This message has echoed through Netanyahu's recent engagements across Israel's security establishment, from IDF general staff headquarters to the Shin Bet, from the Police College to Fire and Rescue headquarters, and in meetings with Magen David Adom personnel. The prime minister is systematically preparing for what could prove his most consequential diplomatic mission since returning to office.

Netanyahu's upcoming Washington visit – his fourth since reclaiming the premiership – represents a dramatic departure from typical diplomatic expectations. Rather than tempering hopes or managing expectations downward, Netanyahu is deliberately elevating the stakes. "Exploiting success is no less important than achieving success," he emphasized this week, a philosophy that will guide his approach to these critical talks.

President Donald Trump awaits Netanyahu as a leader basking in the glow of strategic triumph. Trump's decision to authorize direct US participation in devastating strikes against Iran's nuclear infrastructure not only demonstrated unprecedented bilateral cooperation but also fulfilled his campaign promise to avoid prolonged regional conflicts. The American president successfully navigated between decisive action and escalation prevention – exactly the balance his critics said was impossible.

This diplomatic momentum propels Trump toward his broader Middle East objectives established before inauguration – comprehensive war termination and accelerated peace agreements. The convergence of military success and political opportunity creates a unique window for transformative regional arrangements.

The atmosphere surrounding next week's meetings combines urgency with opportunity, pressure with potential. Time constraints intensify as regional dynamics shift rapidly, while multiple strategic openings demand immediate attention. The agenda will encompass both tactical decisions and strategic declarations, celebrating shared victory while charting future cooperation.

American involvement in Iran operations has fundamentally transformed US-Israel relations, elevating the partnership to unprecedented levels. This development's impact on Israel's regional standing cannot be overstated, particularly given how it complements rather than replaces Israel's independent military achievements. The enhanced partnership promises expanded political dividends alongside military cooperation.

Yet enhanced partnership brings corresponding obligations, especially when American intervention appears to address existential threats through significant risk assumption. Trump's directive requiring Israeli aircraft recall from Iran missions following ceasefire violations illustrates these new dynamics. Such incidents preview potential friction points ahead.

Israeli accommodation on issues that might complicate Trump's agenda becomes increasingly reasonable given the transformed relationship structure. The principled response to such requests should remain positive, provided they don't conflict with Israel's fundamental interests.

However, forthcoming discussions could address core issues including Iran enforcement mechanisms, potential Palestinian Authority negotiations as Arab normalization prerequisites, Syrian security arrangements within broader political frameworks, and Gaza war continuation parameters. Trump's declaration that he will "be very tough with Netanyahu regarding ending the Gaza war" signals these complex negotiations ahead.

Netanyahu's primary challenge involves ensuring that reciprocal discussions remain within acceptable policy parameters while preparing for arguments that existing or future concessions enable greater flexibility on difficult decisions.

Gaza combat operations and hostage recovery

Current media reporting suggests meaningful progress toward a "limited arrangement" with Hamas facilitating ten living hostages' return alongside 18 bodies. The proposed exchange involves 60-day ceasefire implementation, IDF combat zone withdrawals, expanded Gaza supply operations, and terrorist releases according to predetermined formulas. While specific details remain unclear, the arrangement's most significant element appears to be American guarantees linking the ceasefire to complete war termination.

The American-envisioned conclusion encompasses several key components. First, comprehensive fighting cessation across all dimensions, with Israeli forces maintaining border positions and security perimeters. Second, complete hostage return – both living and deceased. Third, Gaza Strip governance through technocratic structures guided by Egypt, additional nations, and potentially the Palestinian Authority. Fourth, Hamas – though severely degraded – would lose official governmental control while maintaining substantial Strip influence. Finally, portions of Hamas leadership would face exile from Gaza.

Concurrently, voluntary emigration opportunities would become available for interested Gaza residents across multiple countries providing US commitments. Strip reconstruction would proceed contingent upon complete military capability dismantlement.

This framework appears theoretically sound for addressing Israel's primary concerns. However, considering Hamas's residual capabilities, continued high popular support levels, overseas leadership's resource mobilization capacity, and demonstrated recovery patterns, such arrangements would likely enable rapid organizational rehabilitation. These factors become more problematic when considering Hamas's leverage through remaining living hostages and Israel's constrained military options.

