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The over-arching goal of the war is the destruction of Hamas and the creation of a completely different security situation in Gaza. The new security situation is crucial for the resettlement in the towns near Gaza and is vital for the overall sense of security in the entire region bordering Gaza. Indeed, it is essential for Israelis' overall sense of security.

Eliminating Hamas is a condition for restoring a certain level of deterrence (a concept difficult to understand and even more challenging to measure). Israeli deterrence collapsed on October 7, and only a clear victory – a knockout and not just in points – will reestablish deterrence. This victory must also be visible to everyone so that anyone who dares to challenge Israel by crossing red lines will immediately face the consequences of messing with Israel. The clear and complete victory must deter anyone willing to go there. The results of this war will highlight what Israel considers red lines: targeted harm to civilians.

Therefore, the destruction of Hamas' military capabilities and the neutralization of its organizational ability to act are crucial for Israel's future. In the Middle Eastern reality, all sharks have been smelling blood in the wake of Oct. 7 amid a perceived weakened Israel must hit back at the shark and display its bloodied corpse for everyone to see. Failing to do that will result in endless swarms of sharks trying to devour the Jewish state.

In the same terrible event on October 7, there was also something that must end in a way that allows healing, after one of the greatest tragedies of the State of Israel: The abduction of many Israelis (and a few foreigners) by Hamas. The rescue of the hostages is a moral imperative with a high and clear priority. In the future, when historians assess the period and the change brought by the clear victory and the decisive defeat of Hamas, they will likely agree that the return of the captives was just a fleeting episode in the grand scheme of things. This is because, historically, this event is of little significance, and it has no impact on the future.

On the other hand, today, when the captives are in the hands of the barbarians from Hamas, for the country, and certainly for the families, it is a problem that must be solved as soon as possible – even at the expense of greater difficulties in actual combat. These difficulties may later become apparent due to having bought time with the hostage deals, which allow it to stop the momentum of the IDF, reorganize itself, and introduce humanitarian aid to the strip.

The terrorist organization will have food, water, and medicine. The price for the hostages is determined by the civilian echelon who is responsible for the army, and the army will adjust itself for the sake of Israeli civilians. This is the essence of the deal - the hostages will be released, and the army will fight a more difficult war.

At the end of the war, after Gaza is free of terrorists and even afterward, we will take pride in not neglecting humanitarian and moral aspects, such as the return of the captives. But this pride will only have a place if the war ends as mentioned with an absolute victory, and for that purpose, the war must be renewed immediately (literally immediately) after the two sides end the ceasefire. The victory requires expanding the war significantly. The historic mission must be completed without hesitation and fear and I believe, there will be endless support for this in Israel.

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After several months of uncertainty and delay, Iran has announced its return in November to talks in Vienna regarding a return to the 2015 nuclear deal. The question is, why? This is an unconditional return, contrary to the position previously expressed by Iran, which demanded an easing of sanctions as a precondition to resuming negotiations. The Iranian concession is an apparent American success.

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The reason Iran is returning to the talks is simple: the present leadership in Tehran has a clear interest in returning to the 2015 agreement because it is a good agreement for Iran, which seeks to develop nuclear weapons. The Iranians understood that the nuclear deal was good for them and that it is now even more so in light of the rapid progress in their enrichment program.

The real question, then, is why did Iran delay?

The delay may have been a negotiating tactic on the Iranians' part, designed to elicit concessions from the Americans. Moreover, the Iranians knew it was safe to delay the resumption of talks because they understood that no US military option existed, neither in the current administration nor the previous one. The absence of a military option was the main weakness the Iranians sensed when the previous US administration withdrew from the nuclear deal in 2018.

It was a significant mistake to withdraw from the deal without charting a viable military option and demonstrating the determination to use it if necessary. The Iranians realized that no matter what they did, with the exception of US or other intelligence services detecting the actual assembly of a bomb, the United States was unwilling to use military force to stop the nuclear project.

