Why has Netanyahu's coalition-making been so difficult? A magical moment is recalled in a well-known Israeli song (sung by Yehudit Ravitz in 1979): "You took my hand in yours and told me, let's go down to the garden – the things you see from there are not what you see from here."

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A generation later, in 2005, the refrain "what you see from there is not what you see from here" became a political catchword. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon used it to explain how he, a leader of the far-right, had decided to pull the Israeli military out of Gaza, violating electoral campaign promises and uprooting thousands of Jewish settlers for what he saw as strategic reasons.

From "there" – the Prime Minister's Office – you see things from a perspective quite different from that of an aspiring political firebrand.

The song's refrain appears to be playing in the background of the current coalition negotiations. In theory, forming a new government should have been simple: Netanyahu has a parliamentary majority of like-minded right-wing parties consisting of his own Likud Party, two ultra-Orthodox parties traditionally loyal to his bloc, and three hardline nationalist religious factions united as the Religious Zionist Party.

But instead of a meeting of minds, the process has proven to be harder than expected. The push and pull among the coalition partners reflects their suspicion that once Netanyahu is "there" – sitting behind the prime minister's desk – he will no longer be the ultra-nationalist they want him to be.

True, Netanyahu was raised on the views of Ze'ev Jabotinsky, founder of the Revisionist (i.e., ultra-nationalist) wing of the Zionist movement. Benzion Netanyahu, the prime minister's father, served as editor of Revisionist periodicals and secretary to Jabotinsky. As prime minister, Netanyahu was known as a fierce protector of Israel's security and rights, who was not given to flights of fancy about peace with the Palestinians.

And yet he is very cautious, never trigger-happy, and acutely aware – as someone who lost a brother in combat – of the costs of conflict. He is also a realist, well-informed of Israel's need to take American views into account (and indeed, to keep tensions with Europe within the bounds that allow for significant Israeli exports to European markets).

Moreover, in recent years he has reincarnated himself as Israel's supreme diplomat. He led efforts to cement links with the nations of the eastern Mediterranean, Africa, Latin America, and, above all, India and other key Asian players. Ultimately, this led to the Abraham Accords with Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and others.

Once "there" as prime minister, Netanyahu is obliged to listen and take into account the firm views of the American administration on matters pertaining to the Palestinians and Israel's conduct in Judea, Samaria, and eastern Jerusalem.

He also needs to be attentive to the grave concerns of many American Jews regarding what they see as the tightening grip of radical modern Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox political parties on Israeli policy.

Netanyahu's quest to sustain, deepen and broaden the Abraham Accords – with his sights set on Saudi Arabia – would also impose restraints on the Palestinian front (while at the same encouraging a proactive policy against the Iranian regime).

Hence, Netanyahu's coalition partners are determined to bind his hands in advance.

First, they propose to carve up key ministries, especially the Ministry of Defense, which under international law is the effective sovereign in areas under Israel's military occupation of Judea and Samaria. Parts of the defense minister's portfolio are to be held by an appointee of the religious Zionist camp.

Similarly, key functions of the Ministry of Education will be scattered among several other ministerial or deputy-ministerial positions held by Netanyahu's partners, thus limiting the ability of a Likud minister of education to control educational content.

This aspect of the emerging coalition agreement has already drawn fierce criticism, including from city mayors seeking to reassure their secular electorate that their children will not be force-fed an ultra-nationalist or Orthodox agenda.

Second, Netanyahu's potential coalition partners insist on specific language in the inter-party coalition agreement about the scope of authority, pending legislation, and administrative reforms, particularly regarding the judicial system and the Supreme Court – language that would presumably govern the conduct of the next government. Netanyahu wants a minimalist text and a quick move to the allocation of ministerial portfolios, but his partners are unwilling to agree.

A third complicating factor is the need to pass specific legislation that would clear Aryeh Deri, leader of the ultra-Orthodox Shas party, to serve in the cabinet despite a recent conviction on charges of tax evasion.

Itamar Ben-Gvir, the right-wing rabble-rouser now designated as minister for national (i.e., internal) security, has his own personal piece of legislation on the agenda, one that would give him operational control over the police. The present government's attorney general has already raised doubts about the constitutionality of this act, but her objection is likely to be overruled.

Will the country now be run by uncontrollable hard-right activists who will, in pursuit of their agenda, push the limits in Judea, Samaria, and Jerusalem?

The final say will be with Netanyahu and the small group around him: the defense minister, foreign minister, national security adviser, IDF chief of staff, and heads of the intelligence agencies. Only after the team is in place can we fully assess what will be the state of play in the push-pull over Israeli policy.

Featured on JNS.org, this article was first published by The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune.

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The war in Ukraine is clearly far from over. For Israel, the changes it is bringing about have far-reaching implications. In almost all aspects, the war has enhanced Israel's national security equation and bolstered its position in world affairs.

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First, an element of immense importance, from a national and Zionist perspective, is the dramatic rise in the number of people making aliyah from both Russia and Ukraine. Over 13,000 olim from Ukraine have arrived in Israel since February, and almost alone among the millions of war refugees, it has been the Jews who had a home to go to.

An increasing flow is also coming from Russia, as socioeconomic conditions keep deteriorating and a partial mobilization of reserves has been declared. Israel's Aliyah and Integration Ministry reported nearly 19,000 olim from Russia during the first five months of the war, a more than fourfold rise compared with the same period in 2021. Israel's Zionist imperative, under such circumstances, is rooted in core values and identity, not in the calculus of interest. Still, past experience has taught that any demographic contribution to the Jewish collective in Israel is of strategic importance in the long run.

The war did generate – albeit only in the first few weeks – a rare and indeed unprecedented opportunity for Israel's then-Prime Minister Naftali Bennett to position himself as a mediator, or at least a go-between, a situation that grabbed the spotlight of global attention.

To some extent, this was a way out of the dilemma posed by Israel's need to keep open channels with both sides. The ongoing Israeli activity in Syria, as part of the so-called Campaign Between the Wars, requires ongoing deconfliction with the Russian Air Force, while Israel was also willing to be of help to the Ukrainian leadership, which at the time sought dialogue with Putin. The window of opportunity for mediation – and for a diplomatic positioning acceptable to both sides – has since closed.

There is no reason to test the point at which Russia's volatile patience will run out, and it is legitimate to remain cautious over weapons sales to Ukraine. There are limits to what Israel can part with amid regional tensions, and in any case, it is the US and its NATO allies that undertook to arm Ukraine since the war began, at a cost of tens of billions of dollars. Israel's contribution is bound to be marginal.

