And yet, anyone who thought that this successful operation would cause the Houthis to stop launching attacks on Israel was mistaken.

The significance of the Israeli operation

The successful strike carried two major messages, perhaps even more important than the direct outcome.

First, after nearly two years of activity, the new operational theater in Yemen established by the Israel Defense Forces (intelligence, operations, air force and more) has proven itself. Building and collecting intelligence, including in real time, and closing a targeting loop 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles) from Israel's borders, not in Gaza or Lebanon, is a major achievement. These capabilities must continue to develop and expand, to include targeting ground-to-ground missile threats, production sites, supply chains, and launch infrastructure. Only then will Israel begin to see a more significant impact on enemy activity.

Second, if the Houthi leadership allowed itself to gather in an exposed apartment without adequate protection, the strike will now force them to change behavior. They will be more suspicious, more paranoid, constantly on the move. That will undermine their ability to govern and manage operations.

From threats to constant action

If Israel's decision makers thought the Houthis would reconsider their steps after losing most of their civilian leadership, recent days proved otherwise. In the past 24 hours, the Houthis attempted to fire four missiles in three separate launches, alongside unmanned aerial vehicles. The threat from the distant south remains.

The Houthis' capabilities are limited, but real. Their motivation is growing, not necessarily out of solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza, but out of their own ambition for international recognition of their rule, to strengthen their domestic and regional status, and to become a major player in the regional balance. From their perspective, they fought Saudi Arabia for seven years and endured, withstood a month and a half of American airstrikes and endured, and have been clashing with Israel for nearly two years, something no other organization or state has done successfully. These experiences embolden them to continue.

The way to confront the Houthi threat is not through fiery rhetoric or biblical metaphors, as Defense Minister Israel Katz suggested, but through a sustained, aggressive campaign of several days, based on precise intelligence, focused on intercepting launch capabilities (similar to what was done in Iran) and targeting leaders. Such a campaign requires significant resources. Given the ongoing war in Gaza and the need to keep a constant eye on developments in Iran, this raises the question of timing. But ultimately, Israel will have no choice. Otherwise, it will face yet another round of launches from Yemen, the 17th already on the planners' table, or be forced into immediate retaliation after an exceptional Houthi strike.

The military campaign must be wrapped in diplomatic moves, including efforts to rebuild an international coalition with the US and Arab states that share the same interests and threat perception – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states – while strengthening local opposition forces in Yemen.

But the diplomatic front is complicated by international trends unfavorable to Israel: France's push for recognition of a Palestinian state, the expansion of the war in Gaza, and statements by some members of the Israeli government about annexation steps in Judea and Samaria or the Jordan Valley as retaliation for France's initiative. Israel must choose its path, prioritize, and define a strategy in line with the regional reality, the threat map, and its national interests, with national security at the top of the list.

Less talk, fewer threats, more action. Deeds will speak louder than words.

A dangerous normalization

These exchanges of blows must be stopped. Israel cannot allow normalization of a reality in which, every few days, or even several times a day, millions of Israelis are forced to seek shelter while hundreds of kilograms of explosives are launched at city centers. Even if the missiles are aimed at Ben-Gurion Airport, the Kirya in Tel Aviv, or the Knesset in Jerusalem, the potential damage of a single strike was demonstrated in the "12-Day War" with Iran.

The public, which has grown complacent about the threats from Yemen, must instead tighten discipline and personal responsibility. Israel must not allow the other side to achieve the success it is seeking.

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Exploiting the French desire for Palestinian state recognition and international pressure led it to harden its stance. The "starvation" campaign brought flooding of the Gaza Strip with humanitarian aid (including approval of a massive Israeli budget of 1.6 billion shekels [$451 million]) and a 10-hour humanitarian ceasefire daily. All this, without the terror organization being forced to pay anything.

Its agreement to the mediator proposal (and the phased release deal), which until two weeks ago Israel supported and promoted, can be interpreted from two perspectives: the threat of conquering Gaza created pressure that forced Hamas to fold, or it agreed to the deal knowing Israel would refuse – each side can choose the explanation that serves its desire and beliefs. The Israeli government chooses the second explanation and is delaying its response to Hamas's agreement to the phased deal, understanding that if the threat moves the terror organization from its refusal so far, then implementing the threat and beginning the IDF's attack on the Gaza area will continue the trend.