The Iranian perception that there is no military option on the table will also be their basic assumption in future negotiations. The Iranians know that the United States has no alternative but to return to the agreement, so they will not rush to fold – and may first try to remove sanctions and gain other economic benefits.

The Iranians also observed that after launching drone attacks against an American base in al-Tanf in eastern Syria last month, the United States failed to respond in any serious manner. Even though there were no casualties, this event demonstrated Iran's determination and reading of American behavior. This lack of an American response signaled that the United States wants to return to negotiations at almost any cost. But, unfortunately, it also might lead Iran to conclude that it can continue its aggressive behavior in the Middle East as long as there are prospects for further talks.

Further, the perceived American weakness will motivate the Iranians to run out the clock in negotiations. The talks themselves give the Iranians more freedom of action as they restrict the ability of the United States to respond to provocations, including even elementary acts of force protection, and thus harm US deterrence.

The United States emphasizes that the return to the nuclear agreement is only a first step, after which it intends to enter into talks aimed at a better and longer deal. However, the chances of reaching such an agreement are nil, because the United States has no leverage over Iran.

Iran could drag the talks out again and things could end back at square one. Moreover, Iran now openly threatens that the talks will fail unless the United States offers guarantees that would bind future administrations' behavior. Any such attempt to enshrine the agreement as a formal treaty, however, would require ratification by the Senate; the necessary two-thirds majority is nowhere in sight.

Israel cannot and should not interfere with the talks. Still, Israel must obtain from the United States a commitment to complete the negotiations in a short time and not let the Iranian procrastinate for months.

Israel must learn what the US response will be if it turns out that there is no chance of reaching an agreement, and what the timetable might be for attempting to reach a longer and stronger deal.

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Either way, Israel must prepare for the possibility it will have to defend itself – because a nuclear Iran is not an option Israel can accept. As has been declared by a few American presidents, Israel should be able to defend itself, by itself.

An effort to prevent Iran from going nuclear will not be simple, and will perhaps even be dangerous – but it is necessary.

This article was first published by the Jerusalem Institute of Strategy and Security.

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In Persian Gulf countries, which heavily rely on energy exports, economic turmoil unfolded as oil prices fell alongside global demand: Saudi Arabia and Russia clashed over the latter's unwillingness to stabilize prices by reducing output. Perceiving Moscow's stance as an attack on its market share, Riyadh increased production in order to further boost tank prices and hurt Russia, which survives almost exclusively on energy exports. 

It is unclear how Saudi Arabia will itself contend with such low prices, as it needs more than double the current market rate to balance its budget. In recent days it appears that a new deal on oil prices has been reached between the major oil producers. 

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In Riyadh, the oil crisis comes amid an internal power struggle within the royal family – Saudi authorities rounded up two senior royals shortly before price cuts were announced. Mohammed bin Salman, the current crown prince, may have to take tougher measures as the kingdom's problems – a worsening economic outlook and royal unrest – converge.

Iran has also been dealt blows by falling oil prices, with tumbling revenues intensifying the pressure exerted by American sanctions and its own public health disaster. The challenge posed by the outbreak itself was compounded by Tehran's initial denial of its existence. The delayed effort to stymie the spread has resulted in a colossal wave of cases that the system is struggling to handle.

Iran is still reeling from the US killing of Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, as well as the erosion of public confidence following Tehran's initial attempt to conceal its responsibility for the downing of a Ukrainian passenger plane. Iran's leaders must now navigate the worsening pandemic, a weakening economy, lack of public confidence and the loss of a linchpin in the Islamic Republic's foreign operations.

Efforts to counter the spread of the virus have led to protests in some countries – for instance, Morocco and Iran – while in others, like Lebanon and Syria, there is a sense that authorities are simply not dealing with the massive problem. 

