The war damaged not only Iran's missile and nuclear programs but also government and law enforcement institutions in Tehran. The regime is experiencing a trauma that it is trying to offset by repairing its image among the public. Yet this trauma is not driving Iranian leaders toward despair, at least for now. Instead, it has strengthened the motivation within the regime to revise its national security outlook.

Iran is therefore restoring its missile program, expanding missile ranges, advancing a long-term plan to rebuild and strengthen the Lebanese Hezbollah terrorist organization, and seeing growing internal pressure on Khamenei to authorize the development of nuclear weapons.

One prominent point in the regime's internal lessons-learned debate is the call by senior security analyst Mehdi Mohammadi to promote a multi-front massacre attack against Israel. Mohammadi, who also serves as an adviser to Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, the speaker of the Majles and a member of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, published a post on November 1 in Iranian media arguing that conditions are ripe for such an offensive.

He wrote that in "Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and Iran a new generation of resistance fighters has emerged, one that is bold and willing to pay any price in the fight against Israel."

Mohammadi added that this is a war of survival between Israel and Iran, which means the regime must "think in a more creative, large-scale and multidimensional way than it has over the past three decades." His meaning was clear: a coordinated, multi-front massacre operation.

The headline of his article, "The next Octobers: the new nightmare of the Zionist regime" left little doubt about his intent. Last night he again pushed his call for a multi-front assault and urged the regime to prepare an operation in which every component of the resistance axis takes part together in a "decisive, prolonged and extensive battle." A limited confrontation, he warned, would not achieve the desired result because it only benefits Israel.

Mohammadi is well known for the uproar he caused in July 2025 when he posted an Instagram story depicting a nuclear strike on Israel. After heavy criticism he claimed it had been uploaded by his page administrator without his knowledge.

The available information suggests that the 7 October attack was launched even though Yahya Sinwar did not tightly coordinate the timing with Hezbollah, Tehran or other components of the Iranian-led resistance axis. A series of recent reports underscores how feverishly the axis is now operating.

These include Defense Minister Israel Katz's disclosure of Houthi presence in Syria; reports on the efforts by the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist organizations to establish a foothold in Syria; the Houthis' plan to infiltrate Israel from the Jordanian border through Iraq or Saudi Arabia; and Hezbollah's ongoing rehabilitation and force buildup.

As part of Israel's own preparations for the threat posed by the Iranian-led axis, the IDF completed the establishment of Division 96 in September 2025. The division is intended to prevent the infiltration of Palestinians, Iraqi militias and Houthis into Israel through the Jordanian border. It will be deployed from Ein Gev to Masada. Even so, construction of the border fence in this area and the development of engineering barriers must be accelerated to prevent a possible incursion.

At the same time, Israel must prepare for the emerging threat and closely monitor possible preparations by the Iranian regime and the resistance axis for a multi-front strike. Tehran must not be allowed to rebuild and rearm its proxy forces, since doing so could serve as a catalyst for such an attack. Statements by senior Iranian officials, from Khamenei to the spokesperson of Iran's armed forces, Abu al-Fadl Shekarachi, show clearly that Tehran remains committed to its ambition of destroying Israel.

Therefore, alongside intelligence monitoring and defensive preparations, Israel would be better served by formulating a crushing, preemptive multi-front strike and applying it at the right moment. In addition, as long as elements of the resistance axis continue to foment instability in Syria and the Assad regime exhibits chronic weakness, a withdrawal from the areas Israel captured in southern Syria would be a dangerous move.

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As part of that process, the terrorist organization sought to calm its social base, which was severely harmed during the war and has signaled bitterness and fatigue. Given the base's vital importance as Hezbollah's source of manpower and electoral support, the terrorist organization pushed a narrative of victory and sacrifice. It also provided financial compensation, with Iranian assistance, to families whose homes were destroyed or who were forced to flee in fear of the war.

At the same time, Hezbollah launched an intensive reconstruction project, aided by smuggling from Iran and relying on local production capabilities. Since the end of the war, the terrorist organization has conducted an internal investigation to identify the sources of the leaks that enabled Israel's deep penetration into its ranks. It has also begun a reorganization process to adapt to the new reality of its confrontation with Israel and has recruited new operatives.

For that reason, in an effort to emerge from the historic crisis caused by the war, Hezbollah's leadership, headed by Secretary-General Naim Qassem, chose to contain Israel's attacks, despite the resentment and unrest this policy generated among field commanders. Lebanon's new political climate, including signs of a state revival and a desire to limit the consequences of the war to end Iranian domination in the country, also influenced the terrorist organization's decision to adopt a containment strategy.

The killing of Tabataba'i comes at a moment when Hezbollah faces a complex equation. If the terrorist organization chooses to retaliate against Israel, it risks losing the gains it has achieved since the cease-fire and playing into the hands of Jerusalem, where leaders are eager to intensify Israeli strikes. On the other hand, failing to respond would project significant weakness, damage Hezbollah's image in Lebanon, and could even spark early signs of internal rebellion within the organization.

