From the perspective of religious tradition, the holiday centers on the Jewish struggle against the religious decrees imposed by the Greeks. When the radical faction of Hellenizers is added to the picture, a clear dimension of civil war also emerges. The Talmudic discussion of the origin of the holiday makes it clear that Hanukkah was established for generations because of the miracle of the cruse of oil and the renewal of Temple service, while the military victory is barely mentioned.

When the military victory does appear in the prayer Al Hanisim, the emphasis is that it was achieved with God's help. Even Maimonides, who notes the restoration of independence, "and sovereignty returned to Israel… until the Second Destruction," still emphasizes the victory over religious decrees and the miracle of the oil.

With the rise of the Zionist movement, by contrast, there was a growing tendency to reinterpret Hanukkah and even to strip it of its distinctly religious content. In the words of historian Ben-Zion Dinur, later Israel's education minister, "Hanukkah became the festival of the Hasmoneans." From religious tradition, the words "for the miracles and the wonders," attributed of course to God, were taken, but in the famous song they were transformed into "for the miracles and the wonders wrought by the Maccabees."

The most striking example is the song We Carry Torches by Aharon Ze'ev, with its well-known line, "No miracle happened to us, we found no cruse of oil." The supernatural miracle of the traditional holiday disappears, or more precisely is made to disappear, and the acts of God, which leave the Maccabees in a relatively passive position, are replaced by heroic, initiative-taking Maccabees, whose heirs we are today.

Is there a need to choose between these two approaches, or can they be combined, allowing each individual and community to emphasize whichever elements of the holiday they see fit?

In religious tradition, a well-known question asks why we light eight candles, given that the miracle of the cruse of oil actually lasted only seven days. The oil that was found sufficed for one day, meaning the miracle itself occurred only during the following seven days. A wide range of answers has been offered over the generations, most of them attempting to explain why it nevertheless constituted an eight-day miracle.

But there is another answer. Rabbi Menachem ben Solomon Meiri (1249–1316) wrote, in addressing the question that troubled generations: "On the first night, when there was no miracle of oil, we recite the blessing for redemption and thanksgiving for finding the cruse." In Meiri's concise formulation, the proper synthesis of these seemingly opposing approaches is reflected.

Indeed, for the miracle of the oil we light only seven candles. But the first candle is lit "for redemption," meaning for the national military victory of the Maccabees over the Greeks. Yet there is something more to learn here: gratitude for finding the cruse. We tend to think that only a clear-cut supernatural event qualifies as a miracle, forgetting the ordinary, natural miracles that occur around us all the time. Even the very discovery of the single cruse of oil was itself a kind of miracle, not something that could be taken for granted as if it were obvious it would be found.

On Hanukkah, the Festival of the Maccabees, it is fitting that we look around us and not take anything for granted. Some of what has happened, and is happening, since the start of the war qualifies as a miracle, not necessarily a supernatural one, but a miracle nonetheless, even if we are the ones carrying it out.

The starting point was the most difficult since the establishment of the State of Israel, exacting a horrific price from us. Since then, Israel's strategic position has fundamentally changed for the better. The pager operation and Operation Like a Lion are examples of the miracles taking place around us and through our own actions. Chag Sameach.

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But there are, increasingly, many signs of the pessimistic view: that Israel is subordinate to US directives, with the command center appearing to supervise Israeli operations and even to constrain them according to the American perspective. At this stage it is impossible to assess the full significance and outcomes of the command center's activity, but it should be remembered that it operates against the backdrop of stark structural gaps between US and Israeli points of view.

The US perspective is that of a global power looking at the world holistically, commonly described in public media discourse as the big picture. Israel's perspective, by contrast, is that of a country trying to cement its status as a regional power that exists in an extremely hostile environment; therefore deterring that environment from harming Israel is an existential imperative.

Moreover, the US views global reality through a lens that emphasizes the creation of a new global economic order, to which President Trump's business background contributes substantially. Israel, by contrast, views regional reality through the lens of culture and identity, especially after it grasped the cultural and identity roots of the October 7 massacre and the worldwide surge in antisemitism that followed.

