One of the cornerstones of Israel's National Security Strategy, from Ze'ev Jabotinsky in 1923, to Ben Gurion in 1953 and Netanyahu in 2018, is the determination that Israel will defend itself by itself without any outside help, even from the United States. In 2018, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu added to the strategy another cornerstone clarifying that Israel must prepare itself for the scenario in which there is one or more nuclear-armed states in the region while doing everything within its power to prevent this.

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There is no doubt that signing an agreement with Saudi Arabia that will include normalization is a task of the highest priority, which justifies taking many risks, so as not to miss the opportunity; but not all risks and not at any price. The reports on a potential deal, under the auspices of the Americans, raise substantial questions regarding some core issues and the required cost.

What is so problematic with the apparent nuclear concessions (in both Saudi Arabia and Iran) and how is this linked to an Israel-US defense treaty and to the certainty of this resulting in a nuclear arms race in the Middle East?

Video: Gallant reveals Iran building airport in Lebanon for terrorism / Credit: Go live

The Saudi demands that Israel can accept on the assumption that it will maintain its qualitative military edge (QME) are as follows: a defense treaty, mainly against Iran; expansion of arms deals; and a free-trade zone.

The problematic Saudi demand is the wish for a complete nuclear fuel cycle on its own soil. The "civilian excuse" is that they need these capabilities in order to exploit their natural resources: mining uranium; converting it to "yellowcake;" and then converting it to gas (UF6) and enriching it to the level required to produce fuel rods for power reactors (to generate electricity) for internal use as well as for export.

The Palestinian issue is of less interest to the Saudis, but it is being pushed very hard by the US. I think that dealing with this problem will be less problematic, as it is not an existential threat to Israel, so a solution will be incorporated into the agreements in some way. What is important is to make sure that it will not take center stage and divert attention away from the truly important and dangerous aspects of the deal.

The Saudi demands stem from the Iranian nuclear deal in 2015, which granted independent enrichment and advanced centrifuge R&D to the Iranians, on their own soil. One can understand where the Saudis are coming from without agreeing with them. The cheating Iranians received this, so why not also them? This argument will, of course, also be used by other countries such as Egypt, the UAE, Turkey, and Algeria and will start a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Raising the faulty and misleading argument that if the Saudis do not receive these capabilities from the US under a controlled mechanism, they will receive them from other countries such as China, is not legitimate, as China has offered the Saudis only a controlled power reactor and not an enrichment program.

The main argument for allowing the enrichment on Saudi soil is based on Saudi Arabia's agreeing to any oversight and management requested by the US and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which will prevent a future conversion of these capabilities to military purposes. But that is false. Teams of American and Israeli experts have reportedly found technical ways to "square the circle" but this does not change the basic cornerstone that a country cannot roll the dice when it comes to nuclear capabilities.

An examination of the "intrusive and unprecedented supervision" as part of the Iranian nuclear agreement from 2015 and the Iranian advances under its auspices shed light on the limits of supervision and any other oversight mechanism that will be invented. On the day that there will be a need to activate these measures, there is a significant risk – which cannot be ignored when it comes to nuclear capabilities and the cost of being mistaken – that political circumstances and the technical limitations that will accumulate over the years will prevent the activation of such measures.

The prospect of an Israel-US defense treaty was brought up before (most recently during the 2019 election campaign in Israel) only to be forgotten, but now it has returned to the forefront as part of the negotiations. The main disadvantage of the treaty is the fact that it is being raised, and in the message it sends: that Israel does not believe in its own strength and ability to defend itself on its own. Regardless of whether the treaty would be limited to existential threats, this in and of itself is causing most of the damage.

As part of the formulation of the treaty, the cornerstone of Israel's NSS will certainly be breached; namely, American soldiers will not be asked to die defending Israel. The treaty will certainly include cases where the US will be called upon to defend Israel, even if only in Israel's region and in extreme circumstances, which will be subject to interpretation. The treaty will include a provision that an attack on one of the members will be considered an attack on its allies, with everything that this implies.

Even under the defense treaty among NATO members, which is stronger than the one the US will offer Israel, the US is not obligated to defend its allies if they launch a pre-emptive attack. That means that if Israel or Saudi Arabia take out Iran's nuclear facilities, the US will not be obligated to defend the two nations if there is retaliation.

The treaty will not prevent Iran's continued aggressive behavior; it will send the wrong message that Israel is accepting Iran as a nuclear threshold state; and it will become a double-edged sword with the potential to severely damage Israeli deterrence and freedom of action.

The claim by the treaty supporters that Israel will not lose its freedom of action – including the ability to attack Iran, supposedly knowing that the US will come to its aid – is fundamentally mistaken and a simple logical analysis will show the opposite. The treaty will give the IDF and the civilian echelon another reason not to attack Iran – or even to strike the infrastructure and facilities that Hezbollah has built in Lebanon, including the sites used to manufacture precision-guided munitions (PGM), with support and funding from Iran.

It would be a grave mistake to link the very important agreement with Saudi Arabia to a defense treaty.  The US needs Israel now more than ever to get the Saudi agreement passed in Congress. Israel will get almost everything it wants without a treaty. Why give the US the feeling that this is the price Israel is asking?

Signing a defense treaty will almost certainly undermine the support on fundamental issues that the US has been giving to Israel for years, under the reasoning that the treaty makes them redundant or that it is possible to reduce or weaken their importance. Why would Israel need a comprehensive and longer-term Memorandum of Understanding? Why would an expanded Qualitative Military Edge be required? There would be no need for large-scale pre-positioning of American systems and for expanding cooperation in R&D and technology. Under the alliance, there is a real risk that the prevailing notion would be as such: The US will provide Israel with a full defense umbrella but every other form of support would no longer be necessary.

The alliance will cause the US to exert pressure to prevent escalations and clashes that could require US intervention. Even if it is written that Israel will not need to consult or receive approval, the reality will be different and the freedom of action will have been lost.

Those in favor of the treaty base their arguments mainly on the claim that our Big Sister will stand by Israel and that harming Israel is tantamount to attacking the US, and therefore deterrence and freedom of action will be strengthened. According to them, the treaty will motivate the US to prevent escalation, and therefore Israel will receive everything it needs to prevent clashes that would obligate the US to intervene.

The disadvantages of the treaty are much greater than the advantages, and it is better not to push toward signing it, especially not as the "currency" for supporting the US-Saudi deal in Congress.

There is no doubt that reaching an agreement between Israel and the Saudis is very important and Israel should take some risks in order to secure such a deal, but there is one way to promote a deal with normalization, cancel Riyadh's request for an independent fuel cycle and cancel the need for a defense treaty while ensuring that the first priority remains preventing an Iranian nuclear program. The US must insist upon the activation of a snap-back mechanism that will restore all UN Security Council sanctions, including an absolute ban on uranium enrichment in Iran.  Skeptics will claim that this is an unrealistic demand, perhaps, but an American demand is sufficient to pull the rug from under the Saudi nuclear demands and allow progress towards a three-way US-Saudi-Israel deal, which will create an opening for joint action against the Iranian nuclear program.

Brigadier General (res.) Jacob Nagel is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a professor at the Technion. He previously served as Prime Minister Netanyahu's national security advisor and the head of Israel National Security Council (acting).

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Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held important meetings with President Joe Biden this week, as well as with other world leaders. But the highlight will be his speech at the United Nations General Assembly. Assuming this will be like previous speeches, there is definitely something to look forward to.

The direct Iranian threat to Israel through its nuclear program and the continued development of long-range and accurate missiles and drones that carry heavy weaponry, the indirect threat coming from its proxies in the Middle East (Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and sometimes even the Palestinian Authority), and the continuing threat from Iran to the free world through its support and encouragement of terrorism, will all undoubtedly take center stage during Netanyahu's speech at the UN.  He will also emphasize the wish for normalization with Saudi Arabia and other countries, the multi-front threats in the north, Gaza, and the West Bank, and the need to tone things down in the (legitimate) internal debate in Israel.