It is also difficult to envision Tehran rushing to Hezbollah's aid and reentering direct confrontation with Israel. In addition to its multiple domestic crises, including a crisis of legitimacy, water and energy shortages, and deep economic distress, Iran is now troubled by the decision of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors. The decision requires Iran to update the agency on its uranium stockpile and on the facilities struck during Operation Am Clavi. As occurred days before the start of the 12-day war, this could serve Israel as a tool to build legitimacy for renewing its campaign against Iran.

The Houthis, even if they join the confrontation alongside Hezbollah, cannot provide the necessary backing against Israel. Hamas and Islamic Jihad, given their current state, are also not interested in renewing fighting in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah's potential isolation on the battlefield will likely shape the organization's decision regarding the scope of its response.

For these reasons, and particularly due to internal pressures within the terrorist organization, it appears Hezbollah will choose to engage in several limited days of fighting, if Tabataba'i was indeed killed. This would allow its field ranks to vent frustration and respond to Israel's attacks. After absorbing the expected Israeli blow, Hezbollah will likely resume its reconstruction process.

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His threat followed an open letter published on November 6 addressed to Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Najib Mikati, in which the Iranian-backed terrorist organization asserted its right to resist Israeli aggression. Yet given Hezbollah's complicated situation, it is doubtful that its restraint has reached a breaking point. The terrorist organization does not appear able to afford a renewed confrontation or even a limited exchange of blows with Israel. In any renewed conflict, even a localized one, Hezbollah risks losing the gains it is currently trying to secure.

Key points

• Hezbollah is rebuilding its military capabilities and recruiting thousands of new fighters with Iran's help.
• Tehran has transferred about one billion dollars to Hezbollah since January 2025 as part of strategic support.
• Israel and the US need to undermine Hezbollah's standing in the social and ideological arenas, not only militarily and economically.

Hezbollah's political troubles were reflected in another part of the same open letter, where it opposed any negotiations with Israel. The statement came in response to growing calls inside Lebanon's leadership, including President Joseph Aoun, several parliament members and media circles critical of Hezbollah, who argue that peace with Israel is essential for Lebanon's survival.

A military clash does not serve Hezbollah's interests at this stage. It is in the midst of rebuilding and expanding its power with the help of Iran's Quds Force and its own growing production capabilities. Daily Israeli strikes indicate the intense pace at which Hezbollah is pushing its recovery. Israel is trying to match that pace, but figures released by the Israel Defense Forces to the media in recent days highlight the difficult operational reality Israel is facing.

In recent weeks Hezbollah managed to smuggle hundreds of rockets, including via Syria, repair and restore launchers damaged in the war, and recruit thousands of new fighters. Qassem's statement appears aimed at appeasing internal factions unhappy with the leadership's policy of containment set by Hezbollah's Shura Council, which serves as its general staff. In early November reports in Lebanon said frustration was growing within the organization's lower ranks over the lack of retaliation to Israeli strikes.

Qassem's implied threat was also directed at Lebanon's political leadership, adding pressure on them to act against Israel to halt the strikes. Much of his speech was aimed at Lebanese officials, portraying Israeli actions as a major threat and emphasizing the importance of Hezbollah's weapons.

Israel, for its part, stands at a crossroads. The operational pattern of the Lebanese Armed Forces toward Hezbollah is inadequate. The Lebanese army projects weakness and lacks the ability to challenge the Iranian-backed terrorist organization, whose officials have openly warned they would "cut off the hand" of anyone who tries to seize its weapons. As Qassem stressed, Hezbollah views its weapons as the core of its power alongside faith and determination.

Iran, meanwhile, continues to shore up Hezbollah to preserve its influence among Lebanon's Shiite community. In late October the office of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, together with Hezbollah, launched the Arabic edition of Khamenei's scholarly book "Poetry and Music: A Study of the Imam Sayyid Ali Khamenei's Religious Ruling."

At the Beirut launch ceremony, Qassem praised Khamenei's scholarly credentials. The gesture served to remind Lebanon's Shiites of the religious sponsorship Iran gives to the terrorist organization. This complements Iran's financial backing, which, according to the Trump administration, has totaled one billion dollars since January 2025. The religious sponsorship is meant to strengthen the bond between Lebanon's Shiites and Iran under Khamenei and give them another reason to remain loyal to Hezbollah.

The Supreme Leader's office has also been signaling its personal support for Qassem, despite and to some extent because of the ridicule he faces on Lebanese social media. The office recently posted on its Arabic-language X account a portrait of Qassem alongside previous Hezbollah leaders Abbas Musawi, Hassan Nasrallah and Hashem Safi al-Din. Next to the portrait was a statement by Khamenei saying, "Nasrallah passed away but the wealth he created remains. Hezbollah's story in Lebanon is a continuing story. It is wealth for Lebanon and beyond."

Khamenei's words highlight the strategic value Iran assigns to Hezbollah and the group's central place in Iran's national security doctrine. Although the Houthis have gained stature in the Iranian-led axis due to their maritime and missile attacks during the Iron Swords War, they cannot replace Hezbollah. Hezbollah has been Iran's strategic arm abroad, from attacks against Israeli targets such as the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, to helping build Shiite militias in Iraq after 2003, to its leading role fighting Syrian rebel groups and Islamic State in Syria, to decades of experience facing Israel.