Proportionality and time

Israel's gamble on conquering Gaza City could prove to be a dangerous gamble, after more than 22 months of war and quite a few times promising decisive moves against Hamas. Among them, bisecting the Strip, the Philadelphi Corridor that would choke Hamas, Rafah that was declared the "last stronghold" with the "last brigade" and a city of refuge for all Hamas leaders, stopping humanitarian aid that would deny its governmental grip – and brought upon us the starvation campaign and flooding the Strip with humanitarian aid.

Gaza City remains almost the last card in Israel's hand to hope it's the one that will bring the decision and end the war. It's already possible to prepare the absolutely last card – the central camps. Moreover, public discourse is diverted from the main point. Taking control of Gaza is presented in the same breath as the action on Beit Hanoun or even the conquest of Rafah. Except reality is completely different and much more complex – Gaza City, the largest of the Strip's cities, sprawls over an area of about 45 square kilometers (28 square miles) (Tel Aviv, for comparison, covers 52 square kilometers [32 square miles]) with 700,000 residents and up to a million civilians.

It's worthwhile and proper to hold the discussion with all its implications. How long will a move to take control (not even clearing) of upper Gaza and lower Gaza, built with many branched and long tunnels? Will the hostages have time to survive in the sub-conditions in which they are held? And another thing – when was the last time Israel conquered an enemy city the size of Gaza? The answer is never. Even in the First Lebanon War (1982), we conquered and controlled only West Beirut in a limited area and population. The IDF has no similar experience, Israel has no idea what this looks like, and we have no ability to assess how this will end, if it indeed begins.

Name shapes consciousness

Even the name chosen for the Gaza City takeover operation testifies to fixation and largely confusion – "Gideon's Chariots B," after Part A of the operation failed and had a limited goal, at least the declared one, to bring conditions for hostage release by applying pressure on Hamas. The operation's continuation testifies to the same thinking, same method, continuity of action. One can only hope for a different result.

Generally, giving names to operations that are part of the "Swords of Iron" war – what's the purpose? What's the need? After all, if we remain faithful to the war's objectives, then all actions serve the same objectives: toppling and destroying Hamas and returning the hostages. Why do we need all that Tower of Babel of names that only shape consciousness, confuse, and don't really advance us toward achieving the war's objectives?

Until military operations commence in Gaza's core areas, the hope remains that the military track – threatening credible conquest of the city – will function as leverage rather than reality. This pressure should compel Hamas to scale back its resistance posture. Ideally, the political track will prevail, leading to a hostage release agreement and war conclusion, with deal terms and conditions yet to be determined.

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The Cabinet decision, which was anticipated due to discussions in preceding days and the prime minister's interview in a foreign language hours before the Cabinet meeting, where he effectively announced the decision, has ushered in a new era for us.

The five-point decision perhaps indicates the general intention, but it is very far from achievable – both in time dimension and in essence. The clause about "dismantling Hamas from its weapons," for example, is a clause open to interpretation. Some will see it as war until the last terrorist, bunker, and tunnel – "eternal war," if you will. On the other hand, the chief of staff can say, with considerable justification, that Hamas as an organized entity has already been dismantled from its infrastructures and capabilities, certainly relative to the point from which we started.

The wording of the last clause, which aims for "a civilian administration that is not Hamas or the Palestinian Authority" that will come after Israeli "security control" (temporary? for years?), is also open to interpretation that each side can understand as they wish, according to their belief or perception – ranging from military administration to annexation and return to Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip.

The clause about "releasing all the hostages" appears in the Cabinet summary only, so we won't say later that we didn't "fight" for their return. This is contrary to all assessments that an operation of this type will last many months and endanger the living hostages, when we have seen in recent videos what time means for most of them, and after the chief of staff recommended to the Cabinet, and not in defiance, to remove the release of the hostages from the war objectives – because he truly knows what this move means.

Israel lost its leverage

Even after the Cabinet meeting that declared we are going all the way to defeat Hamas and return the hostages, we remain with the same big question marks and with even greater skepticism. Will this move, which we haven't tried yet, be the one that brings change?

First, it's not at all certain we'll reach the implementation stage of the Cabinet directives. The beginning of the ability to take control of Gaza City depends on stages that will take a long time – evacuating slightly less than a million Gazans to another place, preparing infrastructure to absorb them, recruiting tens of thousands of reservists again and preparing them for the new plan - time that could constitute a window for renewed negotiations under US and mediator pressure.