As long as the Iranian regime does not face a wide coalition of opponents, which can mobilize hundreds of thousands of demonstrators, it doesn't seem like this situation – with all its difficulty and complexity – will pose an existential threat. More broadly, as long as no ruling regime feels a fundamental loss of control, the authorities, who are experienced with handling the dissatisfaction and alienation that agitate the street from time to time, will be able to confront the challenges raised by the coronavirus.

Until there is a real alternative to the reigning power, the bitter masses will prefer relative stability to anarchy, which has not proven itself a better substitute for corrupt and ineffective governance, even as living conditions deteriorate amid the coronavirus pandemic.

In the meantime, it doesn't seem as though Iran – the driving force behind most of the friction in the Middle East – is changing its plans in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq or even Yemen. It will continue igniting tension in these countries, even if the flame has slightly dimmed since Soleimani's killing. The attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq made clear that the Iranians are continuing to push their agenda, though less vigorously and perhaps less ably.

Will Iran's status as the regional epicenter for the spread of coronavirus hurt it after the dust settles? Will the Iranians who transmit the virus as they move between Iraq, Syria and Lebanon remind Tehran that many people are being unnecessarily harmed – that the scar their policies have inflicted will remain forever?

It is currently impossible to tell, as the crisis is still ongoing, and its conclusion is shrouded in fog.

Reprinted with permission from JNS.org.

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Hezbollah responded by firing advanced anti-tank missiles into Israel, with the leader of the group pledging a "new phase" in which Hezbollah would no longer observe past "red lines."

Meanwhile, Israel disclosed sites in Lebanon where Iran and Hezbollah are working together to build precision-guided missiles that could hit sites throughout Israel during a war.

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This dramatic escalation in tensions with Iran and its proxies is dangerous but unsurprising. It should be understood as a warning that Iran's strategy of training and arming proxy terror groups throughout the Middle East is not being countered aggressively enough.

In the summer of 2006, at the conclusion of the Second Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah, few expected that the quiet between Israel and Lebanon would have lasted this long.

But it is a deceptive quiet because the Israel-Hezbollah battlefield has moved to Syria and other locales. The Israeli Air Force has carried out many airstrikes on Iranian-backed targets in recent years.

That war was a missed opportunity since it ended without a clear victory over Hezbollah, which at the time was a far less intimidating enemy.

Since then, Hezbollah has grown in manpower and firepower to the extent that Israel is careful not to attack it inside of Lebanon.

Today, there is mutual deterrence, which is a strategic accomplishment for Hezbollah, a terrorist group opposing one of the most capable militaries in the world.

Thanks to massive Iranian investment, Hezbollah has now developed into a "hybrid organization," a terror organization with strong military components. Significantly, this success has made the frightening model on which Iran is basing its promotion of new terrorist militias in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.

Hezbollah has some 30,000 troops and an equivalent number in militia positions held in parallel to civilian occupations.

The group has gained valuable combat experience in Syria (at a high cost), and now holds a diverse arsenal of weaponry of a quantity and quality befitting a modern army.

No terror organization in history has had as powerful an armament as the one Hezbollah currently stockpiles. It is no wonder, then, that the Iranians are very happy with their success and are attempting to replicate this model in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. What remains a wonder is why these attempts by Iran are not being fought more aggressively.

Iran is pursuing this effort with adaptations that take into account the different conditions in each place, but the principle is the same: set up a local organization aided by foreigners and supplied by Iran in order to create a militia that serves Iranian interests, but also benefits the local population. Iran's successful joint operations with its proxy forces often increase local support for foreign involvement.

This was not supposed to happen. UN Security Council Resolution 1701 was passed at the end of the 2006 conflict to prevent precisely this situation.

Western countries reinforced UN forces in Lebanon with troops that had a clear mandate to monitor and report on Hezbollah's activities. The resolution included a categorical statement banning the transfer of weaponry to Lebanon. These measures were supposed to ensure Lebanese sovereignty and prevent Hezbollah from growing stronger.

