These developments come as Ankara invests heavily in increasing Turkish visibility in Gaza via Turkish and Palestinian aid organizations. Turkish posters and flags are flying across the Strip, including on bulldozers clearing debris and searching for deceased hostages.

Trump has enlisted Turkey, alongside Qatar, as a lead partner in his initiative and views Ankara as the most effective lever over the Hamas terrorist organization. Erdogan has thrown himself into the task. He credits Turkey with persuading Hamas to accept, and begin implementing, the plan's first phase, and he wants what he considers proper payment for that achievement: a deeper Turkish presence, involvement and influence in Gaza.

Turkey's interest, and Hamas's

For Erdogan, that payoff serves two strategic aims. First, to elevate Turkey's status as a leading regional power that is actively shaping Middle Eastern geopolitics. Second, to hem in Israel, erode its regional standing and blunt its ability to advance Israeli priorities over Turkish ones. A clear example is the Israel–Greece–Cyprus strategic alliance, which Turkey see as threatening key Turkish interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

Ankara regards Israel as its most challenging regional competitor, chiefly in military terms but also in technology, and economically through the potential opened by expanding the Abraham Accords, including IMEC, the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor linking India and East Asia through Saudi Arabia and Jordan to Israel and on to Europe. Diplomatically, Israel's widening ties in the region and its special relationship with the US also come into play.

Backing Hamas and political Islam is one of Turkey's levers for asserting leadership of Sunni Islam in the Middle East. That logic drives Ankara's Hamas policy and its insistence that Hamas retain its standing as a relevant and influential political actor, not only in Gaza but in Palestinian politics more broadly. A significant Turkish presence in Gaza would allow Ankara to safeguard Hamas's vital interests, which by definition are also vital Turkish interests.

A winning combination

Influence in Gaza, coupled with Erdogan's closeness to Trump and the favor the US president shows the Turkish leader, creates what Ankara sees as a winning combination. Erdogan believes, and hopes, that this mix will enable Turkey to force a broad military presence in Gaza as a central pillar of the ISF. A Turkish military footprint in the Strip, reinforced by the growing dominance of Turkish civilian aid groups, could, in Erdogan's view, narrow Israel's room to maneuver and its operational freedom in Gaza, and thus its ability to act consistently, deeply and effectively against Hamas's reconstruction efforts.

Israel's understandable caution about harming Turks, together with Erdogan's sway over Trump to restrain Israel, gives the Turkish Armed Forces a chance to clamp Israel in a pincer, via Gaza in the south and Syria in the north. That is how the Turkish president could carve out and stabilize a strategic comfort zone that works to Israel's detriment.

Given these moves, and in light of Erdogan's hostility toward Israel and his open antisemitism, Israel would do well to keep firmly opposing any Turkish military presence in Gaza. It should act creatively and in close coordination with Washington, working with the Egypt–Saudi Arabia–UAE axis to minimize Turkey's role in the Gaza Strip.

At the same time, Israel should push to prioritize deeper involvement, military presence and influence by that counter-axis, which also sees Turkey and its maneuvers as a threat and a challenge. Above all, Israel needs to internalize the implications: if Erdogan succeeds in executing his broader strategy, Israel could find itself in a Turkish stranglehold, where Ankara sets the rules.

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Without a major blow to Hamas' leadership, there is no way to dismantle the terrorist organization as a military and governing entity or to make recovery difficult. This is especially true following the elimination of Hamas' leadership in Gaza, which left Izz al-Din al-Haddad, commander of the Gaza Brigade who succeeded Mohammed Sinwar (himself replacing his brother, Yahya Sinwar), as the top military leader and effectively the most senior Hamas figure remaining in the Gaza Strip. The eliminations in Gaza shifted the terrorist organization's center of gravity to the external leadership outside Gaza, most of which enjoyed safety and comfort in Doha.

