Prof. Eyal Zisser – www.israelhayom.com

Israel got its northern front exactly wrong

omrif — Mon, 08 Dec 2025 10:00:32 +0000

A year has passed since the war in Lebanon ended. Hezbollah had been knocked to the mat after Israel eliminated its political leadership and much of its senior military command, inflicting heavy damage on its military capabilities. Yet precisely at the moment when the terrorist organization faced an unprecedented crisis, Israel threw it a lifeline. By agreeing to a ceasefire, Israel enabled Hezbollah not only to preserve its remaining power but to rebuild it.

On that very same day, rebels in Syria led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, then still known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani, launched a surprise offensive against the regime of Bashar Assad. Within 12 days they toppled the regime and seized control of most of the country. Assad's fall dealt a serious blow to Iran, which lost its strategic foothold in Syria and its ability to transfer support and weapons to Hezbollah through Syrian territory.

This new reality along Israel's northern border created a dual challenge. On the one hand, Israel needed to maintain constant pressure on Hezbollah and continue striking it to prevent its recovery. On the other hand, Israel had a rare opportunity to capitalize on the dramatic shift in Syria and advance essential Israeli interests with the new regime in Damascus. That regime was prepared to guarantee calm along the Golan Heights border and possibly even beyond that.

Predictably, Israel did the opposite of what the new circumstances required. In Lebanon, Israel allowed Hezbollah to recover and rebuild. Apart from impressive precision strikes attributed to Israel as part of the ongoing campaign between wars, their strategic value is questionable. Similar operations in the previous decade also failed to prevent the October 7 disaster.

In Syria, Israel acted with arrogance, overconfidence and a dismissive attitude toward the new leadership in Damascus, despite its willingness to enter far-reaching agreements. Instead, Israel turned that leadership into an enemy and sank into unnecessary involvement in the Syrian quagmire, which does nothing to enhance Israel's security. Even worse, as in other matters, Israel allowed President Donald Trump to become the arbiter and final decision maker on issues central to Israel's national security.

Hezbollah flags against the backdrop of destruction in Lebanon. Photo: AFP AFP

Al-Sharaa is a jihadist by background, and Israel has every reason to treat him with suspicion. But he should be judged by his actions, not by his past statements. For now, he poses no threat to Israel. He is dependent on the United States, governs a shattered state and, more importantly, lacks any military capability that could endanger Israel.

In the aftermath of the October 7 massacre, Israel was unwilling to place trust in al-Sharaa. Instead, it seized control of the border strip with Syria and barred Syrian forces from deploying in the area. This has created unnecessary friction between the Israel Defense Forces and the local civilian population. More significantly, it has created a vacuum that terrorist groups, some backed by Iran and Hezbollah, rushed to fill. A reminder of this came last week in the incident in the village of Beit Jann, where six IDF soldiers were wounded during operations in an area that has effectively become ungoverned territory.

Israel's needless hyperactivity in Syria stands in stark contradiction to its inaction in Lebanon. None of the IDF's operations there amount to a strategic blueprint designed to neutralize Hezbollah's military capabilities.

Overshadowing all of this is President Trump, whose involvement repeatedly reminds Israel who is currently making the decisions for it, whether in Gaza, Lebanon or Syria. For now, Trump is angry at the Lebanese government, which has refused to meet his demands, disarm Hezbollah or institute reforms. As a result, he has given Israel a green light to act in Lebanon, and Israel must take advantage of that window before Trump changes course.

As for Syria, Trump has already decided that Ahmad al-Sharaa is someone he trusts, a ruler who is "doing a good job in Syria." Here too Israel finds itself compelled to fall in line with the American position, to try to deescalate and possibly even to reach understandings with al-Sharaa under Trump's sponsorship. That path would be far preferable to Israel than an unnecessary entanglement inside Syria.

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The IDF's achievements in the war are squandered

omrif — Sun, 30 Nov 2025 09:00:02 +0000

Last week marked one year since the ceasefire agreement with Hezbollah that ended the campaign on the northern border, the one the Lebanese Shiite terrorist organization launched against Israel on Oct. 8, 2023, a day after Hamas' murderous terrorist assault began.

During the war in Israel's north, and especially toward its end once Israel recovered and regained its footing, the IDF inflicted heavy blows on Hezbollah, eliminating its senior leaders and commanders and neutralizing much of its military capabilities. The fear of the 180,000 rockets the organization possessed – which Israelis believed could paralyze daily life and cause thousands of deaths – faded as if it had never existed.