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We must not confuse the world regarding what Israel's real priorities are. The prime minister should put the onus on the US and Europe in light of the continued aggressive and negative behavior of the ayatollahs in Iran. The listeners must clearly understand that the effort to prevent a terrible agreement with Iran, even in the form of the recent "understandings," has not been relegated by Israel to a low priority. However justifiable and important, the push toward Israel-Saudi-US normalization should in no way come at the expense of the acute need to stop Iran. The meeting with the president and Mohammed bin Salman's interview made it clear that the reported suspension of talks with the Saudis was false.

Parts of the agreements with Saudi Arabia are linked to dealing with the Iranian nuclear program and must not be separated from it; on the contrary, proper linkage will lead to a win-win.

Despite the reports about (legitimate) continued attempts at persuasion, led by Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, it seems that the discourse regarding a narrow defense pact between the US and Israel has lost momentum, mainly due to a lack of American (White House) motivation to promote an alliance at this time, which is a very good thing, as I detailed in previous articles. The drawbacks of such an alliance far outweigh the advantages.

Riyadh's main demands for an agreement with the US are security guarantees, based on a defense agreement along the lines of the Asian model, mainly against Iranian aggression; advanced weaponry deals; a free trade zone, and more. These are demands that Israel can accept, assuming its qualitative military edge (QME) is maintained.

On the other hand, the demands for "civilian nuclear power" are problematic.  The demand is for a full nuclear fuel cycle capability, on Saudi soil. The "civilian justification" for such a request is the tapping of natural resources, i.e., mining uranium and transforming it into "yellowcake," converting it to gas (UF6), and enriching it to the level necessary to produce nuclear fuel rods for power reactors (generating electricity), for local use and export.

Make no mistake, as many do: The Saudis have not asked for nuclear power reactors for the sake of generating electricity, as the Chinese, for example, are offering them. That would not pose a problem, if the reactors and their fuel sources came from the outside the kingdom and were taken out after they were used (like the reactor that Russia supplied Iran at Bushehr). The problem is that the Saudis seek a full fuel cycle on their soil, including enrichment.

The Saudis are ready for any supervision and control measures imposed by the US and the International Atomic Energy Agency to prevent a future shift to a military program. Despite all the reports about experts from all sides seeking and finding ways to "square the circle," I recommend continuing with the old approach of not rolling the dice when it comes to nuclear capabilities. MBS' interview in which he said that the kingdom will have nuclear weapons if Iran gets them, validates this approach. We should ignore irresponsible reports saying Israel is developing "hidden capabilities" that in the future will prevent Saudi Arabia from shifting to a military nuclear program. Even if someone will prove that such verification methods have a high success rate, there is no way of knowing how things unfold. If Israel's rejection of allowing enrichment means the derailment of normalization deals, so be it. Israel should not give in; this is essential.

Accepting the Saudi nuclear demands will of course serve as a basis for demands by other countries in the region such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey. It will launch a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

The Palestinian issue, mainly pushed by the US, has gained traction in recent weeks and Israel will probably make concessions. This issue, which I am less concerned about because it is not an existential threat like the nuclear issue, must not become the main issue, and calculated risks can be taken to achieve normalization.

Netanyahu should remind the world that the Iranians have violated every treaty and agreement that they have signed and despite this, the recent understandings struck with Tehran (which the Americans deny) grant the regime the permission to continue to enrich to 60% purity, which constitutes about 98% of the required path for full military enrichment level. Iran's brilliant negotiating tactics resulted in having the US pay it so that it doesn't do something it really had no plans on doing: namely, enrichment to 90% and beyond.

Meanwhile, Iran continues to develop and produce advanced centrifuges and has been constructing an extensive underground site at Natanz, which will be used for the enrichment and manufacturing of centrifuges. It continues developing and maintaining ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and continues to move forward in the weaponization efforts, the only thing that stands in the way of them having full nuclear capability.

Video: Biden speaks on America's commitment to Israel's security / Credit: Reuters

Accordingly, it's clear where the Saudi demands are coming from. They are based on the Iran nuclear deal, and on the absurd "understandings." The US is, of course, denying there is any linkage between the shameful surrender and the transfer of billions of dollars to release prisoners (this is not only six billion dollars; the true amount will reach around $50 billion), and the agreements on the nuclear issue that bypassed the need for congressional approval, which would have never been granted.

At the same time, the mass-murdering Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi has been welcomed at the UN General Assembly, humiliating Biden with declarations of his complete control over the use of the surrender funds, in complete contradiction of American statements. The Iranians are expelling a third of the IAEA inspectors, failing to answer questions about open cases, attacking American interests in the gulf, violating human rights, killing women and girls in Iran, continuing its massive support of Russia and sending advanced weapons, while the US is giving a de facto approval to increase Iranian oil sales to China in record high volumes.

The prime minister should make it clear in his speech what Israel's priorities are.

It is very important to promote a Saudi-American-Israeli deal that will include normalization, without a defense alliance between Israel and the US, but at the same time, it is possible to overcome the problematic Saudi demand for an independent fuel cycle and to minimize the damage from the understandings with Iran by triggering the snap-back mechanism in the UN that would reimpose the Security Council sanctions on the regime (including a total prohibition on enriching uranium on Iranian soil). This will pull the rug out from under Saudi Arabia when it comes to its demands, will allow the normalization deals to move forward without a nuclear threat from Saudi Arabia, and will create an opening for joint action against the Iranian nuclear program. Those who have suggested that Israel can assure MBS that the Jewish state will remove the Iranian nuclear threat and therefore he should not seek his own nuclear capabilities are assigning Israel the duties of a superpower, despite there being a possible scenario in which Israel will ultimately have to carry out the task on its own.

Brigadier General (res.) Jacob Nagel is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a visiting professor at the Technion's Faculty of Aerospace Engineering. He previously served as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's national security advisor and head of the National Security Council (acting).

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In the coming week, the Supreme Court – with a full 15-judge panel – will discuss the petition to force Justice Minister Yariv Levin to convene the Judicial Selection Committee, whose work has been frozen for a lengthy period due to the argument surrounding its composition.

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Those who follow my writings and interviews in the media and the press know that I don't express political views, especially not on legal reform. Similarly, I previously rejected every offer, including flattering ones, to enter politics, and I plan on doing so in the future.

Video: Protesters in New York demonstrate against judicial reform /Credit: Amnon Shemi and Danny Tenenbaum, UnXeptable

However, for one time only, I have decided to change my ways and offer an alternative suggestion for the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee, since I (perhaps naively) don't see it as a political proposal, but as an attempt, perhaps the final one, to lower the flames.

To the best of my knowledge, a clear majority of the country thought, long before the elections, that it was necessary to change the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee, and still thinks this way today. In my opinion, changing the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee should have been the first topic on the agenda.

It's possible that broad agreement on the method for choosing judges will facilitate the beginnings of the long and complex process of building a Supreme Court and legal system that is balanced and faithfully reflects the entire nation, so there will be no need for discussions about further changes, since these will happen naturally in a balanced legal system, with an emphasis on the Supreme Court. Even if this doesn't happen, it would be worth making changes only after attempting, with broad agreement, to balance the composition of the Supreme Court and the legal system.

The proposal is based on the following principles: The committee will have nine members. Three will be chosen by the Supreme Court president, three by the Coalition (one of them will be the justice minister, who will serve as the committee chair), and three will be chosen by the Opposition. Each of these blocs will be able to choose who they want (a serving or retired judge, a jurist or an academic, a current or former minister, a current or former MK, or any other Israeli citizen). The Coalition or the Opposition will be allowed to change their representatives on the committee in the case of political change and the transition of a party from one side to another.

