"These actions unilaterally change facts on the ground and jeopardize the prospects for a two-state solution," as well as Israel's chances of remaining a Jewish, democratic state, they wrote.

Although the two-state idea is irrelevant right now and the homes are being demolished because of security considerations – and the demolitions require the approval of the High Court of Justice – this is of no particular interest to Jewish Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky of Illinois, one of the signatories. Unsurprisingly, she has the support of the leftist group J Street, which takes an anti-Israeli stance on almost every issue, including the nuclear deal with Iran.

Despite its bias, the letter itself was not particularly disturbing, other than the fact that everyone who signed it was from the Democratic Party, which in the not-too-distant past was considered a consistent supporter of Israel. One of the main reasons for this shift, possibly the most important one, is that President Donald Trump, who is loathed by the liberal Left, supports Israel, making support for Israel a target in the intensifying conflict between the American political camps.

Unlike in the past, when support for Israel in the U.S. was bilateral, the Trump administration's support amid the heated relations between the two political poles have made Israel into a legitimate target for attack in the eyes of the left wing in the Democratic Party. Democratic politicians were notably absent from the opening of the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem. Rather than admit that Democratic presidents, as well as Republican, had gone back on their promises to relocate the embassy, Democratic lawmakers preferred to punish Israel for Trump's "sin" of actually living up to his commitment.

Shalom Lipner, a research fellow at the liberal Brookings Institute in Washington, published an article last Tuesday titled "Netanyahu's risky romance with Trump." One of his supposed pieces of proof is the similarity of the U.S.'s and the Netanyahu government's stances on Iran. Even though even Netanyahu's political opponents in Israel see the issue as one of existential significance, if it's Trump who takes action against the Iranian threat, that is apparently out of bounds. Lipner disparages what he calls "short-term gains," but forgets that reining in Iranian aggression is the opposite of "short-term," and it is obvious that Israel can breathe a sigh of relief after eight years of a U.S. president who had a negative stance toward Israel from his first day in office.

It could be that the current good relations with the Trump administration won't last forever. There is also no way of knowing what the U.S. Congress will look like five months from now, after the 2018 midterm elections, or how the next presidential election will turn out. This is why the internal fight between the center and the populist Left in the Democratic Party should be a concern, especially given that judging by some of the party primaries, the Left could gain strength. Not all of them are necessarily anti-Israel or pro-Palestinian, but their traditional emotional connection to Israel is far from a sure thing.

Israel has no desire to become part of the American domestic political game, and it hopes that the Jews there will differentiate between their interests and positions as Americans and their identification with Israel. Israel's strengthening ties with the evangelical Christian community are a thorn in the side of many American Jews. But the evangelicals are natural partners, not because of their opinions on religion and the end of days, but because of their worldview on Israel. The fact that there are millions of African-American and Hispanic evangelicals is also important.

Some of the evangelical slogans are certainly not to our taste, and it is clear that evangelicals can never replace the connection Israel, as the Jewish state, has with U.S. Jewry, but the practical partnership with them is a political asset that every Israeli government should foster.

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Netanyahu managed to position not only Washington, but all of Europe, on the cusp of a fateful decision. Renewed sanctions against Iran means effectively canceling the main understanding on which the nuclear deal rests: wide-ranging economic benefits for Iran in exchange for lukewarm commitments from Iran about its nuclear program.

As far as international law is concerned, since the agreement is political in nature, a unilateral withdrawal would not necessarily cancel it entirely. But in practice, Washington's near-total control of international financial systems, including those linked to Iran's national bank, leaves many of the economic benefits Iran wanted to gain from the deal empty, particularly when it comes to oil exports. There are many reasons for the current serious economic crisis in Iran, but there is no doubt that Iranian citizens' fears of what may happen as a result of possible American moves is one of the main ones, as is the growing amount of money being smuggled out of the country.

The upcoming date of the decision, May 12, is not the last stop. That will come in mid-July, when Trump is supposed to announce whether the U.S. will apply for additional, more severe, unilateral sanctions against Iran. His May decision will signal what he intends to do later. There is no doubt that the ayatollahs are aware of the ramifications if Trump follows through on his warnings. Based on what he said after Netanyahu's press conference, there is now more chance of that happening, especially if the Europeans, despite their declarations that they intend to stick to the nuclear deal, respond even partly to the positions of the U.S. In the meantime, Iranian leaders are announced that if any changes are made to the deal, they will drop it completely. We can assume they know that such a situation would put the option of military action against them back on the table.