But the reality has been completely different. Lebanon today is completely dominated politically and militarily by Hezbollah, not by the Lebanese government or army – so much so that Iran is moving to a new stage focused less on increasing the quantity of arms than on improving their quality.

A sufficient quantity of precision-guided missiles could be a tiebreaker in the current stalemate, as they would allow Hezbollah to paralyze sensitive infrastructure and strike at strategically important targets in Israel, both military and civilian.

Israel's cautious approach to Lebanon has allowed Hezbollah and Iran to realize their vision there. Israel's more aggressive approach to Syria has so far prevented Iran from freely entrenching. Because Iran's military buildup in Lebanon is already too far advanced, eventually there is likely to be a terrible war between Israel and Hezbollah.

World powers should take heed. What Iran has accomplished in Lebanon with Hezbollah offers a clear vision of the future. The same thing will happen in the coming years in other parts of the region if the international community fails to stop Iran's development of proxy militaries across the Middle East.

Reprinted with permission from JNS.org.

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Hezbollah's aim was two-fold: to seize Israeli vantage points and stir panic inside Israel, thereby compelling the Israeli military force fighting Hezbollah's complex attack to turn back. And no less importantly, they sought to take over an Israeli community and abduct as many civilians as possible. Thus, at the end of the war, Israel's failure would continue to resonate for a long time after the fighting itself ends, because the hostage negotiations would take a long time and would bring Israel to its knees.

The operation currently underway in the north has the power to reverse this threat. Without a winning card up its sleeve, Hezbollah will need to consider its next step carefully. The many missiles (many of them advanced precision missiles) the organization possesses are still its main strength, and its ability to defend southern Lebanon tenaciously has not waned. But without the winning tunnel card, which would have catapulted Hezbollah's capabilities to a new level, its strength has eroded. This means the organization is more likely to be cautious and less likely to initiate a war in the near future.

Operation Northern Shield raises complicated questions about Israel's initiative and willingness to enter a war to prevent the threat it sees growing. When it comes to nuclear weapons, the accepted view in Israel – known as the Begin Doctrine, named after the late prime minister Menachem Begin, who implemented it when Israel bombed Iraq's nuclear reaction in the 1980s – is preventive. The same policy guided former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in 2007, when he decided to attack the nuclear reactor in Syria.

But when it comes to conventional weapons, Israel has launched a pre-emptive war only once – Operation Kadesh in 1956, when then-Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan launched a mission to keep Egyptian forces from acquiring the capability to overpower the IDF. The operation was a success and bought Israel 11 years of relative calm, at a difficult time when the country was also busy absorbing massive waves of new immigrants and building its economic and military infrastructure.

"Pre-emptive wars" are considered problematic. They are hard to legitimize, because they are by definition "wars of choice." In other words, sacrificing thousands of lives may not be necessary when the enemy isn't pounding at the gates. The country's citizens, like the international community, have a difficult time supporting wars if there is even the slightest possibility it won't erupt. Thus, for example, Israel allowed Hezbollah to grow exponentially stronger and acquire the best Syrian, Iranian and even Russian-made missiles – and deploy them.

Israel spoke in extremely lofty terms following its unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, and after the Second Lebanon War in 2006, but hasn't done anything to stop Hezbollah's armament in Lebanon. Only in the chaos of the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011, did Israel decide to use force to prevent the transfer of sophisticated weapons to Hezbollah from Syria and Iran – while its policy of non-intervention in Lebanon persists.

Can this operation – which is currently being carried out strictly from Israeli territory – spark hostilities on the other side of the border? The answer is a resounding yes, whether intentionally or otherwise. But even if the operation remains on Israel's side of the fence, it could, if Hezbollah's assets and dignity continue taking a hit, trigger a violent response.