Meanwhile, the military-industrial complex – another important part of Israel's strategic assets and resources – has also been dramatically affected by the war. It has grown in prominence globally due to a transformed sense of threat to the West. Israel's defense industries, which provide an indispensable contribution both to the IDF's qualitative edge and to the national economy, have been on the unimaginable brink of really taking off ever since the war broke out.

During Prime Minister Yair Lapid's visit to Berlin, the option of a contract with Germany for the sale of Israel's Arrow 3 missile defense system for more than $2 billion was put on the table. It is part of a broader pattern that is likely to bring Israel's military exports – to leading countries, including the US, and no longer to suspect third-world regimes – above the $15 billion mark annually. This significant economic boost is a source of national strength.

In a more general sense, there is another impact of the war in Ukraine – less concrete, yet important – on Israel's standing in the world. Dramatic security events, such as 9/11, the later wave of terrorism in Europe and now the war in Ukraine, can help others understand both the challenges and dangers Israel faces, and the manner in which it responds to them. Negative terms such as "militarism" and "securitization" are cast aside in favor of the defense and intelligence discourse, in which Israel carries weight well beyond its demographic and geographical dimensions.

Moreover, the sharp rise in the costs of oil and gas, and the fears of a cold winter in Europe, had an almost immediate effect on Israel's position as an energy exporter (albeit a minor one). There was once again talk about the economic feasibility of the EastMed Pipeline, after the US had essentially buried it. Other ways of exporting to Europe based on existing arrangements – such as the tripartite EU-Egypt-Israel agreement for the use of Egyptian liquification facilities – have gained in importance. The talks leading to the agreement began before the war but were greatly accelerated by it.

The same is true of the internal Lebanese dynamic that led to the signing of the parallel exchange of letters over the maritime boundary delineation with Israel. The generous concession Israel made reflected the need to quickly bring gas to the markets, rather than a surrender to Hezbollah threats. Israel responded to US and French needs, and enabled Energean to stay in place and begin gas production at the Karish field.

Indirectly, this also undermined Hezbollah's raison d'être: If Israel agrees to a "win-win" with Lebanon, what need is there for an armed Iranian proxy that pretends to be the "protector of Lebanon"? The willingness of President Michel Aoun, long an ally of Hezbollah, to sign the agreement was proof that the war has had an effect, through the gas market, on Israel's strategic environment.

Moreover, Israel's standing has been enhanced by the fact that its greatest enemy, Iran, has lined up with Russia against the West. Israel has taken steps to persuade Western leaders that this is a watershed event. With Iran firmly aligning itself with the anti-Western camp forged by the Ukraine war, the meaning of a possible nuclear deal changes. It no longer appears to be a statesmanlike achievement for US diplomacy, but a sign of fatal weakness in the face of a scheming, hostile player. Even without confronting the Biden administration, Israel can and should sharpen this message.

Inevitably, an Israeli position that is focused on the Iranian threat and the implications of Iran's support for Russia means further deterioration in Israel's relationship with Putin, but this can hardly be avoided. In addition to the expectations of the Biden administration, the mainstream of both parties in Congress, and the attitude of friendly European leaders, Israel should also be aware of attitudes among American Jews, who strongly support Ukraine.

Friends of Israel on both sides of the political aisle in Washington have begun to offer criticism, albeit subdued, of Israel's "lukewarm" response to Russia's conduct. There is a moral hazard involved in shrugging off horrors such as those exposed in Bucha and later in Izium, and indeed they were denounced by Lapid.

Still, a measured management of the risks involved requires caution when it comes to providing lethal weapons to Ukraine. It is also necessary to sustain some channels of communication with Moscow, despite all that has happened.

In the Syrian arena, where intensive Israeli activity has resumed after a technical hiatus, the message to the Russians should be clear: Not a sentimental attitude but a cold calculation requires both us and them to avoid friction. It falls to them to restrain those in the Syrian regime who look for ways to avenge the attacks on the Damascus and Aleppo airports and mounting Syrian losses.

Israel's military capabilities are well-known to the older generation of Russian officers, hence their realization, which has held firm since 2015, that it is better to let Israel strike in Syria than to come to blows between the Assad regime and the IDF. There are ways of validating this realization in their minds, through direct and indirect communication, while leaving room for reconstructing friendly relations on "the day after."

The bottom line is that the global and regional reality created by the Russia-Ukraine war strengthens Israel and enhances its international and regional standing. The Iranian gamble on a closer association with Russia may yet turn out to have been a costly mistake; one that opens new horizons for Israel in intelligence sharing, diplomacy, and advocacy.

Yet there are also dangerous aspects to the situation, above all because it is increasingly difficult to predict how Putin will react if he finds himself in strategic distress.

Featured on JNS.org, this article was first published by Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

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Egypt has been present in various ways, both directly and indirectly, in the events and developments that have resulted in the current alignment of forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond: Following the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Greece and Cyprus, under pressure from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's neo-Ottoman ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean, saw the need to engage with the new Egyptian leadership under President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi and Israel. They share their concerns, whereas much of the European establishment does not.

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As a result, tripartite summits and numerous ministerial and professional meetings have been occurring regularly since 2015 in the two triangles of Greece-Cyprus-Israel and Greece-Cyprus-Egypt, resulting in the establishment of two parallel secretariats in Nicosia.

With the US increasingly involved in military and other aspects, the Israeli triangle is now known as the 3+1 alignment. While Egypt has yet to agree to joint strategic consultations, Egypt's future is on everyone's mind.

Egypt played a direct, leading role in establishing the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum as an internationally recognized regional organization, initially in 2019 and formally in 2020. This reflected more than just a shared interest in energy. Originally, a 3+3 arrangement involving Italy, Greece and Cyprus, as well as Egypt, Israel and Jordan – with a problematic Palestinian add-on – is reminiscent of the Western Mediterranean Forum, commonly referred to as the 5+5 Dialogue, which included Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, along with five EU countries. But unlike it, it is an alliance of nations with similar ideologies. Later, France became a member, and the United States and the European Union became observers.

3. The Palestinians, in their folly, blocked the United Arab Emirate's participation, but the Emiratis and Saudis did come in as Mediterranean players for their own reasons. The UAE contributed to forming a foreign ministers' consultation group, the Paphos Forum, which brought together the UAE, Israel, Greece and Cyprus.

While Egypt is not fully present, its national concerns and long-term goals are clearly on the agenda. The same can be said of the more recent breakthrough in Greek-Saudi cooperation due to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's visit to Athens.

The so-called "Negev Summit" was actually a meeting of American and Israeli foreign ministers, along with Egypt, Morocco, the UAE, and Bahrain. It will be held twice in 2022 – once in Sde Boker in Israel's southern desert and once in Bahrain. Unlike Cairo's stance in previous decades, which tended to express concern about Arab "normalization" with Israel, el-Sissi gave his full support to the Abraham Accords and their consequences and even hosted an Egyptian-Emirati-Israeli summit in Sharm al-Sheikh in March.

