Yet economic pressure is not the only tool the United States and its allies are using to counter Iran. In recent months, the Trump administration has been quietly working to forge a new security alliance with the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman – as well as Egypt and Jordan, to counter what Washington views as aggressive Iranian expansion in the region.

Tentatively known as the Middle East Strategic Alliance – and already nicknamed "Arab NATO" by the international press – U.S. and Arab officials say the coalition is being planned in an effort to expand cooperation on counterterrorism, missile defense and military training, partly to address the security challenges posed by Iran and its proxies.

The basic concept of an Arab NATO, however, is structurally flawed and stands little chance of success.

Unlike the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was established on the basis of shared interests and a more or less common "strategic culture," in the face of a shared Soviet threat, the Sunni-led countries that the Trump administration expects to join the new alliance disagree on fundamental matters, including the crucial question of how best to conduct relations with Iran.

While Saudi Arabia and the UAE view Tehran as their greatest enemy and are fighting a protracted war against Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen, Kuwait and, especially, Oman have historically enjoyed peace and periods of close cooperation, with Iran.

While Muscat facilitated the secret negotiations between Iranian and American officials that ultimately produced the 2015 nuclear deal, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain have consistently opposed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as the accord is formally known.

An even greater obstacle to the formation and effective functioning of an Arab NATO is the schism pitting the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain against Qatar. That crisis began in June 2017, when Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Manama decided to ostracize their tiny neighbor, cutting trade and diplomatic ties with Doha over its alleged support for terrorism and relationship with Iran.

Qatar, notably, is home to the largest U.S. air base in the region, while Saudi Arabia is the world's largest buyer of American weaponry; the crisis, therefore, put the United States in an awkward position vis-à-vis two of its most important Middle Eastern allies.

Officially floated for the first time by Trump during his 2017 trip to Riyadh, the idea of forging an Arab NATO seems to be an attempt at what has come to be known, in international relations, as "buck-passing." In other words, by pursuing an "America First" foreign policy the Trump administration is trying to shift the responsibility for taking on Iran to its Arab allies.

The administration appears to be intent on using the plan as a catalyst for profitable arms sales to those countries; hours after the U.S. president landed in Riyadh last year, he and Saudi King Salman signed a number of agreements, including an arms deal worth about $110 billion, effective immediately, plus another $350 billion over the coming decade.

But buck-passing is exactly what America's Arab allies want, too, when it comes to countering Tehran. Unwilling or unable to engage with Iran directly, its Sunni rivals hope to persuade the United States and even Israel to do the heavy lifting for them. As one analyst pointedly put it, Saudi Arabia seeks to fight Iran "to the last American," by luring it into a war with the Islamic republic.

This fundamental clash of perceptions and expectations at the heart of the concept does not bode well for the successful launch of an Arab NATO – especially given the irony that these plans are being mooted at the same time Trump has threatened to break with the original NATO if other allies don't increase their military spending.

Lastly, is it far from clear how such an organization would go about confronting Iran in practice. A successful alliance might manage (as Israel has emphasized recently) to prevent Tehran from establishing a long-term military presence in Syria as well as defeat Shi'ite Houthis in Yemen and restore the ousted Saudi-allied President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi to power or, more concretely, to set up a missile defense shield covering the wider Middle East.

But unless internal rifts between potential members are resolved and a political consensus on burden-sharing is achieved, the Trump administration's plans for passing the buck to an Arab NATO are unlikely to become reality.

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Israel and Sunni Saudi Arabia have no formal diplomatic ties and decades of enmity behind them. However, their mutual pleasure over the grass-roots demonstrations in Iran is the latest manifestation of a growing convergence of political interests, between the two Middle Eastern countries against their shared regional nemesis: Iran.

If the Saudi-Israeli rapprochement continues, their collaboration could lead to improved Israeli relations with other Arab states, removing Iran's security buffer and possibly making Tehran more vulnerable to direct Israeli military action.

The first signs of the thaw between Saudi Arabia and Israel appeared in 2015 when both nations opposed the nuclear deal struck between Iran and the six world powers known as the P5+1. According to the terms of the deal, Tehran would cut back its nuclear program in return for relief from economic sanctions. To compensate for its nuclear concessions and concerned that Washington might not honor its commitment to the agreement, Iran followed its signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action by intensifying the consolidation of its regional power base.

To that end, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and their overseas operations arm, the Quds Force, doubled down on their support for like-minded and mostly Shiite paramilitary groups across the Middle East.