Yet a year after the agreement was reached and the fighting ended, it is clear that in Lebanon, as in Lebanon, nothing has changed. Hezbollah still stands firmly on its feet; despite the blows it absorbed, it retains its standing among Lebanon's Shiite population and is working determinedly to rebuild its capabilities while refusing to give up its weapons.

The original sin, of course, was Israel's willingness to sign a dubious agreement that anyone with eyes in their head – though apparently not in Israel's political or military leadership – could see Hezbollah never intended to honor, and that the Lebanese government had neither the ability nor the will to enforce on the Shiite terrorist organization.

But a year has now passed, and although the IDF has carried out impressive covert operations targeting the group's field operatives, it is becoming clear that these are not enough to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding or to eliminate what remains of its military strength. In this sense, last week's killing of Hezbollah's chief of staff, Tabatabai, in the heart of Beirut is the exception that proves the rule – not evidence that Israel has truly decided to take off the gloves and escalate its campaign against Hezbollah.

The same reality exists in Gaza. After two years of a difficult war and numerous operational achievements, a ceasefire has been imposed on Israel that allows Hamas to rebuild its power and its political position under American protection. Anyone who believes that an Arab or Muslim force will emerge willing to confront the organization and disarm it is deluding himself – just as anyone who believes the US will allow Israel to resume fire in Gaza and thereby topple the one foreign-policy achievement the Trump administration can claim.

Finally, it is worth recalling Iran. Israel dealt it severe blows, yet barely a hundred days have passed and already talk has resumed of another round, Iranian threats of revenge, and Tehran's determination to renew its march toward nuclear capability.

Israel also tends to boast that it succeeded in toppling Bashar Assad's regime, but the past year has dragged Israel into futile involvement in Syria's quagmire. It is ending with a deadlock in the talks Syria initiated with Israel in an attempt to reach understandings that would secure stability on the border. And here too, everyone is waiting for instructions from Washington to halt Israel's activity and military presence in Syria.

From all this emerges a familiar pattern: Israel excels at achieving victories on the battlefield but fails to complete the task, or even loses those gains, in the diplomatic campaign that follows. After all, war is never a goal in itself. It is always meant to serve diplomatic aims, a lesson Israel has not learned or has forgotten.

Israel's refusal to formulate a political vision for Gaza's future brought upon it a forced agreement that allows Hamas to retain its strength in the territory. The decision to halt fire in Lebanon five minutes to midnight enables Hezbollah to rebuild. And the absence of any political initiative alongside military action has collapsed the Arab-Israeli front against Iran.

The late Ariel Sharon, who subdued the waves of terrorism during the Second Intifada (2000–2005), had a guiding principle: speak softly and calmly, but hold a stick in your hand and do not hesitate to use it when necessary – a blend of political wisdom and military power. It is unfortunate that instead, some in Israel are preoccupied with who tweeted last and how to bring down the IDF chief of staff, as if he were the country's last enemy.

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On the border, Egypt looks the other way

omrif — Sun, 23 Nov 2025 09:30:51 +0000

Along the Gaza border, the past few weeks have brought a deceptive and misleading calm, while the Israel-Egypt border has come to life amid a surge in weapons smuggling that has become a major challenge, and perhaps even a security threat.

Thousands of drones operated by crime organizations, which are plentiful across Israel's wild south, cross the border every day, carrying weapons and potentially drugs from the Egyptian side into Israel. The drones themselves are entirely Israeli-made or purchased inside Israel by the crime groups.

It may be tempting to downplay the phenomenon, since the motive is criminal and therefore falls between the cracks. The Israel Defense Forces and the Shin Bet are reluctant to deal with criminal activity tied to organized crime, while the Israel Police may want to act but is unable to. Yet experience shows that weapons stockpiled for criminal purposes often end up in the hands of terrorist organizations, and the criminal of today becomes the terrorist of tomorrow.

Instead of confronting the crime groups and preventing both the procurement and the use of drones, we rush to shut the barn doors after the horses have run off, pouring resources into trying to intercept and bring down the steady airborne flow of drones making their way into Israel.

IDF Force on the Egypt-Israel border. Photo: Ziv Koren

Indeed, the IDF is working to intercept the drones, but its success has been only partial. Meanwhile the defense minister posts instructions to the military on social media that no one is willing or able to carry out.