This time, Greece and Cyprus were not there, but Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias said they should be invited to the opening of the B'nai B'rith-sponsored Israel-Hellenic forum on June 27.

During US President Joe Biden's visit to Israel, a new multilateral building block for this regional security architecture emerged: India's idea of a "Western Quad," translated into the so-called "I2U2" group virtual summit. Prime Ministers Narendra Modi of India and Yair Lapid of Israel, President Mohammed bin Zayid of the UAE and Biden met on Zoom and authorized a common agenda.

While there is no apparent link to the Mediterranean, one of the UAE and Israel's long-standing concerns has been to support Egyptian stability and mitigate the potential effects of great power competition in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and beyond. All of this has long piqued the US's interest, which is now spreading to India as it seeks to exert influence over the regional balance of power and counter the ambitions of China and its Belt and Road Initiative.

What Makes Egypt so Important?

A thread connecting the majority, if not all, of these recent interactions is a concern for Egypt's future (and the related issue of control of Libya). Indeed, while there are several compelling reasons for the rise of these alliances, ranging from energy cooperation and other economic and environmental initiatives to military exercises, two strategic issues stand out.

One has to do with Egypt's political stability and orientation following the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood. The other is Erdogan's bid for regional leadership under the banner (until recently) of support for Islamist political forces such as Hamas in Gaza and the Government of National Accord in Libya. Until recently, Erdogan's position toward Israel and her Sunni Arab allies was clear and posed an aggressive challenge to Egypt and Israel.

Indeed, Sissi's ascension to power in 2013 fueled the increasingly common perspectives that brought Israel, Greece and Cyprus together. So too did the outbreak of war in Libya in 2014, which quickly devolved into a proxy conflict between Sissi's Egypt and Erdogan's bid for regional hegemony. Under Erdogan's leadership, Turkey came to see itself as the overarching patron of Muslim Brotherhood movements in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Gaza and elsewhere, fueled by Erdogan's AK Party ideology.

Despite the decline of its direct influence, Egypt remains the most critical part of the regional order. The days of former Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser casting a long shadow across the Arab world are long gone; former President Anwar al-Sadat transformed the conflict, first in war and then in peace; and President Hosni Mubarak was America's most important ally in the region, despite his population's deep anti-Americanism.

But Egypt remains the region's most populous country, the only one to have crossed the 100 million mark between Pakistan and the Atlantic (and, for that matter, between the Sahara and the Russian border). It is also situated at a critical strategic crossroads because China's Belt and Road Initiative must pass through the Suez Canal. Last but not least is Egypt's role as host and leader of the Arab League, which was founded in Egypt in 1944 and has been led by Egyptians for most of its history.

The interconnected issues of Egypt's stability and economic viability are thus critical. At this point, two specific questions loom: Will Egypt benefit significantly from the eastern Mediterranean gas fields' potential? And, as a result of the assault on Ukraine, will there be widespread deprivation, even famine, that threatens the stability of Sissi's rule and provides totalitarian Islamist radicals with opportunities for mischief?

The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Conflict and Its Ramifications

One of the keys to Egypt's future has become a practical and moral struggle between two maps of the eastern Mediterranean representing two opposing visions. The first was part of a memorandum of understanding signed in November 2019 in Ankara by Erdogan and the prime minister of Libya's so-called Government of National Accord (a sure sign of discord). A separate agreement provided for direct Turkish military support, which indeed turned the tide of battle and led to the collapse of Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army siege of Tripoli. This map, which has never been made public, appears to draw the Eastern Mediterranean EEZ in a way that deliberately ignores Greece's rights to sovereignty in Crete, Carpatos and Rhodes; and purportedly creates a border between Turkey and Libya, which would bottle up all possible energy links between Israel, Egypt and Cyprus on the one hand, and Greece and the rest of Europe on the other.

Another map was created in response to the first after extensive discussions between Greece and Egypt, and the foreign ministers of both countries signed it in Cairo on August 7, 2020. When it comes to the waters off Crete, it contradicts the Turkish-Libyan map and relies on the law of the sea, implying that Greece and Egypt share an extensive EEZ.

Significantly, the UAE declared its support for the Egyptian-Greek agreement a day later, followed six days later by Israel. Almost immediately after, the Abraham Accords were announced. This was not entirely coincidental: Israel's stance on the neo-Ottoman challenge was crucial for the UAE and others in the region. The fight is far from over.

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The prospect of food shortages and social disruption adds to the difficulty of energy extraction. The challenge now is to translate the alignment into an effective energy policy, with European and US support, to help Europe break its Russian energy habit, as well as to design a solution to the delineation issue that respects the law of the sea and the legal rights of all while providing reasonable answers to Turkish concerns.

As long as the regional alignment remains in place and the United States, which has significant sway over Ankara in the run-up to a Turkish election year, commits to supporting Israel, Egypt, Greece and Cyprus on this matter, this should not be beyond human capacity. Israel and its Washington allies must play an active role in promoting this agenda.

Meanwhile, given the magnitude of the crisis and what is at stake, it may be necessary to seek additional US and E.U. assistance. Once again, it may be up to Israel to help lobby for this kind of emergency help, given all that could happen (for Israel and the whole region) if Egypt fell into the wrong hands or its society fell apart.

While the specifics of Israel's role do not need to be publicized, Sissi should be aware of these efforts.

Col. (ret.) Dr. Eran Lerman, the former deputy director of Israel's National Security Council, is the vice president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

This article was originally published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

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The Blue Flag 2021 air force exercise and the gathering in Israel of air force commanders from several countries, including the United Arab Emirates, represents an impressive milestone.

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This international cooperation has now been extended to include joint naval operations with United States Central Command (CENTCOM). The Israeli Navy and the US Navy's Fifth Fleet held a joint exercise for the first time in September in the Red Sea, marking the transition of cooperation to CENTCOM.

Moreover, this was followed by a joint special forces exercise with the US Marine Corps near Eilat and the extraordinary step of a joint naval exercise with the Israeli Navy's Red Sea flotilla, Emirati and Bahraini ships, and the US Fifth Fleet.

In September, CENTCOM officially took control of the military's relationship with Israel, taking over from European Command (EUCOM).

In addition to improving military capabilities, Israel's military diplomacy also has strategic value in consolidating the country's role as a member of good standing in what might be termed the Like-Minded Defense Community. This community enhances Israel's stature among its regional partners, undermines efforts to isolate it and sends a message to hostile forces.