Hezbollah also has deeper religious ties to Iran and a significant geopolitical advantage over the Houthis thanks to its border with Israel. Israel therefore needs to expand its campaign against Hezbollah into the social and ideological spheres.

"Competing" with Hezbollah

At this moment Israel has a distinct advantage. Hezbollah's political weakness, its fragile standing with its Shiite base and strong backing from President Donald Trump's administration give Israel both space and time to continue targeting the group. Still, Israel and the US will likely need to widen the effort beyond the military and the economic. Lebanon's parliamentary elections, scheduled for May 2026, are expected to serve as an important test of Hezbollah's support among its base.

Israel and the US should undermine that base by initiating a long-term strategic project that would create a competing network to Hezbollah's dawa system, which encompasses welfare, health, social and financial services.

The attempt to cut Iran's financial support to Hezbollah, as announced by John Hurley, the US Treasury's Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, is a step in the right direction. But Israel and the US must go further by reducing Lebanon's Shiite community's economic dependence on Hezbollah and offering an alternative that helps them develop an independent Lebanese identity. This includes providing replacement services for those Hezbollah currently supplies.

On the ideological front, in response to Hezbollah's Imam al-Mahdi Scouts youth movement, through which Shiite children between ages 0 and 10 are indoctrinated into loyalty to Khamenei, Israel and the US should launch initiatives emphasizing loyalty to Lebanon and the prosperity Lebanon's Shiites could achieve by abandoning their opposition to Israel.

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Presented as a geo-strategic analysis, Kharazi's remarks in fact revealed dangerous, classical antisemitism, cloaked in diplomatic language. His statements only proves the antisemitic nature of Iran's regime, and offers another glimpse into the ideological justification Tehran promotes for the destruction of Israel.

Kharazi warned that Israel seeks to establish a "Greater Israel" spanning from the Nile to the Euphrates – a goal, he claimed, rooted in promises made in the Torah. He accused Israel of following a 24-point plan allegedly crafted by the Freemasons in a clear reference to The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the notorious 19th-century antisemitic forgery that fueled persecution of Jews in Europe. Kharazi added that "the Jews are a small minority seeking to control the world," thereby explicitly embracing the conspiratorial narrative of the "cosmopolitan Jew" pulling the strings behind global powers. His deliberate mention of the Freemasons was also no coincidence, reviving the old antisemitic myth that Jews secretly control this shadowy group, a theme common in late 19th-century propaganda promoting the notion of a global Jewish takeover.

A 'just' Jihad

Kharazi also likened Israel to the Islamic State terrorist organization, claiming that like ISIS, Israel too promotes "sacred violence." This is a familiar dehumanizing tactic used in Iranian regime rhetoric, aimed at framing aggression against Israel and Jews as legitimate self-defense, even as a service to humanity. Tehran thus attempts to lend a moral veneer to its hatred of Israel, portraying the fight against it as a righteous jihad.

At a regional conference in Qatar this past May, Kharazi had already urged regional states to unite against Israel's expansionist ambitions. Now, it seems that his remarks, widely disseminated by Khamenei's English-language media arm, were intended not only for governments and peoples in the region but also aimed at leveraging the global surge in antisemitism since October 7, to draw broader Western audiences into Iran's orbit.

These statements were no off-the-cuff remarks. Kharazi was quoted directly on the supreme leader's official website, one of the regime's top platforms for broadcasting carefully coordinated messaging both internally and externally. The conclusion is clear: Antisemitism is a central pillar in the ideological framework of the Islamic Republic. The religious justification provided by Khamenei and other regime figures for the October 7 massacre stems from this antisemitic worldview. Kharazi's rhetoric helps set the ideological stage for another such atrocity.

In doing so, Kharazi joins a long list of Iranian officials, led by Khamenei himself, who have transformed "the Jewish question" into a political and propaganda weapon. Instead of criticizing specific Israeli policies, they adopt a religious-mythological narrative of a cosmic battle against the "Zionist entity," which they view as a direct continuation of the biblical "Jew." Even after Operation Shield and Arrow and the blow dealt to Iran's axis of resistance in the 2023 Israel–Hamas war known as Operation Iron Swords, Tehran continues to pursue its vision of Israel's annihilation. In his recent speeches, Khamenei reaffirmed this goal, effectively instructing his subordinates to redouble efforts toward its realization, especially in light of the disruption of their previous plan, stemming from a lack of coordination with Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar.

Riding the wave

While Iran publicly claims to distinguish between Jews and Zionism, it is actively laying the groundwork for yet another war crime in the mold of October 7. Israel must intensify its efforts on the international stage to expose and highlight the antisemitic discourse promoted by the Iranian regime. Such a campaign would undermine Iran's legitimacy, shed appropriate light on the dangerous ideology it espouses, and bolster Israel's international legitimacy in countering Tehran.

At the same time, Kharazi's statements may also suggest the regime's growing weakness, and its attempt to ride the wave of global antisemitism to muster support, both globally and regionally. The lack of regional response to his call in May, the blow suffered by Iran and its proxies in the war, and the broader upheaval in the Middle East that followed, including the rise of an anti-Hezbollah government in Lebanon, have led Tehran to once again play the antisemitic card, in an effort to compensate for its strategic setbacks and weakening position.

