One of the challenges facing Israel's new government is the potential for the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, bringing about a deterioration in the security situation.

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PA leader Mahmoud Abbas seems unable to rule effectively, i.e., to maintain a modicum of law and order in the territories under his control. He lost Gaza to Hamas in 2007, and we now see the "Lebanonization" of the PA taking place in the West Bank: the emergence of a myriad of armed groups, with some displaying only limited loyalty to the PA, and others, especially the Islamists, trying to undermine the current regime.

In addition, a deteriorating economic situation, resulting from years of declining international aid, unsustainable public patronage and questionable fiscal policies have pushed the Palestinian government and banking sector to the brink of insolvency, further eroding the PA's authority and legitimacy. The PA also increasingly fails to provide basic governance, leading to a widespread Palestinian perception of the ruling elite as corrupt and authoritarian.

We may well see the breakdown of the PA into various sectors, effectively ruled by new local barons who maintain a monopoly over arms in their fiefdoms. The PA may become a "failed state." A violent succession struggle following the death of Abbas only enhances the probability of such a scenario.

The premise of the "two-state solution" (2SS) paradigm was that given the opportunity, the Palestinians would be able to establish a state and prevent terrorism against Israel, similar to Egypt and Jordan. Yitzhak Rabin hoped for a Palestinian state that "without the Supreme Court and B'Tzelem" on its back could govern effectively, while Israelis were led to believe that the Palestinians could establish a Palestinian entity that would have good neighborly relations with Israel. That did not work very well.

Yasser Arafat and his successor, Abbas, were unwilling to confront the armed opposition groups (Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad) that continued to engage in terror against Israel. They refrained from engaging in a civil war to secure the monopoly over the use of force, the required feature of a modern state. This avoidance led to the emergence of two Palestinian entities (Gaza and the West Bank) and the potential for further fragmentation.

Moreover, the PA does not show any inclination to compromise on its maximalist goals and live peacefully next to Israel. It still demands the division of Jerusalem, the return of numerous Palestinian refugees to Israel and a withdrawal to the 1967 borders. Its education system and media continue propagating tremendous hostility toward Jews while blaming Israel for all Palestinian problems. Security cooperation with Israel primarily concerns apprehending armed activists of the Islamist opposition, as the PA often turns a blind eye to terrorist activities against Israel.

A desire on Israel's part to prevent the anarchy of a failed state – the primary motivation to save and strengthen the PA – is understandable. Nevertheless, Israel should remember its limited capability for political engineering beyond its borders. Moreover, that the Palestinians can change and behave reasonably, or that a vigorous PA benefits Israel, are questionable.

In short, Abbas and his coterie are part of the problem, not of the solution. Jerusalem should thus think twice about promoting efforts to preserve PA rule and prevent a descent into chaos while rejecting the reoccupation of the West Bank.

Chaos is indeed not a pleasant prospect. Chaos in the territories poses a security problem to Israel, but one that will be mitigated if the various Palestinian militias vying for influence compete with each other. A succession struggle following the death of Abbas could divert attention from fighting hated Israel and prevent coordination in the low-intensity conflict against Israel. In addition, anarchy in the territories may give Israel a freer hand in dealing with the terrorists.

Furthermore, chaos might ultimately yield positive results. The collapse of the PA will weaken the Palestinian national movement, which heretofore has been a source of endemic violence and is a recipe for regional instability in the future. The PA has supported the policies of radical regimes such as Iran. It is also thoroughly anti-American. Moreover, it threatens at least two "status quo" states, Israel and Jordan.

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The collapse of the PA and the failure of the Palestinian national movement to establish a decent state might reduce the appetite of the Palestinians for an independent entity. The disintegration of the PA would be a public relations debacle for the Palestinians and reduce their appeal among naïve Europeans and Israel-bashers worldwide. The dysfunctional character of the Palestinian political entity would become apparent to all and elicit a more robust understanding of Israeli fears over the destructive implications of Palestinian nationalism.

Moreover, disorder in the territories could be the incentive for fresh thinking on the Palestinian issue, both on the part of the Palestinians and elsewhere. More chaos in the Palestinian-ruled territories might open up new opportunities to stabilize the situation. The disappointment of the PA falling apart could bring a more realistic and conciliatory leadership to the forefront.

The internecine violence of the previous intifada led to the acceptance of the 1991 Madrid Conference formula – an indication of growing political realism among the Palestinians. The failed PA experiment could be an additional factor to a more politically mature body politic. For example, the Palestinians in Gaza may ask the Egyptians to return, while in the West Bank, the rule of the Hashemites may look increasingly favorable compared with that of the PA

Despite the terror group's growing popularity, it is misleading to portray Hamas as the only alternative to the PA leadership. Indeed, Hamas rule in Gaza has not been a successful experiment; and the allure of Islamic radicalism is fading.

