The extensive knowledge Sa'ad acquired in Gaza and abroad, his rich experience in a series of command and staff roles, and the extensive network of connections he developed with many elements in the 'resistance axis' would likely have shortened the Hamas' recovery process. Therefore, one must wonder about the wording of the political echelon's announcement that the directive for Sa'ad's elimination was given "in response to the activation of an explosive device planted by Hamas terrorists, which caused the injury of our soldiers in the yellow zone of the Strip."

Is it true that had this device not exploded, Sa'ad could have continued his life undisturbed? Can his partner in the Hamas leadership, Izz al-Din al-Haddad, and other commanders in various roles, interpret Israeli policy this way and assume they are guaranteed immunity as long as they do not harm us?

One does not need to be a great statesman to understand that Israel's clarifications were intended to appease the Trump administration and assuage criticism from the mediating countries. This impression is reinforced by the continuation of the political echelon's statement, which describes Sa'ad's recent activities "in rehabilitating the terrorist organization and in planning and executing attacks against Israel and rebuilding a strike force, in blatant violation of the ceasefire rules and Hamas' commitments to respect President Trump's plan."

However, the implication is that, in principle, Israel accepts the ceasefire rules even regarding arch terrorists, and that it needs good reasons (or excuses) to justify their elimination even while the October 7 attack is, in itself, definitely sufficient justification.

This conduct, as well as efforts to reach agreements, may weaken the image Israel has created for itself throughout the war: the "neighborhood bully" who removes threats by force and dictates order in the region. This approach is not devoid of weaknesses and risks, but before replacing it, it is worth examining the balance of its advantages and disadvantages relative to the alternatives.

One way or another, Israel must continue the policy of targeted killings systematically and continuously, without explaining and without apologizing. Hamas' opposition to demilitarization only strengthens this approach.

Leaving Gaza in ruins

"The Hamas movement adheres to 'resistance' as a strategic option, but at the same time attempts to adapt its actions to the current political and humanitarian circumstances in the Gaza Strip." This is how the Hamas website Al-Risalah summarized the terrorist organization's position in light of its current challenges, marking the 38th anniversary of its founding. It relied on the words of Khalil al-Hayya, the leader of Hamas in Gaza.

In an interview granted to the Qatari network Al Jazeera last week, Khaled Mashaal said: "The war in its total form has undoubtedly ended, and we hope and are working to ensure it does not return." 

Regarding Israel's two central demands, anchored in President Trump's 20-point plan, Mashaal presented unsurprising compromise formulas. Regarding the transfer of power from Hamas, he noted the movement's agreement to the establishment of a technocratic government "and for a union between the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria". Regarding the disarmament of Hamas and the demilitarization of the Strip, Mashaal repeated the "hudna" idea, holding fire and keeping weapons without disarming. 

With these formulas and a willingness to support the deployment of an international stabilization force, Mashaal hopes to convince the mediating countries, and through them the US, to pressure Israel to move to Stage B of the Trump plan.

This is the stage supposed to provide the Palestinians with one of the most important achievements from their perspective following the halt of the war, a significant Israeli withdrawal from Gaza territories, including the southern, northern, and eastern areas currently under IDF control, except for a narrow security strip along the border area (the security perimeter). This stage is intended to pave the way for a complete IDF withdrawal in the third stage.

At the current point in time, what interests the American administration more than anything is the stabilization of the ceasefire, cementing a reality of non-belligerence that will allow the US president to take credit for this achievement and move on to realizing his other plans.

However, it is difficult to say that under current conditions, moving to the second stage is an Israeli interest. The opposite is true! IDF control of the areas from which it is supposed to evacuate not only improves security preparedness for various scenarios but also leaves Israel with a significant lever of pressure on Hamas and the mediating countries to fulfill its demands.

In Israel's view, the ceasefire is not the goal. Dismantling the enemy's capabilities and demilitarizing the territory of weapons are the main goals in Gaza, and so far, not only have they not been achieved, but apart from declarations of commitment to this, no practical plan has been presented to achieve them.

Now, after all the living hostages and almost all the deceased hostages have been returned, withdrawal from these areas is a price Israel is being demanded to pay, an interest of the Palestinians and the guarantors of the agreement, but not of Israel.

Implications for Hezbollah

As has been written more than once, the vacuum created by the absence of clear definitions for the terms "demilitarization" and "disarmament" is beginning to be filled with creative interpretations, like the one presented by Khaled Mashaal. Israel cannot settle for superficial solutions. Its approach regarding the issue of Hamas' demilitarization will influence not only Gaza, but also its efforts to bring about the dismantling of Hezbollah.

The political echelon would do well to clarify simply that the meaning of the demand to demilitarize the territory is that the Gaza Strip remains clean of any military capability, light or heavy weapons, offensive or defensive, ammunition, production means, tunnels, naval and aerial vessels, communication, command and intelligence means, neither in the hands of Hamas nor in the hands of any other Palestinian element in this territory.

From Israel's perspective, it is preferable to leave the situation in the Strip as it is rather than "progress" in an outline that will not advance its goals, will increase pressure on it, and will only burden its conduct. A Gaza Strip where half is under Israeli control and the other half is immersed in destruction and ruin with no future, without hope, and without rehabilitation, is preferable to an outline that does not include true demilitarization of military capabilities.

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Almost a year after the ceasefire agreement with Lebanon took effect, and following clear indications that Israel was unwilling to tolerate Hezbollah's entrenchment efforts or the Lebanese government's inaction, Israel carried out a surgical and focused attack on the organization's most senior military operative, who had been charged with the task of rebuilding its strength.