Blue Flag 2021

The fifth biannual Blue Flag multinational air force exercise, held from Oct. 17-28 at the Uvda Air Force Base in the Negev, was the largest and most significant since the exercise series began in 2013. The exercise is modeled after the US Air Force's largest combat training exercise, Red Flag, held at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada.

Officially, eight air forces took part in Blue Flag: the Israeli Air Force, the US Air Force, Britain's Royal Air Force (for the first time), and the Indian, German, French, Italian and Greek air forces. In addition, judging by a leaked photo from the exercise, it appears that the Jordanian Air Force participated as well – and probably not for the first time. Overall, 37 guest planes and some 1,500 troops arrived in Israel for the exercise.

The drills focused on new threats, such as cooperation against a virtual enemy state, "Dragonland," the air-defense profile of which resembled Syria. The exercise also included defense against intruding enemy aircraft and strikes against the enemy's rear areas, defended by surface-to-air missile batteries.

Further, the participants carried out close air support for ground forces and the escorting of transport aircraft for in-depth raiding forces.

The exercise utilized the capabilities of the fifth-generation F-35 fighter aircraft, which can communicate with and support friendly forces.

There were three unique characteristics of the drill that represent the transformation of Israel's international standing:

1. At the beginning of the exercise, aircraft from participating nations performed a fly-over salute over Jerusalem – including a side-by-side flight by IAF commander Maj. Gen. Amikam Norkin and his German counterpart, Lt. Gen. Ingo Gerhartz. The latter flew a Eurofighter repainted in the colors of both nations' flags. After the fly-over, the countries exchanged medals in two separate ceremonies. Both the fly-over and the symbolic ceremonies won broad attention in the Israeli media, much more so than during previous Blue Flag exercises.

2. During the exercise, there were visits at Uvda Air Force Base by senior representatives from the air forces of several countries, including Japan and Australia, which, together with the United States and India, form an alliance that could redefine the balance of power in Asia. Particularly noted in news coverage was UAE air force commander Maj.-Gen. Ibrahim Nasser Muhammad Al Alawi, whose presence signaled the depth of cooperation in the era of the Abraham Accords. In addition, all senior guests were invited to a dinner hosted by President Isaac Herzog.

3. Nevatim Air Force Base hosted a US-sponsored gathering of air force commanders of forces that deploy F-35s. This, too, reflected the unique standing of the IAF and the IDF as a valuable force that can contribute to the capacities of NATO members.

The broader context

The exercise, and the coverage it received, demonstrate that the IDF's cooperation with other military forces has become institutionalized. In recent years, a profound transformation has taken place regarding the overt presence of Israel as a legitimate and vital part of the defense of like-minded nations.

Once Israel was transferred to CENTCOM's area of responsibility, there emerged a pattern of participation in operational activities, not just exercises. For example, Israeli fighter jets have escorted US bombers on their way to deployment in the region.

The appointment of a permanent IDF liaison officer at CENTCOM headquarters in Florida is a pattern that is likely to be enhanced. Unlike cooperation with EUCOM within NATO operations in the Mediterranean, which were foiled in recent years by a Turkish veto, work with CENTCOM is not necessarily subject to the consent of all other regional players.

Meanwhile, as guests of the Hellenic air force, Israeli fighters now participate annually in the "INIOCHOS" exercises in Greece, alongside the air forces of the United States, France, Italy, Spain, Cyprus and the UAE.

The Israeli Navy joined the "Nemesis" exercise in November 2021 in Cyprus, alongside the United States, several European allies and Egypt(!). In addition, the IDF special forces regularly train in the Troodos mountains range in Cyprus, simulating scenarios of warfare deep in Lebanese territory.

Furthermore, the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, held joint exercises with Greece and Cyprus. In April 2021, the foreign ministers of Cyprus, Greece, the UAE and Israel met in Paphos, Cyprus, adding a diplomatic layer to the patterns of military cooperation.

In Asia, while treading carefully not to raise the ire of China, Israel is increasingly cooperating with the US-led Quad that includes the UAE and India. Over the last decade, Israel also witnessed breakthroughs in defense cooperation with Australia and Japan.

Moreover, for two generations, it has built what amounts to a security partnership with Singapore, and the attempts to treat it as a secret are becoming absurd. For example, Defense Minister Benny Gantz held what was supposed to be a secret trip to the country in October, but the news leaked.

In Europe, cooperation with the German air force is not limited to the Blue Flag exercises. Working relations are extensive and continuous, demonstrated by the growing personal relationships between German and Israeli officers. In addition, Israeli units have been taking part in some NATO exercises.

The demonstrative jump by Israeli paratroopers in Slovenia this year was carried out in commemoration of the brave men and women, such as the legendary Hannah Senesh, who the Nazis executed in 1944.

Moreover, Israel has a significant role in the extensive intelligence cooperation in terrorism and nuclear proliferation, with no one agency able to contend with all the challenges alone. Israel also consults with the Five Eyes alliance between Australia, Britain, Canada and the United States.

How does military diplomacy serve Israel's strategic interests?

Technological superiority and defensive capabilities add to the now-familiar triad of deterrence, early warning and decisive outcome.

True, the scenarios in the exercise were not designed to simulate any action against Iran, though the exercise did occur in conjunction with a rising level of tension and a statement by the IDF chief that preparations for a military response to the Iranian nuclear project are now underway. Israel certainly does not expect any participants to be of active help should such circumstances arise. Yet more generally, the recognition granted by other air forces to the strength and sophistication of Israel's air force should give Tehran and other regional foes such as Turkey pause.

The regional forces opposing Israel seek its political, economic and military isolation. This military cooperation between Israel and its regional and Western allies, along with trade and other areas of exchange, demonstrate that at the end of the day, these factors are far more critical than meaningless votes at the United Nations.

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Equally important is the message to Israel's newly established friends in the region, and to Egypt and Jordan, who find themselves in the same trenches against revolutionary Islamists. This exercise and others, including those taking place in the Eastern Mediterranean, establish a significant alignment of forces.

Finally, the growing military and intelligence cooperation contribute directly to the overlap with Israel's advanced technological solutions. This, in turn, generates interest in acquiring Israeli technology.

This provides income and employment – but above all, contributes significantly to Israel's national security. Only a solid and reliable economic grounding – which requires larger markets than the IDF can provide – enables the defense industries to thrive and make their top-end products available.

Featured on JNS.org, this article was first published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies.

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There have been several signs over the past few weeks that the Turkish government is seeking a "reset" with Israel. The most notable was Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's conversation (July 12) with Israeli President Isaac Herzog after the latter took office.

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This effort comes against the background of US-Turkish tensions and EU sanction threats over aspects of Turkish policy, but also of Erdogan's and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus's aggressive stance on the future of the island.