Chaos, as a temporary situation, is not necessarily the worst-case scenario. Israel should not shudder at the prospect of the PA taking a fall.

 Reprinted with permission from JNS.org.

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Prime Minister Yair Lapid has recently announced his vision at the United Nations for solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – the two-state solution.

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While many lauded Lapid, including President Joe Biden, a policy recommendation based on an illusion is unlikely to succeed. The idea that Jewish and Arab states will coexist peacefully is widespread in contemporary academic and political circles but ignores the reality on the ground.

Unfortunately, a stable and peaceful outcome per the two-state solution is unlikely to emerge soon for two reasons: the Palestinian Arab and the Zionist national movements are not close to reaching a historic compromise, and the Palestinians have proven themselves unable to build a state.

The two are too far apart when it comes to the core issues – Jerusalem, refugees, and borders – and bridging the differences appears impossible. Israel's positions have hardened since the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000 and the intermittent Palestinian terror after the Gaza Strip became a launching pad for thousands of missiles aimed at Israeli civilians after 2007.

At this juncture, Palestinian society, under the spell of a nationalist and Islamic ethos, is unable to reach a compromise with the Zionist movement. Recent polls (March 2022) show that two-thirds of the Palestinians say Israel is an apartheid state, and 73% believe the Koran contains a prophecy about the demise of the State of Israel. The current Palestinian education system and official media incite hatred of Jews, who are blamed for all Palestinian misfortunes.

Indeed, Palestinian rejectionism won the day whenever a concrete partition was on the agenda, such as the one offered by former Prime Minister Ehud Barak in 2000 or the one proposed by former premier Ehud Olmert in 2007. Even the "moderate" Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas rejects the idea that Israel should be a Jewish state. Any Palestinian state will be dissatisfied with its borders and intent on using force to attain its goals.

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Finally, the two dueling societies still have the energy to battle and, more significantly, to absorb the anguish required to achieve their respective political objectives. Nationalism inspires people to endure pain and hardship during national wars. Often, societal exhaustion – rather than an opportunity for an optimal compromise – ends protracted ethnic conflict. If pain is the most influential factor on the learning curve of societies, it seems that Israelis and Palestinians have not suffered enough to settle.

The sober realization that a Palestinian state will not live peacefully next to Israel refutes the first assumption of the two-state solution paradigm.

The second assumption of the two-state solution postulates that the Palestinian national movement would accomplish this goal, given the opportunity to build a state. This assumption is also divorced from the current political reality.

The system's primary failure lay in the area most critical to state-building – a monopoly over the use of force. Indeed, the PA lost control of Gaza to Hamas and has continuous difficulties dismantling militias in the territory under its formal control. Noteworthy is that even Hamas has failed to acquire a monopoly over the use of force in Gaza, allowing armed organizations and clans to exist.

The expectations that the Palestinians will build a modern state soon, even with Western assistance, are naive. It took centuries to build nation-states in Europe. Except for Egypt, a historical entity possessing a level of political cohesion, attempts at state-building in the Middle East have only partially succeeded. Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen are all examples of political entities grappling with the problem of establishing central authority and modernity.

Unfortunately, not every protracted conflict has an immediately available solution. In the absence of a negotiated agreement, conflict management is the appropriate strategy for dealing with the Israel-Palestinian Arab dispute.

Such a strategy aims to minimize the cost of armed conflict and preserve freedom of political maneuvering. Its goal is also to buy time, hoping the future may bring better alternatives. The lack of a clear end goal is not inspiring, yet this may be the best way to deal with a complex situation.

Featured on jiss.org.il., this article was first published by jpost.com. 

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Turkey and Israel reestablishing diplomatic relations is a matter worth celebrating, although one should not expect ties to return to their honeymoon-like state like in the 1990s.

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Ankara has always been the one to determine the degree of closeness between the two countries. Israel, on the other hand, has shown a consistent willingness to have good ties with Turkey due to it being a regional power.

It is one of the three largest countries in the Middle East, sits on a strategic bridge between Europe and Asia, and has the second-largest NATO military – after the United States – equipped with the best of US weapons.

The Turkish economy is among the 20 largest in the world and the country possesses an impressive industrial capacity. Ankara seeks to be the leader of the Muslim world and Jerusalem wants to have good ties with it to dim the religious aspect of the conflict with the Arab world.