Israel did not equivocate or apologize but instead took full responsibility for the action. Crucially, Israel maintained a normal routine on the home front, a move calculated to prevent the enemy from interpreting a change in policy as an acknowledgment of a necessary response equation, particularly for eliminations at this senior level.

This operation represents a significant intelligence and operational coup for the IDF, especially considering Hezbollah's adjustments over the past year and the lessons the group drew from the war. Israel is signaling that it retains the capability to track down terror operatives, locate their hideouts, and execute precise strikes deep inside residential areas of the Lebanese capital.

The willingness to conduct this operation, coming just weeks after Naim Qassem warned publicly that "the continuation of the aggression unacceptable and everything has a limit," underscores that Israel is not deterred by the possibility of its actions leading to renewed fighting.

Israel is conveying this message through the elimination of Tabataba'i not only to other Hezbollah operatives but also to Hamas in Gaza, the Iranian leadership in Tehran, the Lebanese government in Beirut, Ahmad al-Sharaa in Damascus, and the various countries involved in security arrangements in both arenas, from Turkey and Qatar to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. By taking this action, Israel is reaffirming its commitment to independently disarm its enemies should political arrangements prove incapable of doing so.

While Hezbollah leaders will undoubtedly attempt to leverage the strike to unite Lebanese forces against Israel, the operation could conversely bolster the Lebanese government's demands of Hezbollah, most notably its call for a state monopoly on weapons.

Finally, the Beirut strike shows that Israel's operational latitude remains intact under the current Trump administration policy. Although the administration prefers to avoid a renewal of intense fighting, it displays understanding, and possibly even support, for Israel's pinpoint operations after other diplomatic efforts to prevent its enemies' military expansion have been exhausted. It's plausible that the American administration believes such a strike will not impede the political track but may even accelerate progress toward a resolution.

Much like Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon is being forced by Israel's actions into a critical decision point where every available option is detrimental. If the group chooses restraint and de-escalation, Israel will continue to eliminate its operatives and further erode its tattered dignity. If it opts for a forceful response, it will incur a steep cost and bolster the arguments of its opponents within Lebanon. And if it settles for a symbolic counter-strike, it will demonstrate weakness against Israel and cheapen the value of its senior commanders' lives.

Today, neither Hezbollah nor Hamas possesses the leverage to constrain Israel's actions or impose a price that would compel it to hold back.

The enemy's attempts to inflame the Judea and Samaria arena and thereby complicate Israel's operations and extract a cost have persisted since the war began. The security establishment has learned how to manage this threat, and its ongoing operations have largely prevented the enemy from achieving its desired effect.

It is reasonable to assume that Hezbollah is also exploring the option of carrying out attacks abroad, potentially with or without the aid of other Iranian actors. This potential scenario is also a priority on the security establishment's agenda.

The most challenging scenario demanding focused attention from Israeli agencies is a kidnapping attempt. Hamas is acutely aware of the difference between the reality before the release of the living hostages and the current situation, despite existing agreements. The lure of a kidnapping is substantial. While conditions in the Gaza Strip may create opportunities, the threat is not limited to that front.

Now is the time to heighten vigilance and intensify intelligence and preventative efforts across all theaters. IDF forces must be permitted to adopt an aggressive fire policy to protect the areas under their control within the Strip's limits, thereby preventing Gazans from gaining access to those zones. Concurrently, offensive operations against terror operatives with relevant expertise in Judea and Samaria and east Jerusalem must be stepped up. The message must be unequivocal: Do not permit another kidnapping – at any cost.

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Hamas' military wing made clear early this week that fighter surrender or weapons abandonment remain off the table. Mohammad Nazzal, a senior Hamas official abroad, rejected exile outside Gaza and urged mediators to intervene.

Turkey wasted no time seizing this as another diplomatic opportunity, with sources saying it is "working to ensure safe passage for approximately 200 'Gazan civilians' trapped in Rafah tunnels" – as if 200 civilians simply got stuck in underground passages.

The deteriorating relationship between Ankara and Jerusalem, sparked by Turkish arrest warrants and Israel's response, combined with Israeli opposition to Turkish participation in Gaza's multinational force, will feature in Jared Kushner's discussions with Netanyahu, though not as the central focus.

Washington's primary objective is stabilizing the ceasefire. Meeting this goal requires advancing to stage two of the Trump plan and generating implementation momentum. With everyone occupied by processes and mechanisms, reality on the ground will shift toward non-combat, enabling Trump to pursue his broader diplomatic ambitions.

From Israel's perspective, however, the ceasefire is not the end goal. Particularly not now, after recovering living hostages and most deceased remains. Eliminating enemy capabilities and removing weapons from the territory remain Israel's core objectives, which cannot be sacrificed to ceasefire demands or satisfied through cosmetic arrangements.

Furthermore, Israel's approach in Gaza will directly impact Hezbollah arrangements (and the reverse), leaving no room for creative half-measures that sound good but deliver nothing.

Even without this consideration, regional discourse is already showing such formulas emerging. Examples include attempts to limit disarmament definitions to offensive weapons only – excluding tunnels, personal arms, and other capabilities from discussion. Another involves establishing an "administrative committee" for civilian Gaza governance, supposedly without Hamas participation, when the terror group already influences personnel selection and will clearly control such governance as the Strip's dominant force.

Returning to the besieged in Rafah – their number remains unclear. Media reports citing Israeli sources estimate 150 to 200. Foreign press mentioned lower figures, while Hamas websites simply stated the military wing withholds information due to sensitivity, describing them as "Qassam elite" facing high risk "while contending with medical supply shortages, electricity deficits, and the need to secure tunnels after extensive war damage."