Where is our neighbor

There is one unknown in this equation that no one seems to talk about: Egypt. Where is our neighbor, from whose territory the smuggling is carried out?

It is important to remind ourselves that Egypt is not an enemy or a threat, not today and not in the foreseeable future. Since Israel signed a peace agreement with Cairo nearly fifty years ago, quiet has prevailed along what was once a battlefield where thousands of soldiers were killed, from the 1948 War of Independence through the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Are there people in Egypt who view Israel as an enemy? It appears so. Is Egyptian public opinion largely anti-Israel? That is also true. But at the same time, the Egyptian government and most Egyptians still regard peace with Israel as a vital Egyptian interest and have no desire for war. Besides, the strategic threat facing Cairo comes from the south, from Ethiopia, which Egyptians say is depriving them of Nile River water, the country's lifeline since antiquity. There is also the internal threat from the Muslim Brotherhood and from Hamas, its Palestinian offshoot, which the Egyptian regime is battling for its survival. It was, after all, the Egyptians who once warned Israel not to cooperate with Hamas and not to allow it to entrench its rule in Gaza.

Israel and Egypt have a complex relationship, including economic and especially security cooperation. It has had its ups and downs, for example when Islamic State operatives fought the Egyptian army in Sinai and Israel stepped in to help. On the other hand, we have seen Egypt turn a blind eye and show indifference as weapons were smuggled into Gaza for Hamas and now regarding the drone-smuggling phenomenon.

After all, it is difficult to convince an Egyptian policeman earning twenty dollars a month not to look the other way for a hundred dollars when a drone hovers overhead.

Israel can and must hold a firm and uncompromising dialogue with Egypt on this issue. Unfortunately, however, Israel is turning its back on its Arab neighbors and prefers to communicate with them through the US administration, which has its own interests that do not always align with Israel's and is more attentive to Turkey's president and Qatar's emir.

Israel must first address the domestic problem of drone procurement and their use by crime organizations, but the key is to formulate a policy and take the necessary steps, because in this matter, unlike the situation in Gaza or Syria, the Americans will not find or dictate a solution for us.

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Israel cannot let Trump set Syria policy by default

miriw — Sun, 16 Nov 2025 08:00:33 +0000

How did young Ahmed al-Sharaa become a jihadist? According to his account, the outbreak of the Second Intifada in the early 2000s led him to adopt a radical Islamic worldview, move from Syria to Iraq, and join the ranks of al-Qaeda and ISIS to fight American forces that had occupied that country. They captured him and he spent several years in American prisons before being released. When he returned to Syria in 2012 after the civil war broke out there, he founded the Jabhat al-Nusra organization as a Syrian branch of ISIS. But in subsequent years he began moderating his statements, broke away from ISIS and al-Qaeda, and even declared that the US was not an enemy and that his men would not target American objectives. His men, who then controlled the Syrian Golan Heights, made sure to maintain quiet along the border with Israel.

The Americans were not impressed by these statements. They designated al-Sharaa's organization as a terrorist group, set a cash reward of $10 million on his head, and sent planes and special forces to strike him and his men.

But since then, much water has flowed in the Potomac River running through Washington, and last week al-Sharaa was received as an honored guest at the White House – with everyone, especially President Trump, eager for his favor.

In his defense, al-Sharaa explains that his jihadist past in the ranks of al-Qaeda and ISIS was like youthful indiscretions of a young man in his twenties, and that he has since matured and changed his path and views. In the US, they also credit him with the fact that since seizing power in Syria he has made almost no mistakes, and that he makes sure to say and do the right things from the Americans' perspective. Toward Israel too, he maintains a low profile, and repeats again and again his desire to reach a security agreement with it that would ensure quiet along the border between the two countries.

Yet he is a jihadist whose roots are planted in al-Qaeda and ISIS. While sending smiles to the West and Israel, he is turning Syria into a zealous Muslim state that persecutes – and often massacres – members of minority communities, the Alawites, Druze, and even Christians, a state seeking to impose a religious Muslim lifestyle on the secular majority (in Middle Eastern terms) living there.

But for President Trump, none of this matters, as he has decided that al-Sharaa is his man in Syria. In Trump's defense, one could say Syria doesn't really interest him, and a statement of his from the previous decade is remembered, in which he said Syria is "sand and death," and its residents are mired in tribal conflicts. Therefore, Trump explained at the time that his administration had no intention of interfering in what happened in that country.