The renewal of ties comes at a time of economic and political hardship in Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's monetary policy and the tourism crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic have caused an economic crisis. Ankara saw an opportunity to become an energy bridge to Europe through a gas pipeline running from Israel. Reconciliation with Israel Jerusalem and the recognition of the Abrahamic Accords also helped gratify wealthy Gulf states and receive financial aid from them.

In addition, this new attitude toward Israel also reduces tensions with the US, which brokered and supports the Abraham Accords. Furthermore, the Biden administration is more critical of Turkey than its predecessor, and Israel – a close US ally – may mitigate some of that criticism.

By improving ties with Israel, Turkey is also trying to weaken its cooperation with rivals Greece and Cyprus with whom Ankara has ongoing disputes and security tensions. Furthermore, since the civil war and instability in Iraq, Turkey has used the port of Haifa and the passage to Jordan to export goods into the Arab world.

And yet, despite the economic dependence and Ankara's change of tone, we must remember that as long as Islamist Erdogan is in power, Turkey will continue to be hostile toward Israel and support the Hamas terror group. It will also be difficult for Israel to accept Islamist Turkey with its Ottoman impulses in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

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In recent years, Cyprus, Greece and Israel have significantly intensified their political, energy and military relations.

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The political leaders of the three countries meet regularly. They coordinate their energy policies, particularly on the gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean. In addition, they founded the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), including Egypt, Italy, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. This became a regional cooperation platform for developing natural gas fields in the Mediterranean.

Moreover, the three states conduct various military exercises that hone their capabilities. Additional interactions in other areas cement this alignment, which is of political and strategic consequence. For example, it contributed to Turkey's policy change towards the Abraham Accords and Israel.

A more coherent common foreign policy agenda is needed to enhance the strategic significance of the Athens-Jerusalem-Nicosia partnership. The first item on the agenda is better coordination in Washington to sensitize the United States to regional realities, because the US does not seem to have a coherent policy on this region.

Washington is obsessed with human rights in its approach to Egypt, the most important Arab state. In Libya, it tilts toward Islamist elements. The apex of strategic shortsightedness was the cancellation of US support for the EastMed pipeline (for supposed environmental reasons) that was planned to begin providing energy to Europe a few weeks before the Russia-Ukraine war, precipitating an energy crisis.

The Biden administration needs to focus its approach to the region. As the US turns its attention to China for understandable reasons, the eastern Mediterranean region will get even less American attention. However, rising energy prices might slow the American departure from the larger Middle East.

This period should be capitalized on to secure a better American understanding of the value of Cyprus, Greece and Israel's trilateral alignment. President Joe Biden's upcoming visit to Israel is an opportunity to enhance this understanding.

The second item on the common agenda regards Egypt, a member of the EMGF and a historical rival of Turkey. Greece and Cyprus have already promoted military relations with Egypt in the face of security threats and in order to defend their interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

Yet Egypt is reluctant to join the Hellenic alignment with Israel, despite the significant improvement in Cairo-Jerusalem relations. Efforts toward integrating Egypt into the configuration are needed because Egyptian participation could be highly beneficial to all parties.

The third issue is Turkey, a revisionist power animated by neo-Ottoman and Islamist impulses. It has moderated its behavior for various reasons, but as long as Recep Tayyip Erdogan is its leader, the potential for mischief is great.

Yet the US exit from the region and a weakened Russia confer greater freedom of action to Turkey (and other regional powers). The Russia-Ukraine war underscored the strategic importance of Turkey's location. Moreover, the US will hesitate to pressure Ankara in order to avoid pushing it into Russian hands. These developments could encourage Turkish adventurism. Containing Turkey will continue to be a significant challenge.

A fourth issue relates to the new West Asia Quad grouping of the United States, India, Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). New Delhi is attempting to build an alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road initiative by linking India to the Mediterranean via the UAE and Israel.

Such an endeavor will endear its participants to Washington. Israel, the UAE and the Hellenic nations should promote this alternative. Furthermore, establishing this Quad will strengthen the Abraham Accords, which are young and fragile. The people of the Gulf have not yet internalized the inherent advantages of recognizing the Jewish state. Moreover, the Abraham Accords are contingent upon Israel making good on the expectation that it will end the Iranian threat.

Ukraine reminded us that war is still a policy option even in Europe, and the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East are more bellicose regions than Europe.

Alas, international law and guarantees have proved ineffective in preventing predatory states from aggression. This is no surprise to those who understand the essentially chaotic nature of the international system, where there is no international policeman to maintain law and order.