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That decision comes amid rising external pressure, including the activation of the Security Council snapback sanctions mechanism, and a sense of trauma in Iran after having been surprised by Israel.

The first worrying sign from Iran: Tehran appears focused on increasing the range of its ballistic missiles to intercontinental distances, meaning 5,500 kilometers and beyond. MP Mohsen Zanganeh told Iranian television recently that the unidentified lights seen in Iran's skies two days earlier and which stirred public curiosity were in fact a successful test of an intercontinental missile. It may have been the Khorramshahr-5 ballistic missile, reportedly capable of 12,000 kilometers, which Defense Minister Nazirzadeh said has not yet entered operational service.

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-abdollahian denied Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's claim after the test that Tehran is working on intercontinental missiles that would allow it to threaten Washington and New York. However, Ahmad Bakhshaish Ardestani, a member of the parliament's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, confirmed the report. In an interview with Iranian media he said Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei removed a previous limit that kept Iran's missile range under 2,200 kilometers, and that Iran is now developing its missile program as far as it wishes, because it must strengthen what he called its most important military power, namely its missile program.

The second worrying sign from Iran: alongside talk of intercontinental missiles, pressure is growing within the regime on Khamenei to approve production of nuclear weapons. Last week Ali Shamkhani, a senior adviser to Khamenei and a long-time manager of Iran's nuclear program, urged the regime to develop nuclear weapons, saying it would have been better if Iran had developed such weapons in the 1990s. Earlier, on September 22, it was reported that 70 members of parliament sent a letter to the Supreme National Security Council, the high body that makes the regime's strategic decisions, demanding permission to develop nuclear weapons. The MPs emphasized their request is to authorize possession and development of such weapons for deterrence purposes, but not to use them.

At the same time, nuclear scientist Mahmoud Reza Aghamiri, president of Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran, which is under US and European sanctions because of links to the nuclear program, said last week that if one day Iran is required to build an atomic bomb, it could do so well. He added Iran has the capability and resources to develop nuclear weapons, but that it does not intend to do so.

The third worrying sign from Iran: alongside the two previous moves, Tehran is signalling a determination to rebuild its proxy network despite the major changes the war has caused in the Middle East. As revealed by the Mossad's Persian-language account on X, Abdollah Saberi has been appointed to replace Saeed Izadi, who was eliminated in Operation Rising Lion, as head of the Palestine branch of the Quds Force. In that role Saberi will be responsible for rebuilding Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, in Lebanon and in Syria.

Saberi is expected to rely on Unit 840 of the Quds Force, the unit responsible for special operations which in recent years the IDF and Shin Bet foiled in attempts to smuggle advanced, game-changing weaponry to terrorist actors in Judea and Samaria; on Unit 340, the Quds Force's technical assistance unit that provides know-how and technological equipment for Iran's regional networks; and on Unit 190, which is responsible for smuggling arms to the network, whose commander Henam Al-Hiryari was also killed in Operation Im Keliv.

Tehran sees cultivation of the so-called "Axis of Resistance" as essential to its national security. That idea was echoed recently by Parliament Speaker and member of the Supreme National Security Council Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, who explicitly expressed the Iranian aspiration to renew the ring of fire around Israel. He argued that if Iran does not fight Israel on the Golan front, Israel will fight Iran on its own borders. He also stressed that Iran's route for transferring support to Hezbollah remains open, even if it has become more difficult in light of regional changes, a sign of Iranian motivation to rebuild Hezbollah and reinvigorate the organization. Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy Ali-Reza Tangsiri recently boasted of Tehran's ability to export missiles, unmanned aerial systems and warships.

The trauma is still here

This trend is also apparent in the Islamic Republic's response to a message Russian President Vladimir Putin recently conveyed from  Prime Minister Netanyahu that Israel does not intend to renew the war against Iran. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Iran's forces remain on alert for the possibility of a renewed war, because it is quite likely that this is an Israeli deception.

At the same time, in an effort to curb a sharp fall in the national currency and to tamp down unrest that could spark protests, the regime is sending calming messages to its public. Security officials told the media that the enemy will not dare to renew the war and that the likelihood of such a resumption is small. Armed Forces Chief of Staff Mohammad Bagheri and IRGC commander-in-chief Mohammad Pakpour emphasized in statements to the media that Iranian forces are fully ready for a powerful fight against any kind of threat or aggression.

Where is Tehran headed? 

And what does the Supreme Leader say? In a speech last month, Khamenei argued at length that resuming negotiations with the US would be a move whose harms outweigh its benefits, because it would amount to capitulation to President Trump and would bring further US demands on missiles and other areas.

Nevertheless, the moderate and reformist camps are questioning his policy, as evidenced by sharp criticism of the decision to reject an invitation for President Pezhakian to attend a summit hosted by Trump in Sharm el-Sheikh. In their view, his participation could have opened a door to renewing talks with the US and easing tensions. However, given Khamenei's deep suspicion and lack of trust in Trump, it appears for now the Iranian leader will continue to set strict conditions for resuming talks and will push a policy designed to weather the Trump era.

