Samples collected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at two Iranian sites where Tehran has not reported any nuclear activity showed traces of radioactivity. Although the IAEA refrained from naming the sites in its quarterly report of June 5, 2020, they were identified last year by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington. The identification was based on information extracted from the Iranian nuclear archive smuggled out of Tehran and into Israel in January 2018.

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The first site visited by IAEA inspectors in August 2020 was a pilot plant for uranium conversion, with an emphasis on the production of UF6 (uranium hexafluoride, a uranium compound which, in its gaseous phase, enables the enrichment of uranium by centrifuges). This site, located about 47 miles southeast of Tehran, operated under the aegis of the Amad military nuclear program. In documents from the Iranian nuclear archive, this location is referred to as the "Tehran Site." The facility was dismantled in 2004.

The other site was Marivan, located near the town of Abadeh in central Iran. This facility, also part of the Amad program, was designed to conduct "cold tests" of nuclear weapons (that is, to simulate the activation of a nuclear explosive device using natural uranium rather than weapons-grade uranium). This included operating a multipoint explosive system for the activation of a nuclear weapon, as well as the development of its neutron initiator.

According to satellite imagery published by ISIS, Iran razed part of the Marivan facility in July 2019, more than a year before they allowed IAEA inspectors access to it. It is likely that this was done to prevent exposure to nuclear activities that had taken place there in the past. This was not the first time the Islamic regime had razed nuclear sites: it did so at the Lavizan-Shian facility in Tehran in 2004 and the Parchin facility in 2012.

It is possible that the traces of radioactive materials found in samples taken by IAEA inspectors in August 2020 indicate renewed efforts to develop a neutron initiator for nuclear weapons previously conducted at the Marivan site.

The IAEA report of June 5, 2020, referred to a third location as well. Though its name was not revealed in the report, it was implied that it was the facility the regime had previously operated in Lavizan-Shian. This suspicion was based on the fact that between 2002 and 2003, a metallic natural uranium disc was found at the site that had been processed by drilling and hydriding (compressing hydrogen atoms inside uranium), an activity Iran neither reported to the IAEA nor provided an explanation for. This finding suggests that the regime had attempted to develop a UD3 neutron initiator at the site.

In addition to all of the above, Iran periodically intensifies its confrontation with the IAEA, causing great concern to the United States and the West. The following are examples:

Iran began enriching uranium to 20 percent, a level that can serve as a springboard to 90 percent (weapons-grade). The regime announced on Jan. 28 that it had accumulated 17 kg of 20 percent enriched uranium and intends to reach an annual production capacity of 120 kg. Note that 150-200 kg of 20 percent enriched uranium are required to reach 15-20 kg of 90 percent enriched uranium. (According to other calculations, Iran could accumulate 90 percent enriched uranium for its first bomb within a matter of a few months.)

Iran recently installed three cascades at the Natanz uranium enrichment plant, each containing 174 advanced IR-2m centrifuges. They were scheduled to go into operation as early as Jan. 30, with the aim of reaching 1,000 operational centrifuges of this type at Natanz within three months. Iran also began installing two cascades, each with about 170 of the more advanced IR-6 centrifuges, at the Fordow enrichment facility.

On Jan. 13, Iran informed the IAEA that it was researching the production of metallic uranium – an activity which, if true, is another violation of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear agreement. Britain, France and Germany have expressed concern that the metallic uranium produced by Iran will be used for nuclear weapons development.

Iran has not yet provided the IAEA with a plausible explanation for the low-enriched uranium particles found by agency inspectors in 2019 in samples taken from a warehouse at the Turquzabad site in Tehran. An IAEA report from last November said the particulate compounds were similar to particulates found in Iran in the past that turned out to have been from imported centrifuge components (purchased from Pakistan, according to earlier publications). This theory was backed up by the fact that the particles included (among other things) the uranium-236 isotope, which does not exist in nature but is formed as a result of neutron capture by the uranium-235 nucleus – a process that takes place inside a nuclear reactor. As far as is known, it is unlikely that the process of manufacturing the particulates containing uranium-236 took place in Iran.

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The problem of Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons is now largely in the hands of Joe Biden, though he is not enthusiastic about taking it on. Biden stated during his election campaign that he intends to return the United States to the JCPOA, albeit with amendments, and remove the sanctions imposed on Iran by the Trump administration, but it is doubtful that he has formulated a clear policy on this issue so far. He did, however, announce on Feb. 8 that the United States will not lift sanctions until Iran fulfills its obligations under the JCPOA.