As the visits of the Greek and Cypriot foreign ministers indicate (on July 21 and 26, respectively), Israel's partners in the Eastern Mediterranean feel the need for reassurance with regard to an obvious attempt to drive a wedge between them and Israel. In line with the positions taken during their meetings, it should indeed be made clear to all, including Egypt, that any (unlikely) improvement in relations with Turkey will not come at their expense.

Despite the signals, as an Islamist, Erdogan's basic orientation towards Israel is bound to remain hostile.

Why does Turkey profess to be interested in rapprochement with Israel?

Erdogan's relatively long telephone conversation with Israel's new president came within five days after the latter took office. The official readout of their discussion mentions the "potential for cooperation between the countries in many fields, in particular, the areas of energy, tourism and technology," as well as the need to maintain a dialogue "despite the differences of opinion." (Erdogan's version, as might have been expected, gave due place to the need for "a two-state lasting and comprehensible solution within the framework of UN resolutions.") This was read in Israel and beyond as a bid to shed the bitter tensions of the past decade and open a channel of communication.

Indeed, this was not the only gesture of its kind by Turkey aimed at countries in the region with which it almost came to blows in recent years. Senior envoys have gone to Egypt now that the situation in Libya has been stabilized to some degree. Both Ankara and Cairo know that they cannot get everything they want in Libya. Turkey's allies in Tripoli cannot get rid of Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army, and even with Egypt's support, the LNA under Haftar cannot conquer the country's eastern half. A political process, fragile and complicated, is underway, and Turkey is obliged to seek some understandings with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

Turkey has also reached out to Saudi Arabia, after a long period of tension over the siege of Qatar and other points of contention.

The signaling to Israel is thus part of a broader pattern. At its root lies a growing sense of diplomatic isolation and vulnerability, given Turkey's reduced standing in Washington (as demonstrated by President Joe Biden's recognition of the Armenian Genocide); and on the other hand, the hope of driving a wedge between the members of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum alignment.

Moreover, this coincides with the decision to escalate pressure on the Cypriots to accept facts on the ground in the TRNC controlled areas, and specifically, the reopening of the ghost city of Varosha, near Famagusta, to habitation by Cypriot (or Anatolian) Turks.

In this light, the courtship of Israel needs to be seen as a bid to sow dissent among key members of the strategic alignment embodied by the EMGF. Ankara looks upon this regional organization, and its underlying logic of strategic cooperation on a broad range of issues, as a deliberate effort to contain Turkish aspirations for hegemony in the region.

Distancing Israel, as well as Egypt (and Egypt's Arab backers) from Greece and Cyprus could make it easier for Erdogan to pursue his neo-Ottoman ambitions, rewrite the rules in Cyprus, and down the road (even if tensions in the Aegean have abated somewhat) implement the concept of the "blue homeland" (mavi vatan).

This concept assumes an extended realm of maritime control which ignores the Exclusive Economic Zone rights of Greece; Turkey's map negates the EEZ delineation generated by the existence of Rhodes, Karpathos and Crete. Clearly, one of the drivers of Erdogan's move in Cyprus is the incessant need for action which stems from the growing discontent and signs of domestic weakness of his ruling party, AKP (and the reliance on the ultra-nationalist MHP).

Signs of worry in Athens and Nicosia?

Not surprisingly, a note of alarm began to enter the Greek and Cypriot discourse with Israel. Both countries understand that the "alignment" is not (yet?) an alliance, and that Israel is not and will not be committed to join a military confrontation with Turkey if one erupts.

Still, the reality and the perception of close coordination with Israel on a range of issues contribute to the resilience of both Greece and Cyprus in the face of an aggressive challenge. Hence the concern about a possible change of Israeli attitudes towards Turkey.

With notable alacrity, both Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias (July 21) and his Cypriot counterpart Nikos Christodoulides (July 26) visited Israel within a fortnight of Erdogan's call. While there is a wide range of issues on the bilateral as well as the trilateral agenda, it was manifest that the recent aggressive stance taken by Turkey in Cyprus was at the forefront of their concerns.

They came to be reassured about Israel's stance. Significantly, President Herzog also called his Greek counterpart, Katerina Sakellaropoulou, to inform her of the content of his conversation with Erdogan, and met with Christodoulides during his visit, apparently with the same purpose in mind.

Israel's priority: Shoring up the Mediterranean alignment

During both visits, Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid went out of his way to show fraternity and warmth (also seeking, more broadly, to repair Israel's relations with Europe). During his meeting with Christodoulides, he publicly criticized Turkish actions in Varosha and expressed Israeli solidarity with Cyprus.

These sentiments, as already indicated, need not be interpreted as a strategic commitment. The ability of Cyprus to counter these actions, beyond bringing the matter to the attention of the international community, is quite limited to begin with.

Israel's stance does, however, send a clear signal that needs to be sustained. The alignment, as developed in recent years, is important to Israel in many respects (including some which pertain to our national security in future emergencies, and to Israel's diplomatic standing in Europe). It will not be traded away for a short-lived rapprochement with a leader in Turkey whose Islamist orientation remains fundamentally hostile.

There is also the significant aspect of Israel's improving relationship with France. (That relationship has been shaken, but not undermined, by the NSO scandal, which was the immediate reason for the urgent visit of Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz to Paris). Now a member of the EMGF, France shares with Israel a perspective on Turkish ambitions, and like Israel and Egypt does not grieve over the removal of elements associated with the Muslim Brotherhood from power in Tunisia.

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Even more important are the relationships with Jordan (a member of good standing of the EMGF, although it has no Mediterranean shore of its own) and Egypt. Stabilizing Jordan is vital to peace and stability for the Eastern Mediterranean as a whole. The king of Jordan's trilateral summit in Athens with the leaders of Greece and Cyprus (July 28) was an important step towards the consolidation of the alignment.

As for el-Sisi, who at present also plays a key role in seeking to calm tensions with Hamas in Gaza, the importance of his role can hardly be overstated. While he may be willing to engage with Erdogan over practical matters, such as the Libyan situation, the basic ideological chasm between his regime and the Islamist orientation of the AKP is not likely to be bridged.

For Israel, the obvious message to send is that with very few exceptions – and Erdogan's Turkey is not one of them – the strategic commonality with Egypt is at the very top of our long-term interests and must remain so. Alongside Israel's partners in the United Arab Emirates, and through the utilization of the growing cooperation between Greek and Jewish diasporic organizations in the United States (and elsewhere), active efforts should be made to uphold the international legitimacy of the Greek-Egyptian EEZ map, and to ensure that US policy on Libya will push back against Turkey's bid for hegemony.

IDF Col. (res) Dr. Eran Lerman is vice president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies. Lerman was deputy director for foreign policy and international affairs at the National Security Council in the Israeli Prime Minister's Office. He held senior posts in IDF Military Intelligence for more than 20 years and teaches in the Middle East Studies program at Shalem College in Jerusalem.