In light of these developments, Israel should prepare for the possibility that Iran will return to Syria, especially in a scenario where Khamenei is persuaded by hard-line officials calling for development of nuclear weapons. Iran's attempt to upgrade its missile program and restore the "Axis of Resistance" demonstrates once again that Tehran will remain at the center of Israel's strategic calculations.

Domestic support for developing nuclear weapons, Iran's growing international isolation, the missiles Tehran is trying to develop against the West and, for now, the end of the Gaza war all give Israel an opportunity to strengthen its strategic partnership with the US under President Trump. Accordingly, Israel should work to expand that partnership to leading European states, a move that would build broad cooperation against Iran, deepen pressure on Tehran and legitimize kinetic and economic action against it.

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Given Iran's conspiratorial mindset and Khamenei's deep suspicion of US actions, Tehran is likely to view the plan as a move aimed squarely at undermining the regime. The leadership may suspect that Trump's plan is designed to complete the weakening of another arm of Iran's regional proxy network—Hamas. This would add to Hezbollah's current difficulties in Lebanon, the decline of Shiite militias in Iraq, and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. In Tehran's eyes, all this points toward the main goal of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Trump: toppling the Iranian regime.

Iran's state media has already framed Trump's proposal as an "imperialist plan designed to perpetuate the occupation of Palestine." The plan threatens Iran because it explicitly weakens Hamas and its grip on Gaza. Should Hamas accept, control of the Strip would pass to a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee responsible for day-to-day governance under the oversight of an international transitional body—"the Peace Council"—led by Trump and joined by figures such as former British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

The positive reception of the plan by Arab states and Israel undermines the regional policy Iran has tried to lead since Israel's attack in Qatar. At the Islamic summit in Doha, Tehran pushed for a unified front against Israel, urging not only condemnations but also harsh action, including economic and diplomatic boycotts. Trump's plan flips this strategy on its head. Now Israel and key Arab states appear to be aligned, not opposed. Moreover, if Hamas rejects the plan, as it is expected to, the tacit approval from the US and indirect backing from Arab states for Israel to occupy Gaza runs counter to Iran's regional strategy.

How might Iran respond?

Several factors fuel Tehran's opposition: Khamenei's distrust of the Trump administration, Iran's desire to block a US-led regional order, and its aim to leverage the Swords of Iron War, and the Israeli attack in Qatar in particular, to shape a pro-Iranian regional order. Tehran also fears that Israel seeks to renew direct confrontation with Iran, thereby pushing Arab states to avoid any cooperation with Jerusalem in such a scenario.

From Iran's perspective, Trump's plan could pose dangerous consequences for its national security. Tehran will likely attempt to pressure Arab states diplomatically to oppose the plan. It will also seek consultations with Hamas on how to exploit it, using the proposal to stall Israeli military action in Gaza and to prevent even temporary Palestinian displacement, while simultaneously blaming Israel for obstructing implementation or pushing for Hamas allies to infiltrate the proposed technocratic administration.

The requirement that all hostages be released before Israeli withdrawal prevents Iran and Hamas from pursuing a deception strategy, extracting concessions from Israel, such as avoiding a full occupation of Gaza, without Hamas delivering on its side. Tehran and Hamas are also expected to seek Qatari mediation for support in navigating the bind the Trump plan has created. Even if Hamas ultimately rejects the proposal, Iran will likely try to reassure its leaders of the necessity of resistance, offsetting Hamas' concerns about the strong backing Arab states have shown for the plan.

Ultimately, Trump's initiative appears to undercut Hamas' most valuable leverage: it demands the release of hostages upfront while forcing disarmament. It also contradicts Hamas' strategy of leveraging the October 7 attack as a long-term asset, even at the cost of losing control of Gaza. Despite mounting pressure from Arab leaders, Hamas is expected to reject the plan or, at the very least, turn to Qatar to negotiate changes that would hollow it out.

Israel, meanwhile, is already benefiting from the proposal. Even before implementation, the plan has thwarted Iran's attempt to build a unified Islamic front against Israel. Still, it risks stoking Iranian fears that Israel and the US are preparing for war, this time aimed at a regime change. The danger of Iranian miscalculation, including the possibility of a sudden strike against Israel, is a scenario both Washington and Jerusalem must now take seriously.

Senior Iranian officials such as Yahya Rahim Safavi, Khamenei's senior security adviser, have already called in mid-August for a surprise attack on Israel. Those calls could now gain momentum, particularly after the activation of the "snapback" mechanism, which increases the chances of Iranian miscalculation.

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Ahead of the Hezbollah and Amal protest rally this week at Riyad al-Solh Square, adjacent to the parliament building in Beirut, Qassem emphasized Hezbollah's uncompromising stance, whose main points are these: the terrorist organization refuses to hand over its weapons and is even prepared to confront Lebanon's authorities in order to preserve them, which he described as "our spirit, our honor and the future of our children."

The clear addressees of Qassem's remarks are President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. Hezbollah propagandists are already calling both of them on social media "Yazid," after the Umayyad caliph Yazid, detested by Shiites, who was responsible for the killing of Imam Husayn at the Battle of Karbala in 680. Alongside this, other Hezbollah propagandists on social media called for violent confrontation during the protest rally. In this context it is worth noting that security around President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam has recently been reinforced, out of fear that their fate could resemble that of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik al-Hariri, who was assassinated by Hezbollah in 2005.