Although the chances of this happening are presently low, this must be the IDF's working assumption and its war readiness should be adjusted accordingly. This situation, as stated, raises the question: How far the IDF is willing to go to impair Hezbollah's capabilities? Secondly, should a pre-emptive strike – say a large operation inside Lebanon – be considered after Hezbollah's tunnels are successfully neutralized? These questions require considerable thought.

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In recent years, opportunities have emerged to change this reality. ‎Israel's peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan provided the ‎precedent, as did the informal relations Israel has forged with ‎several other Arab countries. Those remain mostly clandestine, but ‎sometimes they are given some public expressions.‎ For example, Saudi Arabia has allowed Air India to fly through its ‎airspace to and from Israel, and there are growing rumors about ‎military cooperation between Israel and Persian Gulf states, ‎bolstered by statements made by various "former officials" in the ‎Gulf that the time has come to improve ties with Israel. ‎

Jerusalem has also been trying to build new bridges to African ‎countries. I remember one discussion in which it was said that investing ‎‎$100 million in Africa would serve Israeli interests better in the long term than an ‎investment in new weapons. ‎

Indeed, with relatively little investment, Israel could provide many African countries with ‎much-needed aid that will advance them economically, socially and ‎militarily – preferably in that order. ‎

Israel has three main interests – diplomatic, economic and ethical.

The diplomatic interest is clear: Israel wants to influence how ‎African countries vote at the United Nations and other international ‎institutions. Africa contains 54 countries, and if they side with ‎Israel in such votes – or even simply refrain from voting against it –‎Israel's global standing would change for the better.‎

The economic interest is also clear: Africa is a growing market, and ‎the more ties Israel can forge there, the easier it ‎would be for it to garner business there. Many countries already ‎maintain robust business ties with African nations, but Israel still has ‎several advantages, mostly because it is small and unthreatening, unlike the ‎superpowers that operate intensively on the continent.‎

From an ethical standpoint, it is important for Israel to contribute to ‎humanity, especially if it can do so in places and on issues that can ‎advance the average citizen and those at the bottom of the ‎economic ladder.‎

Achieving such results requires bilateral visits by the countries' ‎leaders. To make this vision practical, the state needs mechanisms ‎versed in the ways aid fund and business ventures can best be ‎utilized, especially since initial investments of this kind involve ‎considerable spending. ‎

In Israel, the Foreign Ministry's Center for International Cooperation ‎is engaged in providing aid to foreign countries. This department ‎should be bolstered and its efforts should become a priority on the ‎prime minister's agenda, as this "investment" can and will yield ‎economic and political dividends for Israel in the global arena. ‎

In the wake of Chadian President Idriss Déby's historic visit to ‎Israel this week and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's recent ‎visits to Africa, one can only hope the momentum achieved in ‎Africa is maintained and that Israel finds a way to leverage these ‎visits into a wide-ranging economic journey.‎

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It is a fascinating event from a gossip perspective, like a chapter in a suspense novel. To a large extent, it's similar to the assassination of the Russian spy in Britain – agents are dispatched on a murder mission, the perpetrators successfully flee the scene. Technology comes into play as local law enforcement agencies are able to identify the route the killers used to enter and leave the country. Even in the case of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh's assassination in Dubai, which was attributed to Israel's Mossad, photographs of the alleged killers were published and their modus operandi was retraced using hotel security cameras.

The incident could impact a number of relationships in the region and across the globe. No one should be surprised by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's fiery response. The person who has ordered the arrests of dozens of Turkish journalists isn't actually bothered by the murder; rather he is using it to settle a score with the Saudi regime, due to severe disagreements between them. The Saudis loath the Turkish dictator who dreams of resurrecting the Ottoman Empire – and the feeling is mutual. For Erdogan, this is also an opportunity to divert his public's attention from Turkey's economic crisis.