Choosing the judges, from the president of the Supreme Court and until the final registration, will require a majority of seven members of the committee. A majority of eight members can be required for the election of the Supreme Court president, and perhaps also for choosing a Supreme Court judge.

The proposal has two flaws: It may result in total stagnation in choosing judges, if agreement is not reached between the three groups forming the committee (or at least one member joining the opposing group), and this may sometimes lead to the choice of mediocre judges, due to the need to reach a compromise between the groups.

To the best of my knowledge, there is a solution to these two flaws. When the committee convenes, and disagreements and factionalism subside, each member of the committee will strive to make appropriate appointments. It may be that there will be compromises and candidates will only be chosen because they are accepted by everyone on the committee, or that "deals" will be made, but this is exactly what will lead to a balanced composition.

I am convinced that similar proposals were raised in the past, or maybe are currently on the table. I received enthusiastic agreement, as well as reservations, when presenting these ideas to people from across the political spectrum.

The rationale behind the proposal is that, when considering this important issue, there can't be winners or losers. No figure, from any side, should be able to control a certain constellation of the committee, as happened in the past, and prevent balance and homogeneity.

There will undoubtedly be opponents to the proposal, but in my opinion, this will only prove that the opponents are not really seeking a solution, but want to preserve their preferred status, or to control the committee, or to replace the government.

If the Coalition opposes the proposal and insists on a majority in the committee, it will prove that they are not interested in balance but in control, without understanding that today they are the Coalition and tomorrow they may be the Opposition and this proposal, which must not be changed in the future without a special majority, will preserve their status as the Opposition. If the Opposition opposes the proposal, which gives them the same power as the Coalition, this will prove that their goal isn't really to change something in the system and to lower the flames, but only to change the government using non-democratic methods. If the judges oppose the proposal, it will show that their goal is only to preserve their unreasonable powers, which have no precedent anywhere in the world, in determining the composition of the courts.

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It's clear that the Israel Bar Association will oppose the proposal, but there is broad agreement that there is no justification for their membership of the committee. If one of the groups wants to offer them one of their places, they can of course do so.

If the proposal is adopted by each side, maybe we will be able to prevent the upcoming sensitive and needless Supreme Court hearing, and perhaps the hearings that are expected to follow, which may lead the country in unwanted directions.

The above analysis and opinion are my personal opinion only and do not represent any of the different groups with whom I am currently in touch, or those with whom I have worked in the past.

Brigadier General (res.) Jacob Nagel is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a visiting professor at the Technion's Faculty of Aerospace Engineering. He previously served as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's national security advisor and head of the National Security Council (acting).

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A "limited defense treaty" between the US and Israel as part of a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia and a trilateral agreement between the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, contains much more cons than pros, especially when it might come at the expense of Israel's top priority concern: Preventing a bad Iran nuclear deal (or understandings) that will lead Iran on its sure path to a bomb in a very short timeframe.

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Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer is in Washington for meetings with senior White House officials, ahead of very critical decisions regarding the US, Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. According to what was published, and even approved by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, during this round of talks, Dermer's meetings will focus on moving forward on a "limited defense treaty" between US and Israel.

Reports about a potential treaty have been in the air many times in the past, as recently as 2019, when Israel was in election season. This issue died down only to resurface now while being pushed by minister Dermer, who has not hidden his support for such a treaty for more than a decade.

But, now the talks might become more serious, connected to a possible comprehensive US-Saudi deal, involving Israel and a potential, very important, normalization between Israel and the kingdom.

According to various sources, Riyadh's main demands are US security guarantees that would be based on a mutual defense treaty like the one the US has with Japan, mostly aimed at countering Iran's aggression; advanced arms deals; a free-trade zone between the countries, and more. Israel can live with all these demands, assuming its QME (qualitative military edge) will be kept.

Adding the Saudis' "civilian nuclear" demands, things become a little more complicated. The Saudis are requesting a fully independent nuclear fuel cycle capability that would enable them to commercially tap their natural resources, including mining uranium, turning it into a "yellowcake", converting it to gas (UF6), and enriching it to the level required to produce nuclear fuel rods for power reactors (electricity generation), for domestic use and for export purposes.

They demand that the capabilities be entirely on Saudi soil. They are willing to accept the monitoring, inspections, and management requirements by the United States and the IAEA, to prevent them from using the enriched military-grade uranium. It will be very dangerous and difficult for Israel to accept these demands, but it looks like Israeli officials and experts, together with their American counterparts, are looking for ways to "square the circle".

The Palestinian issue has not been forgotten. It is being pushed now mainly by the US, but the Saudis will probably add it in the end to their list and Israel will have to give something to the Palestinians in order to gain the normalization.

Israel must not be confused when it comes to its priorities. Israeli officials must prevent a potential misunderstanding, making sure the US understands that preventing a bad agreement or "understandings", regarding the Iranian nuclear program has not been relegated to a lower priority even as it seeks a deal with Saudi Arabia or a defense treaty with the US. The potential damage is severe.

There is a clear link between some of the components of a Saudi deal and proper handling of the Iranian nuclear program, and the right way is to try and tie them together and reach a win-win situation.

The Saudi demands, of course, are based on the faulty precedent created by the JCPOA, which gave Iran expansive independent enrichment capabilities and advanced centrifuge R&D on Iranian soil. It is, therefore, possible to understand where the Saudis are coming from, and why their nuclear demands are legitimate, even if one does not agree with them. In their view, the Iranians, who had violated every treaty and agreement they signed and deceived the world, received the right to independent enrichment, so why shouldn't they get the same? The same argument will be used, for sure, by countries in the region like Egypt, the UAE, Turkey, and others. Understanding the Saudi argument is key to finding a solution that might present a win-win situation.

Adding the Israeli request to sign a "limited defense treaty" with the US, complicates everything.

What are the cons of a US-Israel treaty?

The main problem with a treaty is its existence. By raising a need for a treaty, Israel is conveying the message that it lacks confidence in its power and capability to defend itself by itself, regardless of what will be written inside the treaty details. The title itself creates most of the damage.

A hostile president, in the future, could exploit the treaty against Israel, and there are many ways to do so without any particular problem.

No matter what wording will be used in the treaty, it will break the historical unwritten understanding that Israel does not want American soldiers coming to its rescue and dying on Israeli soil. The treaty will contain sentences indicating there will be certain cases, even if they are only in extreme situations like an existential threat, in which American forces will be called to act on Israel's behalf in the Middle East. There is no such thing as a "half-treaty," or a "limited treaty". In order to obtain the benefits of a treaty (and there are some), it will clearly include sentences like: "An attack on one of the treaty members shall be considered an attack on all the treaty members, with all implications."

But the problem is much deeper. NATO's Article 5 is the highest level of security guarantee that the US can give to its allies. If the US, even according to Article 5, will not defend NATO allies if they will launch a preemptive attack, then the US for sure won't defend anyone else who has a degree of guarantees that falls even below Article 5 levels, like Israel or Saudi Arabia, if they will attack Iran, for example. The US wouldn't defend Israel if it preemptively bombed Iran's nuclear facilities, or more accurately, the US wouldn't be obligated to defend Israel even if it had Article 5-like provisions in a treaty. It is clear that under any defense treaty, Israel will get less than Article 5 guarantees, so presenting such a treaty as giving Israel better freedom of action against Iran, is wrong.

Iran is going to behave aggressively in the region, with or without a treaty, and since Israel is not asking the United States to come to its aid in the event of an Iranian attack, by sending American forces, the treaty will be counterproductive, and potentially inflict severe damage to Israeli deterrence, based on the indirect message, that Israel does not trust its own independent capabilities and needs the United States' support.