Hamas spokesmen have raised no claims about broken commitments on this matter. They frame the connection to recovering IDF soldier Hadar Goldin's remains through humanitarian considerations and stability interests.

Given these circumstances, Israel possesses every advantage to transform this incident into a powerful symbol of its Hamas dismantlement commitment. Time favors us here, and provided our forces can block attacks from the besieged or other directions, no rush exists. Regardless, this event's conclusion must be decisive – mass surrender, detention or terrorist deaths. Images and publicity carry value. This is how regimes fall. Exile, as some mediators suggest, while not inherently rejected, should only acceptable as a post-surrender, post-arrest step, never as a replacement.

A Al-Resalah Hamas website editorial characterized the besieged issue as testing Hamas' capacity for post-war challenges. "It combines military, diplomatic, and humanitarian aspects and conveys an important message to the Palestinian public and the world regarding Hamas's ability to protect its people and manage humanitarian crises, in an extremely complex environment and under international supervision." This equally tests Israeli determination, providing further reason Israel cannot accept any solution Hamas would claim as an achievement.

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The administration is aiming for November 18, the date of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's visit to the US. During the visit, the two sides are expected to announce an expanded defensive pact and new arms deals, even before resolving Saudi Arabia's demand for independent uranium enrichment.

Statements by senior Iranian officials about their determination to rebuild damaged nuclear sites and continue enrichment are likely to be used by bin Salman to justify his nuclear ambitions. In light of this, he is expected to add the demand to the list of conditions for normalizing ties with Israel, after his previous request for a roadmap toward an Israeli-Palestinian political horizon was incorporated into Trump's 20-point plan.

Saudi Arabia, which welcomed the Gaza ceasefire and voiced hopes for stability, remains, like the United Arab Emirates, skeptical about the feasibility of Trump's plan for ending the war. Both nations have conditioned their participation in Gaza's reconstruction on a sustained and stable ceasefire, a phased Israeli withdrawal, the disarmament of the Hamas terrorist organization, and the transfer of authority to the Palestinian Authority or another internationally recognized body.

Trump and his team are likely to try to bundle these stipulations into the normalization deal Israel would be expected to accept.

About a week before bin Salman's visit, Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa is scheduled to visit Washington, where bilateral relations will be discussed. However, his ties with Israel are also likely to come up, in light of ongoing talks aimed at establishing security arrangements between the two countries.

Adding to this volatile mix is the growing tension on the Lebanese front, driven by Hezbollah's rearmament efforts and the Lebanese government's failure to dismantle the terrorist group.

US Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack recently revealed troubling data about Hezbollah's remaining firepower and the Lebanese government's inability to address the threat. Combined with warnings from Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, this has reignited public discussion around the possibility of another round of fighting in Lebanon, despite official rhetoric about peace prospects.

So what does all this indicate?

First, instability remains the defining feature of the region. The intense involvement and close monitoring by Trump and his advisors reflects their understanding that the embers are still glowing on every front.

Second, ambiguity. The ceasefire and diplomatic arrangements in each arena were intentionally left vague to expedite agreements, but this has allowed for divergent interpretations. Reality on the ground will ultimately shape the outcome.

Third, disarmament. The idea that the so-called "resistance axis" can be disarmed through diplomatic agreements is, at best, naïve. An editorial last week on Hamas' Al-Resalah website predicted that efforts to disarm both Hamas and Hezbollah will fail miserably.

The writers stressed the centrality of armed struggle to the resistance ideology and argued that disarming these groups would effectively spell the end of the axis, an outcome the groups cannot allow. In both Gaza and Lebanon, there is no governing authority capable of enforcing such a disarmament.

Was Israel too quick to ease military pressure?

The famous observation by Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz that war is the continuation of politics by other means has been frequently cited by those arguing that the time has come for diplomacy. But in light of the current picture, it's worth asking whether Israel was too hasty in scaling back its military pressure.

Either way, it is not too late to learn the lessons and recalibrate.

First and foremost, Israel must avoid trading real strategic gains for vague future promises. This applies to preserving its military presence and freedom of action in Syria, to nuclear enrichment in Saudi Arabia, and to any future diplomatic frameworks with the Palestinians.

Second, Israel must not compromise in the fight to prevent Hamas and Hezbollah from rebuilding and rearming. With all due respect to mediators and even the US, this is a task that only Israel can carry out.

Third, no matter what agreements are signed or understandings reached, reality on the ground will be determined by action. Israel should take advantage of the current moment, while Hamas and Hezbollah are weakened, to impose the arrangements it deems necessary.

This policy may carry risks, of renewed hostilities, friction with mediators, and possibly even with the US administration, but the alternative is far more costly.

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One can reasonably estimate that its primary preoccupation will involve coordinating civilian aid entry into the Strip and preventing escalations that threaten the ceasefire. In both domains, Israel will probably be the principal address for pressure. Conversely, it's challenging to envision this headquarters accomplishing anything beyond declarations concerning the more crucial areas for Israel: stripping Hamas of weaponry, preventing smuggling operations, and demilitarizing the Strip.

During a weekend interview with Al-Jazeera, Khalil al-Hayya, the Hamas leader, referenced the international forces' role as providing separation and border supervision, along with managing ceasefire monitoring. He indicated his organization seeks elections leading to unified government, and presently doesn't dismiss transferring "administrative control" to a mutually agreed committee and managing the Strip through "a national figure residing in Gaza." One needn't be an expert to comprehend which options this criterion eliminated.

