Despite the dramatic surprise surrounding the fall of the Assad regime, the Israeli government accurately read the situation and swiftly instructed the IDF to seize control of the buffer zone on the Syrian Golan Heights. Since then, Israeli forces have been operating in Syrian territory from roughly 10 outposts stretching from Mount Hermon to the southern Golan near the Yarmouk slopes.

Hostility to Israeli presence

Within this framework, the forces carry out intelligence-driven raids to foil terrorist activity in villages within their sector, including beyond the buffer zone. This activity, which over the past year has become routine, has led to the thwarting of Hamas-directed cells, Islamic State-inspired cells and cells directed by Iranian proxies. In Sunni Muslim villages and towns, there is hostility toward the Israeli presence, and there have already been exchanges of fire that, until Friday morning, had not resulted in Israeli casualties. In this context, the encounter early Friday between a paratroop unit and armed men in Beit Jann, in which six soldiers were wounded, was not unexpected.

Beit Jann lies in a narrow valley on the slopes of Mount Hermon. Its residents, together with the adjacent town Mazraat Beit Jann, about twenty thousand Sunni Muslims in total, were considered supporters of the Assad regime during the civil war. After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the IDF captured the area and remained there throughout the months of attrition until withdrawing under the 1974 disengagement agreement. At the time, I served as a tank commander at an outpost near Mazraat Beit Jann. In those days, the villagers were unarmed and did not serve as fertile ground for terrorist networks.

Today, the situation across Syria is entirely different. During the civil war, and especially after the fall of the Assad regime and the collapse of the Syrian army, the villages and towns became awash with weapons of all kinds, not only small arms. In this dimension, the monopoly on armed force across Syria is far from being held solely by the official government and army.

Political upheaval in Damascus

Damascus is marking one year since the fall of the Assad regime. Through astute diplomatic maneuvering, the new president, Mahmoud al-Shar'a, has secured broad international backing, including from the White House. Yet he is struggling to impose stability in the face of heavily armed separatist minorities, primarily the Druze and Kurds. At the same time, the regime itself uses armed Bedouin tribal groups for its purposes, as seen in the fighting in the Druze Mountain region, even though these groups are not fully subject to government authority.

Syria today is in a state of fluid, uncontrollable transformation, resembling streams of molten lava flowing during a volcanic eruption. Israel's activity, by this analogy, serves a dual purpose. The first and immediate goal is to prevent these streams from reaching the Israeli Golan border.

The second goal is to influence the shaping of trends unfolding in Syria that have long-term implications for Israel's strategic interests, just before these "lava streams" cool and solidify into a lasting new reality. From this perspective, the IDF's military friction, which also includes efforts to provide humanitarian aid to local residents, serves a purpose that extends beyond counterterrorism.

A global battleground

Meanwhile, Syria has become a battleground for global influence. Turkish efforts, bolstered by Qatari funding, stand out prominently. At the same time, Russia is seeking to restore its influence in and on Syria, including moves to reassert its presence on the Golan. One can assume Moscow is aiming to prevent a situation similar to the Gaza Strip, where the US has exclusive regional dominance in shaping long-term trends.

Within this system, the IDF presence in the area carries strategic significance, tied to readiness and the ability to operate east of the Golan border. This operational concept dates back to the tactics passed from Orde Wingate to Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon in the 1938 Special Night Squads, which emphasized proactive operations beyond settlement fences and raids deep into Arab villages. This is what active defense looks like.

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In wartime, especially during a prolonged conflict, the equation of national security shifts daily and demands constant review. This is an opportunity to recall the Israel Defense Forces' definition of national security in its combat doctrine: "National security deals with ensuring the ability to effectively confront any threat to national existence and vital national interests."

Among the consequences of the current war, and in the face of a growing international drive for a UN resolution declaring a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, including Jerusalem, Israel's most vital interests are under severe threat. This represents a strategic trend that requires serious attention and demands new strategic direction across all dimensions. The planned offensive in Gaza must be evaluated in this context as well.