Iran will be under the impression that Israel has decided to shift to its containment, like the US, and that if it will not cross an elusive unimportant "red line", it will remain immune. Claiming that with a treaty Israel will not lose its freedom of action against Iran and can decide to attack Iran, knowing the US will come to its rescue because of the treaty, is wrong and the analysis shows the opposite. The treaty will unfortunately give the IDF, another reason not to attack Iran, and not to attack the dangerous infrastructure and facilities the Hezbollah built on Lebanon soil, including the production facilities of the PGM's (precise guided munition).

As a practical matter, the US might defend Israel, although probably not after an Israeli preemptive attack, but that depends on who is the president and what are US priorities at that time. The US will find a way out when it wants; see the Taiwan case, even though it wasn't a treaty there.

It would be a grave mistake to bind the very important agreement with Saudi Arabia with the signing of a US-Israel treaty. Israel will look very strange when asking the US for a defense treaty, to get things they want regardless of the treaty. Why should the US "pay" by signing a treaty, for Israel to agree to do something Israel wants anyway? On the other hand, the US needs Israel's support now more than ever before, to pass the entire US-Saudi deal in Congress. Israel can get all the goodies they want, without a treaty, so why give the US the feeling that this is the "price" Israel wants in order to support and help the administration pass the Saudi deal, in Congress?

American support for what Israel really needs exists without a treaty. Signing a treaty, even if it includes those issues inside the wording, can only undermine the US support for these issues, on the grounds that if there is a treaty they are no longer needed, or at least they can be reduced and weakened: No need for a broader and longer new MOU; no need for a better QME; no need for a wider and sophisticated deployment of US weapons systems in Israel; no need for wider and much more sensitive R&D and technology cooperation, and more.

There is also a danger of curtailing Israeli freedom of action in general, especially vis-à-vis Iran, Russia, and China, regardless of what is written in the treaty. A treaty would motivate the US to prevent escalation, in order to prevent a confrontation that would require the US to intervene, so they will put a lot of pressure on Israel not to escalate. It can be written in the treaty wording that Israel will not have to consult or obtain approvals from the US, but according to treaty drafts from the past, it is explicitly written that Israel will have to consult.

There are of course also treaty pros, most of them are based on interpretation that turns some disadvantages into an advantage: The treaty will send a clear message that the US is behind Israel and that harming or attacking Israel will be considered an act of violence against the US, so it might Increase Israel's deterrence and freedom of action against Iran, Russia, and China.

Signing a treaty can upgrade US-Israel relations for many years to come while bringing the Congress on board, as a partner to the deal in advance, by ratifying it, maybe preventing the need to reapprove the deal arrangements every year.

The treaty motivates the US to prevent escalation, so it will probably give Israel almost anything it needs to prevent a confrontation, that would require them to intervene.

It is obvious that a treaty's cons are much larger than its pros, so it would be best not to push for it, at this stage, especially not as a part of the wider Saudi deal.

The correct, and practically the only, way to advance a Saudi deal that would help bring normalization with Israel, overcome Riyadh's request for an independent nuclear fuel cycle, take the bad deal (or understandings) with Iran off the table, and eliminate the need for a defense treaty, is to insist on triggering the snapback mechanism to the fullest extent against Iran, by reinstating all UN Security Council sanctions that were lifted when the JCPOA agreement was signed in 2015, including a total ban on uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. Such an American demand, even if it will not mature because of an Iranian objection, will pull the rug under the Saudis' enrichment demands, and make it possible to move forward with a Saudi-American-Israeli deal without the nuclear threat from Saudi Arabia and without a need for a dangerous US-Israel defense treaty, and open the door to a joint Israeli-American action against the Iranian nuclear program.

Brigadier General (res.) Jacob Nagel is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a visiting professor at the Technion. He previously served as Prime Minister Netanyahu's national security advisor and the head of the Israel National Security Council (acting).

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Even as Israel is rocked domestically by protests for and against judicial reform, there is continued tension between with the actors waging a multi-theater campaign led by Iran. Tehran has been orchestrating this by pressuring its proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and Judea and Samaria to stage provocations and terror acts, to threaten Israel with harsh reactions against an Israeli response, and to continue amassing advanced weapon systems that are sent from Iran or otherwise financed and manufactured with Iranian money.

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No doubt, the Iranians have taken a page from Israel's actions: this is their version of the WBW (the War Between Wars) – only this time it is Iran that has the initiative.

In Lebanon, Iran has been building Hezbollah as its main force for a future conflict, for many years. Hezbollah has hundreds of thousands of statistically dumb (not accurate) missiles of various ranges, anti-tank missiles, UAVs, ISR (intelligence) capabilities, and other means. However, the main danger is their goal to build an arsenal of PGMs (precision-guided munitions) by transferring missiles, missile parts, and production technology from Iran. In recent years, they have also been converting dumb missiles and even manufacturing full PGM missiles in production facilities built on Lebanese soil. PGMs will pose a very big problem in a future campaign, and Israel has been conducting an ongoing campaign to prevent and reduce this threat, as a main part of the war between wars (WBW), but reportedly mostly in Syria and Iran and not in Lebanon.

Nasrallah has changed his organization's behavior patterns and has recently even stepped up its provocations – apparently as a result of his erroneous analysis (he did the same mistake several times in the past) and the perception of Israeli weakness. His analysis is being fed by reports in the Israeli and international media and by the Israeli reaction (or rather, non-response) to his provocations. Some examples include: sending a terrorist to Megiddo with an IED; building tents on the Israeli side of the Lebanese border; provocative actions by masked armed fighters on the fence; setting up intelligence-gathering posts very close to the fence; preparing the Radwan Force to invade Israel using attack tunnels near the border; creating "nature reserves" filled with tunnels, launchers and missile caches; firing steep-trajectory missiles at Israel and anti-tank missiles at a position in Avivim and at an IDF vehicle; and threatening Israeli aircraft and drones, and many other provocations.

I reject the misguided attempts to distinguish between a "provocation that does not constitute a threat" and a clear act of terror. That is exactly what Nasrallah wants, and Israeli officials should not help him set that narrative.

The time has come for Israel to change its policy in the north and implement the changes introduced by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2017-2018 in Israel's NSS (National Security Strategy). Israel must punish Hezbollah for every provocation and attempt to change the situation on the ground in Lebanon, but this is not enough: Israel must also punish those who fund and encourage Hezbollah, i.e., Iran. The Iranian punishment does not have to come immediately or directly; there are many ways and means to harm and weaken Iran.

Video: Hezbollah trains for possible confrontation with Israel / No credit

The IDF knows how to carry out such a shift in policy. As has been the case in the recent operations in Jenin and many times in the past in Gaza, Judea and Samaria, this must include the element of surprise, subterfuge, and a disproportionate response that will harm Nasrallah, his organization, and the state of Lebanon.

The fear of escalation is understandable, but it cannot be the leading factor in the decision-making process by the IDF and the cabinet. The IDF is the strongest power in the Middle East; those who should fear a potential deterioration are Hezbollah, Iran, and Lebanon. If Israel will act wisely, this will be the case, as we have seen in the past.

Israel must regain its deterrence vis-à-vis Hezbollah, which has been eroded in recent years. Without getting into the debate about the merits of the latest deal with Lebanon on the maritime border and gas fields, I have no doubt that a significant part of the deterrence loss can be attributed to the way Israel conducted the negotiations with Nasrallah. In my opinion, the agreement itself was marginal and would have not even made headlines without the election season at the time, but Israel should have started the gas production from the field before the agreement was signed, even if for just a few days, in order to maintain its deterrence. Nasrallah understands strength and identifies weaknesses, and now his perception (never mind if he is right or wrong) is that Israel has been deterred on that occasion. It has affected his behavior since then, and he must be disabused of that notion.