From an American viewpoint, Gaza is a nuisance and perhaps something that can be worked around in the broader campaign against Hamas. That view can overlook the fact that Hamas still stands as a governing authority, so long as it only nominally yields control or relinquishes weapons. According to that approach, the Arab "partners" would supposedly ensure that a weakened Hamas does not morph back into the real monster it is from a cultural-identity perspective.

That reasoning overlooks the fact that those partners often share views similar to Hamas's toward Israel. This helps explain coordination with Hamas over the sham of a technocratic government that is purportedly about to be formed. The economy will supposedly do its part in the American-favored direction.

From an identity standpoint, Israel understood, at a terrible cost, that identity is the central issue here. Hamas, the terrorist organization, and a decisive majority of Palestinians will not give up their basic identity, which centers on the destruction of Israel. Repeated polls show broad support for the October 7 attack. They are only waiting and preparing to create the conditions that will allow it to happen.

In Israel, people increasingly understand that the supposed "partners" never abandoned their core beliefs. Hence their enduring view of Gaza's future: a permanent evil that will harass Israel, challenge it politically and militarily, and weaken it en route to its "destruction".

One component of the Oslo trap was the assumption that the economy and better living standards would change a culture of hatred centered on the destruction of Israel. Even if the Americans frame it differently now, Israel must guard against repeating that mistake.

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The disgraceful heckling of Netanyahu's name in front of Trump administration officials, caught off guard and visibly uncomfortable, is a telling indicator of the domestic climate. The joyful return of the hostages, while heartening, is unlikely to usher in an Israeli internal unity so crucial for confronting external threats. The fact that this is an election year will only further exacerbate polarization. Among us lives a radical minority that has never wavered from its overarching goal: to delegitimize the sitting government, and especially its leader, at any cost.

This is not merely harsh criticism of specific policies. This is a sweeping, absolute campaign of delegitimization that recognizes no limits or rules of engagement. The same people who invoke "statehood" as their guiding principle wield the term in vain, draining it of all substance. Other slogans, like "brothers in arms," are similarly emptied of meaning. To them, the government is illegitimate by its very nature. They are fundamentalists who frame the internal struggle in stark, binary terms: good versus evil, children of light versus children of darkness, messianics versus liberals, dictators versus democrats.

Make no mistake: this is not some fringe minority with no sway. Many of its members, or at least its most influential voices, are entrenched in the country's key power centers. They enjoy near-automatic backing from the bulk of Israel's mainstream media and benefit from protest funding on a scale never before seen here. However small this group may be, the toxic atmosphere it fosters has seeped into broader opposition circles to varying degrees.

Polls reflect this trend: figures like Yair Golan, who openly use radical delegitimizing rhetoric, are gaining traction. In contrast, opposition figures who maintain a more measured, statesmanlike tone – like Benny Gantz – are losing ground.

On the regional front, the Arab and Muslim countries participating in the Sharm el-Sheikh summit harbor deep hostility toward Israel. Public discourse in many of these countries is riddled with antisemitism, in varying degrees and forms. For them, the Gaza Strip is meant to serve as a perpetual source of provocation and harm to Israel – a pressure point to challenge Israel diplomatically and militarily. These states are already looking for ways to justify expected violations of the complicated ceasefire agreement.

France and Spain, also present at the summit, symbolize the broader international dynamic – a toxic blend of two persistent patterns observed throughout the war: the soft bigotry of low expectations for Palestinians, and the antisemitism of impossibly high expectations for Israel.

The Palestinians are consistently afforded understanding, indulgence and tolerance for every violation of any agreement. Israel, by contrast, is always expected to uphold rigid rules of conduct and adhere to international laws of war that no other country on Earth is required to follow. Yes, that too is antisemitism. Imposing unique standards on Israel – and on no other state – aligns precisely with the definition of modern antisemitism. But who cares? During the war, we saw campaign after campaign against Israel – from "war crimes" to "genocide" to "starvation." There is always a new blood libel to invent when it comes to Israel.

In the months ahead, Israel will mark 70 years since the brutal murder of Ro'i Rothberg, of Kibbutz Nahal Oz. The eulogy delivered by Moshe Dayan should remain etched in the minds of today's decision-makers:
"Beyond the border furrow, a sea of hatred and revenge boils, awaiting the day when our calm dulls our vigilance; the day we heed the envoys of hostile hypocrisy urging us to lay down our arms... Let us not shrink from recognizing the hatred that accompanies and fills the lives of hundreds of thousands of Arabs, who sit in wait for the moment their hands can reach our blood... This is our life's choice – to be ready and armed, strong and unyielding, or to let our sword slip from our grasp – and perish."