Critics of the Gaza operation argue that it cannot guarantee the war's objectives: returning the hostages and dismantling the Hamas terrorist organization. The response to that criticism is that war, by its very nature chaotic and unpredictable, never guarantees a desired outcome.

It is therefore reasonable to acknowledge that the operation may fail to achieve its stated goals. That uncertainty is familiar to every leader faced with authorizing an offensive move. A historic example is the Yom Kippur War cabinet debate over crossing the Suez Canal. Then-IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar pressed the political leadership to clarify whether they believed the canal crossing would help achieve his aim: a ceasefire and the end of the war.

Even with Elazar's clear objective, success could not be guaranteed once the operation began. Nor was the follow up plan, after the canal crossing, fully defined. It remained unclear whether Israeli forces reaching the west bank of the canal would turn north to encircle Egypt's Second Army or south to encircle the Third Army. Ultimately, circumstances on the battlefield led to the decision to focus southward, surrounding the Third Army.

This flexibility, in my view, underpins the operational concept devised by the Southern Command and the IDF chief of staff for the next stage of Operation Gideon's Chariots. The plan envisions a gradual capture of Gaza City, with each stage subject to real-time decisions: exploiting opportunities or halting to avoid emerging risks, including those endangering the hostages' lives. The hope is that such a measured approach will yield cumulative achievements that bring about the defeat of Hamas, on Israel's terms.

Managing the campaign to capture Gaza will require sensitivity not only to local battlefield conditions but also to the broader strategic environment in the region and worldwide. If conducted in this manner, the conquest and clearing of Gaza City could set the conditions for bringing the war to a decisive and successful conclusion. It is precisely in this flexibility that the answer lies to the senior officer's warning of a potential blow to Israel's national security.

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However, this maneuver does not yet signal a decisive push into the heart of Gaza City or the central refugee camps. As indicated by both the prime minister and the defense minister, the objective of the operation remains the application of sustained military pressure on Hamas, with the expectation that this will lead to another ceasefire and the release of hostages.

This approach by the IDF represents a middle path between two conflicting strategies being debated in the Israeli public discourse. One path advocates focusing solely on securing the release of hostages, even at the cost of accepting all of the terrorist organization's demands, including ending the war and a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. The other calls for a comprehensive military campaign to capture the entire Gaza Strip and eliminate Hamas, even if this requires forgoing further efforts to rescue hostages at this stage.

In contrast, the IDF's approach aims to pursue both goals - simultaneously promoting the release of hostages while also degrading Hamas' military capabilities and its governing authority. In practical terms, the logic behind the IDF's actions provides the political leadership with flexibility at a critical juncture. If military pressure yields progress toward a new hostage deal, operations can be paused under a ceasefire. But if no such progress is achieved, the military campaign can escalate and expand.

From the IDF's perspective, two main considerations underlie this middle-ground approach. The first, openly stated, is the belief that sustained and intensifying military pressure will lead to the release of additional hostages. The second is that an extended ceasefire would benefit Hamas, giving it time to recover, rebuild, and reorganize its military forces in preparation for renewed fighting. The IDF aims to prevent such a scenario by maintaining the momentum of military pressure.

Over the two weeks since the start of the operation, a significant portion of the damage inflicted on Hamas has been achieved through the use of airpower. In parallel, ground operations have enabled the IDF to reshape the battlefield in preparation for any future military action. In this context, the IDF has focused on establishing key transportation corridors, such as the Netzarim corridor, the expanded Philadelphi corridor, and now the Morag axis, designed to provide the IDF with freedom of movement and maneuverability in response to any future developments or arrangements.

For now, the overall direction of IDF operations continues to follow a measured, incremental logic that remains open to a range of flexible possibilities going forward.