Second, the Cabinet decision comes after 22 months of war in which its objectives were not achieved, after trying different forms of combat management – from raids to takeover, from conquest to cleansing; from stopping humanitarian aid to removing all restrictions and allowing humanitarian aid by any country or organization that just wants to provide it; from unwillingness to stop the war, through negotiations only under fire, to giving 10 hours of ceasefire per day for humanitarian aid.

Thus, consistently, Israel lost every leverage it had in negotiations with Hamas, and even though we dismantled its battalions and brigades, after we eliminated almost all its senior officials and after we damaged many of its capabilities, it hasn't budged from its demands.

This is also a decision made against the recommendation of the chief of staff and the security establishment, so embarking on such a significant move at such a problematic time – in the context of the hostages, in the context of the international arena and also in the domestic arena in Israel – will make it difficult for the political echelon to shift responsibility to the military echelon if the move doesn't succeed (assuming we even reach its launch).

Since the political echelon is the one that brought the recommendation and pushed for action, it will only be left to "blame" the military echelon for not meeting the goals set for it – "releasing all the hostages." We haven't tried this direction yet!

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Since fighting resumed in Gaza, the Houthis have increased their attacks against Israel to unprecedented levels, all while the Americans conduct an aggressive air campaign as Israel (at American insistence) focuses on defense.

A fine line exists between containment and restraint versus attack and deterrence, and when results (not intentions) are what matter, it was clear this was only a matter of time. After all, defense is never airtight, and 100% effectiveness is impossible, even though Israel's defensive systems provide security at impressive rates.

The interception failure at Ben-Gurion International Airport came at the most inconvenient timing and location for Israel, right after flights resumed to Israel and at the strategic site of the country's only aerial gateway, leaving no choice but to respond. The response came too late, was forced, and I risk saying it won't bring significant change in Houthi behavior.

Israel's security doctrine cannot rely on outsourcing the prevention of threats to other countries, certainly not for extended periods. This projects weakness throughout the region, particularly to Iran. The test of Israel's strategy will be in the response following the next attack from Yemen, which will unfortunately come.

Israel's response comes against the backdrop of expanded fighting in Gaza and at a sensitive stage in American negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear program. Both factors affect the ability to maintain a continuous response and prevention against an additional distant theater – Yemen. The end of restraint has been forced by circumstances (the failed interception at Ben Gurion Airport) rather than through a comprehensive strategy.

Only a balanced combination of defense that thwarts threats and provides decision-makers with room to take offensive initiative at the place and time of their choosing, without other constraints, should guide the cabinet in formulating policy during the current campaign, which still faces many challenges both near and far.

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For months, senior IDF officials and government leaders have assured the public that Hamas had been dismantled as a military force, that it had lost most of its capabilities, and that its grip on local public opinion was waning.

Over the past few months, Israel applied significant pressure on Gaza by closing the Rafah border crossing, asserting control over the Philadelphi Corridor, and slicing the Strip in half along the Netzarim Axis while preventing residents from returning to northern Gaza. However, two of these pressure levers were removed this week.

The hostage release deal is necessary. If anything, it should have been implemented earlier. Yet, in the past two weeks, as Israel refrains from making decisions regarding "the day after" Hamas in Gaza, the reality on the ground shows a terrorist organization that remains the Strip's sole ruler. Hamas is exploiting each hostage release phase to stage a theatrical display of governance and reinforce its control. Its ability to organize and maintain outward symbols - uniforms, equipped vehicles, staged photography, flags, police presence, and more - alongside military displays of armed fighters and vehicles, is far from what one would expect from a group that has been crushed and stripped of its capabilities.

How, after all the IDF's bombardments and military pressure, when Gaza is completely isolated from the outside world, is Hamas still able to mobilize forces and equipment in such an organized manner, both in scale and in condition, within days? This is difficult to comprehend, and it demands an explanation from IDF commanders, something we have yet to hear. This is an organization that was supposedly stripped of its command structure and assets, yet it still manages to project strength. The victory image we sought in this war against Hamas in Gaza appears elusive. Hamas remains standing, and as time passes and the hostage release process continues, its grip and control over the Strip only tighten.