Featured on JNS.org, this article was first published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies.

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Even as Hamas continues its salvo of rockets into Israel, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Fatou Bensouda announced on Twitter that her office will monitor the sides' conduct for possible war crimes being committed in the flare-up.

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At first sight, this should be great news for Israel. Under the Rome Statute, which laid the foundation for the court's jurisdiction, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad are committing double war crimes daily: directing attacks against Israeli civilians not involved in hostilities and using civilians as human shields.

Unfortunately, it is not the Hamas terrorists the ICC wants to investigate. The start date of another probe Bensouda launched – into Israeli conduct in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip – begins with the day after three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped and murdered by terrorists in 2014. It is clear they are not interested in investigating Hamas, but Israel alone.

The same is true of the current Israel-Gaza conflict. The only thing that leaves room for hope is Bensouda's successor, British lawyer Karim Khan, who might reexamine this march of folly – which has undermined the ICC's own authority and turned it into a political circus.

Bensouda's latest investigation into Israel is not only an insult to the Israel Defense Forces, which uses phone calls and roof-knock munitions to evacuate Gazans ahead of airstrikes, but also a message to the terrorists that the ICC is on their side. They can now go ahead and double down on their aggression.

It also harms the Palestinians themselves, a nation whose terrorists claim to "protect" its values and interests. The ICC's encouragement will only promote the cycle of violence.

Lastly, the ICC's decision to define Palestinian territory based on the June 4, 1967 lines will only harm the Palestinian people, which is not the case for their leaders, who benefit from the conflict. It sets unrealistic expectations about what the permanent peace accord would look like, essentially blocking the prospects of any agreement, and therefore, further perpetuating the conflict.

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The outrage in Israel over the deaths and the continuous, intense firing of rockets on the center of the country prompts a discussion about the option of military force. There is no doubt that the IDF has the upper hand in achieving this goal, if it is asked to do so. It is also important to illustrate to Hamas leaders that in their unbridled conduct, they are hastening the moment where this will be inevitable.

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At the same time, when widespread regional flare-ups around the Iranian nuclear crisis can erupt at any time, there are other considerations, no less legitimate, that require prudent and calculated conduct.

In the absence of a political alternative – seeing as how Mahmoud Abbas will not enter Gaza on an Israeli tank – an extensive ground operation to overthrow Hamas could bring the IDF into a state of continuous rule over a distinctly hostile population, and all that it entails. This is not the time to divert the gaze and center of gravity of Israel's capabilities from the threat on the northern front, and from the need to leave all options open against Iran and its metastases.

The definition the army gave to its objectives in Operation Pillar of Defense are once again being heard, as they were on previous occasions: a "weakened and deterred" Hamas. But in the unique circumstances of Operation Guardian of Walls, one must be more precise and say "(very) weakened and (very) deterred".

The IDF blows should be intense and aimed at causing severe damage to the intermediate level of command, infrastructure and weapons. It is important that the blow reverberates with a reluctance for future military confrontation for years to come. In doing so, it is important to unequivocally sever any connection between the end of the round of fighting in Gaza and Jerusalem, or the status of Israeli Arabs.

Israel is not alone in having a stake in Hamas not gaining any grip on the Temple Mount, thereby undermining the status of the camp of stability in the Arab world: the consequences of such an achievement for terrorism will be far-reaching. Even if many in the Arab world protest against Israel's actions, their actual interest is to prevent Hamas from gaining any achievements in this arena. To the same extent, it must be ensured that Hamas does not have the power to channel the dangerous attitudes on the Arab street in Israel for its own political needs.

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The United States is keen to return to the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran and is likely to do so even though the Islamic Republic is playing hard to get. (This assumes that Ayatollah Ali Khameini indeed wants to renew the accord, to obtain sanctions relief).

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The Biden administration's declared intention of reaching a "better and longer-lasting" follow-on agreement with Iran − focused on more effective inspections, Iran's regional mischief and ballistic missiles − will be null and void if Iranian demands for full sanctions relief are met. Such a concession would leave the US without any real leverage on Iran.

The regime will certainly attempt to obtain an American commitment to preventing Israeli attacks against it in line with the Western commitment in the 2015 accord not to sabotage Iran's nuclear facilities. Thus far, Washington has refrained from publicly criticizing Israel for its alleged attacks on Iranian targets. But if Washington agrees with Iran on a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Israel will be put in a difficult position.

Does it continue covert action aimed at slowing the Iranian nuclear project, against the wishes of the Biden administration? And if covert operations exhaust themselves, will Israel risk conflict with the US by directly attacking Iranian nuclear facilities?

Even if the lifting of sanctions gives the Iranian economy only a gradual boost, Tehran's position in the Middle East will be significantly strengthened and its aggressive behavior across the region will intensify – as it did after the 2015 accord was signed.

Worst of all, an American return to the 2015 agreement in defiance of Israel's concerns on an issue that is vital to its security will cast a dark shadow over the Jewish state's status as a key American ally in the Middle East. And it would be wrong to assume that any "compensation" offered to Jerusalem by Washington will include armaments that will improve Israel's attack capability against Iranian nuclear facilities.

Under these circumstances, Israel's entente with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia may intensify. On the other hand, it also is possible that the Gulf Arabs will bandwagon with Iran when they see America withdrawing from the region and Israel's hands tied by the United States. The Biden administration clearly is less committed to the Abraham Accords than its predecessor. The seeds of a Saudi Arabia-Iran dialogue, brokered by Iraq, are already evident.

There also are question marks about the future of ties between Israel and Azerbaijan, a country in which Israel has important strategic assets. However, Baku is growing closer to Ankara, and this could lead Azerbaijan to adopt a less friendly approach towards Israel, especially if Washington disregards Jerusalem.

Such a weakening of Israel's strategic status, alongside the Biden administration's friendlier approach to the Palestinians, may increase the latter's demands on Israel. This could be accompanied by Palestinian violence.

In the face of these worrying trends, the following matters should be uppermost in Israel's mind:

Israel must unapologetically explain its diplomatic and security stance and equip its friends with clear talking points – that a return to the 2015 agreement is not only a threat to Israel but will shorten the time for an Iran nuclear breakout and precipitate nuclear-weapons proliferation across the Mideast, including in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt; a danger to the entire world.

It is vital to preserve Israel's freedom of action. A resolute Israeli position, backed by action against the Iranian nuclear project that threatens to cause nuclear proliferation throughout the Middle East, will strengthen the Abraham Accords and prevent Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states from moving closer to Iran. Speaking out loudly in opposition to the renewal of the JCPOA is an element in maintaining Israel's freedom of action and deterrent ability. It is important to do so now in real time.