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This frustration is particularly evident now, with the withdrawal of IDF troops from the Netzarim Corridor. It fuels the demand, championed in the government by Minister Bezalel Smotrich, for the war to continue once the first phase of the hostage deal is completed. However, from a strategic perspective, military plans should not be dictated by emotions of frustration.

For Israeli public opinion, and as far as is known, the expectations of the White House, the continued release of hostages remains a top priority until the process is completed. If the negotiations reach an deadlock, it is preferable that Hamas be responsible. A significant portion of the Israeli public needs to know that the Israeli government is genuinely committed to securing the release of all remaining hostages, even in a second phase of the deal.

There is no doubt that after 16 months of war, Hamas remaining in power is an undesirable result. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that this means Hamas has won. War is not a soccer game, and the final outcome is not determined solely by the situation at a given moment, especially when the timing of the conclusion is not predetermined.

A relevant historical lesson comes from the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. That conflict played out in stages. A significant round of fighting occurred in the fall of 2020, during which Armenia suffered severe military losses. However, despite the ceasefire, most Armenian residents remained in Nagorno-Karabakh. A subsequent decisive battle took place in the fall of 2023, ending with Armenia's complete withdrawal from the region and the mass displacement of its Armenian population. Looking at this example, one must ask: Why the rush to resume the war in Gaza immediately after the first phase of the hostage deal?

Strategy has always depended on cunning and the choice of the right timing, which requires a degree of flexibility. The rigid insistence on immediately resuming the war reflects a clear lack of strategic adaptability.

Given Israel's frustration over the current situation in Gaza, it is worth considering an alternative perspective: Hamas remaining in power may present certain advantages. Other alternatives, such as control by the Palestinian Authority, were never truly viable. At best, the Palestinian Authority's security apparatus and Hamas leadership would have reached an understanding, replicating Hezbollah's model in Lebanon. The Palestinian Authority would have served as the official governing entity, while Hamas, without disarming, would have continued to build its military threat against Israel. In contrast, the current situation offers a certain clarity: what is visible is what exists. This reality, at least, is easy to assess, and that has its advantages.

The war against Hamas and Iran's regional proxy network is far from over. One battle has ended, but another is taking shape. At the conclusion of a meeting yesterday between Hamas leaders in exile and Iranian leadership, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei declared: "By the grace of Allah, the day will come when you will all proudly resolve the issue of Jerusalem for the Islamic world, and that day will certainly arrive."

Israel must recognize that the war in Gaza is part of a broader regional conflict, one that has been focused on Jerusalem from the outset as a unifying cause for the entire Islamic world. In this context, the push to continue the war in Gaza must be assessed within a wider strategic framework, factoring in the right timing and developments on other fronts. The IDF, too, would be wise to maintain the element of surprise rather than rigidly adhering to an arbitrary timeline.

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The Palestinian Authority's security forces' battle against terror groups in Jenin and Tulkarem seems far from reaching a decisive end. It remains unclear whether the objective is to restore PA control over northern Samaria or if this is merely a show of force – a message to the new US administration and an attempt to signal the Authority's ability to exercise sovereign responsibility. Analyzing the power dynamics between the sides, the fighting will likely end in an agreement delineating each party's operational zones and coexistence boundaries.

Despite his advanced age, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) possesses strategic awareness and accurately reads the international arena. In his earliest days as PA chairman in September 2004, he explained his approach in an interview with Al-Rai newspaper. He determined that suicide terrorism had harmed the Palestinian cause, shifting international legitimacy from supporting the Palestinian struggle to backing Israeli policy. Therefore, he demanded: "Let us fulfill our Road Map [a plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict] obligations, convince the world we've done our duty, and that [Ariel] Sharon needs to fulfill his."