US Secretary of State Tony Blinken said on Feb. 1 that the breakout time in which Iran might ramp up enrichment of uranium to weapons-grade "has gone from beyond a year [under the deal] to about three or four months." He also said an agreement with Iran should be "longer and stronger." However, many of Biden's newly appointed officials (including Blinken) are former members of Barack Obama's administration who were deeply involved in negotiating the JCPOA. The appointment of Robert Malley as the US special envoy to Iran raises particular concerns. If the United States does return to a courtship of Tehran, the task of dealing with the Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons may be left primarily to Israel.

IDF Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Raphael Ofek, a BESA Center Research Associate, is an expert in the field of nuclear physics and technology who served as a senior analyst in the Israeli intelligence community.

Featured on JNS.org, this article was first published by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

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• Iran pledged to reduce the number of centrifuges in the Natanz enrichment plant to 5,060 IR-1 units and to limit its uranium enrichment to 3.67 percent. However, as of July 8, 2019, it began to enrich up to 4.5%.

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• The agreement demands that the Fordow underground uranium enrichment facility, containing 2,710 IR-1 centrifuges, including 696 active centrifuges, be converted into a "Nuclear Research, Physics and Technology" center with 1,044 centrifuges cut off from the UF6 feed pipeline (UF6, or uranium hexafluoride, is a uranium-fluorine compound fed in a gaseous state into centrifuges for enrichment).

In addition, 348 unused centrifuges were to be used to separate stable isotopes for use in medicine, agriculture and industry, while the remaining centrifuges were to be transferred to storage at the Natanz plant.

However, on Nov. 9, 2019, uranium enrichment was renewed at Fordow, with 1,044 units in operation, including those intended for stable isotope separation.

• The agreement stipulates that the amount of uranium Iran is permitted to enrich to 3.67% is limited to 300 kg (661 pounds) of UF6 (the uranium content of which is 202.8 kg, or 447 pounds). But as of Feb. 19, 2020, the amount of uranium enriched at Natanz and Fordow totaled 1,020.9 kg (2,251 pounds), or more than five times the allowed amount. Of that amount, 806.3 kg (1,777 pounds) was enriched to 4.5% and 214.6 kg (473 pounds) to 3.67%.

• On Sept. 7, 2019, Iran began to violate the limit to which it had agreed regarding the operation of advanced, high-enriching centrifuges. Contrary to the agreement, Iran is enriching uranium with about 400 centrifuges of advanced models (IR-2m, IR-4 and IR-6). The enrichment capacity of the IR-6 centrifuge is over eight times that of the IR-1.

The latest IAEA report says the agency continues to liaise with Iranian authorities regarding IAEA inspections of natural (non-enriched) uranium particles of an anthropogenic (i.e., man-made) source from an undeclared Iranian site: the warehouse in Turkuzabad, a suburb of Tehran, which was unveiled by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a speech to the UN General Assembly on Sept. 27, 2018.

According to the BBC on March 3, the IAEA dispatched a document to several member states claiming that Iran had rejected a request to allow inspection access to three other unidentified sites as well. According to the document, the inspectors want to find out if natural uranium is being used at any of the sites from which they are being barred. At another site, the IAEA says there have been activities that are "consistent with efforts to sanitize part of the location."

Iran's violations of the nuclear agreement -- its raising of the uranium enrichment rate to 4.5%  and accumulation of uranium in excess of the 300 kg UF6 limit -- do not currently have a military aspect. This is because uranium enriched to less than 5% is suitable solely as fuel for nuclear reactors and cannot be used for nuclear weapons (for which enrichment to at least 90% is required). Iranian officials claim these violations are meant to pressure the European Union into neutralizing the sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States.

However, the main concern about Iran's future ability to manufacture nuclear weapons are the advanced centrifuges the regime is continuing to develop. Behrouz Kamalvandi, the spokesman for the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, said at a conference at Fordow on Nov. 9, 2019 that the enrichment rate is being increased "based on our own needs and instructions. … [W]e have the possibility to produce 5 percent, 20 percent, and 60 percent, or any other uranium enrichment required."

Furthermore, on March 27, Kamalvandi announced that on Iran's National Nuclear Technology Day on April 8 his organization was going to unveil a new advanced centrifuge. (The event was postponed due to the coronavirus crisis.) He added that "some of Iran's advanced centrifuges have reached a phase where we can industrialize them … [they] can be manufactured at 60 centrifuges per day."