Will Lebanon be torn apart again?

Hezbollah is not interested in a civil war. Such a war would inflict severe reputational damage on the terrorist organization, which seeks to cling to its hackneyed slogan, "the army, the people and the resistance," a phrase Qassem repeated in his speech even though Lebanon's leaders have made clear it has expired. A civil war would drag Lebanon back into the all too recent past of a bloody internal conflict and would embolden the government in Beirut, namely that Hezbollah prefers its weapons over Lebanon's stability.

Hezbollah has been pushed into a corner, and therefore seeks to exert counter-pressure on Lebanon's leadership through a series of shows of force, the nearest of which will take place tomorrow. The significant support the terrorist organization still enjoys within its social base, the Shiite community in Lebanon, enables it to take a firm stand against the Lebanese government's historic decision to disarm it by the end of 2025.

At the same time, despite the political revival of the Lebanese state, its army and security services remain weak and will not be able to force Hezbollah to disarm. Iranian backing also imbues Naim Qassem's policy with confidence and encourages him to resist pressure from the Lebanese government and the Trump administration.

The cards Israel could lose

However, the deep dispute currently shaking Iran's political arena over the regime's policy after the war against Israel is spilling over into Tehran's position on the Lebanese crisis. In contrast to the unequivocal backing Iran's conservatives give Hezbollah's position, in recent days parts of the reformist camp have called on the regime to change course. In their view, Tehran should not interfere in an internal Lebanese matter. Hezbollah, they argue, must respect the Lebanese government's decision, as the state is the sovereign, weapons must be held exclusively by it, and the presence of an armed militia in Lebanon is unacceptable. The reformist camp also questioned the usefulness of the visit to Beirut by the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani. They warned that Tehran's involvement in Lebanon could harm the regime and provide the US and Israel with a pretext to act against Iran again. Therefore, the solution they propose is to integrate Hezbollah into the Lebanese Army.

Even so, the regime's support for Hezbollah's position was made clear in the statement by Quds Force deputy coordinator Iraj Masjedi, according to whom the Lebanese government's decision to disarm Hezbollah is a "US-Zionist scheme that is unacceptable to the Lebanese people and will never be realized."

In his speech Qassem called on the government, of which Hezbollah remains a member, to hold intensive discussions on how to restore its sovereignty, which he said is harmed by the ongoing Israeli presence in five outposts in southern Lebanon. He also called on the parties, elites and influential figures in the country "to assist the government in thinking and implementing the plans," and alongside this presented Hezbollah's proposed solution: Israel must withdraw from southern Lebanon, stop its attacks on Hezbollah and release its captives, while the Lebanese state begins rebuilding the south. In return, after these steps are completed, which would strip Israel of its strategic cards, Hezbollah would be ready to discuss Lebanon's "defense strategy," in Qassem's words.

In recent contacts with the US government's envoy to Lebanon and Syria, Tom Barak, Israel proposed, according to Lebanese media reports, turning the belt of contact villages in southern Lebanon into an uninhabited, demilitarized economic zone. In exchange, Israel proposes a gradual halt to strikes and targeted killings, a gradual withdrawal from several occupied areas and "the completion of the issue of Lebanese prisoners." Such an Israel–Lebanon agreement could indeed speed the return of residents of Israel's north to their homes. However, it does not meet the need to deliver a severe political blow to Hezbollah as well, given the new reality. Israel could therefore forfeit important cards and leave Hezbollah as a popular force among the country's Shiites, who form its base of power.

It appears that in the struggle against Iran's years-long investment in Lebanon, there are no shortcuts. Israel and the US must strive to undermine Hezbollah among the Shiites by building a rival network to the terrorist organization's da'wa apparatus and by providing political support to its opponents within the community. Until then, Hezbollah will likely dare to threaten Lebanon's stability, relying on the extensive support it enjoys among the country's Shiites.

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Ahead of the protest rally that Hezbollah and other organizations plan to hold on Wednesday at Riad al-Solh Square, near the parliament building in Beirut, Qassem emphasized in his speech Hezbollah's firm position, with its main points being that the organization refuses to surrender its weapons, and is even prepared to confront Lebanese authorities to preserve the weapons, which are "our spirit, our honor and the future of our children," according to Qassem's words in his speech.

The clear address in Qassem's words is to President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. Hezbollah propagandists are already calling both of them on social media by the dubious title "Yazid" after the Umayyad Caliph Yazid, hated by the Shiites, who was responsible for the murder of Imam Hussein in the Battle of Karbala in 680. Alongside them, other Hezbollah propagandists on social media are calling for violent confrontation during Wednesday's protest rally. In this context, it should be noted that recently security around President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam has been increased, out of fear that their fate will be similar to that of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, who was eliminated by Hezbollah in 2005.

Will the country be torn apart again?