The Western world's relationship with Saudi Arabia is also cast into doubt. The Americans are having a hard time accepting that a man who had recently lived in the U.S. was despicably murdered in his own consulate. On the other side of the scale are America's economic and diplomatic interests in the Persian Gulf, where Saudi Arabia is its main ally. Weakening Saudi Arabia will directly strengthen Iran, America's main adversary in the area, which is another reason for Trump's efforts to ease tensions. The Europeans are also deeply disgusted about the incident and what it represents, although they are less tethered to Saudi Arabia by large trade deals and are less worried about Iran.

It's still unclear how the affair will affect the standing of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. The transfer of power from his father is a critical juncture for him. When he was appointed by his father, his path as the inevitable heir to the throne had seemed relatively effortless, and that future control of the kingdom would assuredly pass to his offspring while keeping his many cousins at arm's length from the crown. Now his throne is wobbling and it isn't obvious how the debacle in Istanbul will impact the stability of his rule, which the 33-year-old crown prince had appeared to have consolidated.

In the wider lens, it's important to note the Sunni world is currently leaderless in its fight with Shiite Iran. Saudi Arabia tried assuming that mantle on the basis of its wealth and control of Mecca, the holiest city in Islam, but as a consequence of the murder it has apparently squandered this legitimacy and as a result – with no visible leadership on the horizon – the Sunni world will be weaker.

Lastly, there's the Israeli angle. Against Iran, their common enemy, Israeli-Saudi relations have quietly become stronger behind the scenes. Presently, it isn't clear how the assassination in Turkey will affect domestic stability within the kingdom and consequently its relations with the world, but perhaps with Israel they will actually be bolstered amid the turmoil. Israel's under-the-table ties with Jordan, with whom it also has open diplomatic relations, are robust, yet the Jordanian king decided not to extend the special land lease with Israel.

The two cases are different but lead to a harsh conclusion: Israel's relations with Arab countries must still be taken with a grain of salt. The character of these regimes and the way their leaders think and act prevents true rapprochement. Some of these regimes are veritable sand castles sitting atop shifting dunes; things can change quickly. In any endeavor, whether diplomatic or intelligential, public or clandestine, we should always remember: Nothing lasts forever.

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Maintaining this line of communication is vital because Syria's ‎skies are very crowded. The Israeli, U.S., Russian and Syrian air ‎forces fly over this area regularly, the Turkish Air Force patrols ‎over the Syrian-Turkish border, and Iran sends civilian cargo planes ‎through as part of its efforts to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah in ‎Lebanon and Syria. ‎

It is important to stress that Israel does not coordinate its ‎operations in Syria with Russia. Neither Moscow nor Jerusalem wishes to ‎see Russia claim or be held responsible for Israeli strikes on Syrian soil. Maintaining an operational hotline aims to prevent either side from ‎making a lethal mistake and provoking a conflict, hence the hotline's ‎official name: the deconfliction channel.‎

Israel's actions in Syria have always been calculated and prudent, from ‎the moment it began actively thwarting Hezbollah's armament efforts in ‎‎2012 and even more so since 2015, when Russia stepped into the Syrian ‎civil war to shore up President Bashar Assad's regime. This has prompted ‎Israel to exercise maximum caution as it intensified its efforts against ‎Iran's attempts to entrench itself militarily in Syria, and the Israeli Air Force has ‎spared no effort to avoid compromising Russian bases, equipment and ‎weapons and avoid even the slightest chance of harming the Russian ‎soldiers deployed in Syria. ‎

This has not been an easy feat, as in many cases Russian and Syrian ‎forces share bases and fight alongside each other, and Israel has ‎dedicated considerable intelligence resources to pinpointing the ‎location of Russian soldiers so it can uphold its commitment to Russia. ‎The highly efficient deconfliction channel has proved essential to these ‎efforts, and the professionalism shown by the Israeli and Russian soldiers ‎manning this hotline has contributed greatly to the fact that in the ‎hundreds of strikes Israel has carried out in Syria since 2015, not one ‎Russian soldier was harmed. ‎

Monday's incident, in which a Russian Ilyushin 20 reconnaissance ‎aircraft was accidentally shot down by Syrian fire some 35 kilometers ‎‎(22 ‎‎miles) off the coast of Latakia as it was returning to a nearby Russian ‎base, killing the 15-man crew, was truly tragic.