He even bragged, "Production [enrichment] above 250,000 SWU [separative work units] is definitely achievable, but our goal is to reach one million SWU." As it takes approximately 5,000 SWU to produce 20 kg (44 pounds) of 90%-enriched uranium from natural uranium (which contains about 0.7% uranium-235, the fissile uranium isotope), This means that Iran is quite close to obtaining enough enriched uranium to construct its first nuclear bomb.

As for Iran's missile and space program, on April 22 the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced the successful launch of the Noor-1, Iran's first military satellite. This is after several recent failures by Iran to launch satellites into space.

The satellite was launched using a three-stage missile launcher nicknamed "Qased" ("messenger"). Its first stage was based on a rocket fueled with liquid fuel, with the two additional stages fueled by solid propellant. Solid fuel propulsion indicates an impressive advance in Iran's missile technology.

 While Tehran claims the satellite launch was part of a civilian space research and exploration program, US military experts have expressed concern that the program is intended to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles that can threaten the United States with nuclear warheads. Iranian ballistic missiles are also being developed for a 2,000 km (1,242-mile) range, which could threaten Israel.

On April 29, Iran marked National Persian Gulf Day. There have been recent incidents in the Gulf --regarding which Tehran has claimed paramountcy since the days of the shah -- between IRGC ships and US Navy vessels. Also, following former Revolutionary Guards commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani's killing on Jan. 3, Iran launched more than 15 missile and rocket attacks against US bases and targets in Iraq.

Tehran has also continued its military entrenchment in Syria. Despite recent claims by Israeli security officials that due to the Israel Defense Forces' intense activity Tehran has become a liability rather than an asset to Damascus, Iranian-backed Shi'ite militias, and Hezbollah in particular, seem to be continuing their operations in the Syrian Golan Heights.

Iran's overall situation is quite distressing. The Iranian people have lost faith in the regime, especially now, in view of the ravages of the coronavirus pandemic. The people (along with the rest of the world) doubt the official casualty figures. As of this writing, the regime is claiming about 110,000 cases and 6,800 deaths, but the true numbers are estimated to be much higher. This distrust became stronger against the backdrop of the authorities' initial denial of the downing of a Ukrainian passenger jet on Jan. 8 after takeoff from Tehran (most of its passengers were either Iranian or of Iranian origin).

The coronavirus outbreak has dealt a new blow to the Iranian economy, which had already collapsed in 2018 as a result of US sanctions. The Iranian rial plummeted to unprecedented lows and the Iranian street expressed its anger that the regime had wasted so much money on its operations in Syria. According to the London Arab newspaper Asharq al-Awsat on Jan. 1, 2020, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said the damage to the Iranian economy resulting from sanctions by the end of 2019 was $200 billion.

In 1965, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto responded to the development of Indian nuclear weapons by saying: "If we have to feed on grass and leaves, or even if we have to starve, we shall also produce an atomic bomb." Indeed, in 1972, at the beginning of his tenure as Pakistan's president, he set his country's nuclear-weapons project in motion.

It is highly doubtful that the Iranian people are ready to eat grass in order to bring the regime's dreams of an Iranian nuclear bomb to fruition. Though the mullahs' goal of becoming a regional power that controls Shiite Islam across the Middle East remains unfulfilled, the regime continues to do what it can to demonstrate its power.

The object is to show the world that Iran is not capitulating to the United States in any way -- not regarding its nuclear and space programs, and not militarily. It also seeks to project an image of strength to the increasingly resentful Iranian people, as it fears that signs of weakness could bring an end to its rule. However, the regime's investments in security at the expense of the nation's welfare may backfire.

This article was first published by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

Reprinted with permission from JNS.org.

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Four days later, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) spokesman confirmed that uranium enrichment had begun at Fordow (though only to a level of 4.5%, the grade of nuclear fuel in nuclear power reactors) – in full view of IAEA inspectors on-site to monitor the implementation of the July 2015 nuclear agreement.

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For his part, AEOI Director Ali Akbar Salehi used the unveiling of 30 new advanced IR6 centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment facility (in addition to the 30 already-installed IR6 centrifuges) to laud Iran's (supposedly peaceful) nuclear program. Hailing the IR6's high enrichment capacity – 10 separative work units (SWU) compared to 1.2 SWU for the older IR1 comprising the lion's share of Iran's pre-2015 centrifuges – Salehi boasted that over the past two months, Tehran had increased its uranium enrichment capacity from 6,000 SWU and 450 gram uranium per day to 8,660 SWU and 5 kilogram uranium per day.

While saying that Iran would momentarily limit the enrichment process to a 5% grade (way below the 90% required to produce nuclear weapons), Salehi revealed that Tehran was testing IR8 centrifuges (with some 20 SWU enrichment capacity) and experimenting with an IR9 prototype "which is 50 times faster than the IR1."