French President Emmanuel Macron's speech to Congress, which analysts said was intended to convince the U.S. to uphold the Iran deal, and other hints surrounding his meetings with Trump, indicate that Macron is not one of the more enthusiastic supporters of the deal. He may not want to cancel it, but he wants to add points on which Europe will insist if the U.S. withdraws. The new deal he is proposing has four underlying principles: a total, permanent ban on nuclear weapons for Iran; a total ban on Iranian military aggression in the Middle East; an end to Iran's long-range missile development program; and improvements to the faulty system of oversight that allows Iran to continue (as Netanyahu unequivocally demonstrated) their secret work on nuclear weapons.

But there is a flaw in this plan: What will make Iran comply with the demands without threatening to cancel the deal entirely? Macron had no answer for that. Therefore, his role will be to convince his European partners to cooperate with the Trump administration rather than getting bogged down in opposition that serves the Iranians and, to no lesser degree, the Russians in their face-off with the West.

There is no chance of swaying Russia and China from their support of the nuclear deal, not because they are partners in Iran's ambitions for hegemony, but because the deal is a tool for them to wield in their struggle against the U.S. in Ukraine, Syria, and the rest of the Middle East. Time will tell.

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Still, we cannot ignore the fact that this situation – which could clearly have been predicted – demands an appropriate diplomatic response, including legal ramifications. Apparently, this still hasn't happened.

From Israel's perspective, the main lesson from last weekend's events in Gaza is that they should be seen as a pattern and a preview of what might happen in the future if an independent Palestinian state were to be established on our eastern border under the current circumstances. No security fence or even a concrete barrier can stop an organized mass attempt to breach the Israeli border along a much larger front than merely the Gaza border, unless the IDF and the rest of Israel's security forces maintain full control, not only of the borders of Judea and Samaria, but inside those territories.

This leads to questions about the conventions of the two-state solution. According to proponents of the plan, the "right of return" for Arab "refugees" will apply only to a Palestinian state – which is supposed to ease our minds about our tiny country being flooded with hundreds of thousands of hostile "returnees." As if the small and resource-strapped Judea and Samaria could support double or even more its current population.

The obvious conclusion is that any possible peace deal must put an end to the fiction of Palestinian refugees that the U.N., for political reasons, keeps on life support. The "refugees" should be granted permanent residency in the places they have been living for three generations.

Others will argue that the problem could be offset by massive Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria, which would check the Arab demographic spread, and possibly prompt some of the latter to emigrate. This scenario ignores the concrete reality, and all the tricky numbers won't change the fact that within a few generations – even if there is large-scale aliyah by Jews, a worthy goal in itself – we would see an Arab majority or at least a sizable Arab minority from Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea. This would cancel the vision of a Jewish state and require serious restrictions to its democratic government, not to mention constant violent clashes between the populations of the "one state for two peoples."

There aren't many in Israel who identify with the insane idea of a single state for both peoples – although even they don't love the idea of a nightmarish "Gaza" controlled by terrorist organizations on our eastern border – and this is apparently the position of the prime minister, as well. The reality demands a) that the settlement effort focus on the country's security needs and b) intense diplomatic work to reject worthless solutions that are more dangerous than the current situation, even if they are spearheaded by our friends.

This does not mean that we must hold the status quo sacred, but rather that we – with the help of the U.S. – must move ahead toward interim solutions that will remove unnecessary financial, civil and governmental limitations from the Arab population in the territories without affecting Israel's operational freedom on matters of security.

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But this is also why AIPAC has never lacked enemies, whether they be American politicians who don't appreciate its influence or Jews on the radical Left who are either anti-Zionist or simply oppose the policies of the current Israeli government. Of course, there are also those on the Israeli Left who have criticized the organization for its supposed right-wing positions.

This time, however, AIPAC is being criticized by the Right, under the pretext it has officially come out in support of the two-state solution. While the organization did adopt former President George W. Bush's policy in support of the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state alongside Israel during the presidency of former President Barack Obama, by 2016, the issue had been removed from its agenda due to, among other things, a lack of conditions amenable to either negotiations or a peace deal.