The handling of Hezbollah's provocations in the north is directly related to Iran and Israel's wider campaign, which is likely to erupt in the upcoming years, especially if the Biden administration will continue to make every possible mistake as it pursues understandings with Iran on its nuclear program while granting Iran all advantages – including a de facto green light (for the first time) to enrich uranium to 60% while receiving nothing in return except for a false sense of calm until the 2024 elections.

I am definitely not calling for a war in the north, but in order to prevent a war, Nasrallah must understand that it will not break out on his terms, nor will it end by the power of his decision. If Nasrallah will not understand the message, Israel must take the initiative and demonstrate a credible military threat against Hezbollah, just as it demands from the United States vis-à-vis Iran, including readiness to initiate a broad pre-emptive strike. One of the main tenets in Iran's doctrine is the buildup of weapons and fighters around Israel so they can join the wider conflict with Israel when it breaks out. Nasrallah's mistakes and his attempts to change the rules of the game by establishing new facts on the ground must be "exploited" by Israel in order to massively undermine the Iranian doctrine, especially by destroying Hezbollah's PGM arsenal and the production facilities that manufacture new PGMs and convert dumb missiles into PGMs on Lebanon soil.

Restoring Israeli deterrence will also improve Israel's standing in the region, including the efforts to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia. But it is very important that even on this important issue, the right priorities will be strictly maintained. It will be a huge mistake by Israel to "pay" for normalization with Saudi Arabia using "nuclear currency", by making concessions on the Iranian nuclear program or by giving in to Saudi demands for independent nuclear capabilities on its soil, under the guise of civilian nuclear capabilities, regardless of who will supervise the facilities and which flag will be flying above those facilities.

Brig. Gen. (res.) Prof. Jacob Nagel is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a professor at the Technion. He served as National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and as acting head of the National Security Council.

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According to all indications, the negotiations between the United States and Iran on a nuclear deal known as "freeze for freeze" – which is actually "quiet for money" – are on the verge of finalizing what the sides call "understandings" (as opposed to an official agreement).

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The idea is to freeze Iran's progress when it comes to highly enriched uranium in exchange for partial sanction relief (oil sales), the release of some frozen funds, and the freeing of prisoners. Presenting this as understandings and not as an agreement will likely allow the administration to avoid going to Congress, where it is likely to face fierce opposition.

Israel must highlight up front – and loudly – the dangers of the provisions being formulated and express firm opposition even at the cost of harming the prospect of a possible deal with Saudi Arabia, which in itself is very important but much less so than concessions given to Iran on its nuclear program. Some of the reporting on this issue says that during a confidential Knesset meeting, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israel could live with these understandings. These reports stem, in my opinion, from an incorrect interpretation of his words. Such a statement is unreasonable and inconsistent with his consistent positions on Iran's nuclear program. These words were probably never said, or perhaps misunderstood.

The understandings allow Iran to continue enriching its uranium to 60% purity without increasing the accumulated amount. The meaning is a de facto approval for Iran's enrichment to that level.

Since the idea of a "less for less" agreement was first raised, Tehran has enriched massive amounts to 20%. This is the main problem, which is intensified by the understandings currently being formulated. The need to prevent enrichment to 90% has been stressed, but it is mostly semantic. Nonetheless, the assertion by Israel that enrichment to 90% would trigger a kinetic reaction was very important, and it is a pity that the US didn't join this and only opted for the wording "severe reaction".

Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy Agency closed two cases against Iran over nuclear traces, while still having not received answers on another two open files. How can an agreement (which apparently includes a promise to close the remaining open files later) be reached without getting answers? This would further deteriorate the agency's shaky standing.

The agreement will legitimize all previous Iranian violations and allow Iran to retain the assets obtained through the ongoing violation of all agreements and treaties it has signed while injecting billions of dollars to revitalize the economy. It will also enable Quds Force's continued support of terrorism in the Middle East and around the world.

How can someone agree to a freeze, when Iran, under the understandings, continues to develop and manufacture advanced centrifuges and possess ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads?

Iran will also secretly continue to develop weaponization capabilities, which is what really separates it from having nuclear capacity, while its true status continues to be largely hidden.

If freezing is on the table, why is there no requirement to completely freeze the construction of the two underground sites at Natanz: One where the advanced centrifuges are stored and the other (still under construction) is to be used for future enrichment to high levels?

The Biden administration's only goal is to achieve calm through the November 2024 presidential elections. The understandings will stop all action against Iran's nuclear program, based on the mistaken assumption that it would put the nuclear issue "back into a box." Jake Sullivan and now Barbara Leaf, both high-ranking White House officials, have already stated this belief. The understandings will also make it very difficult for Israel to attack alone if it concludes that the time has come. It is true that under the "understandings" it will be a little easier to attack than under an agreement, but it is still going to be very difficult.

In the background, the Iranians continue with their attacks on American interests in the Gulf and in the Middle East; violate human rights and kill women and girls in Iran; continue lending massive support to Russia; and transfer advanced weapons that help kill Ukrainian women and girls.

Instead of reaching those flawed understandings with Iran, it would be better for the US to trigger the snapback mechanism that would reinstate all canceled Security Council sanctions – including a total ban on uranium enrichment – before this mechanism expires in 2025. Such action would hollow out the Saudi desire to seek legitimacy for an independent nuclear fuel cycle.

The agreement will once again come with a heavy price for Israel, so Israel must act against it loudly and in one voice. This critical issue must not be drowned out by the noise of political debates or be compromised by the desire to reach a Saudi deal.

Iran is trying to draw Israel into a multi-theater conflagration while staying out of direct confrontation for the time being. Israel must continue to improve its military capabilities while at the same time send a clear message against the understandings being formulated. Every hint that there is anything to talk about will convey that Israel is weak – like the US – and cannot be trusted. The message will reach our friends in the Gulf, those who have signed agreements with us, and those who may sign in the future – but only if Israel will remain strong against the Iranian threats.

Brigadier General (res.) Jacob Nagel is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a visiting professor at the Technion's Faculty of Aerospace Engineering. He previously served as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's national security advisor and head of the National Security Council (acting).

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Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, National Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi, and his senior deputy Gil Reich are all in Washington for meetings with senior White House and state officials, ahead of critical decisions regarding Iran and Saudi Arabia. 

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Israel must not be confused about the priorities of what should be presented during the talks. It is very important to prevent a potential error in judgment (perhaps unintentional) and to make sure the United States understands that preventing a bad agreement regarding the Iranian nuclear program has not been relegated to second priority after reaching a deal with Saudi Arabia. The potential for damage is very severe.

The US and the clerical regime in Iran have recently held more talks, which included mediators from Oman, Kuwait, and others. These were aimed at reaching a nuclear deal known as "less for less", which is actually "much less for much more". Just reading the recent interviews of Robert Malley, the president's envoy to the negotiations with Iran, and Ali Vaez, his successor as the International Crisis Group's Iran project director, reveals that the discussions are serious. 

Despite these efforts, there is still the risk that the Israeli focus will be on a Saudi-American-Israeli deal, which in itself is very important. This could result in the effort to prevent a faulty temporary agreement with Iran, which will certainly become permanent, dropping to second place. 

There is a close connection between some of the components of a Saudi deal and proper handling of the Iranian nuclear program, and the right way is to try and tie them together and reach a deal that will be a win-win for Israel, and also for the United States, despite the latter potentially not viewing it this way. 

In the meetings held between the negotiators from the United States and Saudi Arabia, some Saudi demands were raised, most of which were not directly related to Israel, and the decisions regarding them must be made exclusively in Washington, taking into account the indirect effects on Israel and maintaining its qualitative edge. On the other hand, the demands related to independent nuclear capabilities are directly and worryingly related to Israel, Iran, and the entire region. On this sensitive issue, Israel must refrain from making mistakes.