Assumptions that civilian governance transfer to internationally-guided mechanisms would prevent Hamas rehabilitation ignore existing Strip power dynamics. Such frameworks would more likely provide Hamas cover rather than confrontation from international oversight bodies.

Given these scenarios, political leadership should maintain complete war objective achievement while pressing Washington counterparts to target Hamas leadership operating from Qatar and Turkey, simultaneously advancing voluntary emigration initiatives.

Iran conflict's expanding scope

The Iranian confrontation has entered its opening phase rather than reaching conclusion. Operation Rising Lion successfully achieved all designated objectives, optimally accomplishing every feasible military goal within its operational parameters.

Iran emerges wounded, humiliated, and revenge-driven. Assumptions about Iranian passivity would be strategically dangerous. Alongside capability reconstruction efforts and operational lessons learned, Iranian leadership will pursue Israeli retaliation opportunities regardless of timeline requirements. Intelligence and security officials must operate assuming Iranian surprise attempts without restraint considerations.

The first issue requiring Israeli-American agreement is enforcement of Iran's activities. Israel must clarify that enforcement without agreement is preferable to agreement without enforcement.

President Trump has repeatedly declared that Iran will not have military nuclear capability. From Israel's perspective this is extremely important, but not sufficient. We must also talk about limiting ballistic missiles and precision weapons, through which Iran planned to achieve against Israel influence similar to that of non-conventional weapons.

Iran must not receive any relief or benefit to convince it to sit at the negotiating table. The international community still has the option to impose sanctions on Tehran through the snapback mechanism, and this should be activated.

Syrian strategic calculations

Syrian developments exemplify new reality dilemmas facing Israeli decision-makers. Israel confronts delicate strategic choices requiring careful balance between opportunity and risk. Excessive threat focus could eliminate rare opportunities for northern border reshaping and regional influence expansion. Conversely, "Oslo process" style concessions might enable dangerous Islamist threats in critical areas.

Israeli experience demands cautious approaches, particularly regarding security deployment modifications for various scenarios. This caution becomes essential when engaging regimes led by jihadist figures whose Western-friendly presentations lack authentic testing and may represent survival tactics rather than genuine transformation.

Golan Heights status discussions remain completely unacceptable. The only acceptable modification involves Syrian regime de jure recognition of existing arrangements. The Golan Heights constitutes Israel's strategic eastern defense line. Golan Heights retention without peace agreements surpasses peace agreements without Golan Heights control.

Any agreements must guarantee Israeli aerial and ground operational freedom throughout Syria for minimum decade-long periods, including proactive operations against hostile establishment attempts. Syrian regime limitations must prevent agreements or alliance participation enabling hostile elements' Syrian establishment or operational bases across territorial, maritime, and aerial domains. These restrictions prevent Syrian transformation into corridors or focal points for threats against Israel from regional or extra-regional sources. Syria must also face restrictions on developing, producing, or acquiring strategic threat weapons including nuclear, biological, chemical, missile, and precision capabilities.

Israeli demands should include Druze community security guarantees while positioning Syria as potential Palestinian Gaza emigrant destination following Trump initiatives. Syria's suitability stems from Arab identity, regional proximity, and historical connections. Given expected extensive reconstruction requirements for millions of Syrian citizens, Palestinian Gaza integration wouldn't create exceptional burdens. These arrangements should integrate Israeli, American, and Syrian coordination frameworks.

Effective enforcement mechanisms must anchor all agreements. Accumulated experience demonstrates that agreements without enforcement lack meaningful value.

Strategic partnerships with conditions

Saudi Arabian peace agreement opportunities – representing the Arab world's most significant player – reach unprecedented accessibility levels. Iranian nuclear program strikes and "axis" dismantlement, including Hezbollah collapse and Assad regime disintegration, create new Middle Eastern realities where moderate Arab states recognize Israel as solution rather than problem against extremist Islam. Mohammed bin Salman's Vision 2030 provides foundation for demonstrating this transformation.

However, Saudi-Israeli relationship establishment must never be conditioned on Palestinian Authority status improvements. Post-October 7 Israel cannot afford questionable adventure engagement. Abraham Accords removed Palestinian Authority veto power over Arab-Israeli relationship establishment, and this authority must not be restored. Palestinian statehood, regardless of border limitations, constitutes Israeli security threats.

