Through overnight, baseless accusations, İmamoğlu was charged with organized crime. To make matters worse, his university degree - a prerequisite for running for the Turkish presidency - was revoked. In other words, Erdogan successfully carried out a "political assassination" to secure his grip on power. It is important to emphasize that he would not have been able to act so ruthlessly at home if he did not feel strong on the international stage. The Turkish leader is convinced that his external successes grant him the freedom to do as he pleases domestically.

While the world was shocked by the heated exchange in the Oval Office between the US president and his Ukrainian counterpart, Turkey proudly showcased a very different image: Erdogan holding an umbrella over Volodymyr Zelenskyy's head in Ankara. This moment was not just a PR stunt portraying him as a strong leader offering protection to the "needy" but also became a symbol of "active and respectful Turkish diplomacy."

Erdogan's secret to success has been his willingness to push Turkey beyond its borders, combining soft power with hard power. In Africa, alongside establishing embassies and airline routes, Turkey provides military equipment and trains local armies.

This same strategy can be seen in Ukraine and Syria. While supplying drones to Kyiv, Erdogan has avoided adopting sanctions against Russia, allowing him to maintain a delicate balance with Moscow. Turkey's strategic position enabled it to broker the crucial 2022 "grain deal," ensuring the continued export of Ukrainian agricultural products.

Turkey's military and geopolitical clout has also significantly strengthened its standing in Europe, especially at a time when NATO's future remains uncertain. Unsurprisingly, Erdogan seeks to be part of the emerging European military alliance, a move that would provide him with protection against Moscow while neutralizing the influence of Greece and Cyprus in regional conflicts.

Toward the West, Erdogan presents a friendly façade, while in the Middle East, he maintains a tough image. Toward the end of last year, he began paving the way for a ceasefire with the Kurdish insurgency. The Turkish president extended an olive branch to the Kurdish rebel leadership in an attempt to end a 41-year-long conflict, yet at the same time, he issued a public warning, stating: "The hand that reaches out in peace is also capable of striking like an iron fist wrapped in a velvet glove."

Indeed, by late February, without any visible concessions on Erdogan's part, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan announced from his Turkish prison cell the end of his organization's armed struggle and called on his fighters to lay down their arms. Clearly, this move was aimed at Turkey's domestic politics - Erdogan needs Kurdish parliamentary support to remove constitutional term limits for the sitting president. Shortly after, Kurdish autonomy forces in northern Syria were also forced to sign an agreement with the new administration of Ahmad al-Sharaa, widely perceived as Erdogan's puppet.

In conclusion, Erdogan's foreign policy serves as a powerful strategic tool, advancing both Turkey's global ambitions and his personal political aspirations. His ambiguous approach - respectful toward the West and uncompromising in the Middle East - grants Turkey diplomatic flexibility, allowing him to secure achievements even after two decades in power.

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The fragile normalization between Israel and Turkey, which managed to survive the turmoil of the Temple Mount and Operation Protective Edge, has collapsed after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan took a pro-Hamas stance in his recent speech at the Turkish parliament and at the rally for Palestine in Istanbul on Saturday.

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In fact, Erdogan's anti-Israeli leaning was evident from the start when he chose to remain silent on October 7, and issued a "balanced" statement the next day, calling on both sides to exercise restraint and not blame Hamas for the killing of innocent Israeli civilians.

Ironically, Erdogan's "balanced" stance was the most "pro-Israeli" position to be found in the Turkish political spectrum. All Opposition parties, including Turkish secularists and far-left groups, had taken a pro-Hamas stance. Their complete disregard for the Israeli civilians killed and unjustifiable concern for Palestinians in Gaza dominated the public discourse. As a result, the highly anti-Israel atmosphere left Erdogan with no choice.

Considering Erdogan's ambition to regain control of the Istanbul and Ankara city halls in the upcoming March 2024 elections, it seems that the Turkish president has taken this anti-Israeli move in order not to lose favor with the Turkish Opposition. In other words, Israel has once again become a scapegoat for political gains in Ankara.