"While we now have a sufficient amount of 20% enriched uranium [enrichment grade for nuclear reactor fuel, which could serve as a springboard for 90% enrichment], we can enrich more if necessary," he said, adding that Tehran would need only four days to enrich uranium to a 20% level should it decide to do so. His assertion was amplified by the AEOI's spokesman: "We can produce 5%, 20%, 60% or any other percentage of enriched uranium" (60% enrichment level is the highest springboard before reaching the critical 90% threshold).

Given that enriching natural uranium for 20 kilogram of nuclear weapons-grade (of at least 90%) requires approximately 5,000 SWU, Iran seems to be about one year from having the fissile material for its first nuclear bomb.

The latest Iranian move constitutes the fourth violation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in so many months. The first violation occurred on July 1 when Tehran crossed the upper limit of 300 kilograms of 3.67% enriched uranium allowed by the agreement, only to raise the enrichment level to 4.5% the week after. On Sept. 7, Iran began operating more advanced centrifuges, with higher enrichment capacities. And while Tehran sought to misrepresent these violations as legitimate moves aimed at persuading other JCPOA signatories to oppose US sanctions, few European leaders were impressed.

In a press conference on Nov. 6 during a visit to Beijing, French President Emmanuel Macron warned that Rouhani's statement implied that "for the first time, Iran has decided in an explicit and blunt manner to leave the JCPOA agreement, which marks a profound shift." He was quickly followed by his British and German counterparts, who criticized the latest Iranian violation as "most worrying," while Federica Mogherini, the European Union's "foreign-policy minister" and one of the JCPOA's staunchest supporters, lamented that "it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the JCPOA."

To make matters worse, Tehran's relations with the IAEA have also soured. This is due in part to Iran's preventing an IAEA inspector from entering the Natanz nuclear facility and the subsequent withdrawal of her accreditation, and in part to a change of leadership at the UN agency; incoming acting director Cornel Feruta seems to be more critical of Iranian misconduct than was his late predecessor, Yukiya Amano.

On Nov. 7, two days after Rouhani's announcement, the IAEA's board of governors met for a special session to discuss not only Tehran's latest violation but also its prolonged failure to come clean on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's revelation in his Sept. 27, 2018 UN address that Iran had removed 15 kilograms of radioactive material from a warehouse in Tehran's Turquzabad suburb and "spread it around Tehran in an effort to hide the evidence."

Indication of the veracity of this claim was afforded by the last IAEA report (Nov. 11, 2019), which noted that its inspectors had "detected natural [not enriched] uranium particles of anthropogenic [man-made] origin at a location in Iran not declared to the agency."

Assuming this included the 15 kilograms noted by Netanyahu, which, according to the IAEA's findings, comprised man-made natural uranium, it is possible that it was a dummy nuclear weapon core for the purpose of conducting a "cold test" to simulate a nuclear explosion. In this scenario, the casting of the natural uranium core would have been carried out at one of the Parchin site facilities, where Iran's nuclear weapons development tests had previously been conducted.

Responding to Rouhani's announcement, US Secretary of State Pompeo estimated that Tehran may be preparing to break out in 2020 toward nuclear weapons. A joint report by the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Institute for Science and International Security (issued on Nov. 13) was similarly grim, setting the possible breakout time between eight and 10 months.

Reprinted with permission from JNS.org.

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On May 7, Tehran threatened that if no solution was found to the problem of US sanctions, it would ignore the restrictions on uranium enrichment placed on it by the nuclear agreement and enrich up to 20%. Two weeks later, on May 21, Iranian Atomic Energy Organization spokesman Behrouz Kamalvandi said the uranium enrichment capability at the Natanz plant had increased fourfold. As a result, Iran may soon exceed the limitation on the amount of uranium it is allowed to enrich under the JCPOA.

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Former IAEA deputy director general Olli Heinonen recently stated, during a visit to Israel, that he believes Iran will be in a position to acquire nuclear weapons within six to eight months. He later clarified his remarks, explaining that he was referring to the time needed to enrich uranium in the quantity and quality required to produce a nuclear bomb.

Heinonen served as the IAEA's deputy director general and was head of its inspection department over the past decade. He was considered a hawk on the matter of Iran's nuclear program, in contrast to the feeble position toward Tehran taken by the previous IAEA director, the Egyptian Mohamed ElBaradei.