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"Most antisemites," said Professor David Hirsch, sociologist and founder of the movement against the academic boycott of Israel, "don't think they are antisemites." The starvation campaign now includes heads of state and organizations that signed the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's working definition of antisemitism, which specifically addresses the possibility that certain ways of relating to Israel constitute antisemitism. "Starvation," when presented this way, means not only that hunger exists in a specific place, but that someone is intentionally and systematically organizing that "starvation." This campaign provides an opportunity to revisit the antisemitism at the core of these matters.

About a decade ago, the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance published a new working definition of antisemitism, which sparked considerable debate. Unsurprisingly, many of the leading anti-Israel organizations that have conducted anti-Israel campaigns for years vehemently opposed the definition signed by 35 countries and hundreds of institutions and organizations, such as parliaments, sports clubs, corporations, and others that adopted it as a working definition, even though it was emphasized that this did not constitute legal status.

The definition did not remain at the level of general abstraction and was supplemented with illustrative examples. Almost all debates about the new definition focused on sections directly relating to Israel, and summarizing the debate exceeds the scope of this column. Particularly important is the explicit example given of antisemitism in its new, anti-Israel form – "Applying double standards by requiring of Israel behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation."

However, those well-funded anti-Israel organizations, operating under the guise of "human rights," immediately understood they would be considered antisemites, since applying double standards to Israel is their bread and butter.

The starvation campaign now includes heads of state and organizations that signed the new working definition of antisemitism, which specifically addresses the possibility that certain ways of relating to Israel constitute antisemitism.

This leads to the starvation campaign. In what similar cases of "starvation" have the "starvers" introduced and continue to introduce thousands of aid trucks to the "starving"? The "starvers" enable countries to stage media airdrop shows, where it's evident that one truck carries more aid than any well-documented airdrop. Organizations that pride themselves as "humanitarian" delay aid to the "starving" simply because they demand exclusivity without competition in bringing aid. This is the only "starving" area from which pictures emerge of "starving" people dumping flour on the ground to use flour sacks for carrying other aid products. Mothers displaying "starving" children appear very un-starved themselves. One of the countries supporting the starvation campaign has a border with the "starving" area, and if only they agreed to open it, the "starvers" would allow the "starving" to leave happily.

Above all, during the "starvation" campaign, the leaders of the "starving" people released videos proving they are systematically starving helpless hostages. Why would Hamas do this when it could harm the success of the starvation campaign working in their favor? Could it be that, as particularly pronounced antisemites – murderous and barbaric as always – they deeply understand global antisemitism and assess that it doesn't matter what they do, antisemitism will already do its work for them?

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With the renewal of the wave of refusal – described in sanitized language as "ceasing volunteering" – it's important to recall the long-standing discourse that has taken place here regarding the issue of refusal.

"Who will they listen to, their commander or their rabbi?" This question has been asked for many years, in hundreds of opinion columns in the press, in academic research papers and books, at conferences and seminars.

Regardless of the answers given, the components of the equation in the question were clear. The IDF commander represented the state, the elected government, rule of law, and especially statehood. On the other side were religious-nationalist soldiers and officers, seen as potential refusers. The question contained a clear message that there's a social group – religious nationalists – with a constant, permanent potential for refusal. And of course, there are important rabbinical authorities with the potential to instruct and make halakhic rulings for large segments of religious nationalists who follow them.

Amir Oren, a columnist for Haaretz, once seriously asked what would happen if Yoram Cohen, the kippah-wearing head of the Shin Bet, received an instruction from the prime minister that contradicted guidance from his rabbi. This reflects ignorance.