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This means that states belonging to the Athens-Jerusalem-Nicosia alignment must prepare for war without illusions. While intra-alignment relations should be strengthened, it is worth remembering that this is not an alliance. Israel should be the model and its self-reliance doctrine must be emulated. Each state should invest in defense and enhance military capabilities and deterrence. Weakness always invites aggression.

Implementing this agenda is a national security imperative for the alignment, and the US should actively promote it. Moreover, the US could provide a modicum of stability in a bad neighborhood. Athens and Jerusalem, the founders of Western civilization, should show the way for the rest of the world.

Featured on JNS.org, this article was originally published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

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Turkey's regional policies have led to its increasing isolation, and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's monetary policies have led to a deteriorating economy. Ankara is currently trying to mend its ties with regional powers, including Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

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On Feb. 3, Erdogan announced that he would host Israeli President Isaac Herzog for an official visit to Turkey in mid-March. Erdogan also claimed Israel was interested in restoring diplomatic ties, noting that Prime Minister Naftali Bennett maintains "a positive approach." Erdogan's comments followed other, similar signals to Jerusalem. These included the release of two Israeli tourists detained on suspicion of espionage in November after two weeks in prison. Herzog and Bennett each called Erdogan separately to thank him.

In addition, in January, Erdogan called Herzog to offer his condolences on the death of his mother. A week later, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu called his Israeli counterpart Yair Lapid to inquire about his health after the latter had recovered from the coronavirus. This was the first conversation between Turkish and Israeli foreign ministers in almost a decade. Similarly, Israeli universities have been contacted by Turkish universities.

While Turkey maintains robust trade with Israel, Erdogan has harshly criticized Israel on the Palestinian issue, with remarks bordering on anti-Semitism. Meanwhile, his country continues to host Hamas terrorists.

Energy concerns are at the top of the Turkish agenda in its drive for rapprochement with Israel. Turkey is mainly dependent on energy imports from Russia and Iran and needs to diversify its energy sources. Therefore, Turkey wants Israel's gas reservoirs for domestic use and export to Europe, strengthening its energy-hub status.

Moreover, Israeli gas could generate revenue for the struggling Turkish economy, particularly ahead of the upcoming elections. Furthermore, a pipeline from Israel to Turkey via Cyprus is the optimal solution economically and practically, though Cyprus's approval might be needed.

After the United States withdrew its support for the expensive and technologically problematic EastMed pipeline, which was to move gas from Israel and Cyprus to Europe via Greece, Turkey hopes Israel could be tempted to ignore strategic considerations and place its gas faucet in Turkish hands.

Furthermore, Ankara faces an unfriendly US administration under President Biden. Turks have always believed that Israel and its lobby can influence American foreign policy. Therefore, improving relations with Israel could be helpful in the American arena.

Better relations with Washington are more needed than before as Russia, a historical rival of Turkey, is becoming increasingly assertive. Moreover, the Ukraine crisis underscores the difficult Turkish position as it attempts to balance its NATO membership with its efforts to distance itself from the West.

A clear Turkish rationale for better relations with Israel is to dissolve or weaken the strategic partnership between Jerusalem, Greece and Cyprus. As a result of Turkish hostility, the security cooperation among this triangle was strengthened considerably. Israel should resist efforts to weaken it.

This bloc was joined by Egypt and the UAE, pursuing complementary policies in the eastern Mediterranean on energy, exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and Libya, to the chagrin of Turkey. To a great extent, Israel is the linchpin of this alignment.

The closer relations between the UAE and Turkey may be additional input in the Turkish moves toward Israel. The UAE wants Turkey to stop its vocal criticism of the Abraham Accords between the Gulf sheikhdoms and Israel.

Turkey is interested in maintaining access to Jerusalem and its Islamic holy places. Ankara desires to increase its presence in Jerusalem to bolster its leadership in the Islamic world and prefers to minimize Israeli opposition to its activities in the city.

Israeli governments have always sought good relations with Turkey. However, the deterioration in relations was primarily the result of a significant reorientation in Turkish foreign policy under the ruling Islamist AK Party. While an Islamist Turkey is likely to remain a geopolitical rival, Israel should respond positively to Ankara's overtures and clarify its positions in its negotiations with Turkey before Herzog's visit.

First, Israel's president should be treated with complete respect. There are rumors in the Turkish media that Erdogan plans to meet Herzog not at the presidential palace but at a lesser venue. This would be a sign of disrespect.