According to open-source assessments and publications coming presumably from Saudi sources, Riyadh's main demands are as follows: security guarantees; advanced arms deals; getting the same status as a NATO ally; a free trade zone between the countries; reducing pressure on human rights issues; and more. Israel can live with all these demands if its qualitative military edge is maintained by the United States.

Regarding the "civilian" nuclear issues, the Saudis requested fully independent capabilities that would enable them to commercially tap their natural resources, including mining uranium and turning it into a "yellowcake", converting it to gas (UF6), and enriching it to the level required to produce nuclear fuel rods for power reactors (electricity generation), for domestic use and export purposes. The Saudis apparently demanded that the capabilities be exploited entirely on Saudi soil. They are unlikely to object to any monitoring and inspection required by the United States and the IAEA. It will be very difficult for Israel to accept these demands, as presented.

Saudi demands, of course, are based on the faulty precedent created by the JCPOA, which gave Iran expansive independent enrichment capabilities and advanced centrifuge R&D on Iranian soil. It is therefore possible to understand where Saudi Arabia is coming from in seeing these demands as legitimate, even if one does not agree with them. In their view, the Iranians, who violated every treaty and agreement they signed and deceived the world, received the right to independent enrichment, so why shouldn't they get the same? Understanding the Saudi argument is key to the solution that I will present to reach a win-win situation.

The rationale behind the alleged nuclear deal the US and Iran are working on is freezing Iran's progress – i.e. granting Iran de facto approval to enrich uranium to 60% – in exchange for the release of some of Iran's frozen funds (in Iraq and South Korea) and perhaps also the release of prisoners. Israel must clarify in advance what the dangers in this absurd deal are, and present strong opposition – even if it will harm the potential progress toward the very important Saudi deal.  

The absurdity in the emerging Iran deal is even magnified when you add up the time that has elapsed since the idea was first raised by the US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and if you take note of the change in the fundamentals since then. America's overarching goal of having a one-year breakout period is no longer relevant; an agreement will result in that window total perhaps no more than a few weeks while giving the Iranians tens of billions of dollars that would enable the regime to recover economically and to continue financing terrorism.

Since the idea was first raised, Tehran has been massively enriching to 20% (this is the main problem, although everyone emphasizes enrichment to 90%, which is mostly semantic and declarative), and to 60%, and even "dabbled" in 84% enrichment, even though the IAEA is about to close this investigation file. Iran produces uranium metal, prevents the inspectors from accessing suspicious sites, and maintains all paths to the bomb.

The deal would legitimize Iran's violations and allow it to retain all the assets it has obtained through those violations. At the same time, the IAEA continues to close its investigation files on the Iranian issue. This could undo the agency's very raison d'être.

The agreement will allow Iran to continue in its development and manufacturing of advanced centrifuges, as well as give it permission to hold on to ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. It will also continue weaponization – the only thing that truly separates Tehran from having nuclear capability. Meanwhile, its true status will continue to be largely hidden.

The agreement will stop any activity against Iran's nuclear program by the United States, certainly in an election year, under the mistaken assumption that the plan is "back in a box", as Sullivan phrased it, and will prevent, or at least make it very difficult, for Israel to attack alone.

All this – while the Iranians attack American interests in the Gulf and in the Middle East, violate human rights and kill women and girls in Tehran, and continue their massive support for Russia by transferring advanced weapons that help kill Ukrainian women and girls.

Therefore, the correct and practically the only way to advance a Saudi deal that would help bring about normalization with Israel, overcome the issue of Riyadh's request for an independent fuel cycle, and take the bad deal with Iran off the table, is to have the Israelis – during their meetings in Washington – insist on triggering the snapback mechanism to the fullest extent against Iran, by reinstating all UN Security Council sanctions that were lifted when the agreement was signed, including a total ban on uranium enrichment. 

Such an American demand, even if it will not come to be in the end because of an Iranian objection, will pull the rug under the Saudis' enrichment demands, make it possible to move forward with a Saudi-American-Israeli deal, without the nuclear threat from Saudi Arabia, and open the door to joint Israeli-American action against the Iranian nuclear program.

Any American approval to give Saudi Arabia the right to enrich uranium on its soil – certainly if it will be without strong Israeli opposition and regardless of the level of supervision in Saudi Arabia and who will actually be responsible for the enrichment – will immediately trigger a similar demand from countries that have already received some civilian nuclear capabilities from the United States (the UAE, for example) while complying with the so-called "123 rules" that cover all dangers, and from other countries in the Middle East. A nuclear arms race will then begin.

A bad nuclear deal will once again inflict a heavy toll on Israel, so Israel must act against it in a loud and unified manner, even if the potential for advancing the Saudi deal, which is very important to Israel, is undermined in the process. This critical issue should remain the number one priority and must not be included in any Israeli political controversy. Sources inside Israel, official and unofficial, who express the opinion that even a bad agreement has advantages, such as giving Israel more time to prepare for a future confrontation with Iran, are wrong and misleading, and they also harm Israeli interests.

At the same time, Iran is trying to draw Israel into a multi-front confrontation and to remain, at least for now, out of real physical confrontation. Israel cannot allow Iran to get away with that, and at the same time, Israel must continue to improve its capabilities – military or otherwise. The Israeli message against an agreement with Iran must be crystal clear; any other form of conduct will send the message – especially to the Gulf states – that Israel is weak and cannot be trusted.

Brigadier General (res.) Jacob Nagel is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a visiting professor at the Technion's Faculty of Aerospace Engineering. He previously served as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's national security advisor and head of the National Security Council (acting).

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In the shadow of the escalation in Gaza, Iran is exerting pressure on Hamas (and perhaps also on Hezbollah) to respond harshly to extract a price for Israel's operation against the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This is part of Iran's ongoing effort to drag Israel into a multi-theater campaign while leaving itself out of a direct confrontation at this stage.

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Iran continues to violate all the agreements it signed: It infringes on human rights in Iran and Ukraine; it supports Russia in its war against Ukraine; it funds terrorist organizations in Lebanon, Syria, Judea and Samaria, and around the world, while drawing closer to Saudi Arabia and Syria. Nonetheless, there are still those in the United States, together with the EU, who yet again dare to float the prospect of having a partial nuclear deal.

On the absurdity of a partial and faulty nuclear deal (called "less for less", but it is really "much more for much less") I wrote many times in the past. It looks like the Iranians are (again) doing Israel's bidding by refusing to accept the deal, even though such a deal would at most give the West a delay of a few weeks or months until Iran obtains enough fissile material for a bomb, and at the same time will lead to extensive sanction relief. This will allow the regime to recover economically and continue funding and supporting terrorism. Under an agreement signed by the superpowers, including the United States, it will also be very difficult for Israel to attack Iran on its own.

There is no doubt that Iran has been, at least partially, behind almost all recent attacks on Israel in the south, in the north, and in the east, through Hamas, Hezbollah, and its forces in Syria. Its goal is to push Israel into a confrontation on four or even five fronts: Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, Judea and Samaria, and Jerusalem.

Now is the time to implement one of the major changes in Israel's national security strategy that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu began in 2017-2018 – by punishing not only those who attack Israel directly, as the IDF and Shin Bet have done in recent days against the PIJ in Gaza – but also the actors who fund and send them under the expectation that they would be treated with impunity: i.e. Iran. The punishment does not have to be immediate or direct, as this could have the region spiral into all-out war. There are many ways to punish and weaken Iran indirectly, including from the inside by, for example, supporting the protesters taking to the streets of the Islamic Republic.