Hamas, which has proven to be a tough negotiator in the hostage release talks, has adeptly leveraged the situation to its advantage. Its insistence on a phased release plan spread over 42 days, combined with the removal of Israeli pressure levers, such as reopening the Rafah crossing and lifting the territorial division at the Netzarim Axis, was likely a strategic move aimed at reasserting its control. By facilitating the return of hundreds of thousands of Gazans to northern Gaza without basic living conditions, Hamas is effectively using them as human shields, making it far more difficult for the IDF to resume military operations in the north, or anywhere else in the Strip.

Israel's attempt to impose conditions on future hostage release phases is, in essence, an effort to "cut losses." While it is being framed as a necessary step to remove the physical threat to hostages from an uncontrolled, frenzied crowd - a justified move - it is also an attempt to deny Hamas the "victory displays" that serve its internal propaganda goals, and one day, could be used against Israel as well.

Even when the second phase of the hostage release is completed, and all captives return home, it will not be a victory image. The release is a moral obligation and a national necessity, one that stems from one of the greatest failures in Israel's history. We must not delude ourselves. It is crucial to remember the cost, the time that has passed, and those who could have returned alive but never will.

As a nation and a society, we seek moments of optimism, joy, excitement, and the affirmation of life. But let us not be mistaken, these emotions will not erase the horrors of October 7, 2023. And to those who assured us that "we have defeated Hamas" (as Defense Minister Katz claimed upon taking office) or that "Hamas has been dismantled, along with its battalions and capabilities" (as the IDF Chief of Staff declared), I hope the images from Gaza are prompting a reassessment. They should be asking themselves: Where did we go wrong? More importantly, where do we go from here? What reality will remain in Gaza on the day we bring the last hostage home? Hamas' PR displays and military parades leave much to ponder.

The writer is a reserve brigadier general, former commander of the Israeli Air Defense Command, and a strategic advisor.

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Six months ago, I dubbed the current conflict "The First UAV War". Hezbollah, primarily but not exclusively, identified both the potential threat of unmanned aerial vehicles and the IDF's vulnerability to them. They have been systematically deploying hundreds of aerial platforms from the north toward all parts of Israel.

Before the ground offensive, these were mainly very small and slow devices that, under the cover of topography and the Lebanese border, allowed brief exposure and diving toward towns and outposts near the fence. This scenario is almost impossible for defense systems to counter. With the start of the ground offensive, we see Hezbollah using larger vehicles (and there are even larger ones, as we see and experience in other arenas), which challenge the Israeli home front. This was evident on Yom Kippur eve with the strike on a retirement home in Herzliya, and yesterday with the tragic outcome in Wadi Ara.

If we examine the past week, during which the Israeli Air Force intercepted a UAV from Yemen (north of Ashkelon) and two unmanned aerial vehicles from Iraq (near Rishon LeZion), along with those I mentioned in the last two days from Lebanon – we understand that the multi-front challenge is not coincidental. This involves Iranian guidance of the concept, technology, means, and operation.

The UAV threat caught Israel not optimally prepared for a known and recognized threat. Compared to the IDF's capabilities against high-trajectory threats, the response in this area is insufficient. The primary challenge is detecting these vehicles in flight. This initiates the response chain, from translating to civilian alerts (and we saw the importance and difference in outcome between the incident in Herzliya and the one in Wadi Ara) and continues with intercepting and neutralizing the threat, either by ground systems like Iron Dome and additional means, or by aerial platforms. Many UAVs were intercepted by fighter jets.

As the war continues, we must assume that enemies across all fronts will continue to challenge us. In this learning competition, we must find a response in the form of technology, means, deployment, and preparedness, and any other solution that will improve our ability to cope. Although the potential payload of a UAV is less than that of a ballistic missile from Iran (660-1,100 pounds of explosives) or a heavy rocket from Hezbollah (220 pounds or more), the psychological aspect of penetrating the aerial dimension and the ease with which the home front in central Israel becomes an accessible target in the enemy's eyes is not something that can be normalized.

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The recent Israeli operation targeting Hezbollah's leadership in Beirut marks a critical juncture in the year-long conflict that has gripped the Middle East. Its repercussions will reshape the region's geopolitical landscape.

In the annals of warfare, certain moments stand out as inflection points that fundamentally alter the trajectory of a conflict. The strike on Hezbollah's nerve center in southern Beirut is one such moment. It signals a strategic shift: Israel, after months of reactive posturing, has seized the initiative. This offensive, built on years of meticulous intelligence work, aims not just to degrade Hezbollah's military capabilities but to dismantle its operational infrastructure.