Al-Hayya proceeded to lament Gaza's humanitarian conditions and stressed it requires 6,000 aid trucks each day, plus entry of specific materials Israel currently prohibits. One can anticipate this message will reach mediating nations and every international actor. Winter's approach will likely bring an accompanying "Gaza is freezing to death" campaign.

Hamas refuses to disarm

Concerning Hamas disarmament? Al-Hayya responds diplomatically, "The matter remains under discussion with factions and mediators," and lest we harbor false expectations he clarifies, "Hamas' weapons are connected to occupation and aggression's existence. Should the occupation conclude, the weapons will transfer to the (Palestinian) state."

Similar statements have been audible throughout recent periods from the organization's spokespeople and senior officials. They've consistently emphasized: Our weapons are legitimate, we won't disarm . Admittedly, in formal announcements they carefully stress their commitment to the agreement and avoid provocative declarations that might antagonize President Trump and his administration or mediating nations, but regarding the disarmament provision they leave no ambiguity about their stance.

While the Kiryat Gat headquarters continues taking shape and determining its functions and operational approaches, Hamas in Gaza has regained its footing. It operates efficient command and control systems, is restoring order throughout Gaza's devastated streets, suppressing opposition, deterring and dominating. It allows everyone to debate agreement details' interpretation and drafters' intentions while concentrating on fundamentals: strengthening its position, replenishing forces, securing supplies, planning reconstruction.

It presumes Gaza remains lodged like a bone in Trump's and other regional leaders' throats, who seek to dispose of it as swiftly as possible to advance implementing major regional initiatives. Its expectation is that under these conditions they'll accept a formula offering the semblance of resolution and permit it to capitalize on the "gaps" within it and the exhaustion from interminable debates regarding its interpretations.

Despite the intense desire to advance peace visions, we cannot compromise on critical matters for us in the Gaza Strip. We must eliminate the vagueness concerning headquarters and mediation and coordination entities, and also explain to the public what these will ultimately contribute toward accomplishing Israel's objectives.

The rearming issue under humanitarian aid and reconstruction means' cover demands particular Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee oversight and public reporting, preventing us from burying our heads in the sand and exploiting the secrecy veil typically covering this activity.

MK Amit Halevi's public announcement about intensifying rules of engagement for IDF forces regarding Strip suspects requires IDF response and clarifications. It's completely inappropriate to heighten risks merely from ceasefire collapse fears. Even those concerned about this should recognize that harming our soldiers could similarly cause that, beyond the immediate price paid.

Furthermore, rather than awaiting agreements and mechanisms, we should shape reality. Hamas tunnels should face attack not solely responding to harm against us. If avoiding casualties is desired, we can provide advance warning. We must leverage Hamas' weakened position and all living hostages already being in Israel. Such an approach could enhance Israel's and mediators' negotiating position regarding weapons disarmament.

Concerning the international headquarters for the Gaza Strip, we must acknowledge this mechanism's risks and also that participating in it might constrain the IDF and direct it toward preferring dialogue channels as default over operational activity. We need to establish what Israel gains from this mechanism, and concurrently determine rules now for our conduct within it, in ways that diminish its risks.

Meir Ben Shabbat is head of the Misgav Institute for National Security & Zionist Strategy, in Jerusalem. He served as Israel's national security advisor and head of the National Security Council between 2017 and 2021, and prior to that for 30 years in the General Security Service (the Shin Bet security agency or "Shabak").

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Moreover, the recognition move gives backing not only to Hamas and not only within the Palestinian issue, but to Islamist terrorism in all its forms, precisely at a moment when Israel, in its war against parts of those forces, is managing to dent their capabilities through this approach.

Furthermore, the declaration that Macron and his partners intend to improve the standing of the Palestinian Authority and what remains of Fatah will politically strengthen Hamas and its allies. The move will paint the Palestinian streets in Judea and Samaria green, Hamas' color, an area where support for the terrorist organization is already trending upward.

And another point: the recognition initiative, which Macron and his partners say is meant to help establish calm and stability, not only fails to achieve that, it is already increasing tensions that will probably escalate further as a result of the countermeasures Israel will be forced to take. The next wave of terror and violence, heaven forbid it comes, already has a name: "Macron escalation".

Anyone impressed by the conditions some leaders attached to their declaration has probably not closely examined the real condition of the Palestinian Authority and how it operates. This applies not only to its involvement in financial support for terrorists and their families, the glorification of attackers and turning them into role models for Palestinian youth, but also to the corruption that has spread within it and the way it is perceived by parts of its own people. The sheikhs of Hebron proposing to detach from the Authority and join the Abraham Accords as an autonomous area is evidence of how it is perceived, at least by some of the public. The fine words about conditions to be imposed on the Palestinian Authority are nothing more than lip service, pretence or at best naïveté.

And we have not yet addressed feasibility: in his speech this week at the UN "Two-State Solution" conference, Mahmoud Abbas said that "Hamas will not have a part in the government. Hamas and its partners must hand over their weapons to the Authority." As the old saying goes, words do not pay the customs duties.

Can that same Palestinian Authority, which cannot cope on its own with phenomena of terror, the proliferation of weapons, anarchy and lack of governance in whole areas that are already under its responsibility, sustain itself at all? Countless IDF operations in the field and the thousands of arrests the Shin Bet carries out each year to rein in trends of terror are a sign of the magnitude of the security challenge it faces, and of course that is not the only challenge before it.