The Israeli campaign against Iran will probably reach a direct and broad confrontation in the upcoming years. Israel should act wisely by preparing for such a scenario and exploiting the regional conflicts – most of which were launched by Iran or backed by it – and the internal conflicts in Iran, as a tool to weaken Tehran in the long run and in the run-up for a broader clash.

Iran has been preparing for a wider conflict for many years. One of the main tools of the Iranian doctrine is dramatically shoring up its capabilities around Israel with weapons and fighters that would be ready, when necessary, to join the overall effort against Israel.

In Lebanon, Iran is building Hezbollah as its main force for a wider conflagration with Israel. Iran has armed the organization with more than 150,000 statistical missiles of various ranges, anti-tank missiles, UAVs and drones, intelligence capabilities, and other means. In recent years, the main effort has been concentrated on building a PGM (precision-guided munition) arsenal by converting some of the statistical missiles and by manufacturing others, including lately on Lebanese soil. The PGMs may serve as a game-changing weapon in a future campaign, Therefore, Israel is waging an ongoing and broad campaign to prevent or at least reduce this threat, as part of the "campaign between wars".

In Syria, Iran has in recent years – under the cover of the civil war and through the assistance it gives to Bashar Assad's regime – tried to create capabilities that mimic those it has in Lebanon. Iran is trying to establish itself in Syria by building a significant military force based on the Shiite militias by transferring and manufacturing PGMs for Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran is also arming the Syrian army with advanced weapons to replenish the weapons Assad used during the civil war and the weapons destroyed by alleged Israeli air strikes. Iran has recently begun arming the Syrians with air defense systems to replace the Russian systems transferred to Ukraine due to the new Russian priorities.

In Gaza and Judea and Samaria, Iran massively and continuously supports Hamas and PIJ, with advanced armaments and a regular budget, and encourages them to attack Israel. Some of the capabilities are indeed intended for the ongoing conflicts with Israel, but the real mission is to support a future confrontation with Israel. That is why the Iranians are sometimes furious with Hezbollah when some of the advanced munitions that Tehran supplies for its purposes get used by the organization in a confrontation with Israel whose timing had not been coordinated with Iran.

Israel must "exploit" the regional conflicts to frustrate Iran's entrenchment efforts at a much larger scale, especially by destroying the arsenals and its various capabilities to manufacture and convert munitions in order to prevent their use in the future. The main efforts should be vis-à-vis the warehouse and the PGMs capabilities in Lebanon, but also vis-à-vis Syria and Gaza.

At the same time, Israel must prevent Iran (economically and practically) from rearming its proxies after their weapons will be destroyed. To do it effectively, Israel must pressure Washington, in coordination with the Gulf states, to deal with all three components of the Iranian nuclear program – fissile material, weaponization (which should be now the main effort), and the means of delivery – and at the same time create maximum economic pressure and a credible military threat.

A partial and weak nuclear deal will send a false signal to Iran (and to the markets) that the West will agree to everything Iran did and will do. Israel will be left alone again, and it will be very difficult to take out the nuclear program under an agreement. In addition, any agreement will give Iran windfall revenues, allowing the regime to rehabilitate its economy, and continue arming its proxies around the region while reducing the effectiveness of Israeli operations to destroy their capabilities.

Israel should continue improving its military capabilities toward a broad future confrontation with Iran, alongside building other capabilities. It's time to change Israel's thinking and take the initiative, as has been the case in recent days in Gaza. A plan must be built to turn lemons into lemonade by having Iran's plan of a multi-front confrontation become a double-edged sword, and by severely undermining their efforts to entrench themselves in the region and arm their proxies. The paradigm shift will also strengthen Israel's standing in the region, including the efforts to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia, despite the agreement it recently signed with Iran, under the auspices of China.

Brigadier General (res.) Jacob Nagel is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a visiting professor at the Technion's Faculty of Aerospace Engineering. He previously served as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's national security advisor and head of the National Security Council (acting).

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After a long pause in the nuclear talks, during which Iran came closer to a nuclear capability (especially by stockpiling enough fissile material for the bomb), "leaks" emerged about an alleged American desire to offer once again a partial deal and to return to the negotiation table. Although the proposed deal is not a new idea, it is very important to dismiss the rumors and to clarify in advance the danger of a "less for less" deal.

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The idea of "less for less", which is in practice "much less for much more", is based on some restrictions and freezes on Iran's nuclear program, mainly by halting any further progress, in exchange for partial sanction release.

The absurdity of this proposal is even more pronounced today than in the past. The US original goal of keeping Iran a year from breakout (stockpiling enough fissile material for the first bomb), is long "gone with the wind." An agreement, even a broad one, will buy the world only a few weeks or maybe a few months, alongside a substantial easing of sanctions, allowing the regime to recover economically and to continue financing and backing terrorism all over the world.

There is no doubt that Iran is standing behind the recent attacks on Israel in the north and the south, through Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran is pushing for confrontation in four theaters: Lebanon and Syria, Gaza, Judea and Samaria, and Jerusalem. The time has come to implement the change in Israel's National Security Strategy from 2018 and aggressively punish the attackers, but also the country from which the attacks originated and the country that sent them.

Since the idea came up, Tehran has enriched uranium to 60% purity and even "played" with 84% (although the real problem is the massive amounts that have been enriched to 20%). It has also produced uranium metal, prevents International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors from accessing suspicious sites, and expects maximum sanctions relief in exchange for a handful of restrictions on its nuclear program, all the while preserving all the paths to the bomb.

So, why the proposed deal is so risky?

The deal is not a preparation for a broader, longer, and better deal, as its supporters (both American and Israeli claim), because this will be the last deal. Tehran will ostensibly agree to a few concessions and will receive many benefits in return. This was true a few years ago and is even more so now, in light of the changes since then. The deal would legitimize most of Iran's violations and will allow Iran to retain assets obtained through breaching the JCPOA and the NPT. Tehran will continue to undermine the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its demand to stop and dismiss all past and present investigations will be accepted (otherwise there will be no agreement) and will jeopardize the basic foundations of the IAEA and the NPT. The advanced centrifuge will be produced in large quantities and kept in secret enrichment sites. Since far fewer centrifuges will be required, it will be possible for Tehran to "sneak in" to the bomb. The Iranians will continue to possess ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, while the actual status of the weapons team – which is what truly stands in the way of Iran obtaining nuclear capability – will continue to be unknown.

In order to preserve the chances of a deal, Iran forced the United States and Europe to instruct the IAEA director general not to publish too harsh reports on Iranian violations, or demand a special board meeting, or even transfer the issue to the UN Security Council.

Signing such a deal would stop the work on Iran nuclear program in the US, under a mistaken assumption that it is "back in the box", as Jake Sullivan has said in the past. We should keep in mind that this plan originates with Sullivan, as he was the architect of a similar interim bad agreement in 2013 (the JPOA), and he is probably the one promoting it now if the reports are correct. Once the Iranians will get significant concessions, a bigger, broader follow-up deal is only an illusion. Iran's leaders understand how to leverage far better than President Joe Biden and his people.

It is interesting and important to also examine the Gulf states' angle, especially in light of Saudi Arabia's rapprochement with Iran and its influence on the countries of the Abraham Accords. Just this week, senior Iranian and Saudi officials met under Chinese auspices to promote the renewal of relations.

Interesting and surprising information provided by senior Israeli officials raises the surprising possibility that while the Saudi move was indeed intended for regional stability and sending a message to the United States and Israel, it could also be for wielding Saudi economic and civilian influence within Iran and in the long run help undermine and topple the regime. The Saudis understand that the Iranian expansion continues, and alongside the American incompetence, the Saudis decided to try exerting influence from within, using money and diplomacy, and realizing Saudi interests against the regime.