Agreement, alliance, or economic profit considerations must not override strategic judgment. Saudi Arabian peace agreement significance cannot be exaggerated, yet not every price justifies such achievements.

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According to the newly published report, which was also reviewed by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), a significant portion of the agency's findings is based on intelligence acquired by the Israeli Mossad during its 2018 operation to seize Iran's nuclear archive in Tehran.

The ISIS said Iran's success in conducting various nuclear detonation tests indicates the Islamic Republic is further along in its nuclear weapons development than previously assessed by experts, excluding uranium enrichment.

The report comes amid ongoing negotiations between Iran and the US over a nuclear deal that, according to reports, is both highly advanced and at constant risk of collapse.

Should these talks break down, one likely outcome would be military escalation, potentially including an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities.

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Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's exclusion from President Donald Trump's Mideast visit signals West Wing fatigue with the Israeli leader, The Washington Post reports, citing a senior White House official who as saying the meeting was not necessary because he had already visited Washington "700 times" since Trump's inauguration.

Trump will embark Monday on a four-day journey through wealthy Gulf monarchies, with scheduled stops in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The trip predominantly centers on securing commercial agreements and fresh capital from the region's affluent nations, the Post reported.

This Gulf excursion, marking Trump's first significant international venture of his second term, demonstrates the president's strategic focus and represents a departure from customary practice where new presidents typically prioritize visits to traditional Western allies. The Post reports this approach reflects Trump's personal fondness for the region, its prosperity, and the ceremonial grandeur these host countries intend to display during his visit.

The presidential tour unfolds amid numerous pressing regional security challenges, including Gaza's situation, Iran's nuclear ambitions, and Trump's longstanding aspiration to facilitate diplomatic normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The Washington Post notes that Gaza's conflict has thrust the region into turmoil, weakening Iran and its allied groups significantly and creating a distinctive moment where power dynamics could potentially shift.

White House officials indicated to the Post that security matters would not be the central focus during Trump's 3½ days in the region, highlighting the president's more limited vision for America's global role and his concentrated emphasis on business arrangements and investments that could strengthen his domestic political standing. Notably, despite its proximity, Trump has opted against visiting Israel – perceived as a diplomatic slight toward Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

"There is a real opportunity here, but the Trump administration in no way, shape or form wants to push it, because it's not interested in reshaping the region," said Steven A. Cook, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. "And so it's perfectly willing to cut deals with the Iranians, thereby extending the life of the regime."

The decision to start with Saudi Arabia mirrors Trump's approach from 2017, though during that first-term visit he continued onward to Israel and European partners with deeper historical connections to Washington.

This presidential journey follows recent visits by his son, Eric Trump, who along with his brother leads the Trump Organization. The Post notes Eric traveled to Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in recent weeks to oversee agreements involving the family's real estate and cryptocurrency ventures. Those deals included investors connected to local governments, blurring distinctions between Trump family commercial interests and US diplomatic policy. The administration has maintained that the president no longer participates in Trump Organization operations and is making financial sacrifices to serve in office.

"President Trump will return to re-emphasize his continued vision for a proud, prosperous and successful Middle East where the United States and Middle Eastern nations are in cooperative relationship and where extremism is defeated in place of commerce and cultural exchanges," White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt told reporters Friday.

While Trump made an unexpected overnight trip to Italy last month for Pope Francis' funeral, the Post reports the Middle East journey was designed as the inaugural international excursion of his second term.

Gulf monarchies excel at staging elaborate displays of ceremony and spectacle, and Trump's movements from Riyadh to Doha to Abu Dhabi are expected to feature plenty of both. According to the Washington Post, during his 2017 visit, Trump joined Saudi King Salman and Egyptian President Abdel Fatah El-Sisi placing hands on a glowing sphere in Riyadh, followed later by participation in a traditional sword dance.

Eight years later, similar festivities likely await before Trump attends a summit with Gulf Cooperation Council leaders. A Saudi-US business conference will happen concurrently elsewhere in the Saudi capital.