AIPAC Executive Director Howard Kohr did mention this position in his remarks to the conference. While this may have been unnecessary, he did not say anything new. AIPAC originally adopted this position in an effort to "balance" its attacks on the Obama administration regarding the Iran deal. AIPAC, we must remember, is not an Israeli body but an American body, and therein lies its strength. It was established to promote U.S.-Israel ties on the basis of shared values and interests, and like it or not, the two-state solution has been the official policy of three previous administrations and apparently is also that of U.S. President Donald Trump.

AIPAC must be bipartisan. In American politics, this is now more important than ever, especially given the possibility the Democrats regain control of at least one of the chambers of Congress.

As for Israel, AIPAC reflects the positions of the democratically elected Israeli government. The enthusiastic welcome for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the most recent conference was a clear reflection of this.

Both the two-state and one-state solutions are equally negative: A Palestinian state in the current reality of the Middle East would be an irredentist terror state that would threaten Israel's existence; a binational state, on the other hand, would nullify the vision of a Jewish state. A responsible Israeli government does not cast its fate with either of these options, but rather with the country's vital long-term security considerations. At any rate, the only ones with something to gain from these attacks on AIPAC are Israel's detractors.

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The Palestinian strategy is based upon the assumption that a diminishing U.S. presence and the resulting increased Russian presence in the Middle East, along with the troubled relationship between Washington and Europe, have combined to create the optimal conditions for ousting the U.S from its role of sole mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It may also be that Trump's problems at home and the questionable stability of the Israeli government have also played a role in the Palestinians' decision to push ahead with efforts to internationalize the conflict.

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas made the first move in this direction when he spoke of "the Palestinian peace plan" at the U.N. Security Council last week. Although not stated outright, "the plan," a combination of the usual historical negationism and tired suggestions supposedly aimed at achieving a framework for peace with Israel, would in fact cancel the framework for direct negotiations between the two parties. It would also recalibrate U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which ties Israel's withdrawal from territory with the demarcation of security boundaries.

The world, which is busy dealing with crises like the one with North Korea, is barely interested in the Palestinian issue. At the Munich Security Conference earlier this month, for example, the issue was completely sidelined. Putting the Security Council at the center of Palestinian efforts was another mistake. No American administration, let alone the current administration, would allow this international body to lead diplomatic processes that are not in line with its policies.

Apart from Israeli Ambassador to the U.N. Danny Danon's remarks and a short response from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu following Abbas' U.N. speech, Israel has also moved on from the issue. While Israel may have its own suggestions as concerns the conflict with the Palestinians, it will not make them public before Trump announces his peace plan, which according to U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley will be made public soon.

Ever since the joint U.S.- Russia initiative to establish the Geneva Conference in 1973, Moscow has not played a significant role in the Palestinian issue, and despite conflicting reports, does not appear to have shown any interest in doing so. Nevertheless, the important role it plays in the Middle East today as a result of its deep involvement (alongside the U.S. and Iran) in Syria means Russian President Vladimir Putin could play a role in the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, if only to neutralize possible dilemmas that concern the conflict simmering between Israel and Iran in Syria and Lebanon.

Only a fool would try to predict how matters will progress in Syria. Although Syrian President Bashar Assad appears to have succeeded, with the help of Russia and Iran, in maintaining control of the government, it will be a long time before peace and stability are restored in that country, if at all. Once improbable, a diplomatic settlement between Syria and Israel now appears to be less likely still. But that is precisely why good relations between Netanyahu and Putin could play an important role in putting out fires in Syria. Indeed, the quiet understandings between the two leaders on Israel's (relative) freedom of action in Syria have proved beneficial in recent days, as when Israel responded to the incursion of an Iranian drone into its territory with airstrikes, and they could also prove important when it comes to the conflict with the Palestinians.

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Due to the importance of good neighborly relations with these countries, we do not need to reflect on the absurdity of this idea. However, we can note that while the entire Middle East was awash in waves of terror and violence – from Islamic State to Iranian belligerence – the person in charge of America's foreign policy blatantly ignored the reality in the region, whether out of ignorance or worse, because Israel's security was extremely low on his list of priorities.