Besides that, the days have passed when the suppression of minorities or human freedoms troubled anyone in Washington. It also seems the days have passed when Americans would consult with Israel, ask its opinion, and coordinate their moves in the region with it. Today, Israel is no longer counted in the White House, and those who have become Trump's oracles are his close friends, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan, a dictator and fervent Hamas supporter, and, alongside him, the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, another enlightened leader of a state spreading extremism and terror. And these two, as is known, adopted al-Sharaa into their fold, and now the American president follows in their footsteps.

Meanwhile, al-Sharaa markets himself to Trump as someone who will bring an end to the bloody war in Syria, fight ISIS terror, faithfully serve American interests, and even sign an agreement with Israel.

Despite understandable Israeli fears after October 7, al-Sharaa does not currently pose a threat, and certainly not an immediate and direct threat to us, as he heads a destroyed country lacking an army, and continues to view Hezbollah and Iran as the hated enemy and the central threat facing him. This gives Israel maneuvering room vis-à-vis al-Sharaa, but for this purpose, the Israeli government is required to formulate a policy on the Syrian question, something it has not done to date. And in the absence of an Israeli policy, Trump is the one deciding for us – last month regarding Gaza and now also regarding Syria.

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Countdown to the Third Lebanon War has already begun

omrif — Sun, 09 Nov 2025 08:15:32 +0000

Exactly a year ago, the confrontation on the northern border between Israel and Hezbollah ended in what appeared to be a clear knockout. Hezbollah was defeated, losing its leaders and senior commanders, headed by Hassan Nasrallah, along with much of its military capabilities. It seemed the group would not recover. Lebanon elected a president, formed a government that declared its commitment to disarm Hezbollah, and the ever-optimistic US administration, detached from reality as usual, promised that a peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon was only a matter of time.

But in wars between Israel and its Arab enemies, there are never absolute victories or final conclusions. We defeat the enemy's armies, only to discover a few days after a cease-fire is declared that they are still alive and kicking. So it was after the great victories of the 1948 War of Independence and the 1956 Sinai Campaign, and again after the Six-Day War, when Egypt and Syria resumed fire just days after their crushing defeat.

In the current war, history is repeating itself. Iran is restoring its capabilities and preparing for the next round, Hamas remains the undisputed ruler of the Gaza Strip, and Lebanon represents perhaps the most glaring missed opportunity. There was no external pressure on Israel to halt its strikes on Hezbollah, yet we voluntarily agreed to a leaky, dubious cease-fire that everyone knew the group would never honor.

We knew this, and yet we agreed, hoping that Hezbollah, a radical Shiite organization whose very identity is rooted in its struggle against Israel, would suddenly decide to act like a "good child" and disarm. And we hoped that the Lebanese state, which US envoy Tom Barrack accurately described last week as "a failed and dysfunctional state", would deploy its army against Hezbollah, even though the group is far stronger and far more determined than Lebanon's own military.

Hezbollah flags against the backdrop of destruction in Lebanon. Photo: AFP AFP

Now, a year after Israel's major victory in Lebanon, it has become clear that nothing has changed and that the gains of the war are steadily eroding. True, Hezbollah has kept a low profile and refrained from attacking Israel or even responding to Israeli strikes, but not because it has turned into a "Zionist sympathizer." Like Hamas, it is biding its time, keeping its head down until the storm passes, and waiting patiently for the right moment to strike again.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah has been rebuilding its strength, maintaining strong support among Lebanon's Shiite community, and even reestablishing weapons smuggling routes from Iran to replace those lost with the fall of Bashar Assad's regime in Syria.

Israel, for its part, prides itself on its freedom of action in Lebanon and on the blows it has dealt to minor Hezbollah operatives. Yet these actions appear aimed more at shaping public opinion and pleasing the media than at truly crippling the organization. Does anyone seriously believe that Hezbollah, which commands tens of thousands of fighters, will surrender because Israel eliminated 300 of its members over the past year?

Hezbollah has lowered its profile. Gone are the bombastic threats and boasts about its capabilities that once kept Israeli decision-makers awake at night. The organization speaks less, and more softly, but still makes it clear that it will not surrender its weapons and that "the resistance" remains its strategic choice.

Hezbollah calculates its moves in years, not months. For now, the deceptive calm on the northern border may persist. But again, the real question is not whether the terrorist organization will resume its operations against Israel, but when.