Facing Saudi Arabia's push to implement the two-state solution, Abbas continues to operate similarly today, trying to present the international community with a responsible political entity wielding sovereign authority. In this situation, demanding Israel commit to a two-state trajectory poses the greatest threat to us, more likely than PA security forces turning their weapons against Israeli targets. While such a scenario isn't implausible, the PA leadership understands that direct confrontation with Israel would give the Jerusalem government grounds to reject any progress on resolving the Palestinian issue.

Those who believe diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia toward a regional Sunni-Israeli alliance can be established without concrete commitments on the Palestinian issue should learn from Menachem Begin's mistake during the Egyptian peace agreement. At a conference marking Camp David Accords' tenth anniversary, Dan Pattir revealed that President Jimmy Carter saw the Israeli-Egyptian agreement as a stepping stone to a broader deal resolving the Palestinian issue – which he considered more important. Hence, he clashed with Begin over demands to freeze all settlement construction. At the same conference, David Kimchi claimed Carter promised Anwar Sadat that if reelected in 1980, the Americans would force Israel to implement the Palestinian autonomy as Egypt understood it. Thank God Carter wasn't reelected.

Menachem Begin erred in assessing Sadat's autonomy demands as mere solidarity. To this day, in every meeting with Egyptian representatives, they attribute their deliberately distant and minimalist approach to peace to Israel's unfulfilled Palestinian obligations. Similarly, we should internalize that Saudi demands for advancing a two-state solution wouldn't be seen as a non-binding declaration.

The Oct. 7 massacre created public consciousness enabling broad national consensus to reject establishing a Palestinian state beside the city of Kfar Saba and Highway 6. Israel can renew Yitzhak Rabin's commitment from his final Knesset speech on Oct. 5, 1995, when he brought Oslo II Accord for approval. On one hand, he worked to transfer Palestinians in Areas A and B to PA control – completed in January 1996, effectively ending Israeli control over 90% of Palestinians. On the other hand, he established that Jerusalem would remain unified, including Givat Zeev and Maale Adumim; the Jordan Valley in its broadest sense would be the eastern security border, and the Palestinian entity would be "less than a state."

At Camp David 2000, Ehud Barak abandoned all of Rabin's principles: he agreed to divide Jerusalem, withdraw from the Valley, and grant full sovereignty to the Palestinian entity. The Clinton Parameters in December 2000 presented a map leaving Israel without defensive conditions.

Unlike the Clinton-Barak framework – Saudi Arabia's current starting point – Yitzhak Rabin carefully drew Area C considering Israel's essential security requirements in five vital regions: metropolitan Jerusalem, Jordan Valley as a defensive border against any eastern threat, western settlements in the Samaria hills, protecting the narrow coastal strip; southern Hebron Mountain settlements maintaining a protective line around strategic assets in the south and control of main roads through settlements and security forces.

Not a single Israeli settlement or agricultural farm in Area C fails to serve one of Israel's spatial security requirements. This position needs broad national consensus.

Originally published by Makor Rishon.

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In the predawn hours of Saturday, a ballistic missile from Yemen struck an urban area in Jaffa, echoing a previous warhead impact on a school in Ramat Efal. Both incidents had the potential for catastrophic casualties. The statistical randomness underscores how mere chance prevented far more severe outcomes in these recent events. While faith in miracles exists, Jewish wisdom teaches against relying on them. Consequently, Israel and its defense establishment must confront the Houthi threats from Yemen with the utmost gravity.

The incident prompts three crucial questions: How did this breach occur? Why does it persist - what drives the continued Houthi campaign? And what measures can and should Israel take to protect itself from threats originating in Yemen?

The question of how this occurred encompasses two dimensions requiring thorough investigation. The first lies with the engineers of Israel's defense industry and Air Force Air Defense Command, who must examine all variables and operational systems to enhance interception capabilities, including pre-emptive warhead interception. The second dimension necessitates investigating the supply routes of ballistic missiles, UAVs, and other weaponry from Iran to Houthi forces in Yemen. While Yemen lacks indigenous strategic weapons expertise, modern online instruction enables terror groups without engineering knowledge to assemble sophisticated weapons from prepared components, similar to assembling furniture from IKEA.