On the other hand, there is a justifiable fear in the Gulf that an Israeli attack on Iran will demand an immediate price from them, given their geographic proximity and the Abraham Accords, which position them as collaborators with Israel. Contrary to the above, the Saudi moves can be interpreted in Iran as Saudi weakness, and the money that flows will not bring down the regime but will strengthen it and cause an excess of self-confidence. This analysis, along with Israel's declarations, on the military option, will create a challenge to the stability of the agreements and their ability to expand to other countries.

Saudi activity vis-à-vis Egypt and Syria can also be interpreted in two directions and requires close monitoring.

The Iranians realize that Washington does not want to respond, despite all Iranian ongoing violations, nuclear violations, attacks on American interests in the Gulf and in the Middle East, human rights violations, and killing of women and girls in Iran, including perhaps using chemical weapons as recently reported, massive support for Russia in the Ukraine war, transferring weapons to the Russians and helping them to kill Ukrainian women and children.

If the Americans don't respond to all those violations and even will offer the Iranians a partial deal, why would the regime agree to any further restrictions on their nuclear and missile programs, when they got almost everything they wanted from the small deal while the American president refuses to put a credible military threat on the table? Why should the Gulf states believe the United States?

Therefore, Washington and Israel, in coordination with the Gulf states, must deal with all three components of the Iranian nuclear program: fissile material (even if it begins to be too late), the development of the weapons system (it becomes the main priority), and the means of delivery, together with economic pressure and a credible military threat. Signing a weak deal will send a false signal to Iran (and the markets) that the West will agree to whatever they will do, while Israel alone is too weak, and will not attack.

Israel is bound to pay a heavy price in an ill-advised deal, so it must act against it with a united voice. This critical issue must stay out of any political controversy, and certainly not being connected to any internal debates that help our enemies associate it with weakness (rightly or wrongly). Officials should leave their classified assessments, which they must present to Israel leaders, to closed doors.

Israel must continue to improve its capabilities (militarily and otherwise), including in the War Between Wars and its branches in order to deal with the Iranian threat. Having Israel explore the merits of a limited deal is extremely risky and will send a wrong message to the US and the Gulf states. The US will assume Israel is open to a deal and the Gulf states will assume that Israel is weak like the United States.

Brigadier General (res.) Jacob Nagel is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a visiting professor at the Technion aerospace faculty. He previously served as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's national security advisor and head of the National Security Council (acting).

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Israeli National Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi and Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer have recently held very important meetings with US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and his team, with the participation of Deputy National Security Advisor Gil Reich and other senior representatives from the Ministry of Defense, the Foreign Ministry, the Mossad, and the IDF. Despite the fact that the meeting was held during a tense period in Israel's relations with the US, it carried utmost importance for the joint progress on some important issues. According to the joint statement that came out after the meeting, there is an understanding between the parties, although there are still disagreements regarding the required course of action and especially the pace.

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In accordance with the priorities set by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, topping the Israeli list were the issues of Iran and Saudi Arabia. The American hosts apparently raised questions about the Palestinian Authority, Temple Mount, Judea and Samaria, Russia, Ukraine, and China, and even maybe asked about Israel's internal debates.

Iran and Saudi Arabia were indeed at the center of the discourse, given Iran's continued aggressive nuclear behavior and its support for terrorism, the dangers resulting from the rapprochement between Iran and Russia and their support for Russia's war in Ukraine, as well as Iran's attempts to entrench itself in Syria. It is clear that the importance of strengthening cooperation with the Saudis was raised during the meetings, which took place before the Iran-Saudi announcement on renewing their relations under Chinese auspices.

Iran

The intel picture about the nuclear program is common and clear to both countries, but the significance derived from it and the immediate actions needed are apparently still not agreed upon. Tehran has already enriched enough uranium for several bombs at a level of 60% purity. According to recent International Atomic Energy Agency findings, Tehran was also caught enriching to 84% (it is not clear exactly how much and why they did it) and could immediately switch to 93% enrichment, suitable for the bomb. In addition, Iran denies IAEA inspectors access to suspicious sites and refuses to answer the open questions to the IAEA.

It is very important to understand that. in essence. there is no big difference between enrichment to 60% and 84% – and not even to 93%. The real problem started when Tehran enriched massively to 20%, and the world didn't react, because enriching to 20% is about 70% of the time needed to reach to the 93% point, and it requires almost 100% of the technological know-how. On the other hand, it is important to remember that the world has marked the enrichment to 90% as its red line, and Iran's defiant behavior – with the lack of a global response – is very problematic, so Iran must be punished, even now, for its behavior, with a clear and appropriate response.

Israel has a genuine desire to help the US reach a good, broad, and comprehensive agreement that closes all Iranian paths to the bomb for a very long period. It will not happen before Iran realizes that Israel or the US, or even better, both of them together, will attack it. Although Israel has the capability to go it alone, it is preferable to have the US play a role in the preparation and execution of such a plan.

Under no circumstances should Israel ask the US for additional budgets or weapons systems. What Israel really needs from the US is mainly flexibility and advancement in supplying the systems that have already been purchased (such as tanker aircraft), or are about to be purchased, and a massive increase in the pre-deployment in Israel of advanced ammunition (like JDAM, artillery, etc.), and maybe in the future, even Israeli-American active air and missile defense systems, once purchased for US needs.

Israel and the US can jointly put on the table a credible military threat and a clear message of genuine readiness for action. It is very important to make a clear American statement that Israel has an independent capability to attack Iran and that the US will support such action, before and after. If this happens alongside massive economic pressure and active support for the riots in Iran, perhaps it could lead to change in Iran, but if not – then it will result in the threats being put into action.

Saudi Arabia

The meeting took place before the surprising announcement of the resumption of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which constitutes a significant deterioration in the balance of power in the Gulf and in the ties between Riyadh and Washington, but of course, also affects Israel. The declaration contained a paragraph about each country's sovereignty and its freedom to choose its future, so if we want to stay optimistic, maybe it is a clue from the Saudis on their desire to reach an agreement with Israel in the future.

Despite the declaration, there is still the possibility of rectifying the situation, and particularly, there are still important things to offer the Saudis, mainly from the US, but certainly also from Israel.

The US can offer the Saudis cooperation and agreements such as with Israel, India, and Taiwan, without compromising Israel's qualitative military edge (QME). For example: supplying predefined military equipment that will not depend on domestic US politics; real joint fighting against Iranian aggression, despite the resumption of relations; a free-trade agreement; a kind of MOU signed with Israel (without money, but with pre-purchased contents); trilateral cooperation with Israel in R&D and technology, and even in the future – cooperation in missile defense when possible, including the supply (from the US, if needed) of adapted American/Israeli systems.

In any case, it will be not wise to offer the Saudis a full and independent nuclear fuel cycle, and promises that cannot be implemented in Congress, such as a NATO-style treaty and a full collective defense commitment like that found in Article 5 of NATO's founding treaty.

When it comes to cooperation – perhaps even trilateral – in civilian nuclear technologies, there is much we can do, and it will be elaborated on in a separate article.

In return, the Saudis can provide the US and Israel with a full comprehensive peace agreement, including bringing other countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan) to the negotiating table, using a phased method, and of course, they should not overheat their relations with Iran.

The Chinese issue, which apparently came up also on the meetings' sidelines, is very important to the US, especially now that China brokered the deal between Iran and the Saudis. It appears as a "double finger in the US eye". Israel must fully adopt the American approach, and in any conflict, clearly choose the American side, including in cooperation with Taiwan. The regulatory processes that have begun in Israel indicate that this approach is beginning to be implemented.

Brigadier General (res.) Jacob Nagel is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a visiting professor at the Technion aerospace faculty. He previously served as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's national security advisor and head of the National Security Council (acting).

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