In fact, do Macron and his partners in the initiative recall that the Palestinian Authority they speak of in their speeches is the same "Authority" that in 2007 lost control of the Gaza Strip to Hamas? Mahmoud Abbas is the same Mahmoud Abbas, only older, and he will turn 90 in a month.

In Gaza's previous iteration of the Authority, heavy pressure was exerted on Israel to grant measures to Abbas and expand his powers to improve his electoral chances against Hamas. Those gestures were given, Hamas won, and we all remember the aftermath. Of course, that does not prevent Macron and his colleagues from reviving the same ideas.

While leaders continue to wax lyrical about the importance of their initiative, security reports bring us back down to earth: another rocket was located, this time in Tulkarm, days after a terror cell from the Ramallah area was exposed producing rockets intended for launch from Judea and Samaria. This comes about two weeks after the attack at the Ramat Junction in Jerusalem that claimed six civilian lives, which was also carried out by perpetrators from the Ramallah area.

The Macron, Keir Starmer and partners initiative to recognize a Palestinian state is initiative for the sake of initiative. Once, when an idea like this came up, Hamas leaders might have suspected some hidden trick and tried to decipher the sophistication. Today such a possibility does not even cross their minds. Hamas understands that this is a step meant to signal "we are here too," and that domestic politics and international competition were important motives in its crafting, and that its consequences were not seriously examined. All they have to do is stand aside and enjoy the gains. Evildoers, their work is done by the naïve.

Anyone who links this step to the start of an IDF operation to conquer the city of Gaza is invited to listen to the interview Macron gave back in April of this year, in which he spoke about the recognition initiative he is promoting, long before Israel's cabinet decided on the conquest of Gaza. Save the self-flagellation for other occasions.

How should Israel respond?

On the diplomatic level, although the immediate significance of recognition is mainly declaratory, it must not be taken lightly, because it gives substantial reinforcement to the standing of the Palestinian Authority in international legal proceedings against Israel. It also creates a foundation for decisions and measures against moves that Israel will carry out in Judea and Samaria.

There is no need to confront Macron head-on now, but under no circumstances should Israel turn the other cheek. There is also no reason to continue treating him with deference. Those who initiated and led this move cannot be accepted as mediators, partners or observers in any process in which Israel is involved.

Despite sympathy with the call to apply sovereignty over parts of Judea and Samaria, one should question the advisability of such a step. First, because taking it as a reactive or provocative measure weakens the claim of its justice. Second, because it is a divisive act during wartime that requires as broad a consensus as possible, and even without it internal tension is high. It seems that a balanced step that enjoys broad internal agreement and has a good chance of securing backing from the Trump administration would be a decision to apply sovereignty over the Jordan Valley.

Regarding security, Israel's general approach should convey the message that its activity for its security will continue as usual and will not take any political recognition of the Palestinians into account. Furthermore, against the backdrop of terror trends, it is correct to make clear that an area that chooses to behave like Gaza will end up like Gaza.

The security establishment must prepare on the assumption that we are facing another rise in tension in Judea and Samaria. The offensive approach adopted at the beginning of the war should continue, including the use of focused preventive measures, and monitoring and security along the seam line must be tightened. Given the independent manufacturing capabilities for weapons and explosives in that area, it is right to stop entirely the entry into Palestinian Authority areas of dual-use items that terrorist elements use in production processes.

An umbrella that will allow Hamas to preserve its power and capabilities

Several media outlets have reported an American plan formulated for the Gaza Strip that is supposed to include, among other things, the release of all the hostages, a permanent ceasefire, the end of the war and the establishment of a civilian governing mechanism with the involvement of moderate Arab states and the Palestinian Authority.

This idea is not new. In the Arab world and within Hamas there has for some time been discussion of formulas that would allow ending the war and reaching the "day after," without IDF rule in the Strip and without implementing Trump's transfer plan.

Hamas spokesmen have repeatedly declared their readiness to vacate their role in managing Gaza's civilian affairs and hand them over to other actors. In previous statements they emphasized that Hamas's position on the Strip's future rests on two principles: first, that managing the Strip is an internal Palestinian affair that requires a "national consensus" — a code name that brings the Palestinian Authority into the equation and allows Hamas to set conditions and demands. The second principle is that "armed resistance to the Israeli occupation is the right of the entire Palestinian people over all Palestinian land, and not only the right of Hamas." This implies opposition to the disarmament of military capabilities.

The civilian mechanism and rehabilitation efforts in Gaza are the main channel for building Hamas's military capabilities. Everything that enters Gaza for civilian purposes will be used by Hamas to build its military power, from engineering equipment brought in to clear rubble that will be used to prepare tunnels, to cement and rebar brought in for construction that will be used for tunneling, to glues, resins and fertilizers that, although entering for civilian uses, will be diverted to the manufacture of explosives. As long as Hamas is the dominant force in the Strip, it will effectively control everything brought into its territory, even if it is not formally a partner in the civilian governing mechanism.

Moreover, a plan that transfers civilian management away from Hamas but leaves it as the significant power broker could lead to the Hezbollahization of Gaza. Under the cover of a "management committee," or whatever name is chosen for that governing body, Hamas would rebuild its military strength and pull the strings behind the scenes in the management of all its affairs. The organization could funnel the energies it regains into increasing terror efforts both in Judea and Samaria and in other regions. Arab and international involvement in implementing such a scheme would only complicate matters for Israel and hinder its ability to confront Hamas's maneuvers.