As for the underlying motivations – we must develop a more nuanced understanding beyond simply labeling the Houthi movement as an Iranian proxy. While the network of ties between Iran and Houthi leadership undoubtedly accounts for the comprehensive support of Houthi military operations, it's crucial to recognize the internal drivers propelling Houthi leadership in their struggle, based on autonomous considerations. Their combat ideology is distinctly formed in both identity and aspirations, functioning as more than just an instrument of Iranian strategy.

Like other radical Islamic militant organizations, the Houthis are driven by genuine jihadist conviction and purpose. Their year-long success in disrupting a strategic maritime route, despite US and British military coalition efforts, fuels their determination to sustain their campaign against the entire West, not just Israel. They interpret the international community's weakness and American military hesitation as divine endorsement of their continued struggle.

The critical question remains: what action should Israel take against this threat? The challenge in mounting effective operations against the Houthis stems from their elusive tactical approach. They operate within an impoverished population verging on famine. In such circumstances, even retaliatory strikes and targeting critical infrastructure such as power stations may yield limited strategic value.

Examining the broader security challenge facing Israel, given the lack of clear strategic targets in Yemen, Israel may need to refocus its offensive strategy more directly on Iran.

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As we witness the unfolding events in Syria, one stark lesson emerges from the rebels' surprise offensive – and it's one that should make us all pause and think. The strategic logic driving the Middle East operates, unlike anything we see in the West, functioning more like a complex ecosystem where the smallest change can trigger cascading effects throughout the region.

Consider this: Just as cattle populations in an ecosystem can affect climate patterns, a shift in one regional power dynamic reverberates across the entire Middle East. It's a far cry from the engineered precision of a modern railway system, where every movement is calculated and controlled. Instead, we're dealing with a delicate balance that can tip any moment.

Take what's happening now. The Sunni rebels' offensive against Assad's forces and Shiite militias in northern Syria didn't emerge in a vacuum. It's a direct response to the changing regional dynamics following Israel's military campaigns against Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. This is exactly how the Middle East's ecosystem works – one event triggers another in an endless chain of action and reaction.

Here's what many Western policymakers fail to grasp: In this region, periods of calm aren't seen as stepping stones to lasting peace but as temporary pauses – "hudnas" – in an ongoing cycle. While Western minds might hope these pauses will eventually solidify into permanent peace, they're missing a crucial point: You can't negotiate away deeply held religious aspirations.

Video: Toppling of Hafez Assad's statue in Latakia / Credit: Arab media

Look at Turkey's current ambitions, for instance. They're not just about modern geopolitics; they're deeply rooted in Ottoman history. Aleppo, with its historic connections to the Harran Valley cities, including my own hometown of Urfa, represents more than just a strategic location. It's a symbol of past glory that still resonates today. The region's history – from Napoleon's campaigns to the Egyptian-Ottoman wars of 1839-1841 – isn't just ancient history; it's a living blueprint for current ambitions.

I saw this mindset firsthand at the Iranian pavilion in a Shanghai exhibition, where a massive map of the ancient Persian Empire under Darius dominated the entrance. This wasn't mere decoration – it was a statement of aspiration, a dream waiting for its moment to become reality.

For American strategists still seeking to impose stable order in the region, perhaps it's time for a different metaphor: Think of the Middle East less like a chess board and more like a weather system, where hurricanes form and strike with a force beyond human control. Yes, conflicts can be temporarily contained, but even the most promising peace arrangements remain vulnerable to sudden, unpredictable shifts.

The tactical implications of recent events are equally sobering. The rebels' offensive, much like the October 7 attacks, demonstrates how modern warfare has evolved. Using everyday vehicles – motorcycles, jeeps, pickup trucks – mobile fighting units can launch devastating surprise attacks. It's a sobering reminder that even a supposedly demilitarized Palestinian state could quickly mobilize such civilian resources for military purposes.