In Syria, Iranian intervention in favor of President Bashar Assad, coupled with a relentless Russian air campaign against the rebels, finally turned the tide of civil war and kept Assad in power. Tehran also took the opportunity to help oust extremist anti-Shiite groups like Islamic State from Syria. Iranian leaders insisted their intent was to "nip terrorism in the bud," but their tacit goal was also – and more importantly – to maintain land access and supply lines to their main proxy, Lebanon's Hezbollah, as part of the Islamic republic's commitment to the "axis of resistance" and its "strategic depth" policy in the region.

The recapture of Aleppo by Syrian government forces in December 2016 relieved Iranian-backed militia forces stationed in northwestern Syria of a formidable battlefield challenge, enabling them to concentrate their manpower and firepower on the southwestern and eastern fronts. This sounded alarm bells for the Israeli government, which feared entrenchment of Iran's military foothold in its immediate neighborhood.

Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior advisor to Iran's supreme leader, has spoken figuratively of a "resistance highway" that starts in Tehran and continues through Mosul, Damascus and Beirut to the Mediterranean. Similarly, with the expulsion of IS from Syria's eastern province of Deir ez-Zor, IRGC-affiliated media outlets such as Mashregh News and Javan Online have promoted the establishment of a land "corridor," linking Iran to the Mediterranean Sea and potentially useful for military as well as trade purposes.

Israel has responded to this perceived threat militarily and politically. On the military front, it has embarked on a sustained campaign of targeted airstrikes against weapon convoys believed to be delivering "game-changing" weapons to Hezbollah as well as a reported Iranian military base in Syria. On the political front, Israel has sought to build an anti-Iran "coalition" with the Arab Sunni bloc led by Saudi Arabia.

In an unprecedented Nov. 16 interview with Elaph, the popular independent Arabic news site, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot offered to cooperate with Saudi Arabia against Tehran, which he labeled the "biggest threat" in the Middle East. "We are ready to exchange experiences with moderate Arab countries and to exchange intelligence to confront Iran," he said, adding that "in this matter, there is complete agreement between us and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia."

Less than two months later, in a Dec. 28 BBC interview, Education Minister Naftali Bennett echoed Eizenkot, explaining that Israel hoped to form "coalitions" with "moderate" Arabs, in order to "contain" Iran.

Riyadh, too, has been cautiously building closer ties with Tel Aviv. In the summer of 2016, one year after Iran's nuclear deal, a Saudi delegation headed by retired general Anwar Eshki met with Israeli foreign ministry officials and Knesset members in an unusual visit to Jerusalem. During the meeting, Eshki tried to persuade the Israelis to accept the Arab Peace Initiative, arguing that a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would foil Iran's attempts to exploit the Palestinian cause and delegitimize its support for anti-Israeli groups like Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah. Israel made no commitments but welcomed the improvement of ties with Arab states.

The growth of Iranian power and influence in the region, however, is not the only driver of Saudi-Israeli entente. The Trump administration's determination to counter the Islamic republic, along with Washington's close relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel, have facilitated bilateral efforts to form such an alliance.

In November 2017, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman summoned Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to Riyadh and presented him with the blueprint for a U.S.-devised peace plan that favored Israelis. The powerful prince then demanded that Abbas either accept the scheme or resign. Tellingly, the Palestinian leader's urgent trip to Riyadh came less than two weeks after Jared Kushner, President Trump's son-in-law and advisor on the Middle East, visited the Saudi capital to discuss the plan with bin Salman.

As delegates gathered at the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos this week, there were no official Saudi-Israel meetings reflected on the public program. But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and top Saudi officials, including Foreign Minister Adel Jubeir, are at the summit and have already made it clear, in formal panel discussions and conversations with reporters, that their governments view countering the threat from Iran as a primary foreign policy goal.

Davos is famous for its backroom meetings as well as the inevitable spontaneous encounters that occur when attendees are crowded into an Alpine conference center; it is not unreasonable to assume that these discussions could solidify relationships out of the public eye.

Iranian leaders are clearly worried about the emerging Saudi-Israeli alliance, which is likely to bring Riyadh's Sunni allies, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, into its fold as well.

In a recent address to the Iranian parliament, President Hassan Rouhani declared that Iran would not resume its ties with Saudi Arabia unless Riyadh ended its friendship with Israel. The new realpolitik of the Middle East means that Tehran may face even greater strategic challenges in the future.

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