Therefore, Israel must make clear that it will not compromise on its demand for the demilitarization of the Strip from military capabilities, in addition to the collapse of Hamas's rule — and not in its place. Israel cannot allow civilian control to be placed in a framework that in practice serves as an umbrella for preserving Hamas's power and rebuilding it.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said a few months ago: "Israel is doing the dirty work for all of us." He was referring to Israel's strike against Iran as part of Operation With the Lion, but his words are also true regarding Israel's war in Gaza. Alongside continued fighting to destroy Hamas's capabilities, the real answer to Gaza's problems is implementing Trump's initiative. This is a rare opportunity to bring about a fundamental change in the situation, purchased at a terrible human cost. It must not be missed.

Originally published in Makor Rishon. 

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The reality turned out differently. Relations held firm despite images from Gaza, accusations of a "starvation campaign," and an international smear campaign against Israel. From the outset of the war, the Abraham Accords countries signaled their intent to maintain ties with Israel and not allow Hamas to sabotage them. They were among the first to publicly condemn the terrorist organization for its October 7 massacre.

UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed met with Israeli President Isaac Herzog on the sidelines of the climate summit in Dubai; Israeli ministers of economy, energy, and strategic affairs paid public visits and met with their counterparts; the IDF chief of staff attended a summit in Bahrain, while a delegation of Israeli rabbis visited Morocco.

Security cooperation deepened, and it is reasonable to assume it contributed to thwarting attacks on Israel throughout the war. Defense and civilian trade grew in 2024, similar to levels in 2023. Investment in Israeli high-tech continued. Tourism was affected by widespread reserve call-ups, aviation security restrictions, and growing concerns over attacks on Israelis, but it did not stop. Other ties remained intact, albeit at a lower public profile, with fewer meetings, fewer statements, and less fanfare.

The war's negative impact on public opinion in those countries cannot be denied. Even before Israel's strike in Qatar, Hamas' propaganda campaign had severely damaged Israel's image and expressions of solidarity. Still, those states understand that Israel's war serves their core interest against their most dangerous foes: Iran and its proxies, and on the Sunni side, the Muslim Brotherhood and jihadist movements. For them, lowering the profile and slowing progress is a necessity, but they hope it will be temporary.

Ankara and Doha's agenda

Turkey and Qatar, the main sponsors of the Muslim Brotherhood, hold ideological positions opposed to Israel's integration in the region and have ambitious aspirations to expand their influence. They invest heavily in this effort, profiting from their ability to present themselves as mediators. The collapse of the Iranian-led Shiite axis created a vacuum they are rushing to fill.

It is no coincidence that both were the first to reopen embassies in Damascus under the rule of Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, and to push for international recognition and Syrian reconstruction.

Syria? Not a partner yet

The idea of Damascus joining the Abraham Accords is wishful thinking. The suited jihadist ruler has spoken positively about peace with Israel, which is noteworthy, but so far it is only rhetoric.

Meanwhile, the brutal displays in his fractured state reveal his true character. Even those who believe that Ahmad al-Sharaa has moved on from jihadism and become a statesman would struggle to assume that his circle has abandoned its dream of building a radical Sunni theocracy.

The Muslim Brotherhood challenge

To counter the disruptive influence of Turkey and Qatar and build legitimacy for expanding and deepening the Abraham Accords, the Muslim Brotherhood must also be addressed. It is unlikely Washington will lead such a move while trying to appease Doha after Israel's strike there. In any case, such a designation would be a long and complex legal process, as US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently explained.

This is not the first time the issue has been considered at the State Department. It would be a significant step toward a better Middle East. Only this May, Jordan outlawed the Brotherhood after uncovering a terror network run by the movement. It joined Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and others that have faced the dangers of the Brotherhood and curbed its activity.

Those who still view the Brotherhood as merely a stream of "political Islam" offering a Sunni alternative to global jihadist organizations forget that its ideology is born of the same doctrine, applied by the same methods. Hamas demonstrated this clearly on October 7.

For US policymakers, pushing for such a designation will be a serious challenge, given America's sensitive ties with Turkey and Qatar. But it would have a positive effect on normalization prospects with Saudi Arabia and ease internal pressure from Brotherhood-inspired opposition against states that have formal ties with Israel or are considering them.

The Houthi obstacle

Another barrier to realizing the full potential of the Abraham Accords is the Houthis. They control the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world's most vital maritime choke points. Their activity has disrupted shipping in the Red Sea, raised transportation and insurance costs, and harmed global supply chains. Beyond economic losses worth hundreds of billions of dollars, their actions reinforce the perception of an old Middle East threatened by an Iranian-backed neighborhood bully.

Washington seems to believe the Houthis will quiet down once the Gaza war ends, and so it focuses its efforts on ending the war. But it is far from clear that this is the Houthis' view, even after Israel decapitated their leadership. Even if quiet comes, they will remain a regional threat, with the next clash only postponed. Sooner or later, there will need to be a US-led international campaign to eliminate them. For those citing their survival as proof against confronting them, history shows what happens when Washington truly decides to act: Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi, Osama bin Laden, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi all ended the same way.

The Palestinian problem

Thirty-two years after the signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles, which led to its creation, the Palestinian Authority is on its deathbed. Even French President Emmanuel Macron's initiative to recognize it as a state offers no revival. It is corrupt, inept, and supportive of terrorism. Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh described Hamas' October 7 massacre as "a daring, unprecedented action, an important turning point in the history of the Palestinian struggle."

Israel will need to explore alternative paradigms beyond those repeatedly tried and failed in resolving the conflict. Macron's declaration, and Israel's possible responses, will add to the pressures on the Abraham Accords countries, especially the UAE. Israeli policymakers will need to factor this into their reactions.