But that's not all. The lapses shown by Israeli authorities on October 7 and the unknown fate of the Abraham Accords have weakened Israel's image in Ankara. Erdogan's recent rhetoric and diplomatic moves have also contributed to this change. In his last speech at the "Rally for Palestine," Erdogan labeled Israel as a "pawn on the chessboard," one that is expendable. Furthermore, he portrayed Israel as a failed state surviving in the Middle East due to Western support.

Erdogan's rhetoric is also reflected in Turkish foreign policy. Recently, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan publicly stated that his country seeks to offer guarantees to the Palestinians in the conflict. When the Turks talk about "guarantees," it's important to note the Turkish-Greek conflict over Cyprus. Israel needs to be vigilant and not ignore the fact that Turkey seized Northern Cyprus in 1974 thanks to the Treaty of Guarantee signed in 1960 between Greece, Britain, and Turkey. In other words, by offering guarantees, Turkey openly declares its intention and readiness to confront Israel in order to protect the Palestinians, both politically and militarily.

This is undoubtedly another deterioration in relations we haven't seen before. It seems that dark days lie ahead. In the same speech at the rally, Erdogan labeled Israel as an "organization" and described the state as a threat of the first order for Turkish national security. 

In front of hundreds of thousands of his supporters, Erdogan publicly accused Israel of funding and arming the Kurdish PKK underground organization. Of course, needless to say, all Western countries, including Israel, define the PKK as a terrorist organization and do not support it. Nevertheless, due to his speech, it seems that after every attack carried out by the PKK, many Turks will point an accusing finger at Israel.

And if that's not enough, in his speech at the rally, Erdogan emphasized that he intends to open a legal front at the Hague tribunal against senior Israelis for their roles in the Gaza war. The implication is that after the war, Israel will face another legal battle within the courtrooms.

In retrospect, October 7 was a crossroads for both "ideological Erdogan" and "pragmatic Erdogan." It appears that the damage to Israel's image as a strong state and Turkish domestic political considerations have pushed "ideological Erdogan" back to the forefront of Turkish foreign policy. Therefore, Israel must prepare for unforeseen and anticipated political crises, such as the legal battle in The Hague.

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Turkish voters are going to the polls on Sunday to determine whether they want to keep incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdogan after two decades in power or to give the Opposition, led by CHP (The Republican People's Party) and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu a chance to be at the helm. According to one of the most recent polls, the challenger is leading Erdogan 49.3% to 43.7%. But these numbers don't take into account the drama that unfolded on Thursday when the secular candidate Muharrem Ince pulled out of the race. It is likely that the 2.2% of the vote that was expected to go to him will now boost Kılıçdaroğlu, although Ince has still refused to publicly endorse the Opposition. If he were to do that, Kılıçdaroğlu could have a real shot at crossing the necessary 50% threshold in the first round of voting.

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But Erdogan's downfall is not a done deal, even if he loses. Considering his total grip over the country's institutions – the judiciary, the military, the intelligence services, the police, the presidential guards (also known as the "Reinforcements), and other militias – not everyone thinks he will simply walk into the sunset if the election doesn't go his way.

The abovementioned poll shows that despite the Opposition having momentum, most Turks still believe that Erdogan will stay on as president after the election through some mechanism.

Let's also not forget that during the local elections in 2019, Erdogan refused to accept the results. After it transpired that his candidates had lost big, he had no qualms in using the state news outlet Anadolu Agency to prevent the publication of the returns for a full 13 hours. This allowed him to lay the groundwork to appeal the results.

As a result, even the judges on the Supreme Election Council caved in and announced a do-over. Ekrem İmamoğlu, who defeated Erdogan's candidate in the Istanbul mayorship race, ultimately won again in the rematch (with an even bigger margin), and only then did Erdogan concede.