The combination of ignorance and anti-religious sentiment that characterizes the discourse was provided in the past, how could it not be, mainly by the newspaper Haaretz. For example, there was a time when Yoram Cohen, the former head of the Shin Bet who wears a kippah, was practically persecuted for his religiosity. Amir Oren, a columnist for Haaretz, seriously asked what would happen if Cohen received an instruction from the prime minister that contradicted guidance from his rabbi. There are quite a few ignorant people who believe that every religious person has a rabbi, and not only that, but that religious people receive regular instructions in all areas of life from their rabbi. According to that imagined reality, for example, a brigade commander who graduated from the pre-military academy, now approaching his 40th year, is a potential suspect. Why? He is perceived as connected through some religious communication network to instructions from the academy's rabbi. Many believe in this imagined reality even today.

Such a question about dual authorities was almost never asked regarding left-wing refusal. It was never described as relying on instructions from external authorities like rabbis. Left-wing refusal was accompanied by beautiful, lofty words like conscience, humanity, and other noble values that supposedly justified the refusal.

However, in the wave of refusal before the war, something unprecedented in scope occurred. The rabbinical authority in the question has now been replaced by senior academics, including ethics and morality experts, and especially former senior security establishment officials, who gave a sort of supposed professional and moral validity. The support of many of them for mass cessation of volunteering, along with the weakness shown by the then-defense minister and chief of staff, led to a willingness to genuinely harm operational readiness.

All this was possible because at a deeper level, there's a reason why the question "Who will they listen to?" was asked specifically about religious nationalists, mostly by those identified with their political opponents. From the questioners' perspective, the commander in the question represented the state, rule of law, the elected government, and statehood only under a very specific condition. The condition was that the policy included evacuating settlements and withdrawing from territories under Israeli control. Only then was the commander the good representative of statehood versus the potentially bad refusers.

When this condition is met, the fact that this policy is completely opposite and contrary to what was promised in elections no longer matters. And if this is the policy, there's even a moral obligation to protect the prime minister like an etrog, even from possible criminal charges. And, of course, it doesn't matter at all that the government relies on a tiny majority of 61 Knesset members, since even the smallest possible majority is still a majority in a democracy. It doesn't even matter if this majority was achieved by the narrowest of margins. Recently, it became clear that if the policy is to withdraw, even a transitional government can do so without needing to bring the agreement to the Knesset. And these are clearly irreversible decisions.

Now, some of the refusers dare to speak in the name of defending democracy and statehood. The chief of staff's firm policy of discharging every refuser from the IDF reflects an appropriate state policy that isn't conditional statehood.

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People experiencing major historical events rarely comprehend their ultimate outcome or their profound impact on future generations. Many might not even recognize they're living through history in the making. When the Hasmonean revolt began, nothing suggested it would lead to the establishment of the Hasmonean kingdom and nearly eight decades of political independence – the last such period until Israel's founding in the 20th century.

When the Hasmonean uprising erupted in 167 BCE in response to Antiochus's religious persecution, none of Mattathias' sons could have predicted how the revolt would unfold – not in the immediate term, and certainly not in the years to follow. Their military triumphs over the Seleucid armies defied all odds. Though Judah Maccabee commanded only a small force against larger, professionally trained armies, victories mounted steadily.

During their early successes against Apollonius, their triumph over Seron at Beth Horon, and the decisive win against Gorgias at Emmaus, Judah's warriors likely never imagined they were forging a religious legacy that would resonate through Jewish history. The Temple's purification and miracle of the cruse of oil occurred roughly three and a half years after the initial uprising.

Yet even after the Temple's rededication – which would establish Hanukkah's lasting date – the Maccabees likely couldn't foresee the sweeping changes ahead. Much like today's resurgent antisemitism, the Maccabees' successes triggered hostility and anti-Jewish sentiment among neighboring peoples where Jews lived as minorities.

The Maccabees soon found themselves launching defensive campaigns to protect Jewish communities across Edom, Jordan, Gilad, and the Galilee. Like Israel today, they had to divide their forces across multiple fronts. Through these efforts, the Hasmonean kingdom gradually emerged.

"Israel now finds itself in the middle, or perhaps only at the start, of a historic transformation many describe as biblical in scale. While we sense its magnitude, recent months have shown how unpredictable such moments can be, even in the shortest timeframe – a mere blink in historical terms. Just three months ago, the landscape looked entirely different: Hezbollah maintained its command structure under Hassan Nasrallah, Iran held its land bridge to Lebanon through Syria, and Yahya Sinwar, who orchestrated the Oct. 7, 2023 atrocities, remained at large.