‎However, perhaps more than anything, it reflects the lack of professionalism in the Syrian forces: The Russian plane is not at all similar to the Israeli jets used in striking Syrian targets – it is larger and slower ‎than fighter jets, and as a reconnaissance plane, its flight patterns are ‎different. ‎

Moreover, according to the Israeli military, the IAF jets were safely back in ‎Israeli airspace at the time, so the ‎Syrians would have had to seriously miscalculate to target the Russian ‎plane. If experience had not taught me to accept stupidity as a better ‎explanation than any conspiracy theory, I would have said the Syrians set out to ‎down a Russian plane in order to compromise Israeli-Russian ties. The ‎Syrian forces performed so pathetically it is hard to believe this is ‎their actual professional level, but that does seem to be the case. ‎

Now it is up to Israel to convince the professionals in Russia that it acted ‎in good faith and as always, did everything within its power to prevent ‎any harm from coming to any Russian aircraft, and that it was Syrian ‎negligence that caused this tragedy.

The Russian response, however, will ‎not be made by these professionals, but rather by Russian President ‎Vladimir Putin. He, for his part, would be able to make a more informed ‎decision when he has all the information, and Putin, we must remember, ‎is an experienced leader, who will not let grief over the loss of human life ‎cloud his judgment.‎

The question of Israel, Russia and Syria's respective and relative ‎contribution to the tragedy will have an impact on Putin's decision, as ‎will the explanation that is given to the victims' families and Russian public ‎opinion, which does not make light of the loss of Russian soldiers. For ‎these reasons, the dialogue with the Russians must be professional, open ‎and completely honest – Israel has nothing to hide and nor should it keep ‎any information from Moscow.‎

Israel has always been careful to show Russia – a world power – the proper ‎operational and diplomatic deference in the years since it intensified its ‎involvement in the Middle East and it must continue to do so. Still, we ‎must not lose sight of the fact that Israel's operations in Syria seek to ‎thwart a substantial threat against it, and Iran's regional efforts must ‎meet a forceful Israeli response. ‎

Russia must be made to understand that Israel will not tolerate Iranian ‎presence in Syria, nor will it abide the Islamic republic's efforts to arm ‎Hezbollah in Lebanon with game-changing weapons, and it is up to the ‎Israeli government to make that clear. ‎

Israel may find it harder to operate in Syria from now on; it may even ‎have to exercise greater restraint, and it will certainly have to further ‎improve the workings of the deconfliction channel, but we must not get ‎confused: Preventing the Iranian efforts to tighten their grip on the ‎region remains Israel's top priority and it is up to the IDF to carry out the ‎government's policy on this matter. ‎

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The IDF saw this as an imminent threat and opened ‎fire, killing two Hamas operatives. What followed ‎was the familiar cycle of rocket fire on border-‎adjacent communities and Israeli strikes on Gaza ‎targets in response, and so on and so forth. ‎

In these types of situations, each party is somewhat ‎forced to prove it will not be the first to blink ‎and therefore keeps firing, and each party assumes ‎that calling a unilateral cease-fire would be ‎perceived as a show of weakness that would erode ‎their ability to generate deterrence. This, in turn, ‎will position the warier side at a disadvantage down ‎the line, because it is clear to everyone that this ‎will not be the last round of violence between ‎Israel and Hamas. ‎

Hamas' fire on Beersheba and the ‎IDF's targeting of a five-story Hamas building in Gaza indicate ‎that until last night, things were heading downhill, despite the fact that both parties would prefer to ‎hit the brakes.‎