For Israel, this should be a wake-up call. Imagine similar assault groups launching from Tulkarm and Qalqilya toward the coastal strip. While Israel may be watching Syria's current turmoil from the sidelines, we must acknowledge an uncomfortable truth: even the mighty IDF cannot guarantee absolute superiority in every scenario.

Originally published in Makor Rishon. 

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The shooting attack on IDF soldiers on Sunday near the Jordan Valley reinforces the security establishment's assessment that terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria are getting stronger and may reach a strategic tipping point. The Palestinian Authority has long lost its control over its cities and it is only thanks to the pro-active posture of the IDF and Shin Bet that Jenin and Nablus have not become another Gaza. 

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The new terrorist threat should have Israel rethink its overall rationale guiding its policies since the Oslo Accords have come into effect in 1990s. Almost 30 years since they were supposed to usher in a new era of peace, it is incumbent upon us to undergo a paradigm shift by scrutinizing the flawed assumptions on which they were based.

The first rationale was that a separation from the Palestinians was a prerequisite for any resolution of the conflict. The fact of the matter is that in northern Samaria the IDF pulled back from Jenin in 1996. In 2005, several Jewish settlements were uprooted in northern Samaria. In both cases, this only turned the area into terrorist hotbeds that only drew Israel back time and again in order to protect Israelis on the coastal plains.

It is also hard to deny that the IDF withdrawal only strengthened the terrorist elements there, much like the Gaza disengagement turned that enclave into an even greater threat to Israel. Thus, terrorist hotbeds are the direct results of the void created by the lack of Israeli troops and civilians in the area, and one must wonder: Perhaps separation is anything but a solution? 

The second assumption: Any risk that is entailed in pursuing the path of the Oslo Accords was calculated and reversible. Then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin explained that Israel will retain effective control over areas that are handed over, making it possible to reverse course should the need arise. What has unfolded in the Gaza Strip over the past few decades – along with the new trends in Judea and Samaria –  has been a rude awakening. Just look at how the efforts to reestablish the Jewish settlement in northern Samaria have been met with opposition by Israeli security officials (who are taking their cues from their US counterparts). This shows that as far as the international community is concerned, Israeli withdrawals are irreversible. 

The third assumption: "Ending the occupation" will grant Israel international legitimacy. The international criticism directed at Israel any time the IDF launches incursions into Palestinian cities ignores the fact that this is defensive action aimed at curtailing the murderous terrorism in Israel. Accusations such as "it is none of Israel's business to be there" undermine the very idea that Israel has the right to defend itself as it sees fit by taking the initiative in Palestinian areas. 

The fourth assumption: A Palestinian state will be demilitarized. The proliferation of standardized weapons in the Jenin areas is not in line with the fundamentals on which the Oslo Accords were based. The Israeli expectation that a Palestinian entity of state would not challenge Israel's security failed the test of reality. To understand the potential threat, it would suffice to look at what has unfolded in the Gaza Strip. It is clear that had Rabin knew that Gaza would become what it is now, he would not have signed off on the Oslo Accords. The underlying premises on which the two-state solution has been based appear to have failed miserably. In light of this situation, Israel must chart a new path forward when it comes to the future of Judea and Samaria and the Jordan valley. 

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Defense Minister Benny Gantz made the right call by sounding the alarm on Monday, saying that a Hezbollah attack on Israel's gas installations in the Mediterranean Sea could trigger war. Such a clarion call makes sense because it can on the one hand serve as a warning to Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah lest he acts against Israel and on the other hand, it can alert Israelis by and large and the international community.

Israel's security officials have not taken Nasrallah's threats lightly. There is no doubt that his repeated threats of engaging in warfare against Israel have upped the ante in terms of his gull and brazenness, and this should not be ignored. 