"The focus of this trip is business. It's economics. That tells you something," said Richard Haass, a veteran diplomat and president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. "It's revealing about this administration that it's the first administration in the modern era to approach the world largely in economic and business terms rather than strategic or diplomatic terms." According to the report, even Saudi Arabia's selection as the initial destination appeared driven by a highest-bidder approach, with Trump challenging the Saudi government to increase its American investments in exchange for the coveted first visit.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was the first foreign leader who spoke with Trump after his inauguration. During that conversation, he informed the president that Saudi Arabia would invest at least $600 billion in the United States over four years. Trump requested they "round out" that commitment to $1 trillion, suggesting that would secure Saudi Arabia as his first foreign destination as president.

"They've agreed to do that, so I'm going to be going there," he said weeks later, although specifics remain unclear, and the Post notes Saudi investment claims during Trump's first term produced fewer jobs and less capital than initially projected. "I have a great relationship with them, and they've been very nice, but they're going to be spending a lot of money to American companies for buying military equipment and a lot of other things."

Meanwhile, Netanyahu won't receive a face-to-face visit in Israel, potentially complicating his domestic political position where he portrays himself as an essential link to Washington. A senior White House official told The Washington Post no meeting was necessary because Netanyahu had already visited Washington "700 times" since Trump's inauguration, seemingly suggesting some administration frustration with the Israeli leader. Netanyahu has actually visited twice – still twice more than any other world leader. The official spoke anonymously to discuss travel strategy freely.

During the visit, prominent US corporate executives will also travel to Riyadh for a Saudi-US Investment Forum. Though Trump emphasizes commerce, regional leaders will certainly raise Gaza and other critical issues even if major policy developments aren't immediately forthcoming.

Arab leaders believe Trump has granted Netanyahu unrestricted freedom to expand military operations in Gaza. US representatives have been approaching countries about accepting Gazan refugees – a step numerous Arab nations fear could facilitate complete Israeli control of the territory, eliminating its Palestinian status.

In his first term, Trump oversaw mediation between Israel and several Arab nations, normalizing relations through agreements called the Abraham Accords.

The Saudi government seeks assistance with its civilian nuclear program and expanded defense cooperation from Washington. US diplomats have offered these concessions to encourage Riyadh's normalization with Israel, but Saudi demands for a Palestinian state pathway will likely prevent a Saudi-Israel agreement for now. Some Trump officials have suggested advancing the US portion of an agreement in exchange for economic benefits or promises of future movement toward Israel.

Iran will probably emerge as another discussion topic. Trump's administration has initiated direct talks to restrict the country's nuclear weapons aspirations. Trump recently announced the US military would cease bombing the Iran-backed Houthis, a group in Yemen attacking Red Sea shipping since Hamas' assault on Israel, in exchange for protection of American vessels.

The visit coincides with Trump's family business expanding into some destinations on his itinerary. Over the past week, the Trump Organization announced new projects including a substantial hotel and tower in Dubai and a golf course near Doha. These ventures are proceeding in partnership with Dar Global, a real estate company also collaborating with the Trump Organization on other Saudi Arabian projects.

The Trump International Hotel & Tower in Dubai, announced April 30, will span 80 floors and feature a members-only club "set to redefine the meaning of exclusive luxury," according to promotional materials. The Trump International Golf Course outside Doha, announced May 1, will include an 18-hole course, clubhouse and upscale villas with beach access.

This project forms part of a development supervised by Qatari Diar, a government-run real estate authority. The Trump Organization had committed to avoiding new agreements with foreign governments during Trump's presidency.

A Trump Organization spokesperson told the Washington Post that its agreement involves only Dar Global and that the organization "has no affiliation, partnership or engagement with Qatari Diar or any other agency of the State of Qatar." When questioned Friday about whether Trump's businesses would benefit from the trip, press secretary Leavitt responded: "It's frankly ridiculous that anyone in this room would even suggest that President Trump is doing anything for his own benefit. He left a life of luxury and a life of running a very successful real estate empire for public service."

She added: "This is a president who has actually lost money for being president of the United States."

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Despite declarations from both Tehran and Washington favoring diplomatic solutions to the decades-old nuclear standoff, Reuters reports the two nations remain fundamentally divided on several non-negotiable conditions that diplomats must navigate to forge a renewed nuclear agreement and prevent possible military confrontation.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi and United States Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff will conduct the fourth round of discussions in Muscat through Omani intermediaries, according to Reuters, even as Washington publicly maintains a hardline stance that Iranian officials have suggested could undermine negotiation efforts.

