Erdoğan's grandiose campaign to establish influence in Libya began in response to Turkey's exclusion from the Israel-Cyprus-Greece undersea gas pipeline project. Threatened by a shortage in energy supplies, Erdoğan looked to conflict-torn yet oil-rich Libya to secure his own source of cheap foreign energy for Turkey.

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Located in the center of the Maghreb region of North Africa, Libya has suffered from sectarianism and foreign intervention ever since Muammar Gaddafi was deposed by a NATO-backed popular uprising in 2011. The current conflict in Libya is broadly divided between the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord and the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army, a populist insurgency backed by the United States, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

The LNA is headed by Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, a well-respected military commander and prominent critic of jihadi terror groups and the Muslim Brotherhood. Threatened by the prospect of an LNA-controlled Libya, Erdoğan, seemingly acting out of naked self-interest, has committed Turkish troops and military assets in support of the GNA, shattering precarious ceasefire negotiations and escalating the conflict from low-level skirmishing to protracted, high-intensity open war.

The European response

From a regional security perspective, Erdoğan's effort to convert Libya into a Turkish proxy state has already drawn sharp criticism from EU and NATO defense ministers. Relations between Turkey and France have become especially tense ever since a May 2019 flare-up in the Eastern Mediterranean. During this incident, Turkish naval frigates were hailed for inspection by French patrol vessels, likely on suspicion that they were transporting an illegal arms shipment to Libya. In response, the Turkish frigates repeatedly pinged the French vessel with radar targeting signatures, an action that typically heralds a ship-to-ship missile strike.

In a strongly-worded statement, Agnes von der Muhll, the spokeswoman for the French Foreign Ministry, denounced the Erdoğan regime for its repeated arms embargo violations in Libya and its aggressive interdiction activities in the Mediterranean.

"Turkey's support for the ongoing offensive of the Government of National Accord goes directly against efforts to secure an immediate truce," declared von de Muhll. "This support is coupled with hostile and unacceptable behavior by the Turkish maritime forces towards NATO allies, aimed at hampering efforts to implement the United Nations arms embargo."

Rebooting the Libyan oil market

If Turkey is able to consolidate a power base in Libya, Erdoğan will be able to leverage his mounting hard-power influence to restart and control the country's lucrative oil-export economy. Prior to the shutdown of its oil fields, Libya was one of the EU's largest oil suppliers. Before the outbreak of prolonged civil unrest, the European Union accounted for close to 85 percent of Libya's entire oil export output.

Since the dissolution of the Gaddafi regime, Libya's National Oil Company, currently based out of GNA-controlled Tripoli, has been responsible for managing Libya's oil export-driven economy. As Erdoğan escalates Turkey's military footprint in Libya, Turkish Petroleum, a state-run energy exploration and production firm, has begun lobbying for oil export concessions from the NOC. Around the same time, the Turkish government, in partnership with the Libyan oil industry, announced a joint agreement to establish a new (yet heavily contested) economic exclusion zone to explore potential hydrocarbon drill sites in the Mediterranean.

With Turkey expected to increase its support for the GNA, it could be that Erdoğan plans to exploit the chaos of an escalating GNA-LNA conflict to expand his geo-strategic stranglehold over essential Libyan infrastructure. For now, several major oilfields and four key export ports, including a deep-water port at the Gulf of Sirte, have been blockaded by LNA-aligned militia units. However, as Turkish troops and GNA forces gear up for a major offensive, Erdoğan, working through proxies in Turkish Petroleum, may soon have direct control over Libya's oil production and distribution network.

A second European migrant crisis?

There is also concern, especially among EU stakeholders in the Mediterranean, that Turkey's intervention in Libya could catalyze a second wave of North African migration into Europe. Despite calling for an "end to unlawful attacks," Erdoğan has made no attempt to use his substantial geopolitical clout in Libya to enforce peacekeeping or pursue peaceful negotiations.

As the civil war intensifies, more than 48,000 refugees and 635,000 migrants have been hemmed into overcrowded detention centers across Libya. According to the UNHCR, a further 1.3 million Libyans are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. By continuing to disrupt UN-led peace negotiations, Turkey is increasing the chances of both a domestic humanitarian emergency and a region-wide migration crisis. In the midst of global economic recession and an ongoing pandemic, a migrant crisis in neighboring Libya has the potential to overwhelm the EU's already strained social services and border control mechanisms.

Impacts in the Middle East

Erdoğan's incursion into Libya is already having profound implications on the balance of power in the Middle East. In many ways, Erdoğan's campaign to entrench influence in Libya bears a striking resemblance to Iran's persistent efforts to acquire political and economic control in Iraq. In the case of Libya, Erdoğan's overarching foreign policy objective is to turn the war-torn country into a Turkish proxy state, undermining its geo-economic sovereignty and establishing a strategically valuable power base in North Africa.