Second, Israel should expect Turkey to adopt a more nuanced policy on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Turkey should refrain from opposing the Abraham Accords and cooperating with Hamas and other terrorist entities. Turkey should evict the Hamas terrorist leadership from its territory.

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Third, Israel should seek the cancellation of Turkey's November 2019 memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA), which purports to determine new EEZ boundaries. The Turkey-Libya MoU effectively drew a dividing line between the eastern and western parts of the Mediterranean, threatening maritime security, natural gas exploration, and new infrastructures such as the EastMed pipeline or an electricity cable from Israel or Egypt to a European destination.

Fourth, Israel should aim to establish clear limitations on Turkish activities in Jerusalem that undermine its sovereignty.

Finally, better bilateral relations should lead Turkey to end its obstructive role in Israel-NATO relations.

Turkey recognizes Israel as an important regional power and should accommodate Israeli expectations if it wishes to pursue rapprochement. It fully understands that reciprocity is needed.

This article was first published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

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It remains unclear whether the crisis in Ukraine has come to an end. We can nevertheless predict its far-reaching repercussions. US President Joe Biden's administration represents a liberal worldview that advocates for democracy and diplomacy in conflict resolution. The US is tired of war and has largely refrained from threatening the use of power against Russia. Russian President Vladmir Putin, by contrast, will not hesitate to use military force to improve his country's security situation.

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Russia is scared of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's and the EU's approach toward its borders. It is concerned by the West's encouragement of color revolutions – political changes across the post-communist world – in Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia.

The West's democratic crusade spooked Russia, which was not invited to join NATO and was not consulted on the fate of neighboring countries. Out of concern for its security, Russia has stationed many soldiers on the Ukrainian border, while issuing threats, to draw US attention to its demands. Indeed, the threatened use of force made the US finally engage in talks with Russia to clarify Moscow's security concerns.

As noted by the historian Thucydides, fear is a basic and powerful instinct and a cause of war. Human nature is also motivating Russia's leader, who is interested in broad security margins for his borders. The sequence of events is no surprise, especially after Russia swallowed the Crimean Peninsula and encouraged separatism in Eastern Ukraine.

Russian concerns are reasonable given past invasions from the West. Similar similarities sensitivities resulted in the Monroe Doctrine, which saw a military presence in the Western Hemisphere as a threat to the US.

The Ukraine crisis serves as a reminder of diplomacy's limitations. The US and its European allies encouraged Russia by going back on their commitment to require diplomacy and diplomacy only to resolve the crisis. But diplomacy that is not backed up by credible military ability is ineffective.

The crisis is the US's first international test since the withdrawal from Afghanistan. The US is in no rush to involve its military in the crisis and has thus far threatened economic sanctions. The world is observing Washington's conduct and sees a weak administration that confirms the decline of American power. The Americans could surprise and use force as they have in the past. This, however, appears highly unlikely, and the perception of reality dictates behavior.

The crisis is rattling Europe. Is the NATO alliance capable of deterring Russia, at a time when it remains uncertain whether the organization will survive the internal divisions over the crisis? Despite the talk of a "European military" and "strategic autonomy," Europe still needs an American security umbrella to deal more assertively with Russia, which is also its main energy provider.

The US conduct during the crisis also impacts the nuclear talks in Vienna. Tehran, which is already convinced the US is weak, can drag things out until they are offered the kind of deal they are interested in signing. Iran can sic its emissaries in the Middle East on US allies. Israel could reach the conclusion that it would be better off avoiding coordinating its policies with Washington before using force. In addition, a Russian victory in Europe could expedite flare-ups in the Middle East.

For Israel, there are other lessons to be learned. The situation in Ukraine proves once again the futility of Western guarantees. The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances signed by the Russian Federation, the UK, and the US in 1994 provided guarantees for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in return for their renouncing nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the memorandum was violated when Russia conquered Crimea in 2014, and it is now once again clear that such guarantees are invalid.

International institutions had similar failures. The US called for a meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the stationing of Russian troops on Ukraine's borders even though it knew Russia had the power to veto the move. Discussions on the issue ended in vocal confrontations.

Despite the liberal dialogue in the West, Israel must remember we are still living in a world where every country can only rely on itself.

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Shortly after the Abraham Agreements were signed, then-US President Donald Trump announced that a fourth Arab country – Morocco – would soon establish full diplomatic ties with Israel as well. In return, Washington would recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.

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Although Morocco sent forces to fight against Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War and 1973 Yom Kippur War, it has in recent years emerged as a moderate Arab state when it comes to the Jewish state. The two nations have cooperated in various fields, especially on security and intelligence. And contrary to many other Arab countries, Morocco has treated its Jewish community with tolerance.