Then-President Barack Obama gave the standard answer to those who objected to his unfavorable policies toward Israel: "Security cooperation between America and Israel has never been better."

In many ways this was true, but security is not measured solely by planes, weapons, joint military maneuvers and monetary support, all areas where the Obama administration was indeed very generous. Security is also measured by geopolitical, geographic and even demographic factors, which the previous administration ignored. (In this context, we must also mention the important strategic role played by the submarines Israel purchased from Germany.)

The global strategic and military discourse has recently focused on the "hybrid war," in other words aggression through external forces and proxies whose belligerence does not necessarily lead to an escalation of hostilities or massive retaliatory action. Indeed, Iran has implemented this method across the entire Middle East, including against Israel. Israel is alert to Iran's modus operandi and has decided not to play by the rules of this game. What happened on Saturday on the northern border is practical evidence of this conviction.

Israel needs to prepare for the threat of a hybrid war on other fronts as well. That is to say, a double war, because in addition to its narrow and limited scope, Israel simultaneously has to be ready for conventional aggression, backed by missiles, and so-called "guerrilla geopolitics" (in the form of terrorist activity).

From these two perspectives, Jordan does play an important strategic role in Israeli security (without even acknowledging Israel's even greater importance to Jordan's security). First, Jordanian territory is part of Israel's vital strategic depth. Second, Jordan prevents terrorist elements from spilling across the Jordan River into Israel, essentially reinforcing the IDF in the Jordan Valley. Of course, Egypt's positive role on the southern border should also be noted.

Also strategically important to Israel's security are the large settlement blocs in Judea and Samaria and the communities in the Jordan Valley and Golan Heights. As then-Defense Minister Moshe Dayan once said: In Judea and Samaria and the Golan Heights, the IDF must also be backed by a civilian presence, lest it be viewed as a provisional occupation army.

In this regard, incidentally, there are question marks surrounding the current legislative proposal to annex "settlement spaces" in Judea and Samaria without specifying whether this pertains to all of Judea and Samaria or just Area C. The proposal also fails to  distinguish clearly between the large settlement blocs, which are important to Israel's security, and isolated settlements,  or at least some of them, which not only are not vital but actually pose a security problem. In addition to these issues, this bill unnecessarily hampers Israel in the international arena, including its crucial relationship with the Trump administration.

In Davos recently, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu raised several points about the future of Judea and Samaria and the people who live there, saying: "The Palestinians will have complete authority to manage their affairs, except for security matters – the Palestinians need to have the authority to govern themselves, but not to threaten Israel, and Israel will maintain security comprehensively, including in the Jordan Valley."

He added: "I don't want to annex the Palestinians as citizens and I don't want them to be our subjects."

These statements can be interpreted in different ways, none of which appear to be compatible with the bill in question.

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As the saying goes, why choose when you can have both. Benjamin Netanyahu appears to be the first prime minister since David Ben-Gurion to take a comprehensive view of Israel's relationships with the world, friends and enemies alike, rather than strictly through the lens of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In his opinion, Israel must always try to find ways to advance its diplomatic, security and economic objectives while heeding the realities of a world where past conventions are mired in ever-expanding processes of evolution and change – for better and for worse.

Netanyahu saw, for example, that despite the small differences, there is no inherent contradiction between the American interest in stabilizing the situation in Syria while curbing Iran's geopolitical aspirations, and the Russian interest in limiting its alliance with Iran to specific goals, rather than broadening that alliance into sweeping support for all of the Islamic republic's belligerent and hegemonic goals. Russia has not forgotten the trauma of its disastrous embroilment in Afghanistan, which in President Vladimir Putin's mind was one of the factors that led to the Soviet Union's collapse. Therefore, he will do everything in his power to make sure Syria does not become another Afghanistan. This directly impacts Israeli-Russian relations.

Netanyahu was able to realize, then, the importance of cultivating good relations with Putin's Russia – parallel, not in contrast, to Israel's intimate relationship with Trump's United States, and acted accordingly. Israel, for example, sees Iran's ongoing presence in Syria and Lebanon, whether directly or through its various proxies, as a severe security threat that must be eradicated before it spreads. That is why Israel has acted on several fronts – covert and overt – to prevent it from happening, likely with Russia's knowledge.