Before departing for the Omani capital, Araqchi informed Iranian state TV that "Iran has well-known positions based on clear principles... We hope to reach a decisive stance in Sunday's meeting." He further noted that Iran's technical team was already positioned in Oman and "will be consulted if necessary," Reuters reported.

Witkoff articulated Washington's position to Breitbart News on Thursday, establishing a clear boundary: "No enrichment. That means dismantlement, no weaponization," which would necessitate completely dismantling Iran's nuclear installations at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, as detailed by Reuters.

"If they are not productive on Sunday, then they won't continue and we'll have to take a different route," Witkoff stated regarding the negotiations.

Trump, who has previously threatened military action against Iran should diplomatic channels fail, will embark on a regional tour including Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates from May 13-16. Responding to Witkoff's statements, Araqchi declared Saturday that Iran would not surrender its nuclear rights, including uranium enrichment capabilities.

The Islamic Republic remains open to discussing certain limitations on its nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief, Reuters reported citing Iranian officials, but eliminating its enrichment program or relinquishing its stockpile of enriched uranium represents "Iran's red lines that could not be compromised" during negotiations.

A high-ranking Iranian official with close ties to the negotiating team told Reuters that American demands for "zero enrichment and dismantling Iran's nuclear sites would not help in progressing the negotiations," speaking on condition of anonymity.

"What the US says publicly differs from what is said in negotiations," the official remarked to Reuters, adding that the situation would become clearer following Sunday's talks, originally scheduled for May 3 in Rome but postponed due to what Oman described as "logistical reasons."

Additionally, Iran has categorically rejected discussing its ballistic missile program, while its religious leadership insists on ironclad guarantees that Trump would not abandon a nuclear agreement again, Reuters reported.

Trump, who reinstated a "maximum pressure" campaign against Tehran since February, withdrew from Iran's 2015 nuclear agreement with six world powers during his first term in 2018 and reimposed severe sanctions that have devastated Iran's economy, according to Reuters.

Iran, consistently maintaining its nuclear program serves peaceful purposes, has violated the 2015 agreement's nuclear restrictions since 2019, including "dramatically" accelerating uranium enrichment to levels reaching 60% purity, approaching the approximately 90% threshold considered weapons-grade, according to the UN nuclear watchdog, Reuters reported.

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The assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah closes a circle for Israel. It's not just the precise execution in the heart of Hezbollah's stronghold in Beirut, the infamous underground bunker of Nasrallah's, supposedly impenetrable, or the additional surprise suffered by the terrorist organization, which perhaps didn't think Israel would dare to carry out such an operation. Beyond all these, the assassination is a move with profound significance in the long-term strategic view, which can also point to the next options open to Israel.

Since the IDF stepped up operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah, it has demonstrated superiority on all fronts, especially in intelligence – the main area where it failed last October. Who would have believed less than a year ago that these are the capabilities we would demonstrate today?

Looking back at the past year, some optimistic trends are nevertheless revealed: Hamas has been dealt a crushing blow. The Gaza terrorist organization has not been eliminated, but most of its leadership has been wiped out, its military structure dismantled, and it is no longer capable of harming Israel in the same way as before October 7. Israel, of course, needs to continue the pressure on it, advance the release of the remaining hostages held in Gaza by any means possible, and not let up until it succeeds in eliminating the entire threat posed by Hamas. However, the intensity of the fighting in Gaza has decreased and is not expected to return to the same scale as before. As Israel continues to carry out targeted operations, it will further erode the capabilities of the terrorist organization and its members, and the threat from it will continue to diminish.

In the northern arena, Hezbollah has been revealed in many ways as a paper tiger. Apart from rocket fire, it has not carried out significant actions so far, despite all the blows inflicted on it in the last two weeks. Although we shouldn't underestimate the Shiite organization and its capabilities, the elimination of many of its senior officials, including its senior military commanders, the head of the Southern Front Ali Karaki (who was killed with Nasrallah), the leader of the organization himself, and the heads of the Radwan force, greatly reduce its ability to carry out quality terrorist operations against Israel. This doesn't mean it can't carry out sporadic rocket fire – in recent days, we've seen only a trickle of rockets, though nothing close to the pessimistic forecasts heard here – but the motivation has been hit, the fear has increased, and the capabilities have decreased.