The normalization agreement was signed in December 2020, with economic and diplomatic cooperation as well as direct flights between Rabat and Tel Aviv to follow. Israel is a hot commodity in the world due to its impressive achievements in agriculture, medicine, water engineering, communications, and cybersecurity – all of which can benefit Morocco.

In November, Defense Minister Benny Gantz visited Morocco and signed a cooperation agreement that will foster ongoing military dialogue, defense procurement, and the exchange of intelligence between the two countries. The visit itself, which received wide media coverage in Morocco and abroad, is proof that ties between Jerusalem and Rabat are growing stronger.

Morocco plays an important role globally, and the Middle East and Africa in particular. Its royal family claim to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, which gives it a certain influence among Arab countries. Rabat normalizing ties with Jerusalem will pave the way for other Arab countries to do the same.

It seems the time is right for Israeli-Moroccan ties to flourish. But we should bear in mind that these relations are under heavy criticism by extremists in Morocco, and internal political changes may bring the honeymoon to an end.

We must not forget that instability is a hallmark in any such relationship. If Israel fails to halt Iran's nuclear progress, the pro-Israel trends in the region will disappear. The Iranian threat is what prompted these Arab countries to openly normalize ties with Israel. The absence of Israeli action will take away from the achievement that is the Abraham Accords, including ties with Morocco.

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When Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett meets Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first time (Oct. 22 in Sochi), he must break free of some of his American baggage and approach Putin in realpolitik fashion.

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As background to this meeting, it is important to recall several important historical facts. Israel and Russia are about to mark the 30th anniversary of the resumption of relations between them. Bennett should mention in his conversation with Putin that the Jewish People have a moral debt to Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), which fought fiercely against the Nazis during World War II. The Red Army liberated many Jews from Nazi death camps. Bennett also should acknowledge that the Soviet Union voted in favor of the establishment of the State of Israel at the United Nations in 1947 (it did so primarily to push Britain out of the region), and that it enabled the transfer of weapons from Czechoslovakia to Israel during Israel's War of Independence.

This sympathetic stance towards Israel was replaced by a distinctly pro-Arab orientation in the 1950s. The Soviet Union became the arms supplier for most Arab countries, and trained their armies, seeking influence in the Middle East at the expense of Western powers. In the wake of the 1967 Six-Day War, the Soviet Union led most Eastern bloc countries to sever diplomatic ties with Israel and consistently voted against Israel in all international institutions. Only after the end of the Cold War did Russia re-establish diplomatic relations with Israel and post an ambassador in Tel Aviv. Today's Russia is no longer the superpower that was the Soviet Union, but it still is a very important country. It has a large nuclear arsenal and does not hesitate to use force in foreign affairs (for example, in occupying Crimea). Moreover, it has a significant presence in the Middle East, a region that Russia views as its backyard.

Today, Russia sells arms to Egypt, Iran, Turkey and several other Arab countries. Egypt has purchased two Russian nuclear power reactors, which makes Egypt dependent on Russian nuclear fuel for several decades. In Syria, the Russian air force is fighting to preserve Bashar Assad's regime, proving to everyone that Russia does not abandon its allies – in contrast to the United States. Assad has rewarded Moscow by providing Russia with a naval base in Tartus and an airbase in Khmeimim. In general, Russia seeks to maintain good relations with all parties in the Middle East, including Iran and Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, as well as Turkey and Iraq.

Putin sees Israel as a strong country with impressive military capabilities, willing to use force in pursuit of its interests. He also acknowledges that Israel is a key US ally in the region, and even sees Israel as a potential tool for influence over the United States. A reflection of this was a trilateral meeting of national security advisers from the three countries, held in Israel in June 2019. The three senior officials discussed regional as well as bilateral and trilateral matters, another sign of Russia's desire to be considered a major power on par with the United States.

Unlike some of his compatriots, Putin has a positive attitude towards Jews (reportedly because of childhood experiences). Moreover, he regards the many Russian Jews in Israel as a Russian diaspora to be cultivated. Israel is the only country in the Middle East where Russian language and culture is vibrant.

In their first meeting, one assumes that Putin will seek to take Bennett's measure, and especially to compare him with his predecessor Benjamin Netanyahu, with whom Putin had a good working relationship. Filling Netanyahu's shoes is not easy, but Bennett has probably learned a few things from working closely with Israel's longest-serving prime minister.

It would be useful if Bennett broke free of some of his informal mannerisms and adopted realpolitik language in his conversation with Putin. This is the language that Putin understands well and is comfortable with. An attempt to speak in American liberal clichés is doomed to failure.