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Israel and Lebanon can find a way to resolve their maritime dispute. The Karish gas barge is well within Israel's territorial waters, while the northern gas field, Qana, lies in Lebanese jurisdiction. Israel has made it abundantly clear that it wants Lebanon to extract gas from the northern field, and the US mediation efforts could make that a reality. Lebanon is suffering from a major economic crisis and desperately needs the gas from the Qana field, which is why we have to find the actual rationale for Nasrallah's repeated threats.

The conventional wisdom within Israel's national security community is that his threats are driven by domestic interests as part of the Shi'ite terrorist group's battle for hegemony in Lebanon. The threats underscore his desire to have Hezbollah get the credit for resolving this crisis in a way that benefits Lebanon and results in gas being supplied. Thus, as far as he is concerned, his statements are mainly designed to create the threat of war but he is hardly keen on an actual flare-up. That said, Israel must take seriously the option that he wants an escalation that would serve as a pretext for another round of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon. 

Israel must look at various hidden considerations that factor into Nasrallah's calculus to find what could drive him toward confrontation in the near term. Perhaps he is trying to capitalize on the internal political instability in Israel, believing this is an opportune moment to fight the Jewish state on favorable terms. There is also the possibility that there are much larger forces at work governing his decisions, such as Iran. 

In any event, Nasrallah's threats have had the Right and the Left rally to the flag to defend the country's sovereign interests. The government will get the opposition's full support if it decides to use the IDF for a decisive response that would crush Hezbollah if it attacks. Israel must make it clear that if it decides to trigger another round of hostilities, it will face an IDF that is fully prepared to meet the challenge in a proper and unexpected manner. 

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Defense Minister Benny Gantz's decision to present his recommendation for the next IDF chief of staff in the coming days is correct and legitimate. The end of IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi's tenure is fast-approaching – January 2023 – and it's best to allow his successor enough time to prepare before officially taking over.

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In an unstable strategic environment, in addition to Israel's political turmoil, the IDF is an anchor of stability that must be preserved as a national unifier. All of the candidates for the position are worthy, and none of them are politically affiliated. It is okay for the public discourse to examine the difference between the candidates in terms of the IDF's future, but it cannot, in any way, be polluted by branding them politically.

Even if the government's future is currently shrouded in mystery, this shouldn't override its duty to select the next chief of staff. It's worth remembering the damage that political considerations caused to the Israel Police, which delayed the commissioner's appointment by two years.

In choosing a chief of staff, there are, of course, clear professional criteria that must be met. Nevertheless, the appointment, rightfully so, is not free of additional considerations, such as each candidate's temperament, worldview, and overall vision for the IDF. The decision is entirely in the hands of the political echelon, which is obligated to choose a military leader in which the entire nation, and not just the government, can put its trust.

Ultimately, the process also consists of a certain element of inter-personal trust. When Ben-Gurion chose Moshe Dayan to be chief of staff, he was familiar with the more controversial aspects of his personality and knew how and why he was most suited to lead the army against the challenges of the time. When then-Defense Minister Ezer Weizmann chose Rafael Eitan as chief of staff, he preferred him over Maj. Gen. Herzl Shafir, who was extremely qualified for the position in his own right.

Unlike a conductor steering a train on a fixed track, a chief of staff personally molds the tracks to fit the challenges of the time. In this regard, we can explain how the IDF under Shafir, had he been appointed, would have taken the IDF down several different tracks than those chosen by Eitan. Questions about the nature of these differences need to be deeply examined during the political echelon's decision-making process. And yet, although the choice is made by the political leadership, the chief of staff must enter his role free and clear of any political affiliations.

At the end of the process, just one of the three candidates, each of which is qualified for the position in his own way, will be everyone's chief of staff. In Israel, no job is more demanding and critical than the chief of staff, and no job is more uniting and stately, and this is precisely where the defense minister and government should aim.

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