Israel would do well to act more decisively to counter the growing threat from the north. And if it chooses not to, it should at least monitor Hezbollah's every move with vigilance, so that we are not caught off guard once again. The countdown to another confrontation on the Lebanon border has already begun.

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There will be no phase B in Gaza

omrif — Mon, 03 Nov 2025 11:30:44 +0000

Facing reality this time was quicker and more painful than expected. The fighting in Gaza has subsided, but the war has not ended, and we remain far from the promised peace, farther than east is from west.

At the Knesset session held in honor of US President Donald Trump, a gathering marked by flattery, obsequiousness, and a loss of national self-respectm, Trump promised us a historic peace agreement with the Arab and Muslim world. In practice, however, Israel finds itself facing a Hamas organization that enjoys American protection and is rebuilding its strength in the Gaza Strip under that very umbrella.

From the outset, there was an unbridgeable gulf between Phase A of the deal, ending the fighting and returning our hostages and fallen soldiers, and the lofty vision of peace on earth between Israel and the Arab and Islamic states, which, under the terms of the agreement, includes the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Yet it turns out that even within the framework of Phase Am, the easier part of the agreement, Hamas has failed to meet its commitments. Instead, it is playing its usual game, testing Israel's limits and, even more so, those of the United States. Washington, for its part, is buying the false promises Hamas is selling and remains convinced, as President Trump repeatedly assures us after being "educated" by his friends in Turkey and Qatar, that "Hamas will behave properly."

The real problem lies in Phase B of the agreement, whose implementation depends on three "miracles": first, the disarmament of Hamas; second, the establishment of a non-Hamas Palestinian government to administer Gaza; and third, the deployment of an international force to maintain order in the Strip.

But who exactly is supposed to disarm Hamas? The Lebanese precedent teaches us that, contrary to the hopes and illusions underpinning the flimsy ceasefire agreement signed in November 2024, Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite terrorist organization, has shown no willingness to even consider disarmament. Lebanon's government and army are neither willing nor able to compel it to do so.

Hezbollah, therefore, remains standing strong and is rebuilding its power, while Israel contents itself with limited "campaigns between wars" that barely scratch Hezbollah's capabilities or its determination to stage a political and military comeback in Lebanon and against Israel.

And in Gaza, just like in Lebanon, Hamas has already declared that it will not disarm. Many speak on its behalf, promising that the organization may consider it someday, but both its leadership and its actions on the ground show otherwise. After all, Hamas did not fight for two years, paying a heavy price in destruction and lives, only to simply surrender and vanish.

Hamas is signaling that it is in Gaza to stay, this time under the cover of an agreement and, effectively, under American protection. Washington has repeatedly intervened to restrain and limit Israel's actions, and it will continue to do so in the future.

The challenge facing Israel is clear and is one it has avoided confronting for more than two years: What should be done about Gaza? And what should be done about Hamas, which is gradually restoring its capabilities, not to the level of a pre-October 7 military threat, but certainly as a governing and military force capable of controlling Gaza? All this while Israel, due to American opposition, cannot and will not reoccupy the Strip.

Israel has therefore failed in its effort to defeat Hamas and is unprepared to deal with it diplomatically. It is now evident that Phase B of the agreement will not materialize, that Hamas will refuse to disarm, and that no international force will enter Gaza to confront it, except perhaps forces from Turkey or Qatar, which would gladly come to assist Hamas.

Israel must therefore prepare for a reality of a living, breathing, and kicking Hamas—albeit weakened and battered—continuing to operate freely in the Gaza Strip under the very deal it signed.

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The Palestinian state according to Trump

omrif — Mon, 27 Oct 2025 07:30:11 +0000

The ceasefire deal that President Trump imposed on Israel and on Hamas delivered a concrete achievement — the immediate release of all our living hostages and the return of the deceased, which should (we hope) be completed in the coming days. This is the first and easiest phase of a deal that Hamas even tried to break, and only heavy US pressure, oddly directed at Israel, stopped us from breaking off the whole thing.

The problem, of course, is in the later stages of the deal, whose implementation timetable and mechanics are far from clear. It is possible, of course, that the US will continue to pressure Israel in those later stages, that Israel will be asked to withdraw from additional parts of the Strip and to allow the entry of foreign military forces from Turkey or Qatar, but anyone who believes Hamas will voluntarily disarm, or that an Arab force will successfully coerce it to disarm, is living in a fantasy.