Behind these forces stood a superpower led by a democratic administration, with many members hostile to Israel, primarily concerned with preventing a decisive Israeli victory. No one could have predicted our current position after such dramatic shifts across all fronts.

In this brief period, we've seen Nasrallah and Sinwar eliminated, front-line connections severed, Hezbollah and Hamas leadership structures critically weakened, Assad's regime collapse, Iran's land corridor cut, and Israel establish a security zone in Syria. In Washington, the most pro-Israel Republican administration in history prepares to take office. While an Israeli strike on Iran seemed uncertain months ago, now it's simply a matter of when.

We're living through a historical watershed whose outcome remains unknown. It is our duty to transform this moment into a historic turning point that will profoundly and positively shape generations to come.

Happy Hanukkah.

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The hysterical headlines are true: Israeli democracy is indeed in danger, but not in the way the Left makes it seem. Democracy is not in danger of religious "fascists" and "fundamentalists," but rather lawmakers who adopt such rhetoric every time a right-wing government is elected into power.

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We have often heard such warnings over the years, but in the last few days – as Prime Minister-elect Benjamin Netanyahu is nearing the establishment of a government – they have begun bordering on incitement and outright rebellion.

The Left adopted the "democracy is in danger" slogan even before the establishment of the state. In the 1930s, Ze'ev Jabotinsky was likened to Hitler and Revisionist Zionism to Nazi policies. In the 1950s, when Menachem Begin's Herut faction was moderate, the Left incessantly warned of the danger of the "fascist" Right. This did not cease even when Likud came to power and did not change the public administration of the previous government and even carried out policies of surrendering territories in exchange for peace, including the evacuation of settlements.

The discourse of incitement against the Right and the religious bloc is often conducted in complete contrast to reality, and perhaps the current cases might have been overlooked had they not bordered on outright delegitimization of the incoming government.

"We will continue to stand firm even in the face of the thunder and lightning that can be heard and seen at this time," said President of the Supreme Court Esther Hayut, as if weighing the ties between the government and the authorities was not a legitimate democratic process.

And how can Hayut, who is supposed to understand what democracy is, claim that 2.4 million votes for the right-wing bloc are "lighting and thunder"?

As for outgoing Prime Minister Yair Lapid, he has a short, but rich history of a lack of basic understanding of democracy. Most recently, he urged municipalities to boycott the incoming government, claiming it "abandoned the education of our children." What else could be expected from a lawmaker belonging to the same camp that cries wolf on democracy whenever the Right is in power?

Tel Aviv Mayor Ron Huldai too has claimed that Israel is becoming a fascist theocracy and called for a boycott of the government, even suggesting a civil rebellion.

The democratic Right, which has the right to implement its policies, must remain steadfast in the face of the inciting anti-democratic Left that is inciting rebellion.

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This claim is proof of the status of Zionism as the utmost principle and the very essence of the existence of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people. This claim, that even the nationalist camp is supported by anti-Zionists in order to justify partnership with the Joint Arab List, is proof by proxy that this is an inappropriate measure in principle. If the nationalist camp can deviate from the Zionist principle and rely on the ultra-Orthodox, then the left can rely on the Joint Arab List.

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This comparison, which puts the resistance to Zionism by ultra-Orthodox and by Arabs on the same level is, in the same context, foolish, shallow and ridiculous. Indeed, the vast majority of the ultra-Orthodox leadership fought against Zionism as an idea and as a movement among Jews up until statehood. Agudat Yisrael was founded in 1912 as an organization of ultra-Orthodox groups whose common denominator was opposition to Zionism. In time, the opposition remained symbolic in principle but waned on the practical level.

Yet even during the peak of this historical, protracted struggle, it was obvious that these were struggles and disagreements between movements inside the Jewish people. The existence of a national loop was clear, even if the definition of national was open to acute and profound controversy. In other words, the Jews, as a nation with clear affiliations, waged an internal struggle over the content of Jewish identity and the proper ways of the Jewish people. The ultra-Orthodox advocated the principle that "our nation is only a nation by virtue of its Torah", i.e. that the sole root of Jewish identity is in adherence to the Torah and Halacha (Jewish law) through the Orthodox approach. The Zionists, in contrast, religious and secular alike, advocated nationalism in its modern form, i.e. the right and realization of self-determination of the Jewish people in their homeland.