Beyond the impressive intelligence and operational capabilities displayed by Israel, far from the first time, and beyond the fact that this is Israel's fifth decapitation strike against hostile leaderships (Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah, Iran, and the Houthis), this action projects strength and determination. The Doha strike sends a message about Israel's seriousness in ending the war and achieving the objectives defined by the government. If the remnants of Hamas leadership in Gaza and its support circles dismissed threats about an invasion of Gaza City as empty bluster aimed at pressuring Hamas in negotiations, the Qatar strike may well change their assessment.

If the operation succeeded and Israel indeed managed to eliminate most of Hamas' external leadership, or at least its most senior figures, it would be a devastating blow to the organization, stripping it of critical organizational capabilities. Hamas' external leadership was responsible for fundraising and managing ties with states and groups that supported it. With their removal, even partially, the group faces paralysis and severe functional difficulties that could threaten its survival as a meaningful entity and make any recovery far harder.

Even if most Hamas leaders managed to escape the strike, its importance remains enormous. It instantly changed the rules of the game and completely undermined Hamas leaders' sense of security. From now on, they will have to devote enormous effort to evasion, protection, and hiding, knowing they have lost their immunity and are vulnerable to immediate elimination anywhere.

The strike also creates an opportunity for new momentum in negotiations, if and when they resume. Israel seems unlikely to wait long, even if it slows down the pace of its operation to capture Gaza City in order to facilitate talks and conclude them within a short time frame, under the terms outlined in President Trump's proposal. If Israel has succeeded in removing much of Hamas' hardline external leadership, the result could leave al-Haddad in a stronger position with the potential for a more pragmatic approach.

Victor's generosity 

With the confidence of victory and under the shadow of this dramatic success, Israel could declare triumph, secure the release of hostages, and reshape Gaza's security reality by dismantling Hamas as a military and governing force. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has called on Gaza's residents to expel the remnants of Hamas and declared that there would be no obstacle to a shared future and new relations between Gaza and Israel under an alternative civilian administration once Hamas is dismantled as the ruling authority.

If, however, most of Hamas' external leadership survived, the organization may harden its stance and push negotiations into deadlock, forcing Israel back to its plan for capturing Gaza City and the entire Gaza Strip.

Despite the troubling delay of nearly two years since the war began, the operation's execution helps cut Qatar back down to size, or at least sidelines it from negotiations and Gaza's reconstruction process. Qatar was never an honest mediator. Beyond being a state sponsor of terrorism and a clear supporter of Hamas, it manipulated Israel and other mediators, exploiting the horrors of the war to entrench itself as a regional diplomatic powerhouse. It turned mediation into a major tool of soft power, alongside corrupt use of its vast wealth to buy influence, cultural assets, and powerful lobbying networks that swayed decision-making in states and organizations. Qatar used negotiations to smear Israel, undermine Egypt and its relations with Israel, and maneuver toward a war-ending arrangement that would keep Hamas in power and allow it to regroup for a future takeover of the Palestinian matter. Meanwhile, Doha tightened ties with the US, which amplified Qatar's importance by highlighting its role in negotiations and its broader utility to American interests.

It is hard to believe Israel carried out the strike without prior coordination with Washington, which maintains the largest American military base in the Middle East on Qatari soil. Even if the US government insists it was not informed or gave no green light, many in the region and beyond assume otherwise. In practice, it means that the US ultimately prioritized its commitments to Israel and its vital interests over Qatar's, a move of enormous symbolic weight, projecting Israeli strength across the region.

President Trump's social media posts can be read two ways: as expressing dissatisfaction over a unilateral Israeli strike against a close American ally, but also as acknowledging the legitimacy of the target. Claims of friction between Trump and Netanyahu may reflect an American attempt to soften what Qatar perceives as betrayal. Rumors of quiet Qatari consent to the strike, similar to its tacit approval for Iran's attack on a US base during Operation With the Lion, should not be taken too seriously. Even if partially true, they do not change the fact that Qatar suffered a humiliating blow that exposed its vulnerability and total reliance on American security guarantees.