Heinonen's conclusion about Iran's proximity to the nuclear weapons threshold apparently stems from an assessment of its capabilities in two areas: first, its uranium enrichment capacity today versus its capabilities before the nuclear deal was signed on July 14, 2015; and second, the progress it has made since 2003 in the development of nuclear explosive devices in the AMAD program.

That program was intended to produce five 10-kiloton nuclear bombs (the size of the Hiroshima bomb in WWII) which could then be fitted onto the Shahab-3 ballistic missile warhead. This program was revealed when the Iranian nuclear archive was smuggled out by Israel.

After 2003, the nuclear program underwent various organizational changes to disguise its characteristics. It has operated since 2011 within the framework of the SPND organization, aka the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research.

According to the IAEA's reports on Iran from 2013-2014, before the nuclear deal was signed, the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz contained the following: 15,420 centrifuges of Iran's first IR1 design, which enriched natural uranium to about 3.5% (nuclear fuel of power reactor grade) 328 IR1 centrifuges enriching uranium from 3.5% to 20% (nuclear fuel of research reactor grade) 1,008 more advanced centrifuges of the IR2m design (which apparently has twice as much enrichment capacity as the IR1 design). These centrifuges have not yet been activated. In addition, 2,710 IR1 centrifuges were installed at the Fordow enrichment facility, of which 696 were activated prior to the nuclear deal. They also enriched uranium from 3.5% to 20%.

It is reasonable to assume that if Iran breaks the nuclear agreement, it will – as soon as possible – restart all the centrifuges installed at Natanz and Fordow, as well as the advanced IR6 and IR8 model centrifuges that were developed in recent years. According to Iranian experts, the enrichment capacity of the IR8 is 20 times greater than that of the IR1.

Based on data published by the IAEA, it can be roughly estimated that if Iran breaks the nuclear deal, it will be able to enrich uranium to about 20% at the rate of about 450 kilograms per year. It would then enrich the 20% uranium to 90% (the level of enrichment required to produce a nuclear weapon core) in the quantity of 200 to 250 kilograms – sufficient to produce more than 10 nuclear bombs a year.

Based on the assumption that the time needed for Iran to restart a full-scale uranium enrichment project is three to four months, and adding a month or two for the production of enriched uranium cores in the form of hollow hemispheres, it can be estimated that within half a year Iran may have at least enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon core.

The IAEA has tried to monitor Iran's facilities associated with the production or use of nuclear materials in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but without much success. Most of the information gathered by the IAEA in this connection was received from Western intelligence services.

The most significant breakthrough in exposing the Iranian nuclear program was Israel's Iranian archive operation. Documents in that archive indicate that as long ago as 2003 and 2004, Iran made great progress in its nuclear effort, far beyond what the Western intelligence services and the IAEA estimated at the time. Had the information in the archive been exposed before the signing of the JCPOA nuclear deal in 2015, a better agreement would have been reached.

The Iranian nuclear archive operation and a comprehensive description of its contents were revealed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on April 30, 2018. From October 2018 through May 21, 2019, the Washington Institute for Science and International Security, headed by David Albright, presented a series of highly detailed reports on the contents of the archive, including information about secret facilities that had not yet been exposed. In addition to Albright and others, Heinonen was also involved in these revelations.

Key elements of the nuclear program were conducted at the Parchin military site, about 30 kilometers north of Tehran. The IAEA was informed in 2004 of the possibility that the site was conducting activities related to the development of nuclear weapons, and asked Iran to allow its inspectors to patrol it. At first, Iran evaded the request by claiming that it wanted to maintain military field security, as Parchin was a military base. However, in January 2005 it granted the inspectors partial access to a few buildings on the site.

The inspectors did not find any evidence of suspicious activity at Parchin. On their second visit (November 2005), which also involved only a small part of the site, they took soil samples. The IAEA's subsequent testing of those samples did not substantiate suspicions of nuclear activity at Parchin.

But in 2011, the IAEA received new reports that Parchin was testing explosives related to the development of nuclear weapons.

In May 2012, suspicious activity was detected at Parchin through satellite photographs: the Iranians had destroyed some of the buildings they had forbidden IAEA inspectors to visit in 2005. Not only that; they completely razed the areas surrounding where the buildings had stood.

It was not until September 2015, after the signing of the nuclear deal, that Iran allowed IAEA inspectors to revisit Parchin. Once again, the inspectors took soil samples, and once again, the IAEA's lab tests revealed nothing.

The samples were reexamined in US labs, however, and found to contain a few uranium particles – proof that Parchin had indeed seen nuclear activity.

This article is reprinted with permission from JNS.org.

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