Jerusalem needs to prepare for heightened tensions with Washington and attempt to temper this through diplomatic efforts in Congress, in the Jewish community and with friendly groups in the United States. Israel's stance against the nuclear agreement still can receive considerable sympathy in the United States.

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It is critical that these messages be conveyed by senior professional echelons, without partisan political messaging – Israeli or American. Even if there are disagreements with the Biden administration, the possibility of a US-Israel rift must be avoided.

Israel should be prepared to defend itself against Iranian missile attacks from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen.

Iran wants to surround Israel with missile bases. In this context, Jordan is likely to be a target for Iranian subversion. Strategically, Jordan is Israel's "soft underbelly." Therefore, Jerusalem must do what it can to help maintain the stability of the Jordan.

Indeed, it will take a great deal of sophistication and skill to overcome the difficult situation in which Israel finds itself.

Featured on JNS.org, this article was first published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

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US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin's visit to Israel this week is a milestone in the joint effort to stop Iran's nuclear program. 

This is the first visit by a senior Biden administration official in the region, and this is a positive signal in and of itself as to Israel's status in the eyes of the United States.

On top of that, the visit and the talks it involves are taking place while Israeli and American defense officials are increasing their collaboration. Only recently Israel started providing Iron Dome missile defense systems to the US armed forces, which consider Israel to be an important ally. 

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Gone are the days of the openly hostile defense secretaries, as was the case with James Forrestal in the 1940s or with Caspar Weinberger in the late 1980s. Austin's political clout in the administration's inner circle was visibly on display as of late when he asked Congress for a much higher budget than experts had anticipated: $715 billion

Apart from that, the timing of the visit is critical: The US is now assessing the impact of the indirect talks with Iran on reviving the nuclear deal. It appears that Iran considers itself in a strong position and has interpreted the administration's conduct (including vis-a-vis the war in Yemen) as enthusiasm to reach a deal. Thus, it insists that all the sanctions that were imposed by the Trump administration be lifted, even those that are unrelated to the nuclear program. 

This could prove counterproductive for Tehran. The Biden administration, having already shown that it is willing to hold talks, can seize on the Iranian intransigence in order to create a unified front with its European allies. 

Austin's stance on Iran, as the former CENTCOM commander, will carry significant weight. He knows the power players in the region and thus it is important that Israel show to him just how closely knitted our defense establishments are on all fronts: technological innovation, intelligence, cyber, maritime defense, the global war on Islamic terrorism.

On this strong foundation, we can also build toward a more unified approach with the US on Iran, and lay forth key demands for a new deal that would be longer and stronger (as President Joe Biden said he wanted). 

Thus, we cannot rule out that in light of recent events, including the leaks coming out of Washington, Austin will ask Israel to scale back its activities.

If he makes such a demand, it is imperative that we use this visit to once again make it clear to the Americans that Israel has the right to defend itself the way it sees fit. This is a sacred principle for Israel and it is also important to its new friends in the region, who rely on its strength and its willingness to use it when needed.

It also serves the US's long-term interest. As we learned in 1938, without exercising power when needed, negotiations can lead to appeasement. 

Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman is vice president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

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The Biden administration faces a daunting array of challenges, many of them pressing: the corona crisis and its attendant economic emergency; deep and divisive disagreements on social policy, migration, race and identity politics; reversing Trump's course on climate change; the competition with China; tensions with Putin; and Iran's drive towards a nuclear bomb – an almost overwhelming list. Less urgent concerns may stay low down on the list.

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Still, it is in the interest of Israel, and of her partners in the regional alignment (alongside Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, with France keenly involved too) to alert the administration, and Congress, to the need to chart a new and coherent course for US policy towards the eastern Mediterranean. Otherwise, the tensions that have threatened the region in recent months might erupt, in a manner damaging to basic American interests. Two NATO members coming to blows would be a major setback for the alliance and for the West.

This is partially the result of a problematic record, in recent years, of incoherence in US policy towards Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's neo-Ottoman agenda. Occasional bursts of criticism, and expressions of support for Greece and Cyprus (including the resumption of symbolic arms supplies to the latter) have been interspersed with acts signaling sympathy, at the highest level, for Erdoğan and his moves (for example, in northern Syria) and for his style of governance. In the crucial struggle for Libya, until recent weeks the United States had done little to affect the outcome. All this needs to change.

What happened? And what is at stake?

Tensions have become more acute since the humiliating failure of Erdoğan's party, the AKP, in the municipal elections (notably in Istanbul) in the summer of 2019. This has only served to bolster his alliance with the ultra-nationalist MHP, enhancing the dangerous combination of the Islamist longing for the caliphate and ultra-nationalist yearnings for a lost empire. In practice, Erdoğan undertook several actions:

1. In October 2019, apparently with a nod from President Donald Trump, Turkish troops embarked on the conquest of significant Syrian territory extending east from 'Afrin, already under full Turkish occupation, to the Euphrates, and then again in a large area further east, all the way to Iraq. Turkish and Russian patrols share control of the strip south of the Syrian-Turkish border. This greatly curtailed but has not (yet?) destroyed, the Kurdish state-within-a-state in northeastern Syria (called Rojava by the Kurds). (Trump later qualified his stance by telling Erdoğan, in his own inimitable style, "Don't be a tough guy. Don't be a fool.")

2. In Iraq itself, Turkish forces have regularly operated for years across the border in active pursuit of PKK elements in the areas ruled by the KRG (Kurdish Regional Government). This pattern persists now, in conjunction with the Turkish incursion in Syria.

3. In November 2019, in Ankara, Erdoğan signed two memoranda of understanding with Prime Minister Fa'iz Sarraj – head of the "Government of National Accord" in Libya. The latter, at the time, was in control only of limited areas in the country's northwest, and under siege in Tripoli itself by "Libyan National Army" troops loyal to the self-styled Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar.

One of the MoUs arranged for Turkish military intervention in the war, in support of the GNA. The other set in motion a broader regional crisis by agreeing on a map delineating Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the eastern Mediterranean in a manner that gives Turkey a common border with Libya (in line with the Turkish Mavi Vatan, or "Blue Homeland" concept, which ignores the EEZ rights of Greek islands such as Rhodes, Carpathos and Crete). If enforced, this would deny Israel, Egypt and Cyprus access by pipeline or cable to Greece and European energy markets. At the symbolic level, this represents an overt bid to assert neo-Ottoman hegemony.