Trump seeks to flip with a single word a fragile, temporary ceasefire into an everlasting peace between Israel and the entire Arab and Muslim world. May he be right.

But it seems the real problem in the deal, from Israel's perspective, is not how to handle Hamas in the Strip, but the implicit American commitment within it to establish a Palestinian state, which Washington might try to impose on Israel.

Hamas terrorists. Photo: EPA EPA

Has President Trump founded a Palestinian state in Washington? Ostensibly that is the deal's aim, but it is doubtful that this is really the US president's intention. What is certain is that regardless of what the Americans, and certainly the Europeans, want, a Palestinian state will not come into being, and any attempt to force it into existence will only encourage violence and bloodshed, not only between Palestinians and Israelis but also among Palestinians themselves.

Trump's attitude toward Israel, and in fact that of all previous US administrations, is one of deep commitment and emotional identification with the Zionist cause. By contrast, there is no evident empathy or commitment toward the Palestinians in the wording of the agreement or in Trump's own remarks. He made that clear when he said that all he wants is a deal everyone will approve, and that for him it makes no difference whether there are two states, Israeli and Palestinian, or one state, Israel. His comments that corruption, violence and terror are the hallmarks of the Palestinian Authority and of Hamas, the terrorist organization, reveal what he thinks about the Palestinians' capacity to found and sustain a state.

It should be remembered that much of the world's obsession with establishing a Palestinian state stems, alongside the desire to strike at Israel, from the illusion that a Palestinian state would solve not only the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but all the Middle East's problems, and from the accompanying illusion that Israel alone is the obstacle to creating such a state.

That is not true. For 19 years between Israel's War of Independence and the Six Day War, Egypt and Jordan governed Gaza and the West Bank and never once considered creating a Palestinian state. Moreover, the Oslo accords opened the door for the Palestinians to form a state-like entity to govern and manage their lives. That entity very quickly turned into a corrupt dictatorship devoted to dreams and fantasies, for example about a right of return to Palestine. The alternative that arose to that entity is Hamas, an Islamist radical movement committed to religious extremism, violence and terror.

Experimentation with creating a state can be tried in Libya or Somalia, places no one really cares about. But here we are talking about Israel's future and security, and those are nonnegotiable.

After all this, and contrary to our usual instincts, Israel cannot rely on the Palestinians not to disrupt Trump's show and to not sabotage any attempt to advance peace, as they have done in the past. Israel must rely only on itself and proactively promote policy alternatives that remove the threatening shadow of a corrupt dictatorship that serves as a breeding ground for religious extremism, violence and terror, and that some would like to see established next door at our expense.

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The hidden danger in Trump's ceasefire deal

ErezL — Sat, 25 Oct 2025 23:19:37 +0000

The ceasefire arrangement that President Donald Trump imposed on Israel and Hamas produced a genuine, significant accomplishment – the immediate release of all our hostages and recovery of our fallen, which should hopefully conclude within days. This constitutes the initial and simplest phase of an agreement that Hamas attempted to breach even at this stage, and only substantial American pressure – particularly on Israel – prevented us from abandoning the arrangement.

The difficulty, naturally, resides in the following phases of the agreement – a flawed accord whose execution timeline and methodology remain completely ambiguous. Pressure can undoubtedly persist on Israel in subsequent stages – to retreat from further sections of the Strip and allow entry of Turkish or Qatari military forces, but anyone expecting Hamas will willingly disarm or that an Arab force will be prepared to force its disarmament dwells in fantasy.

Nevertheless Trump seeks to convert through empty rhetoric a temporary and fragile ceasefire arrangement into a peace-on-earth agreement between Israel and the complete Arab and Muslim world. If only he proves right.

People react as they celebrate following the announcement that Israel and Hamas have agreed to the first phase of a peace plan to pause the fighting, at a plaza known as hostages square in Tel Aviv, Israel, Thursday, Oct. 9, 2025 (AP / Emilio Morenatti)

Yet it appears the troublesome element of the agreement from Israel's standpoint is not the engagement with Hamas in the Strip, but rather the concealed American obligation to establish a Palestinian state, which Washington may impose upon Israel.

Did President Trump found the Palestinian state in Washington? On its surface, that represents the agreement's goal, but it's questionable whether the American president genuinely intends this, and what's definite is that irrespective of what the Americans desire, and especially the Europeans – a Palestinian state will not emerge, and any initiative attempting to impose it will merely stimulate violence and bloodshed, not exclusively between Palestinians and Israelis but also among the Palestinians themselves.

