins where the last one ended, the initial stages will almost certainly be more violent. Iran would likely deploy capabilities aimed at inflicting significant damage on Israel's home front, right from the outset.

The collapse of diplomacy, Tehran's determination to restore its nuclear program, and Israel's declared readiness for another attack have pushed tensions to the highest point yet. The risk of escalation is real, and this time Iran may be better prepared than before.

Even if Israel maintains its military superiority, particularly in the air, the question remains: What would be the real purpose of a war whose chances of spiraling out of control are higher than ever?

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Russia, and possibly China, is working to push a UN Security Council resolution that would block the mechanism, but for now the E3 powers (France, Germany and the UK) seem intent on following through on their threat, as they have pledged in recent months. The step is expected to be taken in the coming days.

The snapback option was never the Europeans' preferred course. They had hoped to wield the threat of renewed sanctions as leverage to pressure Tehran into accepting an upgraded nuclear deal with the US. To that end, they were prepared to delay implementation for another six months, provided Iran met several conditions.

But with no agreement in sight, the Europeans are faced with two choices: either undermine their credibility by backing down, or proceed with the sanctions knowing it will further reduce the chance of a deal. They appear to have chosen the lesser of two evils. European officials may also hope that added pressure on the regime in Tehran will force it to retreat from its insistence on the right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil.

In Tehran, however, leaders are signaling that they view the move as unavoidable and are seeking to downplay its impact. The Revolutionary Guard would prefer to avoid the E3 activating the mechanism, but the Iranian leadership insists it will not grant concessions to stop what it sees as an illegal step. In any case, the real prize for Iran lies in Washington, which alone has the power to lift all sanctions, especially on the vital energy sector.

For that reason, Iran sees little point in making compromises with Europe. Any significant concessions, such as reinstating inspectors at enrichment sites, would be reserved for negotiations with the US in exchange for a full removal of sanctions.

Since the Europeans had conditioned a delay of snapback on an Iran-US agreement, which Washington itself has shown little interest in pursuing, the chances of avoiding renewed sanctions were slim from the start.

Siege mentality

Iran is bracing for another "dose" of sanctions. While the Islamic republic is likely capable of weathering further restrictions, including a renewed arms embargo, the impact will still be felt in the weakening of its currency, in added diplomatic isolation, and in the deepening of what Iranian officials already describe as a "siege mentality."

The move will further strain Tehran's already tense relations with Germany, Britain and France, while strengthening its turn toward the "global south," in particular Russia and especially China, both politically and economically. Yet this is not the "final nail in the coffin" for the regime.

Among the possible Iranian responses is withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While this cannot be ruled out, the leadership has so far tried to avoid severing ties completely with the international community. As evidence, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency have recently been allowed back into the Bushehr reactor, though only for monitoring fuel rod replacement, not the damaged enrichment sites at Fordo and Natanz.

Tehran may retaliate diplomatically, such as declaring that the E3 are no longer part of the nuclear negotiations, or even suspending its membership in the NPT temporarily. But in practice, it lacks the means to deter the Europeans from carrying out their threat.

The bottom line is that if and when the snapback mechanism is activated, it will in effect push Iran and the US further away from returning to a nuclear deal, the opposite of the E3 powers' original aim of using it as a tool to secure a new agreement.

The economic impact of renewed sanctions is unlikely to be catastrophic, but it will still harm Iran's economy. The harshest blow would come from curtailing its oil exports to China, a step that has not yet been taken. Tehran is expected to react harshly, but it will likely avoid measures that would completely close the door to negotiations, however slim the prospects of a new agreement may be.

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The impressive US Air Force strike on the Fordo enrichment site was significant due to Israel's limited ability to effectively target the site. However, assessing the strike's outcomes remains challenging, and even if it significantly damaged Fordo, Iran's nuclear program has not been fully destroyed.

It appears that before the strike, Iran – as it claims – concealed significant capabilities, likely including enriched material from the enrichment site itself. This, combined with Iran's extensive knowledge, makes rebuilding the program or advancing toward weapons-grade enrichment (90%) a feasible step for Tehran's leadership, despite the heavy damage to the nuclear program.

Moreover, Iran remains steadfast in rejecting the administration's demands on its nuclear and missile programs. As such, the Fordo strike does not conclude the conflict. Tehran's leadership is likely weighing a measured response to avoid direct conflict with the US, which also signaled restraint through pre-strike communications.

A key issue is what follows if Iran refuses to reengage in talks or provide a justification for further US strikes. Will the administration escalate militarily, or will it pivot to tightening sanctions without additional attacks?

Though this strike might signal military options have been exhausted, without a diplomatic breakthrough, stopping Iran from reconstructing its nuclear program is fraught with difficulty. Renewed Israeli strikes could restart hostilities, with intelligence needs paramount. Yet, no deal can compel Iran to abandon its nuclear or missile ambitions, meaning rigid demands will prolong the conflict. The strategic dilemma of ending the war remains unresolved.

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The unusual travel advisory the National Security Council issued on Tuesday warning Israelis against traveling to Turkey, which according to media reports even included contacting dozens of individuals, shouldn't really come as surprise to anyone. Since the May 22 assassination of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Col. Hassan Sayyad Khodaei, Tehran has repeatedly vowed to exact revenge on Israel, which the Islamic republic has accused of the hit.

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A scenario by which Iran would target Israelis on Turkish soil is not far-fetched. Iran prefers to carry out extraterritorial operations in countries with which it has a land border as it facilitates the logistical preparations of such an operation. Moreover, in recent years Iran has managed to establish covert infrastructure aimed at abducting Iranian opposition activists lured to Turkey, and Iranian Quds Force operative Mansour Rasouli admitted he was ordered to target an Israeli diplomat there.

The relations between Iran and Turkey have suffered a significant blow by the recent Turkish rapprochement with Israel. Iran is leery of any country that maintains ties with Israel, especially when said country has a shared border with it. The already complex ties between Tehran and Ankara were further rattled by the latter's moves and that has made it easier for Iran to execute terrorist attacks on Turkey soil which, in turn, could compromise the cautions ties emerging between the two.

However, Iran's retaliation may not follow the "traditional" line of targeting Israeli assets overseas. The "score" Iran has to settle with Israel now includes the hit Khodaei and an explosion at Parchin military complex, which foreign media reports have attributed to Israel, as well as a series of other events, and this increasingly expanding list could force the Iranian leadership to seek another course of action.

Should Iran decide to retaliate directly against Israel, it would have a choice between its missile and drone abilities and its actions over the past year have proved it has the operational ability to carry out such plans.

The shadow war between Iran and Israel is taking place against the backdrop of the US-led efforts to salvage the 2015 nuclear deal. However, barring a serious escalating entailing a regional conflict, the prolonged Israeli-Iranian loggerheads is unlikely to impact the Vienna negotiations.

Either way, the public threats by high-ranking Iranian officials indicate that Tehran is committed to exacting revenge, so it is not a question of "if" but of "when" it decides to act. Israel's goal at this time is to foil these nefarious intentions.

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