The formation of a Turkish proxy state in Libya also threatens to legitimize and expand the political cachet of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization with a long history of political violence and support for fundamentalist theological figures. Thanks to Turkish backing, the Muslim Brotherhood has become one of the largest political organizations in GNA-controlled Libya. By gifting the Muslim Brotherhood a seat of power in the Maghreb, Erdoğan will further aggravate region-wide sectarian tensions, exacerbating already fragile socio-political situations in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Egypt.

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Erdoğan's pursuit of hegemony in North Africa is driving Libya deeper into conflict. If Turkish military forces are left unchecked, the ensuing humanitarian disaster will trigger a cascade of adverse geopolitical and geo-economic tensions across the European Union and Middle East. To safeguard regional stability, the international community must apply pressure to Turkey and force the regime to evacuate its military assets and advisers from Libya. When Erdoğan's influence is jettisoned from Libya, impartial peacekeeping and good-faith ceasefire negotiations can finally recommence. 

Reprinted with permission from JNS.org.

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The changing of the guard means a shift in foreign policy, with Timo Soini giving way to the Green Party's choice of Pekka Haavisto as foreign minister. Largely seen as a safe pick, Haavisto's appointment may have wider implications, as Finland takes up its six-month term as president of the European Union Council starting on July 1. While the newly elected prime minister has indicated that Finland's council presidency will spend its time on climate change, there will also no doubt be an impact on Israel and other key foreign-policy matters.

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Soini's exit from the Foreign Ministry poses new challenges for the country's position on Israel. Soini was known for strong opposition to biased EU boycotts against Israel, as well as to the more nefarious BDS movement, and his departure leaves the Middle East's sole democracy more isolated. Under Soini's leadership, Finland's ties to Israel were an outlier in a traditionally anti-Israel Scandinavia. His work could be unraveled with the ascension of Haavisto, who boasts strong liberal internationalist bona fides, to the top post.

The extent of the damage to Israel may be limited by the composition of the SDP-led five-party coalition, which successfully excluded the Finns Party despite its strong results. To ensure an alliance with the outgoing Centre Party and fend off the Finns Party, SDP likely agreed to nix first-choice foreign minister candidate Erkki Tuomioja, who has long held unequivocally anti-Israel views.

Although Finland's stance on Israel may not completely shift, Haavisto remains a wild card. The new foreign minister represents a country being led by its first center-left government in over 15 years and wasted no time voicing his opposition to the United States' position on Israel. Haavisto has also voiced firm opposition to Israeli demands regarding Jerusalem and is adamantly against Israel's building projects in Judea and Samaria.

With the EU Council presidency approaching, it seems headwinds are blowing stronger against Israel than they were before the Finnish election, regardless of how many freedoms Haavisto enjoys in steering Finland's foreign policy.

The SDP is replete with self-proclaimed social-justice defenders who have publicly expressed derisive and malignant views on Israel and Jews in general, offering pandering apologies to the media in the aftermath. Current member of parliament Hussein al-Taee, for instance, posted on Facebook in 2012 regarding Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg, a "Jew doing what a Jew does best. F***s up everybody to gain everything."

Others in key positions have touted the same sentiment to gain popularity among the Social Democrats' base, which is enamored with political showboating through support for Palestinians. Like the Social Democrats, the Greens are both left-wing and liberal, and since Foreign Minister Haavisto was their pick as part of the coalition negotiations, he is likely to echo popular opinions on his side of the table regarding foreign policy.

According to track-two diplomacy specialist Dr. Herman Schmidt of the London-based Global Distribution Network, a closed forum was held recently in Washingtonת by Israel-focused think-tanks. During the meeting, several attendees expressed concern over the new Finnish government's policy towards Israel. Schmidt notes that although Finland is hardly a global power-player, the concern is warranted considering the prevalent anti-Israel and anti-Trump attitudes within the newly formed Finnish cabinet.

These swirling political tides in Finland may mean that Israel will find itself with even fewer friends in an already unfriendly EU, which has for years found it convenient to condemn Israel at the expense of placing attention on far more pressing issues. Finland's new government has already begun its new term with considerable power at the helm of the EU Council, and with that power, Finland should diligently weigh its options.

If Helsinki seeks to push the Palestinian cause during its EU Council presidency, it risks derailing the Trump administration's peace efforts and consequently Finland's relationship with Washington. However, the new government now has a golden opportunity to position Finland as a trusted and unbiased mediator by stepping back and allowing the United States to lead the negotiations. In doing so, Prime Minister Antti Rinne, together with Foreign Minister Haavisto, can strengthen and solidify Finland's relationship with the United States and other key allies.

Reprinted with permission from JNS.org.

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