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The main meeting of Israeli and Russian interests is in Syria. Moscow wants to preserve the Assad regime. Russia understands that Israel has the power to rock the boat and undermine Assad's rule. Therefore, Russia has good reason to be sensitive to Israel's concerns about Iranian entrenchment in Syria. Like Israel, Moscow dislikes a strong Iranian influence in Damascus. This explains why, until now, Russia has allowed Israel to strike at Iranian targets in Syria. It is important that Bennett renew this quiet understanding.

However, Israel-Russia understandings on the Iranian nuclear issue should not be expected. Russia sees a strong Iran as a useful factor that weakens the regional status of the United States, which is Russia's main rival in the international arena.

Featured on JNS.org, this article was first published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

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When Prime Minister Naftali Bennett meets Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first time in Sochi on Oct. 22, he must break free of some of his American baggage and approach the Russian leader in realpolitik fashion.

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Israel and Russia are about to mark the 30th anniversary of the resumption of bilateral ties. Bennett should mention in his conversation with Putin that the Jewish people have a moral debt to Russia, formerly the Soviet Union, which fought fiercely against the Nazis during World War II. The Red Army liberated many Jews from Nazi death camps. Bennett also should acknowledge that the Soviet Union voted in favor of the establishment of the State of Israel at the United Nations in 1947 – primarily to push Britain out of the region – and that it enabled the transfer of weapons from Czechoslovakia to Israel during Israel's 1948 War of Independence.

This sympathetic stance towards Israel was replaced by a distinctly pro-Arab orientation in the 1950s. The Soviet Union became supplied arms to most Arab countries and trained their armies, seeking influence in the Middle East at the expense of Western powers. In the wake of the 1967 Six-Day War, the Soviet Union led most Eastern bloc countries to sever diplomatic ties with Israel and consistently voted against Israel in all international institutions. It was only after the end of the Cold War that Russia re-established diplomatic relations with Israel and posted an ambassador in Tel Aviv.

Today's Russia is no longer the superpower that was the Soviet Union, but it still is a very important country. It has a large nuclear arsenal and does not hesitate to use force in foreign affairs, for example, to occupy Crimea. Moreover, it has a significant presence in the Middle East, a region that Russia views as its backyard.

Today, Russia sells arms to Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and several other Arab states. Egypt has purchased two Russian nuclear power reactors, which makes Egypt dependent on Russian nuclear fuel for several decades. In Syria, Russia's air force is fighting to preserve President Bashar Assad's regime and prove that, unlike the US, Russia does not abandon its allies. Assad has rewarded Moscow by providing Russia with a naval base in Tartus and an airbase in Khmeimim. In general, Russia seeks to maintain good relations with all parties in the Middle East, including Iran, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, Turkey, and Iraq.

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Putin sees Israel as a strong country with impressive military capabilities that is willing to use force in pursuit of its interests. He also acknowledges that Israel is a key US ally in the region and even views Jerusalem as a potential tool for influence over the United States, as demonstrated by a tripartite meeting of national security advisers from the three countries, held in Israel in June 2019. The three senior officials discussed regional as well as bilateral and trilateral matters, another sign of Russia's desire to be considered a major power on par with the United States.

Unlike some of his compatriots, Putin has a positive attitude toward Jews, reportedly due to childhood experiences. Moreover, he regards the many Russian Jews in Israel as a Russian diaspora to be cultivated. Israel is the only Middle Eastern country where the Russian language and culture are vibrant.

In their first meeting, it is safe to assume Putin will seek to assess Bennett, in particular in comparison to his predecessor Benjamin Netanyahu, with whom the Russian leader had a good working relationship. Filling Netanyahu's shoes won't be easy, but Bennett has probably learned a few things from working alongside Israel's longest-serving prime minister.

Bennett would be wise to break free of some of his informal mannerisms and adopt realpolitik language in his conversation with Putin instead. This is the language Putin understands well and is comfortable with. An attempt to speak in American liberal clichés is doomed to failure.

Where Israeli and Russian interests truly coincide though is in Syria. Moscow wants to preserve the Assad regime. Russia understands that Israel has the power to rock the boat and undermine Assad's rule. Therefore, Russia has good reason to be sensitive to Israel's concerns about Iranian entrenchment in Syria. Like Israel, Moscow is opposed to a strong Iranian influence in Damascus. This explains why, until now, Russia has allowed Israel to strike at Iranian targets in Syria. It is important that Bennett renew this quiet understanding.