The implications of this action extend far beyond Lebanon's borders. For nearly two decades, Iran has cultivated Hezbollah as its primary deterrent against potential attacks on its nuclear program and as a lynchpin in its broader Middle Eastern ambitions. The group's influence stretches from Yemen to Iraq, Syria, and beyond. A significant blow to Hezbollah at this juncture could unravel Tehran's carefully constructed regional strategy, forcing a reevaluation of its geopolitical calculus.

However, this bold move comes with considerable risks. The resilience of Israel's home front will be tested as never before, with our air defense systems facing unprecedented challenges. The potential for escalation looms large, and the coming days will be critical in determining whether this operation leads to a broader conflagration or creates an opening for diplomatic initiatives.

The timing of this operation is not coincidental. Two weeks ago, the Israeli government expanded its war objectives to include the safe return of northern residents displaced by border tensions. While initially viewed as an ambiguous goal, the recent actions have clarified Israel's intent: a fundamental restructuring of the security dynamics along its northern frontier.

This shift in strategy presents two significant opportunities:

First, it disrupts the entire Iranian axis of influence in the region. The reverberations of the Beirut strike are felt as far as Tehran, potentially undermining Iran's long-term regional aspirations. The strength and visible support of the US-Israel alliance in this moment will be crucial in shaping Iran's response and the conflict's future trajectory.

Second, it brings the prospect of conflict resolution closer than at any point in the past year. The impact of these operations could influence dynamics beyond Lebanon, potentially affecting the hostage situation in Gaza and altering the calculus of Hamas leadership regarding negotiation terms.

Critics may argue that such bold military action risks further destabilizing an already volatile region. However, Israel's targeted approach – focusing on Hezbollah's military infrastructure while avoiding Lebanese state assets – leaves room for post-conflict diplomacy. This nuanced strategy could pave the way for a US-brokered agreement, potentially involving European partners, that addresses core security concerns while respecting Lebanese sovereignty.

The success of this strategic pivot will hinge on several factors: the resilience of Israel's civilian population in the face of potential retaliation, the effectiveness of our defensive systems, and our ability to translate military achievements into diplomatic gains. If managed adeptly, this moment could lead to a fundamental improvement in Israel's security posture and, by extension, regional stability.

As we stand at this crossroads, the choices made in the coming days and weeks will have far-reaching consequences. They will determine not just the immediate outcome of the current conflict, but the shape of Middle Eastern geopolitics for years to come. The opportunity for positive change is real, but so are the risks of escalation. Navigating this complex landscape will require not only military acumen but also diplomatic finesse and strategic foresight.

In this critical moment, the support and understanding of the international community, particularly the United States, will be pivotal. As Israel takes calculated risks in pursuit of long-term security, the steadfastness of its allies will be a deciding factor in achieving a more stable and peaceful Middle East.

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The series of offensives by Israel and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), including the targeted killings of Hezbollah commanders Fouad Shukr and Ibrahim Aqil (both in precision strikes in the Dahieh quarter, Hezbollah's stronghold in Beirut) and two focused psychological-cyber operations targeting Hezbollah operatives' communication devices, led Secretart-General of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah to admit in his speech on Thursday that the organization had suffered its most severe blow since the terrorist organization was established.

Video: The impact site in northern Israel following a Hezbollah barrage on Sept. 23 / Usage under Israeli intellectual property law section 27a

The IDF's preemptive strike on Sunday, which neutralized an imminent retaliation threat, unexpectedly prompted Hezbollah to act. This move, contrary to Hezbollah's initial plans from August 25, was arguably forced by Israel's actions, making the organization's response over the past day almost inevitable.

Despite the escalating situation and the breach of unspoken rules that have governed the conflict for nearly a year, both Israel and Hezbollah seem to be establishing new boundaries. These limits, for now, are preventing the outbreak of all-out war.

Escalation boundaries

Israel is largely confining its attacks to southern Lebanon, while Hezbollah is targeting the area from Haifa to Tiberias and northward – ironically, the same battleground as the Second Lebanon War. Notably, Hezbollah hasn't yet unleashed its full firepower, refraining from massive rocket barrages or deploying precision-guided munitions.

