Since 2006, the four IDF chiefs of staff who have served in that position consecutively have championed the approach of a small, technology-based, quality army with offensive capabilities. This approach stemmed from the view that large wars are a thing of the past: We have peace with Egypt and Jordan, Syria (in 2006) was irrelevant, and at the time there were two small terrorist militias fighting Israel that weren't a true threat.

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Those terrorist militias in Gaza and Lebanon have since become terrorist armies armed with some 150,000 rockets and missiles, along with 16,000 infantry equipped with the best weaponry, including anti-tank missiles. The Syrians have made a comeback and are rebuilding their army with the help of the Russians. Pro-Iranian Shiite militias capable of firing rockets and missiles at Israel are active in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. There are tens of thousands of armed Palestinian terrorists In Judea and Samaria, and inside Israel itself, we can expect thousands of extremist Arabs and Bedouins to riot in the next war, possibly with firearms. None of these factors entered into the equation espoused by these IDF chiefs as they continued cutting the army's size.

If that isn't enough, the units in the IDF's already small reserve corps are no longer combat-ready due to a lack of training and a failure to integrate new weaponry. Essentially, they are presently incapable of implementing an attack inside Lebanon. Without these units, the army cannot carry out such an attack, which could also spark regional hostilities on five fronts simultaneously. This would require the IDF to deploy infantry units to defend these fronts, but the army's size makes this impossible.

The IDF's standing army also has a significant Achilles heel. IDF chief Aviv Kochavi's desire to build an army capable of fighting multi-dimensionally, through synchronizing air and land forces, hasn't gained momentum, with only a handful of ground units possessing such capabilities. Most of the units in the regular army haven't implemented this doctrine, and the few that have are losing their capabilities with the turnover of commanders and soldiers.

A lack of discipline

Moreover, units in the regular army are infected with a lack of discipline, a lack of oversight and supervision, a failure to verify commands, an inability to contend with harsh criticism, an inability to learn land implement lessons, and unreliable investigations. Today, the IDF is an organization that doesn't learn, lacks continuity, and has low standards and a culture of reporting unreliably. All of this means the IDF cannot launch an offensive inside Lebanon.

The majority of reservist tank units haven't adequately learned and trained on the hunting system that has been installed in all tanks, which facilitates command and control of the battlefield and hitting targets. Without proficiency in operating this system, the soldiers in these units will perform poorly.

According to Kochavi's view, every battalion-sized unit, including tank battalions in the regular army, must be able to operate intelligence-gathering drones, guide artillery to targets, and coordinate airstrikes. This is a complex undertaking, and only a few units are currently capable of performing these tasks. The majority of tank units in the regular army lack this training, even though the chief of staff says it's a prerequisite for launching an attack. It looks wonderful in presentations, but on the ground, the situation is vastly different.

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In the final outcome, the current management of the IDF is completely unsatisfactory. It is a failed system that pins personal responsibility on its managers for the IDF's lack of war readiness, which will exact a very heavy price in the next multi-arena war. Were a civilian company to be managed similarly, it would have collapsed a long time ago. This is nothing short of an abuse of the public trust, and the defense minister is also culpable for this grave situation.

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He's not the person who should be recommending the next chief of staff to the government. Benny Gantz's argument to the attorney general that failure to select an army chief under the interim government will impair the IDF's readiness is simply a mockery.

The defense minister, who is significantly liable for the army's dire condition, cannot be objective in his choice of the next chief of staff, and therefore needs to stand down and leave it to an objective committee to examine the issue on a professional basis. The committee must be legally established and present its recommendations to the government.

Several candidates can be recommended to the government, with an emphasis on the most important criteria necessary for advancing the army at this juncture. Based on an adjusted calculation of these considerations for each candidate, the committee would then present its preference. The government would then discuss the candidates and determine the next IDF chief.

In addition to his leadership and operational capabilities, the next army chief must also have the skills to properly manage the IDF and contend with its deficient organizational structure, which has thus far caused it to cross all red lines and is the main factor behind its severe deterioration.

The IDF cannot continue as it has for many years now, with the defense minister the only person authorized to nominate a candidate to the government following a suboptimal selection process, as determined by the state comptroller in his report.

In 2010, the state comptroller wrote a scathing report on the chief of staff's selection process. According to the report, those who hold the greatest responsibility for the country's security – the IDF chief and the other generals – are not appointed to their positions based on clear criteria.

The chief of staff's appointment is based on the recommendation of the defense minister, who bases his recommendation on personal criteria that he has decided for himself. There is no institutional process. Everything takes place in the dark, in secret consultations between the defense minister and the prime minister, the current chief of staff, and former IDF chiefs and generals. None of this process is documented. There needs to be legislation and established criteria on this matter, including the length of an IDF chief's tenure, when a new chief of staff can be appointed, transparency, and proper documentation of the process.

This rotten process leads to a situation commonly known as a "friend brings a friend," whereby belonging to a certain group is the determining factor rather than a person's fit for the job of chief of staff. Over the years, the government has become a rubber stamp for the whims of successive defense ministers who haven't based the most important national security appointment on concrete criteria and objective motivations.

There's no rush in choosing the next chief of staff. Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi's tenure can be stretched a few months if need be. The next IDF chief has to be chosen by the prime minister, cabinet ministers, and the defense minister after the upcoming election – they are the ones who will work with him, and they should be the ones who choose him.

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