Hezbollah is not interested in civil war. Such a war would cause severe image damage to the organization, which seeks to stick to its worn-out slogan, "the army, the people and the resistance," which Qassem repeated in his speech, even though Lebanese state leaders have made it clear that its validity has expired. A civil war would drag Lebanon back to the well-remembered territories from the not-so-distant past, in which the country was torn apart in a bloody internal war, and would clarify the righteousness of the authorities in Beirut, according to which Hezbollah prefers its weapons over stability in Lebanon.

Hezbollah is pushed into a corner, and therefore seeks to exert counter-pressure on Lebanese state leaders through a series of shows of force, the closest of which will take place on Wednesday. The significant support that the organization still enjoys among its social base, the Shiite community in Lebanon, allows it to express a firm position against the historic decision of the Lebanese government to disarm it of its weapons by the end of 2025.

Alongside this, despite the political revival of the Lebanese state, its army and security mechanisms are still weak and will not be able to force Hezbollah to disarm. The Iranian backing also instills confidence in Naim Qassem's policy and encourages him to resist pressures from the Lebanese government and the Trump administration.

The cards that Israel might lose

However, the fundamental disagreement that is shaking the political arena in Iran these days – around the regime's policy in the post-war era against Israel –also spills over to Tehran's position in light of the crisis in Lebanon. In contrast to the firm support that conservatives in Iran express for Hezbollah's position, in recent days, some of the reformist circles are calling on the regime to change its policy. According to these circles, Tehran should not intervene in the internal Lebanese issue; in their approach, Hezbollah should respect the decision of the Lebanese government, which is the sovereign in the country, since weapons should be held exclusively by it, and the existence of an armed organization in Lebanon is unacceptable. The reformist camp even questioned the usefulness of the visit that the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security, Ali Larijani, made to Beirut. They even warned that Tehran's intervention in Lebanon could harm the regime, that it could serve as a pretext for the US and Israel to act again against Iran. Therefore, the proposed solution that emerges from them is to integrate Hezbollah into the Lebanese army.

However, the regime's support for Hezbollah's position was well expressed in the statement by the deputy coordinator of the Quds Force, Iraj Masjedi, according to which the Lebanese government's decision to disarm Hezbollah is an "American-Zionist plan that is not acceptable to the Lebanese people, and will never be realized."

Qassem called in his speech on the government, of which Hezbollah is still a member, to hold intensive discussions in which it will examine how to restore its sovereignty, which was damaged in the shadow of the continued Israeli presence in the five outposts penetrating southern Lebanon. He also called on parties, elites, and influential figures in the country "to help the government in the way of thinking and implementing plans," and alongside this, also presented the solution that Hezbollah proposes. Israel should withdraw from southern Lebanon, stop the attacks against Hezbollah, and release its prisoners, and in parallel, the Lebanese state should begin the reconstruction of the south. In return, after completing these moves, which would remove from Israel its strategic cards, Hezbollah would be ready to discuss the "defense strategy" of Lebanon, according to Qassem's words.

In recent contacts with the American government's envoy to Lebanon and Syria, Tom Barrack, Israel offered, according to reports in the Lebanese media, to turn the contact villages strip in southern Lebanon into an uninhabited and disarmed economic zone. In return, Israel offers a gradual cessation of attacks and assassinations, gradual withdrawal from several occupied areas, and "completing the issue of Lebanese prisoners." Such an agreement between Israel and Lebanon could indeed accelerate the return of northern residents to their homes. However, it does not address the need to deliver a severe blow to Hezbollah also in the political sphere, in the shadow of the new reality. Therefore, Israel might give up important cards and leave Hezbollah as a popular force among the Shiites in the country, who make up its power base.

It seems that in the struggle against Iran's multi-year investment in Lebanon, there are no shortcuts. Israel and the US should strive to undermine Hezbollah among the Shiites, through establishing a competing network to the organization's propaganda apparatus, and political support for its opponents from within the community. Until then, it is almost certain that Hezbollah will dare to threaten Lebanon's stability, based on the extensive support from the Shiites in the country.

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Hezbollah rejected Lebanon's historic August 7 government decision to dismantle its military wing, and implementation now appears unlikely. Lebanon is motivated by two main factors: freeing itself from Iranian domination and meeting US conditions for urgently needed economic aid.

Lebanon's prime minister dismissed Hezbollah's long standing formula of "the army, the people, the resistance" and attempted to link disarmament to an Israeli withdrawal from five outposts in the country. The Trump administration refused, pushing instead for immediate disarmament.

Israel has been benefiting from Hezbollah's weakness, highlighted by its absence from Operation Rising Lion, in which Iran suffered a major blow. Under Naim Qassem, Hezbollah faces a prolonged recovery after the assassination of its senior leadership, which has also strained ties with Tehran. Although Qassem was appointed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's representative in Lebanon and received symbolic gestures of Iranian support, the personal dimension of the relationship has been disrupted by Hassan Nasrallah's elimination.

In a recent online address to a religious conference in Qom, Qassem portrayed Hezbollah as a direct continuation of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's ideology and praised its fight against Israel. In reality, he has largely refrained from retaliating for Israeli strikes that have killed more than 130 operatives and destroyed critical infrastructure. Meanwhile, Hezbollah has allowed the Israel Defense Forces to maintain control over five strategic positions along the border.