In my assessment, Hezbollah is deliberately avoiding strikes south of Haifa, including the Tel Aviv area and critical infrastructure near Hadera. Such attacks would likely trigger a declaration of war, derailing the current, albeit tense, controlled engagement.

The situation remains precarious. Any significant event that Israel can't overlook could instantly change the dynamics. This underscores the critical dual role of air defense: not only to intercept incoming threats – a task being performed admirably so far – but also to give political leaders the upper hand in managing escalation. This capability is a significant strategic asset for Israel.

Challenges beyond the north

We can't lose sight of the ongoing southern campaign, complicated by the unresolved hostage situation and the government's need to prioritize between fronts, with the south being formally prioritized. 

The past day has highlighted the reality of a multi-front conflict, with Iran and its proxies, including militias in Iraq, showing solidarity. This complex scenario demands that Israel's security forces remain vigilant on all fronts. As the Lebanon campaign intensifies, I anticipate increased challenges in the east and south as well.

The tipping point into all-out war will be clear: When we see IDF operations push north of southern Lebanon and Hezbollah starts targeting areas south of Haifa and the valleys. For now, we can only hope to avoid this seemingly inevitable escalation, even as we witness ongoing clashes.

The writer is a reserve brigadier general, former commander of the Israeli Air Defense Command, and a strategic advisor.

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The night of April 14 marked Iran's retaliation for the elimination of the Revolutionary Guards' Lebanon-Syria Corps commander in Damascus two weeks earlier – an attack successfully intercepted by Israel and its allies. On August 25, Israel launched a preemptive strike to neutralize Hezbollah's planned response to the killing of its chief of staff, Fouad Shukr, three and a half weeks prior. These two events form a crucial turning point in Israel's evolving strategy.

These incidents convey two crucial messages. First, the offensive actions planned by Iran and Hezbollah were thwarted – one through defensive measures, the other through impressive offensive capabilities of the Air Force and Intelligence Division. Both instances highlighted a significant gap between our adversaries' intentions and capabilities versus the actual results.

Second, the IDF's intelligence capabilities (which faced justified criticism after Oct. 7) demonstrated remarkable accuracy and penetrability of our enemies' plans. This ranged from uncovering initial intentions to understanding the timing down to the day and hour.

The triad: Deterrence, intelligence, and offensive capability

The events of April and August have far-reaching implications. They're part of the IDF's effort to restore deterrence across the region. This deterrence is built on intelligence capabilities that identify high-value targets, coupled with formidable military power in both defense and offense. These factors challenge our adversaries, forcing them to reevaluate their strategies, target selection, and timing. Adding to this is the unwavering US support for Israel – in defense, offense, and on the international stage.

Deterrence, though it became a contentious term after Oct. 7, remains crucial and relevant. It will continue to play a central role in the security doctrine being reshaped in the wake of the Iron Swords War. When enemies repeatedly see their plans foiled and face severe consequences – with distance (be it Yemen or Iran) no longer providing safety – they're compelled to change tactics. Our challenge then becomes staying vigilant and sharp enough to identify these shifts, lest we fall into outdated thinking that leads to misconceptions.

However, actions alone, no matter how significant, aren't enough. We need to build a comprehensive system that can maximize, analyze, and translate the implications of these operations into an adaptive operational strategy.

In the post-Oct. 7 reality, such moves carry even greater weight. They're essential for restoring the IDF's capabilities and perception – both externally against our enemies and internally within Israel. While they lay an excellent foundation for change, they must be accompanied by complementary measures. Only then can we say we've truly learned from Oct. 7 and are actively reshaping the security landscape in our region.

If we've chosen to alter the security situation in the north without resorting to all-out regional war – which seems to be the preference of the Israeli government and others – then simply creating a sense of vulnerability through targeted eliminations as seen in both the April and August incidents won't suffice. Even proactive threat removal and weakening enemy capabilities – while important – aren't enough on their own. Although the operation on August 25 offered a chance to disrupt Hezbollah's plans more extensively than they had anticipated in their planned response.

The April and August events draw a clear line – one of intelligence, lethality, deterrence, and the dawn of a new reality. Our success will be measured by how effectively we capitalize on these opportunities to keep reshaping the strategic landscape.

The writer is a reserve brigadier general, former commander of the Israeli Air Defense Command, and a strategic advisor.

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