None of this has any relevance to the Joint Arab List. Its representatives undermine the very basic principle of the right to self-determination for the Jewish people. They are the most ardent opponents of recognizing Israel as the Jewish nation-state, even within the framework of a possible agreement with the Palestinians.

They reject the principle of "two states for two peoples". As far as the Joint Arab List is concerned, the intention is one-and-a-half-states for the Palestinian people, with half a state for the Jewish people in the form of "Israel as a state for all its citizens". Some of them believe that the Jewish people are not a nation, but rather simply a religion, and thus negate their right to self-determination. These basic principles translate into corresponding behavioral patterns: Participating in a range of activities against the State of Israel in international forums, sometimes to the extent of supporting BDS; defaming Israel at every opportunity, support for persecution of senior officials at the International Criminal Court at the Hague; declarations of support and praise for terrorists, and so on.

Ruling out cooperation with the Joint Arab List is not racist as they try to claim. No one would reject cooperation with the Joint Arab List solely based on its Arab membership if their modus operandi really was akin to that of the ultra-Orthodox. The ultra-Orthodox, with all their principled opposition to Zionism, came to terms with it on a practical level a long time ago, and advocate for the social, cultural and religious preservation of ultra-Orthodox society within Israel as a Jewish nation-state, most of whose values and character they oppose. The Joint Arab List's representatives, in contrast, remind us again and again of how much they hope for the annulment of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

Israel is the state of 100% of its citizens and the 100% are entitled to enjoy its benefits in general and democracy in particular. However, it is the nation state of only 80 percent of its citizens, and it is not the nation state of the 20 percent of its citizens who are not affiliated with the Jewish nation. Not only are the ultra-Orthodox part of the national majority, they are not mobilized like the Joint Arab List is around the basic principle of annulling Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people.

The essence of Zionism is founded on the principle that only the Jewish people can express their self-definition in Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people. Opposition to this principle is of course allowed under the right of freedom of speech and freedom of political organization, as is commonplace in democracy. Forming a majority coalition that relies on the Joint Arab List means relying on a political element that fundamentally denies the essence of Israel's existence.

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A defeat for the Right, even though it is a majority, is usually caused by three factors, all together or independently: First, voting for parties that do not pass the electoral threshold, such as voting for Otzma Yehudit; second, low voter turnout compared to the Left; and finally, many right-wing voters tempted to vote for momentary centrist parties or for right-wingers who have placed themselves as a minority in left-wing parties, just like the representatives of the Telem party in the Blue and White faction.

Between April and September, it was believed that voter turnout would fall due to the repeat elections. There were even calls to boycott the vote in protest. Moti Sklar, for example, who held senior positions in the Israeli media, claimed that "it's time to raise our voices and declare a voter mutiny." As far as I can recall, such calls were not heard on the Left, who believe in the motto, "Anything but Bibi".

The minor spike of about 1.5% in voter turnout between April and September can be misleading. What contributed to it mostly were Arab voters, whose turnout rose from 50% to 60% in September. They were joined by Shas and United Torah Judaism voters, who also saw small spikes in their strongholds, and we're talking about ultra-Orthodox voters who usually are not affected by fluctuations in the general public.

The nationalist camp should be concerned about what is going on in the Likud and religious-Zionist strongholds. Although there was no turnout change in these areas between April and September, it was still low at only 65%, compared to 72% in Blue and White strongholds.

Is it inevitable? Recent history shows it is not. Let us go back and recall a battle that seemed lost, on the eve of the 2015 elections against the Zionist Union. One of the reasons the Likud won was the dramatic change in turnout. In all types of polling stations, the turnout rose on the 2013 figures, but in the Likud strongholds, there was a significant spike of almost 6%, from about 66% to around 72%. The gap between the Likud and Zionist Union areas dropped to 2%, which proves that in Likud strongholds one can narrow the gap that exists today between both types of strongholds. A similar narrowing over the next few days and a hike of 5% in Likud strongholds (more is even better, of course), could get two more seats for the Likud.