The elections Sunday are not for the Istanbul City Hall but for president and the legislative branch. For Erdogan, it seems, defeat is not an option. His close associates see this the same way. Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu ironically noted that he already sees the likely results as a "political coup attempt" that is against "the people's will".

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On May 14, Turkey will hold elections. For the first time since rising to the top, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's political survival is on the line. 

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The waning purchasing power of voters due to the depreciation of the Turkish lira and the skyrocketing inflation of 112% have been major factors in Erdogan's drop in popularity. These economic indicators have not stopped him from tapping the economy for his campaign, using economic handouts and debt forgiveness. 

For Erdogan, this strategy worked, until February 6, when an earthquake ravaged parts of southern Turkey and exposed his regime's incompetence in helping the disaster victims, especially during the first 48 hours. As a result, his popularity plummeted and for the first time in 20 years, the momentum appeared to be on the Opposition's side. 

The leader of the secular Republican People's Party (CHP), Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, has managed to coalesce the six Opposition parties and form the  Nation Alliance. The various elements of the bloc have deep ideological divisions, making such a pact all but impossible because it has to accommodate secular views, social democrats, liberals, national religions, nationalists, and conservatives. It also has de facto support from the Kurdish lawmakers. This is perhaps the "Anyone but Erdogan" coalition. 

You could be forgiven for thinking Erdogan's potential downfall would be good for Israel. But with the National Alliance including figures like former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and Temel Karamollaoğlu, the head of the Felicity Party, the main Islamic opposition party, it would be premature to say that the president's departure would usher in improved ties between Jerusalem and Ankara.  Davutoğlu has been fiercely opposed to the normalization with Israel and Karamollaoğlu wants to sever bilateral relations altogether. 

A post-Erdogan Turkey's stance toward Israel will depend, to a large extent, on the degree to which CHP is at the mercy of those two individuals. 

If CHP gets fewer seats than expected while Davutoğlu and Karamollaoğlu outperform the polls the leader of the alliance might have to become tougher on Israel as president.  For example, if hostilities break between Israel and terrorist groups, he may be subject to immense pressure from the two. 

In any event, a new Turkish leadership will not create a golden age for Turkey-Israel relations in the near term. In fact, the opposite may be true: Kılıçdaroğlu could try to rally his fragile coalition by burnishing his anti-Israel credentials. There are signs this is already happening: In June 2022, he announced that he would seek to reopen the case against Israel over the 2010 Mavi Marmara flotilla. This could be a bad omen for relations if he were to assume power, and therefore Israel must be extra careful in its handling of the unpredictable new-old political players. 

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Some 15 years after late President Shimon Peres visited Ankara, President Isaac Herzog is slated to arrive at the Turkish capital on Wednesday with the aim of rebuilding relations with his counterpart, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Given the complex relationship between the two countries over the past decade, Herzog's historic visit marks the beginning of a new era for these diplomatic ties.

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Contrary to previous overtures on the issue, this time, Turkey is the one seeking rapprochement. This raises the question of what made Erdogan, who has never shied away from lambasting Israel, pursue it at this time.

Facing the erosion of the Turkish lira and the lack of foreign investors, Ankara was forced last November to normalize its relations with the United Arab Emirates.

The emirates, recognizing Ankara's economic weakness, were quick to announce a $10 billion investment in the Turkish market. In doing so, Abu Dhabi in effect procured the turning point in Turkish foreign policy towards it - and demanded that Ankara abandon its contrarian foreign policy, which also contradicts the spirit of the Abrahamic Accords.

Moreover, restoring relations with the United States, and obtaining natural gas pumped from Israel's exclusive economic waters at the expense of Greece and Cyprus are two additional – notable – anecdotes that explain the shift in the Turkish president's stance toward Israel.