Trump's relationship toward Israel, and essentially that of all preceding American administrations, demonstrates profound commitment and emotional alignment with the Zionist enterprise. Conversely, concerning the Palestinians, no alignment or commitment is evident, neither in the agreement's wording nor in Trump's own statements, and he articulated this effectively when stressing that all he pursues is an arrangement everyone will accept, and from his standpoint it makes no distinction whether there will be two states – Israeli and Palestinian – or one state, Israel. His comments about corruption, violence and terror as the defining characteristic of the Palestinian Authority and Hamas disclose his assessment of the Palestinians' lacking capacity to establish and sustain a state.

Families of hostages propose to nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize in September 2025 (Gideon Markowicz)

One should recall that the fixation with establishing a Palestinian state among numerous world nations originates – beside the impulse to strike at Israel (in the manner of "beat the Jews") – also from the fantasy that a Palestinian state would resolve not merely the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but all the Middle East's difficulties, and alongside this, from the fantasy that exclusively Israel prevents the establishment of such a state.

All this is untrue. For 19 years from the War of Independence until the Six-Day War, Egypt and Jordan governed Gaza and the West Bank and never considered establishing a Palestinian state. Furthermore, the Oslo Accords opened the opportunity for Palestinians to establish a state entity that would administer and manage their existence. But this entity swiftly became a corrupt dictatorship dedicated to dreams and delusions, for instance about "return to Palestine." Meanwhile, the alternative that emerged to this entity is Hamas, a radical Islamic movement dedicated to religious fanaticism, violence and terror.

A trial-and-error approach of state establishment can be pursued in Libya or Somalia, where nobody genuinely cares what occurs there. But here we're addressing Israel's future and security – and these cannot be compromised.

Moreover, contrary to our pattern, Israel must not depend on the Palestinians to destroy Trump's show and undermine any effort to advance peace, as they have done previously. It must depend exclusively on itself and proactively advance policy alternatives that eliminate the threatening shadow of a corrupt dictatorship functioning as an incubator for religious fanaticism, violence and terror, which some attempt to establish in our vicinity and at our expense.

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How can we prevent the next October 7?

omrif — Sun, 19 Oct 2025 06:00:51 +0000

With the release of all our hostages and the return of our fallen – a process that we all hope will be completed soon – the war launched against us by the terrorist organization Hamas on October 7, 2023, will come to an end.

The war may be over, but peace has yet to arrive.

Nevertheless, US President Donald Trump, the architect of the agreement that brought about the end of the war and the return of the hostages, was quick to declare the conflict over – the bloody struggle that has engulfed this land for more than 150 years. The American president even referred to a 3,000-year-old conflict, as though Arabs – let alone Palestinians – existed in biblical times. But he can perhaps be forgiven, given that attention to detail, certainly historical ones, has never been his strong suit.

Still, it is fair to ask whether Trump genuinely believes that bold declarations of peace will be enough to resolve such a complex and deeply entrenched conflict – a challenge that has eluded many skilled leaders over the years, and under far more favorable conditions.

As we look ahead with hope – and more importantly, with vigilance – we must not turn our backs on the past or forget the past two years. We must ensure we have learned the lessons and internalized the mistakes that led, for the second time in 50 years, to a strategic surprise that brought disaster upon us. This was not only the result of underestimating our enemies, arrogance, or overconfidence, but also of a blind adherence to the status quo.

On the eve of October 6, 1973, Israel was convinced its situation had never been better. It therefore chose to cling to the status quo and avoid any action, whether military or diplomatic. Just as it did 50 years later, on the eve of October 7, Israel believed it was in an excellent position, and that refraining from any military initiative – against Hamas or Hezbollah – and from any political move, domestically or with the Arab world, was the correct approach. In other words, to do nothing.

In hindsight, this complacency and comfort zone proved disastrous. It also prevented us from preparing for the attack or averting it.

Even now, some advocate a return to the status quo – to wait out the Trump initiative, assuming it will eventually collapse, and revert to the reality that existed before October 7. This time, however, Hamas is weakened and its military capabilities, destroyed in the fighting.