Qatari officials have said they are investigating the incident and pledged action against Israel, which they labeled a terrorist state. A military response, however, is implausible, given Doha's lack of such capabilities. Any attempt would invite a devastating Israeli counterstrike, regardless of American reassurances. Qatar's retaliation is expected to focus on diplomatic and legal spheres, alongside intensified delegitimization campaigns against Israel. Its decision to suspend active mediation between Israel and Hamas is no threat, if anything, it is a blessing.

Let Turkey and Egypt frown

Israel's decision to target Hamas leadership on Qatari soil, officially not an enemy state, does have precedents, such as the 1985 Israeli strike on the Palestine Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunis. Still, this is a dramatic move, reshaping regional dynamics and, to some extent, global ones. Israel has once again set world-class intelligence and military standards, reinforcing its position as the most powerful and influential force in the Middle East. It is a significant achievement, even if Turkey, Egypt, and other states wrinkle their noses at Israel's growing dominance and determination to wield it across the MIddle East.

Make no mistake: Arab leaders will rush to condemn Israel and embrace Qatar with soothing words. But it is lip service. Behind closed doors, they are rubbing their hands in delight, smiling broadly at Qatar's humiliation. For many of them, Qatar is not just a rival but a dangerous adversary, thanks to its support for the Muslim Brotherhood, jihadist terrorist groups, and destabilization efforts through its Al Jazeera network. They will be pleased to see Qatar weakened, just as they would welcome Hamas' destruction.

Once Israel finishes the job, in time, these sentiments will likely be expressed openly, or at least become evident through regional realignments.

This is Israel's moment to combine statesmanship and military strategy to achieve decisive victory: ending the war, freeing the hostages, and reshaping Gaza's security reality as a key step in building a new regional order. When that happens, Israel will be able to speak of total victory.

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Hamas' terror attack and the massacre it committed on Oct. 7 are a defining event that will forever be etched in Jewish and Israeli consciousness. Investigations into the events of that cursed day clearly demonstrate the systemic collapse experienced by the IDF that day. With them, there are growing claims that if the IDF had been prepared and ready during routine days, and not just during emergencies, for a Hamas terror attack – as befitting a defensive army, which must be prepared for a situation where a terror organization sitting on the country's border might attack one day – the attack would have been thwarted, or perhaps not even launched. These claims are supported by testimonies indicating that on the morning of the attack, Mohammed Deif even considered canceling it for fear that the IDF was preparing an ambush for him.

Beyond the IDF and Shin Bet failure preceding the attack, the fundamental question about Israel's strategic doctrine and accommodation policy toward Hamas continues to resurface. Under this policy, Israel believed the Palestinian terror organization would institutionalize and prefer improving economic reality and the welfare of its citizens, and would therefore be restrained in exchange for a series of civic and economic measures toward the Gaza Strip, and would be deterred by fear of losing those assets.

Moreover, the question of Qatari money transferred to Hamas reemerges, which undoubtedly aided in building the terror army that was ultimately deployed against Israel on Oct. 7. In this context – the Israeli strategy was clear, given the desire to focus on existential threats such as the Iranian nuclear program and Hezbollah's precision missile project, while keeping the Hamas threat under control. The assumption and organizing logic were that preventing a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and improving economic reality, in the shadow of Hamas' institutionalization process, would ensure the preservation of deterrence against the organization, the establishment and deepening of accommodation, and thereby effectively neutralizing this arena in a way that allows necessary intelligence and operational focus on other threatening arenas.

The preoccupation and focus on the concept of Hamas' institutionalization, accommodation, and deterrence diverted attention from the reasonable possibility of thwarting the attack, or preventing it, through proper operational preparation of the IDF on the Gaza Strip border. But at the same time, the importance of the unasked question becomes clearer: Even if the IDF had been properly prepared and either thwarted the Oct. 7 attack or deterred Hamas from launching it altogether, would Israel's strategic doctrine of managing Hamas through arrangements and deterrence have ever been fundamentally questioned?