We know mediation efforts are already ongoing. Egypt ‎has plenty of experience, as well as various ‎leverages it can use against Hamas, and U.N. Middle ‎East envoy Nickolay Mladenov, a veteran diplomat with ‎experience in navigating regional politics, have ‎taken the lead here, and naturally so. ‎

Recent weeks have shown that both Israel and Hamas ‎have, until now, followed the familiar pattern of ‎border flare-ups. Israel may be militarily superior ‎to Hamas, but Gaza's rulers can inflict serious ‎damage if they decide to widen the range of their ‎rocket fire. ‎

Meanwhile, even if the Iron Dome defense system ‎keeps intercepting rockets, the constant sirens and ‎the situation as a whole are making the Israeli ‎public anxious. ‎

The perception of public panic, together with the ‎assumption that the IDF cannot really counter rocket ‎fire, is pushing Hamas to continue despite the blow ‎it has already sustained. ‎

As things stand now, only third-party mediators ‎would be able to stop what appears to be a ‎guaranteed security escalation. We will have to wait ‎and see.

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It is important that we remember this sentence because in Israel – a small state that has to invest its (considerable) resources in battles that are necessary to ensure its existence and security – decision-makers must pick not only their battles but also where to forego military moves.

The rationale is simple: you cannot fight all disruptive elements all the time. Clear priorities must be set and Israel cannot afford to launch wars over considerations of "prestige."

This is not simple, and Israel's captains can error exactly where the rulers of Germany and Russia, France and Britain did. The real challenge is to identify, among the many threats in the region, the ones that must be dealt with in order to ensure Israel's survival, and if need be, to fight them to the brim.

On the other hand, when it comes to "prestige," Israel would be wise to exercise restraint and opt for minimal activity, so as not to interfere with the main objective.

For this reason, for example, the military's extensive capabilities cannot be "wasted" on a minor threat such as kite terrorism, regardless of how annoying it is, or how much of an affront it is to Israel and the IDF's pride.

Kite terrorism is nothing to discount but, so far at least, it has not caused any serious harm. It has not cost human lives, the financial damage it has caused has been minor, and it has not infringed on the IDF's freedom of operation in the southern sector.

Arson terrorism is the default option of a beaten organization that is unable to mark any substantial achievement opposite the Israeli military's success in neutralizing its offensive abilities. Israel must devise a solution to this nuisance, but we cannot confuse this relatively unimportant situation with the other challenges Israel faces, especially vis-à-vis Iran in general and particularly the Iranian presence in Syria. Keeping a cool head and the correct perspective is vital for a realistic decision-making process.

The widespread use of terms like "pride" and "national honor" date back to a time when Israel struggled to cement its global position and its ability to deter its enemies despite being a small, poor, and underpopulated country.

Back when Israel's overall position was precarious the softer issues of pride, prestige and honor were also an important part of building an image of power, both domestically and internationally. Now that Israel is the strongest country in the region militarily and economically, when its relations with most of the world's countries, including some Arab states, are stronger than ever, one can set pride somewhat aside and focus on more significant things.

Clearly, when there is an important interest, even in a secondary sector like the Gaza Strip, it must be protected even if it comes at the price of possible escalation. This was also the case on the day Hamas threatened that thousands of Palestinians would rush the Israel-Gaza border and the IDF did not hesitate to mount a forceful response.

While there is a place for these considerations even during negotiation with Hamas on some sort of cease-fire, the main issue remains that, for the duration of the agreement, Hamas has something of a guarantee that Israel will not interfere with its efforts to improve its arsenal and capabilities as long as Israel enjoys peace and quiet on its border with Gaza.

In the face of this grave weakness, the broader consideration must be taken into account: A cease-fire deal with Hamas will allow Israel to focus mainly on stopping Iran's efforts to entrench itself militarily in Syria. Iran would very much prefer that Israel focus on the Gaza Strip. The advantage of an agreement with Hamas is that it postpones Israel's need to deal with Gaza at this time. This is very important and that is why this option must be considered seriously.

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