The Abraham Accords shattered the notion that normalization with Israel was impossible without first solving the Palestinian issue. That issue still weighs heavily in Arab states' considerations, but letting it dictate policy only strengthens the enemies of peace.

Will we forever live by the sword?

The vision of peace still beats within us, deeply rooted in our hearts, minds, and prayers. But our yearning must not become an intoxicating illusion. True peace will come only after the forces of evil are defeated and lose hope, or alongside continued war against them, as is the case today with the Abraham Accords countries.

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This leadership's activity served as a force multiplier for the terror organization and bridged gaps created in the functioning of some of its other mechanisms, following restrictions on them in the Gaza Strip or Judea and Samaria.

While its leaders in Gaza operate underground, struggle to function, and their voice is not heard, those "political leadership" figures whose life centers outside the region fill their place in presenting the movement's policy and advancing its interests: in Turkey, Qatar, Lebanon, or other countries.

They replace the hiding leadership, also in media appearances, on social networks, in conferences, and in political conversations. They are the organization's headquarters body, responsible for formulating its policy and explaining it, as well as bearing the burden of mobilizing the necessary political support and resources to build the organization's capabilities and activities in various areas.

Some fulfill operational roles, ranging from inter-regional coordination for terrorist purposes to directing concrete activities in different arenas. Saleh Arouri, remembered infamously, was among the activists known to the public, but like hi,m there are about thirty activists: Khaled Mashaal, Khalil al-Hayya, Moussa Abu Marzouk, Nizar Awadallah, Bassem Naim, Sami Abu Zuhri, Izzat Rishq, Osama Hamadan, Mahmoud Mardawi, Taher Nono, Zaher Jabarin, and others. It appears some of these were the strike's target.

In the October 7 context, the publicized thanksgiving prayer of the organization's leaders, who were in Turkey at the time, is well remembered. And not only that, Israeli media also highlighted statements made after the massacre by Ghazi Hamad, a senior organization member in Gaza who relocated to Qatar, who clarified: Israel is "a state we want to bring down", "'Al-Aqsa Flood' is only the first time. There will also be a second, third, and fourth time. We have the resilience and ability to fight and pay the price." Regarding Israel's demand for Hamas to disarm, he ruled, "The resistance's weapons are the essence of the Palestinian issue, we (in Hamas) are committed to this and will not hand over even one empty bullet."

This headquarters is also the natural address that would take upon itself the task of rehabilitating the beaten terror organization, the moment this becomes possible. It is the one that will also make the connection to Iran and its proxies, to other supporting states, to the network of Islamic organizations spread throughout the world and identified with the "Muslim Brotherhood," to money, to media, and to other resources that will be required for this purpose.

Given this leadership's central role and its deep involvement in efforts to drag Israel into a multi-arena regional war, Israel could not afford to leave it standing. Refraining from striking it until now cast doubt among some players about Israel's threats of total war against Hamas, and created the impression that staying in Turkey or Qatar guarantees immunity from it.

After disproving past assumptions about its ability to conduct prolonged or multi-arena warfare, Israel, in its recent operations, is challenging everything perceived by its enemies as "rules of the game."

Doha's announcement about suspending its involvement in mediation regarding Gaza matters is an expected step following the Israeli operation. Qatari anger will also find expression in incitement on Al-Jazeera, and expressions of rage and protest from Turkey should also be expected. The fact that Washington did not prevent Israel from operating in Doha will restrain their response.

On the ground, an escalation should be expected in attempts by Hamas activists in Judea and Samaria and Gaza to avenge the strike on the leadership. Attention must also be given to developments on the Temple Mount and in east Jerusalem.

The great unknown is the impact on the hostages' situation and chances of resuming negotiations. On the face of it, it appears Hamas has a basic interest in preserving the hostages' lives as they are the only insurance policy for the activists' survival. However, it is difficult to predict the emotional reactions from the hostages' captors and the red lines they have set for themselves. One matter needs no concern: if Hamas wants to return to negotiations, the issue of the mediator will not be an obstacle.

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In this war, the State of Israel has indeed crossed what, in the eyes of Iran and the terror organizations, were supposed to be "red lines" in its policy. After the "decapitation operations" of Hezbollah's leadership and the heads of Iran's security system, the day of the Houthi leaders has also come.

But the struggle with the Houthis is far from over. In the same interview with Al-Mayadeen, the Lebanese channel identified with Hezbollah, al-Bukhaiti boasted that his movement "succeeded in imposing discipline on Britain and the US," and promised that "it will do the same to the Zionist enemy."

If, before the Israeli strike, the war in Gaza was the main stated reason for the continuation of the struggle, now the motivation for revenge over the elimination of the leadership and the severe humiliation of the Zaidi movement has been added to it. This in no way raises doubts about the course of action Israel chose – on the contrary, this is the way to demonstrate, and not only to the Houthis, the change that has occurred in Israel's approach following the October 7 attack, and this is the line that should characterize its policy in the other arenas where it is contending as well.

The common denominator for all of them is the instability that allows rapid fluctuation between extreme states. Israel's dramatic achievements have indeed created a new reality, but it is still in formation. Discussing the need for a "political act" to complement the "military act" is premature, if it is even equally applicable to all arenas. Attempting to cut corners through questionable arrangements or premature agreements could prove too costly.

Maintaining freedom of action

Under no circumstances should tangible achievements be traded for political ideas that may stir the imagination, but their chances of materializing are doubtful. Thus, one can welcome the Lebanese government's decision to task the Lebanese army with formulating a plan to disarm Hezbollah, but also assume – with a sober look – that the likelihood of this happening is slim.

Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem made clear that the weapons issue is a red line and that his organization will never agree to disarm, and therefore one should not be tempted by the "discourse of gestures" – it is not right to reduce IDF strikes in Lebanon or reduce the Israeli military presence in order to "give President Aoun a chance and encourage him in his policy."

Israel needs to maintain its hold on all five points in Lebanon where the IDF controls, not allow the reconstruction of Shiite villages that threaten our communities in the north, enforce decisively, and act firmly against any attempt to arm and strengthen. If and when Hezbollah is disarmed, then it will be possible to show openness to other ideas as well.

The same applies to Syria: we need to wake up from the dreams about hummus in Damascus. The refined jihadist ruler indeed spoke positively about the possibility of peace relations with Israel, and this should not be dismissed, but meanwhile, these are just words. The barbaric attacks by regime supporters against the Druze illustrated the complex internal challenges in this divided country. They reminded us and the rest of the world what the base of the new president looks like, who, next month, will stand on the UN General Assembly podium.

Even those who believe that Ahmed al-Sharaa has exhausted the jihad chapter in his life and seen the light on the path of statesmanship now understand what his power base looks like. It is hard to assume that the gang of jihadists surrounding him has abandoned the vision of establishing an extreme Sunni religious state in Greater Syria, and that it will allow action in complete opposition to this vision. Therefore, we must maintain our military presence on Mount Hermon's peak and in the buffer zone in Syria, forcefully prevent empowerment moves that will challenge the freedom of action of our forces, and assist the Druze.

And for those who claim that Israel's actions could undermine political opportunities: first, past experience teaches that the opposite is true – military moves may actually help clarify red lines, and, by themselves, serve as leverage for advancing political arrangements. Second, and more importantly, security without political arrangements is preferable to arrangements without security. These lessons must be remembered, especially ahead of a political month, full of initiatives and ideas.

Meir Ben Shabbat is head of the Misgav Institute for National Security & Zionist Strategy, in Jerusalem. He served as Israel's national security advisor and head of the National Security Council between 2017 and 2021, and prior to that for 30 years in the General Security Service (the Shin Bet security agency or "Shabak").

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Although Khamenei's comments referred mainly to the so-called naval blockade announced by the Houthis against Israel and the terrorism they are waging to prevent ships linked to Israel from crossing the Red Sea, his words also hinted at threats toward Western countries. He suggested Iran could impose restrictions on the passage of "hostile vessels" through the Strait of Hormuz if the West fails to reach understandings with Tehran.

Regardless, the latest wave of Israeli Air Force strikes over Sanaa, the Yemeni capital, has disrupted the momentum the Houthis had been drawing from Iran's backing.

As Israel continues preparing for a ground takeover of Gaza City, and as the ripple effects of the Shiite axis' defeat are felt in Syria and Lebanon, rocket and drone launches from Yemen persist. The Houthis' ongoing fire, and the Israeli retaliatory strikes, have created a daily rhythm of attacks and counterattacks that, without prior intention, have solidified into a "response equation."

Tehran traditionally claims that the Houthis act according to their own worldview and interests, and therefore Iran should not be held accountable for their actions. The same line is taken regarding other organizations that Israel and much of the international community see as Iranian proxy forces, extensions of the Islamic Republic's "octopus."

Even if there were some truth in these denials, Tehran's officials would struggle to hide Iran's role in arming the Houthis with the very ballistic missiles and drones they use to target Israel. Iran's missile industry, whose dangers were clearly demonstrated in recent years, remains a strategic threat not only to Israel but also beyond. Just in the past few days, Iran's new defense minister openly declared that Tehran continues to produce weapons and missiles "even right now."

Iran's attempt to separate the Houthis' campaign from its own role, just as it seeks to separate the nuclear issue from its ballistic missile program, serves its double aim: preserving the use of proxy warfare while avoiding restrictions on its missile production and proliferation.

Israel still has military options against the Houthis that it has not fully employed. These could significantly raise the cost of continued attacks, target wider economic interests, eliminate leaders, and increase their sense of vulnerability from more than just airstrikes. Yet it is important to remember that Yemen is a secondary arena, and its geographic distance gives Israel advantages as well. Excessive focus there could inadvertently serve Israel's other enemies.

Alongside military operations to break the "response equation," Israel must now focus directly on Iran as the critical timeframe approaches to reimpose sanctions lifted under the 2015 nuclear deal. That agreement included a unique "snapback" clause allowing the renewal of international sanctions with the support of a majority of the signatory states. This clause is set to expire on October 18, and to invoke it requires 30 days' advance notice. The International Atomic Energy Agency has already declared that Iran is not honoring its commitments.

The E3 countries - Germany, France, and Britain - hold the ability to trigger the snapback. They have warned that if Iran does not shift its stance in the nuclear talks by the end of August, they will be forced to act. Such a move would reinstate a global arms embargo and restrictions on missile production and distribution. Talks on this issue are set to continue tomorrow in Vienna at the deputy foreign ministers' level.

Israel must press the US administration to influence the E3 decisively. Iran's conduct provides full justification for renewing sanctions. It would be a grave mistake to use this leverage merely as a negotiating tool to push Iran toward an agreement, after it has repeatedly violated past commitments.

Instead, it is time to bring the whip down directly on the regime. After the military setback it suffered in the recent 12-day war, and amid the severe domestic crises battering it, the reimposition of crippling sanctions could, if not immediately, then eventually, bring the most significant achievement in Israel's struggle with Iran: destabilizing the radical regime itself.

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