National-religious voters are in an even worse state. This is a group that consistently votes at the highest rates in the country, higher than the ultra-Orthodox. The classic national religious areas have always seen a turnout of over 80%. However, between April and September, these strongholds saw the largest relative decrease, of nearly 3%. The settlements of Elkana and Beit El were amongst the top 10 communities with the largest drops in turnout between the two election cycles. Even though it's a small decrease, sometimes that small drop is exactly what's missing in order to secure those critical seats for the bloc.

Knesset elections are not like choosing a life partner or friends. For most voters, elections are a lesser evil. Right-wingers should think about the future consequences of their vote. And the only absolute, relevant consequence is the formation of a right-wing government or a left-wing government. Therefore, voting for allegedly the most right-wing party, Jewish Power, which will not pass the threshold, is a vote for the Left. Period. Staying at home due to apathy or some kind of protest against the other candidate you do not like will give more weight to the Left, and therefore constitute a vote for the Left.

Right-wingers must not think that if they do not come to the polling stations they are not voting. They are indeed voting. For the Left. Right-wingers, get over your apathy, and get out and vote.

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Those in favor of raising the minimum threshold make a few arguments: First, that it would force parties to form larger alliances to make it past the threshold. Second, that instead of factions that are politically close to each other emphasizing the differences between them, they could form intra-party alliances that would moderate each group's positions. Finally, they argue that small parties would not be able to threaten to split ranks because they are worried about passing the minimum threshold. The resulting reduction to the number of parties would reduce the rifts in the Knesset, thereby increasing governability, they argue.

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These arguments lay out a causal relationship between several different factors, even though that relationship does not necessarily exist, and reflect the view that changing the system would necessarily lead to changes in society and its leadership.

The idea of raising the minimum threshold is often characterized as an attempt to increase the power of the big parties at the expense of the small ones. But enormous changes have taken place in the party system, without the minimum threshold being changed at all. With the same small minimum threshold in place, we transitioned in the 1980s from having one big, dominant party to having two large parties. Demographic, cultural, and political changes all played important parts in that change. On the other hand, even though the minimum threshold has been raised by increments since the 1990s, the big parties aren't anywhere near 40 seats.

Another goal of raising the minimum threshold is to reduce the number of factions in the Knesset. Some people get confused between factions made up of multiple parties, and parties. Indeed, nine factions made it into the Knesset in this election – but they include 20 parties. The Joint Arab List includes four different parties, while the Blue and White, Democratic Union, and Yamina lists each comprise three parties. Anyone who thinks that raising the minimum threshold would do anything to reduce the fractured leadership in the Knesset got a reminder this week that it would not, when the Balad party broke rank with the rest of the Joint Arab List and did not recommend that President Reuven Rivlin charge Benny Gantz with forming a government.

The "effective number of parties" provides an "adjusted number" of political parties in a given country's party system by counting the parties and weighting that count by the parties' relative strength. Paradoxically, the April election saw a relatively low level of parliamentary divisiveness, according to the effective number of parties, compared to the elections that preceded it. So what happened? 2009 and 2015, which saw the highest levels of splitting, each saw two different governments in a four-year period. In April, despite the low divisiveness, a government was not formed. The reasons for that lie in our political culture and leadership and do not necessarily stem from the number of factions.

The April election showed us to what extent matters of stability and the ability to form a government are not tied to a high minimum threshold. The opposite – the high threshold is what caused that impasse. Let's assume for a minute that that minimum threshold had been lower, and three parties that were kept out by the threshold had been represented in the Knesset – the New Right, Zehut, and Gesher. If that had happened, the votes for these parties would not have been cast in vain, voters would have been represented, and a large right-wing bloc would have been formed that reflected the will of the public. More importantly, most of the partners in that hypothetical coalition would not have been able to threaten the majority. Despite the prevailing perception, small parties don't pose a threat to stability – the mid-size parties do, and a much bigger one. See "Avigdor Lieberman."

Since the inception of the state of Israel, society has developed while taking pains to ensure that the parliamentary system represents small factions, too. That is the only way that everyone will feel part of the system and give it legitimacy. This is an echo of the culture of Jewish debate, which even in the Talmud took care to protect minority, even lone, opinions. It's time to lower the minimum electoral threshold.

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