A 2024 poll found that 85% of Lebanon's Shiites express strong trust in Hezbollah, consistent with previous surveys indicating stable or growing support. In the May 2025 municipal elections, Hezbollah strengthened its grip on Shiite-majority areas through political alliances, particularly with the Amal movement. This backing stems from both ideological loyalty and economic dependence.

With no economic alternative and continued Iranian funding, most Shiites remain loyal. To undermine Hezbollah's base, the US must lead a long-term strategy to challenge the terrorist organization's network of schools, welfare programs, religious institutions, and financial services, by creating a rival infrastructure backed by billions of dollars in American investment.

Such a strategy would aim to break Shiite economic dependence on Hezbollah. Shiites make up about 40% of Lebanon's population, compared to Sunnis at around 30% and Christians at 25%, and bring them under the Lebanese state's authority. With sustained American economic and political aid, Lebanon might persuade Shiites to keep only light weapons and give up Hezbollah's heavy arsenal, despite fears rooted in the sectarian bloodshed in Syria and security concerns.

Backed by US support and strengthened Shiite opposition to Hezbollah, combined with ongoing Israeli efforts to block its recovery, the terrorist organization's political and social influence could be eroded over the long term, rather than aiming for quick results during Trump's presidency.

Hezbollah, which remained armed under the 1989 Taif Agreement, has effectively become Lebanon's sovereign power, using its weapons for political assassinations. It still seeks to advance its vision of a Shiite revival and continued conflict with Israel, even as it attempts to reinvent itself.

The massacre in Syria's Sweida province has reinforced Hezbollah's determination to remain armed, fearing revenge from Sunnis and Christians. The terrorist organization remains loyal to Iran and signals readiness to renew armed conflict with Israel in the future, serving the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which relies on it as a key regional force.

Despite recent remarks by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Tehran appears to be avoiding public involvement in the dispute, weakened by the war and aware that open support would damage Hezbollah. This was evident in April 2024, when Lebanon's Foreign Ministry issued an unprecedented reprimand to Iran's ambassador in Beirut after he spoke out against Hezbollah's disarmament.

To counter Hezbollah's rejection of disarmament, Lebanon needs sustained US economic and political investment, along with continued Israeli action to prevent the terrorist organization's recovery, aimed at weakening its support among Shiites and diminishing its military and political power.

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According to the Iranian narrative, its primary success was in preserving the Islamic regime, based on the assumption that toppling it was Israel's real aim in launching the war.

Two central themes have dominated Iranian media discourse since the war ended. The first concerns the resumption of nuclear negotiations with the US. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is under fire from conservative and ultra-conservative circles for wanting to resume talks, on condition the US guarantees Iran will not be attacked again, and for the implied trust he still places in President Donald Trump.

A matter of hours

The second theme involves whether Iran should respond with force. While some voices argue that Tehran's success in the war negates the need to strike Israel, the conservative-radical daily Vatan-e Emrooz reported on Sunday that top Iranian political and security officials are "intensifying discussions" over launching a pre-emptive strike against Israel.

The paper explained that this option is being considered in response to recent threats by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz, who warned of Israeli enforcement measures should Iran resume efforts to develop nuclear weapons or expand its ballistic missile production. Coupled with reports of US arms shipments to Israel since the end of the war, Vatan-e Emrooz concluded another Israeli strike is likely. It therefore called on Iran's regime to prepare to launch a pre-emptive attack "a day, a few hours, or even just one hour before the Zionist assault on Iran," if its security chiefs determine such a strike is imminent.

To prepare Iranian public opinion for such a move, the paper suggested the regime should frame it as a way to finally end the cycle of war and attacks on Iran, while using the threat to create long-term deterrence.

Meanwhile, signs of Iranian anxiety are increasing - both due to the damage suffered in the war and new threats from France, Britain and Germany to reinstate the UN Security Council's snapback sanctions mechanism against Iran in mid-October 2025. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told French media that Tehran would view a snapback as equivalent to a military attack.

In a related development, Mehdi Mohammadi, a strategic adviser to Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and a former nuclear negotiator, posted an image on Instagram depicting a nuclear attack on Israel. After it drew widespread attention and criticism, Mohammadi deleted the post, explaining it was uploaded by his social media administrator, though he personally believed a nuclear weapon would enhance Iran's deterrent capability.

The fine print in Tehran's ceasefire declaration

Ultimately, Israel and Iran are entering a new phase in their strategic confrontation. Israel has demonstrated its determination to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and its advanced capabilities to enforce that red line. Iran, on the other hand, is suspicious, vengeful, and alert - an impression reinforced by statements from its senior officials. After the war ended, Iran's foreign minister clarified that Tehran had not agreed to a ceasefire, but merely to halt attacks on Israel if Israel stopped its own.

This context increases the likelihood of a miscalculation by Iran, potentially triggering a sudden missile strike on Israel.

Israel's primary challenge in this next stage will be to combine intelligence vigilance with strategic coordination with the US, in order to thwart any Iranian attempt to obtain nuclear weapons and prevent a misstep that could reignite the war in one form or another. At the same time, Israel must work toward as accurate an assessment as possible of the damage inflicted on Iran's nuclear program, to plan its next moves accordingly.

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