Nevertheless, Israel-Russia understandings on the Iranian nuclear issue should not be expected. Russia sees a strong Iran as a useful factor that weakens the regional status of the United States, which is Russia's main rival in the international arena.

Featured on JNS.org, this article was first published by The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

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Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi meet Israel's Prime Minister Naftali Bennett today at Sharm El Sheikh. Bennett's predecessor, Benyamin Netanyahu, was the last Israeli prime minister to make an official visit to Egypt, in 2011. The state visit, which involves a formal ceremony at the airport and press coverage, indicates that the Egyptian government is ready to work publicly with Israel's new government.

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Egypt broke the Arab taboo on relations with Israel when it signed a peace treaty in March 1979. Nevertheless, Egypt has been reluctant to implement "normalization" clauses in the peace treaty, keeping to a "cold peace" with Israel. Cairo has discouraged its citizens from interactions with Israelis. Until recently, when the government tone somewhat softened, it hardly changed the curriculum in the Egyptian education system regarding Israel. Government-controlled media has remained hostile and occasionally antisemitic. There has been some cooperation between the two countries in agriculture and energy, and for a while, Israeli tourists were welcome in Egypt. But the narrow bilateral ties primarily were conducted via military channels.

The Egyptian posture toward Israel seemed to signal the limits on relations with Israel for an Arab state. To a great extent, Jordan emulated the Egyptian positions (Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994). In contrast, the 2020 Abraham Accords constituted a dramatic change in approach, encouraging multi-faceted people-to-people interactions, particularly between the UAE and Israel.

The fanfare around the Abraham Accords, as well as the fact that Israel has a new prime minister, probably made it easier for Cairo to invite Bennett. So did the cumulative impact of enhanced covert security cooperation in recent years between Egypt and Israel. The two countries share a burgeoning common strategic agenda.

The 1979 peace treaty primarily was the result of then-Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's realization that Egypt needed a drastic change in its foreign policy, moving to a pro-American orientation instead of relying on the Soviet Union, coupled with weariness of the conflict with Israel. Egypt still is looking toward Washington and it needs Israel more than ever to deflect American and European criticism about human rights violations. Moreover, US assistance to Egypt of $1.3 billion a year has played an important role in Egypt's economic and military development, and this is linked to American assistance to Israel. While Egypt has tried to diversify its arms suppliers, Jerusalem has a clear interest in continuous American influence in Cairo.

Undoubtedly, Cairo and Jerusalem think alike about the Afghanistan debacle and the regional implications of American retreat from the Middle East, primarily the reinvigoration of Moslem extremists around the world.

At the regional level, Jerusalem and Cairo share a concern about Iran's aggressive policies, although Israel's threat perception is greater. Yet, they are fully in sync about Turkey's promotion of Islamic extremism (with Qatar) and its neo-Ottoman aspirations. Egypt and Israel also are in alliance against growing Turkish assertiveness in the eastern Mediterranean. Egypt is a key member of the strategic alignment embodied in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), alongside Greece, Cyprus and Israel – an alignment which is designed inter alia to contain Turkish quest for hegemony in the region.

Israel lends substantial support to Egypt in the latter's efforts to suppress an Islamic insurgency in Sinai. Gaza is sandwiched between Egypt and Israel and ruled by Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, the archenemy of the Egyptian regime. Hamas has assisted the Islamists in Sinai. While not averse to bleeding the Jewish state a bit, Egypt is interested in lowering the flames of Israel-Hamas confrontation and has acquired an important role in the mediation between the two sides. This diplomatic role gains Egypt points in Jerusalem and Washington, and gives it leverage over Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza.

Egyptian and Israeli interests also converge in Libya. Both countries side with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army, while Turkey intervened in 2020 in the civil war to prevent the fall of the Government of National Accord in Tripoli that includes Islamist elements. Israel's new partner, the UAE, also has assisted Haftar.

Even in Syria, Israel and Egypt seem to have the same preferences. Egypt opposed the efforts of Sunni rebel groups to depose Bashar Assad, while also Israel has been careful not to destabilize Assad's regime – to preserve Israel's freedom of action against Iranian targets in Syria in line with the quid quo pro reached between Israel and Russia after the in September 2015 Russian military intervention.

Egyptians often call their country umm ad-dunya, the mother of the world, expressing self-importance. However, ever since the heyday of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's regional weight has declined. Cairo's focus is primarily domestic, like most Arab countries. Nevertheless, Egypt is the most populous and important Arab state with the strongest military among Israel's neighbors. Therefore, Egypt is an important strategic partner for Israel that rates high priority on Israel's foreign policy agenda.

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