Over the last two weeks, Turkey, like other countries, has been appalled by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This made it appreciate the fact it is part of the NATO alliance – of which it was dismissive in the past. The war in Ukraine will probably see Ankara return to the traditional pro-Western foreign policy we saw during the Cold War.

These circumstances mean that this is the first time in the history of bilateral relations that Israel has the upper hand.

This means that Jerusalem must make the most of this momentum while not relenting on principles such as demanding that Hamas terrorists be expelled from Turkey. We must also make it clear to Erdogan that Jerusalem is closely monitoring the aggressive, antisemitic, and anti-Israel public discourse in Turkey, and any attempt to delegitimize Israel will be considered a serious breach of trust between the two countries.

Unlike in the past, the Israeli struggle should focus on Turkish public opinion and foster direct, healthy contact between the peoples. Along with events such as concerts by the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra, emphasis must be placed on popular events in which clerics, NGOs, and even sports teams.

For Israel to achieve this goal, the Israeli government is required to change its frame of mind as Herzog is doing. It is time to abandon the traditional method of behind-the-scenes moves, which has characterized foreign policy vis-à-vis Arab countries for many years. To truly normalize ties, any contact between Israeli and Turkish officials - on any level - must be visible, with both flags in clear public view.

Any type of covert relationship – with the exception of intelligence sharing – will be counterproductive. Israel's vital interests call for normalizing relations with Ankara but in a manner the Turks will know how to appreciate: without relinquishing national dignity.

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We will never know, apparently, whether the Oknin affair was an isolated event catalyzed by a lowly Turkish police officer or an ambush planned in advance by Turkish intelligence. Regardless, now is the time to draw conclusions.

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In the wake of the affair, we can say definitively that a dangerous precedent was set in terms of Israeli national security, and that various countries could now perhaps adopt a strategy of "framing" innocent Israelis to cynically exploit Israel's desire to protect its citizens. Essentially, this noble Israeli policy is perceived by many countries as a weakness that allows them to extort the Jewish state for diplomatic, social, or strategic gain.

In hindsight, it's safe to say that by extending the Oknin's remand in Turkish custody, Ankara employed this very tactic. Turkey viewed the Oknin's Jewish and Israeli identity alike as a pressure point to press against Israel. By doing so, Ankara intended to close a circle that in its view had remained open for the past month.

As a reminder, Turkey accused the Mossad of running a spy network on its soil. The members of this alleged network – Palestinians and Syrians without Israeli citizenship –allegedly tracked Hamas members in Turkey and reported back to their Israeli handlers on their activities. Contrary to the Oknin affair, the "Mossad affair" made wall-to-wall headlines in Turkey. When officials in Ankara demanded clear explanations from their Israeli counterparts, Israel opted to turn a cold shoulder. It appears this conduct was perceived by Ankara as a diplomatic humiliation. This was the precise pretext, apparently, for Ankara's decision to use the Oknin couple's arrest as a means to extract from Israel what they'd wanted from the "Mossad affair."

Now, upon the affair's conclusion, various Israeli officials are stressing that Jerusalem made no diplomatic concessions to Turkey. Perhaps this is true, time will tell. The silence of the Turkish press on the matter, however, implies that Ankara's gambit wasn't meant to garner public favor, rather something more important and tangible in the intelligence sphere. The very fact that Mossad chief David Barnea was involved in the affair, and that he managed to secure the Oknin's release, bolsters the assessment that this was an intelligence matter pure and simple.

What then could Turkey have wanted from Israel? Considering the obvious points of diplomatic friction between the two countries, there's a reasonable chance that Turkey's demands mainly focused on four key areas: Hamas activity in Turkey, and Turkish activity in Gaza, Judea and Samaria, and Jerusalem. If and when such a deal is ever made, Israel could agree to cease operations on Turkish soil, including via various "subcontractors."