Over the past quarter-century, Israel has clung to the status quo. In this respect, there has been no real difference between the Right, the Center, or the Left. We believed that maintaining the status quo allowed us to deepen our hold on Judea and Samaria, preserving these areas either as a deposit for better days, when a political agreement with the Palestinians might be feasible, or as part of a process of "Israelization" – with every passing day distancing the Palestinians from the vision of a Palestinian state, while strengthening Israel's presence and control on the ground.

But if we choose not to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and instead keep it in deep freeze, others will step in – whether it be terrorist groups that renew their assaults, or President Trump and the international community behind him, who may impose a solution upon us, including the establishment of a Palestinian state under terms unfavorable to Israel.

Israel must therefore launch its own initiative. To do so, the public must make a clear choice: Do we seek a negotiated settlement with the Palestinian Authority? Or do we prefer to leave it to the world to impose a resolution? There is, of course, a third option – annexing the West Bank and granting equal citizenship to its Palestinian residents within the State of Israel. It seems likely that many Palestinians would support such a move, preferring it over life in a repressive Islamist Palestinian state.

Above all, we must take control of our own destiny and act. Otherwise, we will find out our fate is being determined by others.

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Israel must ensure its freedom of action in Gaza will be preserved

omrif — Sun, 12 Oct 2025 16:00:06 +0000

A deal between Israel and Hamas is a done deal, and even if last-minute obstacles appear on the way to achieving it, it will come about. Why? Because President Donald Trump wants it, and in matters concerning Israel and its future his will and opinion carry decisive weight.

Much can be said about Trump, but he knows how to recognize when a deal can and should be closed, and that ability has led him to conclude that now is the time to free the hostages and end the war. That conclusion matches the mood of the Israeli public, but it is also aligned with our vital interests. This was understood long ago by David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, a figure we have not seen since.

Ben-Gurion made many historic decisions in his life, but two proved above all the most important. One was to establish a state at any cost, despite internal and international opposition and despite knowing that this would lead to war with the Arab states. The second, no less important, was to end the war. Not because we had achieved all our objectives, far from it, but because, as he put it, there is a time and season for everything, and Ben-Gurion understood that war is not an end in itself. Israel must turn to a more important task: absorbing mass immigration and building a society, a nation and a state, and, he explained, leave the rest to future generations.

Like Ben-Gurion, Trump, for his own reasons, understands the necessity of bringing the war to an end. But Trump is known for his disdain of minutiae and for believing that endless debate among experts or, worse, lawyers will never produce an agreement.

So, shrewdly and even brilliantly, he put on the table an offer that cannot be refused: immediate, unconditional and complete release of all hostages and missing persons, something the Israeli public longs for, in exchange for a final and absolute end to the war, something the world wants and something Trump now identifies as a supreme interest for both himself and Israel.

When that happens, everything else will become secondary, not urgent and not pressing, and can be addressed in a step-by-step fashion. Sometimes in Israel's interest and sometimes for humanitarian reasons — questions such as the scope and timing of an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, which Palestinian prisoners will be released as part of the deal, how to allow civilian aid into Gaza, and the critical question of what will happen in the Strip after the fact.

What Trump proposes is an important opportunity for Israel that could save it from itself and from the dead end in which we have been stuck for months. But it requires eyes wide open and protection of our security interests, with Trump's help and, if necessary, despite Trump.

What will happen in Gaza should be learned from what happened a year ago in Lebanon. Then, too, we accepted a flawed agreement that was plainly never intended to be honored by the Hezbollah terrorist organization. Hezbollah continues to refuse to disarm and acts freely to rebuild its strength, while Israel has been content with pinpoint actions that do not change the situation at its root.

Gaza is not Lebanon. Hamas was dealt a crushing blow, unlike Hezbollah, which preserved much of its capability. The geography of the Strip is entirely different from Lebanon's. Still, we must learn lessons from what happened in Lebanon.

Hopes that the Hamas terrorist organization will voluntarily disarm, that international forces will deploy in the Strip, and that a process of Palestinian governance building will begin from which Hamas will be excluded — all these are false hopes. Therefore Israel must ensure that it retains freedom of action. Not by unnecessary additional ground maneuvering in the Strip, but by decisive action against any attempt by Hamas to rebuild its army, its rockets, its battalions and its divisions.

And of course, ensure that no house, street or neighborhood in the Strip is reconstructed while Hamas remains in control. Restoring Israel's strength, at home and abroad, is the crucial mission before us today, and if in addition we can advance regional peace, there is no greater victory than that.

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