It would be an exaggeration to say that Israel is acting under a Russian umbrella (or an American one) in this regard. It's safe to assume, though, that Moscow is sufficiently troubled over the possibility that Iran's measures and Israel's countermeasures could drag it diplomatically and perhaps even militarily to a place it does not want to be. Russia was also dubious over Iran's machinations in Syria. According to reports, an immediate "trigger" for a possible all-out conflagration on the northern border is the intention of Iran and Hezbollah to transfer the bulk of their activity to Lebanese territory, including the manufacturing of precision missiles and other sophisticated weapons.

During his brief visit to Moscow, Netanyahu apprised Putin about these potential scenarios. He did so to avoid any misunderstandings if Israel has to act militarily to disrupt these Iranian plans. The Russian military delegation's visit to Israel, headed by Gen. Nikolai Patrushev, immediately after Netanyahu's meeting with Putin, testifies to Russia's alertness regarding Israel's concerns and intentions. Moreover, despite the overall increased tensions between the U.S. and Russia these days, on the matter of Iranian activity in Syria and its possible expansion to Lebanon, there is a modicum of alignment between the two powers, and between each of them and Israel.

One final word of note: In international relations, one must tread cautiously. Painting the nature and scope of cooperation between Israel and Russia in such a positive light is not always accurate, particularly when it comes from people who are not in the know. It can even be detrimental to Israel's relationship with Russia and even the United States.

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Various commentators were quick to point out there was nothing new in Pence's speech. As far as the specific contents go, that is true.

However, as Aaron Miller, a U.S. adviser on Israeli-Arab negotiations under a number of administrations, so aptly said, "Mike Pence's trip was less important for what it accomplished than what it reflected and represented: Under Trump, the U.S.-Israel relationship has undergone a transition from a valued special relationship to one that's seemingly exclusive."

Even if this statement is a slight exaggeration, one of the unique aspects of the Trump administration, as reflected in Pence's speech, is that despite adopting its predecessor's objections to construction "beyond the Green Line," it does not believe that supporting Israel's fundamental demands on issues such as security, the demand for recognition of Israel as the Jewish state and the Jewish people's fundamental rights to their historical homeland disqualifies the U.S. from the role of impartial mediator, nor does it lessen American determination to bring about a just solution to the conflict on the basis of mutual compromise.

In fact, it is the near-hysterical speeches Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah and in Cairo, in addition to the actions of the Palestinians in general, that confirm the verity of Miller's remarks.

In these vulgar speeches, Abbas arrogantly and unrealistically rejected any American role in efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His words practically amounted to spitting in the face of the country that financially enables the existence of the Palestinian Authority he heads. He also issued a radical and ignorant falsification of world and Jewish history that served to pull the rug out from under any possible attempt at compromise.

The people who refer to Abbas' speeches as "fake history" are missing the point. Unlike the former Soviet leaders who knowingly rewrote history for their own political or personal gain, Abbas and many of his associates genuinely believe this falsified version of history. That is why the Palestinians have torpedoed and will continue to torpedo any diplomatic initiative that requires any type of practical or ideological concession, whether on the issue of refugees or in the recognition of Israel as the Jewish nation state, or in other words, the basic right of the Jewish people to the state.

One should not doubt Trump's genuine belief that history has granted him the role of leader who brings an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. What is less clear is whether he has internalized reality or the conclusions that must necessarily be reached on the peace process. It is difficult to see how the goal of "ultimate peace" can overcome the obstacle of Palestinian obstinacy. As Shalom Lipner, a former strategic adviser to the Prime Minister's Office, wrote this week, "Creating unrealistic expectations of a breakthrough when conditions are not conducive to progress is far from a cost-free exercise."

How will Trump respond if he discovers that his expectations were unrealistic? Would he demand that, as a result of the "exclusive relationship," Israel take steps it is unwilling to take?

One can assume that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a sober and responsible statesman, was looking to address this issue when, both on stage at the World Economic Forum in Davos and in conversations on the sidelines with Trump, he raised his proposals for the promotion of a practical solution for the whole issue. This would involve the recognition of a Palestinian entity with broad but limited powers on the issue of security, which would have the ability to self-govern without posing a threat to Israel, and without Israel annexing the Palestinians as citizens or subjects.

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