It is not unlikely that the answer to the unasked question is negative, especially in light of Israel's accumulated historical experience with Hamas since it took over the Gaza Strip. After all, since its takeover of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007, and after every violent round with Hamas (2008, 2012, 2014, the fence events in 2018–2021), Israel returned to the path of "dialogue" with the organization and attempts to reach arragment with it.

Therefore, it is not unlikely that if the Oct. 7 attack had been thwarted by the IDF, or if it had been prevented due to better preparation by the IDF – Israel would have continued the same policy toward Hamas, as part of the concept that effectively led to the "containment" of the Palestinian terror organization and the terror army it built on Israel's border. Indeed, if the attack had not been launched – the recognition of Hamas being deterred would have strengthened, hence the validity of deterrence. Had the attack been thwarted – it would have been categorized as just another escalation cycle with Hamas – similar to the previous confrontations we've experienced in the past – none of which were significant enough to prompt Israel to reconsider its strategic doctrine toward Hamas.

Tragically and painfully, this concept led to a stinging and humiliating failure that exacted a very heavy price from Israeli society. On the other hand, it is frightening to think that if the attack had been thwarted or prevented – this concept would likely have deepened its roots, and we might have received the Oct. 7 attack in an even more intense and dangerous format, in a more coordinated multi-arena manner, and at a much more problematic and dangerous timing.

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However, reading this document in detail leads to the exact opposite conclusion.

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The document is actually another example of Palestinian duplicity and shows they continue to peddle a narrative of victimhood and refuse to own up to their actions while ignoring historical facts.

The document includes statements that are diametrically opposed to what Palestinian leaders say whey assure Israel that they would not erase Jerusalem's Jewish heritage if they gained control over the Temple Mount or how the Jewish settlers in a future Palestinians state would not be harmed.

The part that deals with support for Palestinian prisoners and their families is particularly problematic because it shows an unwillingness to discard the ethos of an armed struggle.

Another example of its perpetual narrative of victimhood is the fact that the document also blames Israel for torpedoing the reconciliation efforts between the Hamas and Fatah factions.

The refusal to own up to their actions has resulted in the Palestinians adopting false excuses regarding the peace process, ignoring their decision to reject any peace proposal that has been put on the table. This rejectionist stance was once again on display this week as the Palestinians boycotted the US-led Peace to "Prosperity workshop" in Bahrain

The document's stance on Israel being a Jewish state is particularly laughable. Not only does it give a false interpretation of the international decisions regarding the Jewish people's right to a nation-state and disregards the Declaration of Independence; it also makes references to the myth that Truman deliberately crossed out the words "Jewish state" in his announcement recognizing Israel.

Blaming Israel for usurping the rights of Israeli Arabs and the ongoing efforts to make them engage in armed struggle against Israel, and the presentation of the "right of return" as an individual right that could not be infringed upon or given up, only show the consistent refusal of Palestinians to recognize Israel's right to exist as a nation-state of the Jewish people.

The document's authors point to the peace treaties Israel signed with Egypt and Jordan and note that those two Arab countries did not have to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.

This comparison is irrelevant because the Jordanians and Egyptians never asked for a right of return and they do not base their national identity on an antithesis to the Zionist idea. Unlike the Palestinians, the raison d'être of Jordan and Egypt is not a function of the resistance to the nation-state of the Jews or on the blaming of Jews for perpetual victimhood.

The Palestinians continue to deceive the Israelis and the international community by using terms such as "two states for two people. " However, as far as they are concerned, "Palestine" should be a nation-state of the Palestinian people, while Israel should not be a Jewish state and lack any special Jewish or Zionist character.

Unless a new Palestinian leadership comes forth and shows a true willingness to reach a final-status agreement with Israel that is based on Israel's right to exist as the nation-state of the Jewish people, it would be best if Israel acted independently to secure the continuation of the Zionist dream so that Israel remains a Jewish and democratic state that is both thriving and secure, all the while keeping the door open for the two-state solution.

In this current political reality, peace will only be a possibility when our grandchildren grow up.

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