4. By May 2020, the introduction of Turkish forces (including Bayraktar drones and air defense units) and proxies (mainly Syrian Islamist militias) brought about a dramatic reversal of military fortunes in Libya. Haftar's over-extended forces withdrew, al-Wattiyah Air Base fell to the GNA militias and the siege of Tripoli was lifted. As the GNA offensive gained ground and threatened to push eastwards, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt made his own countermove. He drew a red line, warning that advance beyond the Jufra-Sirte line in central Libya would lead to an Egyptian military intervention (a threat backed by a significant concentration of armored forces near the Libyan border). This act indeed produced a fragile stalemate, and an opportunity for diplomatic efforts that led to the creation of a new governmental structure.

5. Consequently, on Aug. 6, 2020, Egyptian Foreign Minister Samih Shukri and his Greek counterpart Nikos Dendias signed in Cairo an agreement delineating a "counter-map," asserting Greek EEZ rights and the existence of an EEZ border between Egypt and Greece. Significantly, the UAE expressed full support for this map within a day; Israel did so on Aug. 12. One day later came the announcement in Washington of the planned signing of the "Abraham Accords," indicating the role of the new regional alignment in the Mediterranean, as well as in the Arabian Gulf facing Iran.

6. This alignment is openly backed by France. The Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, established in January 2019 and transformed into a proper regional organization a year later, includes Italy, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Cyprus, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, with France scheduled to join in 2021. The UAE, the United States, and the European Union are permanent observers. The French have also conducted military exercises with Greece and hosted Sisi for a significant state visit.

7. On the other hand, Erdoğan's Turkey looks upon the alignment as a hostile conspiracy. (This, despite repeated assertion by EMGF participants that this is not an exclusionary cabal, and that the Forum is open to other like-minded nations.) This has led to a series of provocative Turkish acts, particularly in the form of seismic surveying by research vessels (such as the Oruc Rais) in waters claimed by Ankara under the "Blue Homeland" map.

Tensions rose in the Aegean and over the Greek island of Kastelorizo, threatening to slide into hostilities. But European pressures helped reduce tensions and brought about comprehensive talks between Turkey and Greece. Whether these can lead to a "Zone of Possible Agreement" remains to be seen. To this list of tensions, one could add the Turkish successful intervention in support of Azerbaijan in the recent war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.

What is at stake amid these local confrontations is the ultimate question of Erdogan's neo-Ottoman ambitions. Symbolic acts, such as the re-dedication of the Aghia Sophia as a mosque; and inflammatory language, such as the calls for the "liberation" of al-Aqsa, add to the sense of alarm in Jerusalem. Recent Turkish overtures have done little, so far, to allay the concerns of Israel, Egypt and Greece, given that Ankara continues to harbor Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood subversives and to endorse Islamist causes.

The American role

As noted by an Israel journalist, US policy – or the lack thereof – has played a problematic role in enabling Erdoğan's conduct. True, in the waning months of the Trump administration Secretary of State Mike Pompeo did offer sharp criticism of Turkish regional policy, and the United States castigated the shelter and support Turkey extends to Hamas terrorists. But for years, Washington adopted positions that amounted to appeasement of the AKP government at the expense of US allies such as the largely Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces. In Libya, too, the American position towards the GNA and the Turkish intervention was far too vague. Most significantly, there has been no authoritative American endorsement of the Greek-Egyptian map.

All this needs to change, and indeed can change under the Biden administration, as it settles down to sort out priorities and policies. Some of the appointments to the ranks below the Cabinet level indicate the prospect of a departure from past policies. Key players in the administration, who have been involved in various ways in the fight against the Islamic State since 2014, have formed an unfavorable opinion of Erdoğan's role and the duplicity of the Turkish authorities. Even in the battle of Kobani, which played a crucial role in reversing the tide of ISIS expansion, Turkey did as little as possible – despite pressure from the US-led coalition – to enable the Kurds to survive and prevail. There are now people in positions of responsibility in Washington who have not forgotten this.

This does not mandate a swing to the other, extreme end of the spectrum. Clearly, Turkey is a major regional player and will remain so. (Nor will it leave NATO of its own free will, and there is no procedure for removing a member of the alliance). The United States does not want to push Ankara all the way to a full reliance on Russia and a working alignment with Iran (or even in the direction, already hinted at by Erdoğan, of seeking nuclear weapons). Even for Israel, let alone the United States, diplomatic engagement with Ankara is important.

But the "rules of the road" for such an engagement need to be equally clear. Talk about "liberating al-Aqsa," and the sheltering of active Hamas operatives, must cease. Following the Qatari-Saudi understanding, and the parallel Egyptian effort to reach out to the GNA and stabilize the status quo, Turkey will need to assure the Biden administration that it will promptly renounce past patterns of propaganda against Egypt and support of the Muslim Brotherhood across the region.

Two-faced practices by the MIT (the "Turkish CIA," under Hakan Fidan) in terms of facilitating the movement of Islamist radicals must come to an end. The same is true for the deployment of Syrian and other militias as Turkish proxies in Libya and elsewhere.

At the strategic level, and as a major demonstrable departure from Trump's ambiguous policy, the United States should make it clear that the Turkish-Libyan EEZ delineation map should be taken off the table, in favor of an open-ended negotiation with Greece and Egypt aimed at a practical compromise serving the interests of all (including Israel).

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What Israel should seek to do (in close cooperation with Greece and Cyprus and in consultation with Egypt's leadership) is to draw the administration's attention to these perspectives and to suggest a practical, open-minded way for Turkey to change course. It should be the purpose of such a policy to enable Ankara to change course, and thus take its proper place in a US-led regional alignment. US allies in the Gulf can be of help in offering positive incentives for this kind of transition.

At the same time, with their unique capacity to mobilize kin or "diaspora" communities, Israel and Greece can play a crucial role in encouraging key members of Congress to clarify what Turkey would be required to do; and what the relevant rewards would be if it does so (in terms of economic opportunities, and perhaps international help in dealing with a large refugee population). A creative solution for the S-400 problem is also needed. Since Congress is unlikely to defray the costs of packing up these missile systems and sending them back to Russia, perhaps some regional player (such as the Saudis or the UAE) may wish to do so, if and when Ankara proves that it is no longer playing a subversive role in regional affairs.

At the same time, Erdoğan should also be made aware of the consequences if he insists on pursuing his present policies. Biden does not need to utilize Trump's crude threats. The Turkish economy is fragile, and Erdoğan's popularity rests upon his ability to deliver economic growth. Turkey is not Iran, which has long been impoverished and cut off from world trade. As a member of the G-20, Turkey's economic future depends on its place in the global economy. Defying the United States and the international community by pursuing its regional ambitions (let alone, as some suspect, embarking on a quest for military nuclear capabilities) could and should have an unambiguous price tag attached to it.

IDF Col. (res) Dr. Eran Lerman is vice president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies.

This article was first published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies.

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