Meanwhile, we can assume Israel would grant full freedom of activity to Turkish NGOs, which for their part want to entrench themselves in Judea and Samaria and Gaza even more. Granting them such permission in Jerusalem would be a grave mistake in terms of Israeli interests, as these NGOs are already working – openly – against the "Judaization of Jerusalem." Alongside the humanitarian aspect, there is concern that Turkey would seek to supplant Egypt as the de-facto mediator between Hamas and Israel on a possible prisoner exchange – and even to end future rounds of fighting. Granting such status to Turkey would be a strategic error of the highest order.

Taking into account Thursday's phone call between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Isaac Herzog and potential developments, it's indeed possible that Israel wants to normalize relations. Although normalization on paper is considered something positive and necessary for Israel's security, the decision-makers in Jerusalem need to be cognizant of the side-effects of normalization with Ankara. That is to say, Israel needs to maintain the integrity of the alliances it has struck with Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Israeli leaders need to understand that the Jewish state is no longer the same isolated country it was in 1948. Israel is stronger today than it's ever been. Therefore, any move toward normalization with Turkey is most welcome, if it is indeed actual normalization that serves the country's immediate interests.

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Against expectations, a court in Istanbul has extended the detention of Israeli tourists Natali and Mordy Oknin on the grounds they allegedly spied on the country for Jerusalem by 20 days. It appears the Turkish attorney's demand their detention be extended is sending signals that the innocent incident, which took place at the new tourist observation point in Istanbul, is turning into a diplomatic crisis between Jerusalem and Ankara.

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In retrospect, the timing of the couple's arrest is no coincidence. Just one month ago, the two states experienced another crisis of faith when 15 Palestinians were arrested by the Turkish intelligence agency for allegedly spying for the Mossad intelligence agency. Despite widespread coverage of the incident in Turkey, given the fact the suspects were not Israeli citizens, Jerusalem chose not to make the arrests an issue with Ankara. Nevertheless, if the Israeli couple is not released the next time the court convenes on the matter, their arrest could lead Israel straight into a new "hostage" crisis with Turkey.

Those who follow Turkish foreign policy know all too well that such "hostage" cases can be solved in one of two ways: the soft power displayed by Berlin or the tough diplomatic stance adopted by former US President Donald Trump.

When Ankara arrested Turkish-German journalist Deniz Yucel on suspicion of terrorist propaganda and incitement of the people in 2017, both countries found themselves in the grips of such a crisis. Then, one year after the German government was forced to get involved, Turkish media outlets claimed Ankara had only agreed to free Yucel in return for an end to German sanctions on Turkey's military industry. Despite the criticism, Germany succeeded in bringing an end to the affair in February 2018, once Ankara appeared pleased with the result.

Ankara pulled the same "gun" on the US when in October 2016, it imprisoned an American priest by the name of Andrew Bronson on suspicion of espionage. Unlike Germany, the US chose to follow the arrest indirectly for a while. As soon as efforts to free Bronson failed to bear fruit, Washington shifted to a different strategy. In July 2018, Trump and his Vice President Mike Pence released a tweetstorm that directly threatened Turkey's economy and led to the depreciation of the Turkish lira against the US dollar. At the same time, Trump began to enact sanctions on senior Turkish officials involved in the affair. Ultimately, Turkey was forced to fold and release the priest.

It's no secret that over the years, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has made a political fortune back home by starting crises with non-Muslim states, and Israel in particular. This is how he has succeeded in distracting the Turkish public from the burning domestic issues of the day. Erdogan knows all too well that public support for him today is at an unprecedented low: For the first time, he and his nationalist allies are not leading the "anyone but Erdogan" alliance in the polls.

The main reason for this shift is the lira's depreciation against the dollar, which reached an all-time low of 10 liras to the dollar on the day the court extended the Israeli couple's detention. Israel must therefore be very cautious and creative in order not to serve Erdogan's propaganda interests. Jerusalem must do everything in its power to bring about the release of the innocent couple, including by making use of its ties in Washington and Berlin.

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