It's also worth taking into account the shock the terrorist organization has entered, its fear of using means of communication and the many surprises it has suffered within a few short weeks. In the absence of an orderly command structure, this is a blow that will be very difficult to recover from quickly. In these weeks, it should be noted, Israel has suffered almost no casualties at all, while Hezbollah counts its dead in many dozens, including almost all of its military leadership. May it stay that way.

It's also worth dwelling a bit on the implications of the organization leader's departure from the scene: Nasrallah is not just another senior commander of the organization. He is not one of many. Nasrallah is not ostensibly a military commander, not a field man who guides the soldiers, but he is the charismatic figure, the gifted orator, the supreme leader to whom the fighters of the Shiite organization look up. He is their absolute symbol.

But in many ways, Nasrallah is much more than that. He turned Hezbollah into the largest and most heavily armed terrorist organization in the world. Since he took over the position previously held by Abbas al-Musawi in 1992, who was also eliminated by Israel, Nasrallah managed to position the Shiite organization at the forefront of the struggle against Israel, drive it out of Lebanon, inflict a painful blow on it in the Second Lebanon War and establish deterrence against it. Nasrallah also armed his organization with tens of thousands of missiles and rockets, advanced weapons, explosive devices, and missiles, using his connections with Iran and the money his patrons from Tehran poured on him. His absence in Hezbollah will be felt greatly, and he leaves behind very big shoes to fill.

One thing can probably be said with quite high certainty: a large part of Israel's deterrence has been restored. The cheers of many citizens in Syria over the IDF's successes in recent weeks can be heard all the way to the northern Golan Heights, and it's hard to believe there are many in the Sunni Arab states who are now crying over the bitter fate of the arch-terrorist from Beirut. The leaders in Arab capitals are certainly looking at Israel with renewed respect after the last three weeks, even if they publicly expressed condolences over his death.

When talking about a new regional architecture, whose promotion in the form of normalization with Saudi Arabia may have been cut short with the outbreak of the war, this is the kind of behavior that Israel needs to adhere to in order to rehabilitate this opportunity. In the Middle Eastern neighborhood, alliances are not made with the weak and fearful, but with the strong. Israel is restoring its status and, incidentally, the possibilities for true normalization from a correct position of strength, facing countries that will see it as equal to them and even more powerful, one that has the ability to assist them in times of trouble. Thus, for example, the statement published this week and attributed to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, that he's not really interested in Israel's actions in Gaza – didn't come in a vacuum.

That's why Israel must not fold now, must not stop. We need to continue pressing the pedal in Lebanon as well to bring about a new reality for the border residents. We must continue to act in Gaza and in other arenas.

Now we must also set our sights on the one big problem that still hovers over Israeli heads, which has not been dealt with since the beginning of the war: the Iranian nuclear program. In addition to the many reports in recent years about the accumulation of highly enriched uranium in quantities sufficient to build several bombs, recently, it has also been claimed that the Iranians may have begun to restart the activities of the "weapons group" – the group responsible for turning the fissile nuclear material into an actual bomb, and then assembling it on a missile.

Now is the most appropriate time to act against the Iranian nuclear program for other reasons as well: The Iranians are looking at the close election system in the US and fear another term of Former President Donald Trump in the White House. Despite his conciliatory words in recent days in favor of reaching an agreement with Tehran on the nuclear program, they know that he is not a predictable person and that he sometimes also advocates using force to achieve his goals.

Therefore, they understand that the few weeks remaining until the elections themselves, and also the weeks between the elections and the entry of the new president into the White House, are critical to presenting the Americans with a reality in which an Iranian nuclear bomb is a fait accompli. Now, they must push forward in order not to reach a situation where there will be another option in the White House to do something about it.

From Israel's perspective, a strike on Iran would now come at a convenient time from an international perspective as well. The Americans may not be pleased with the Israeli moves and the escalation against Hezbollah, but President Joe Biden also doesn't want to be recorded in the annals of American history as the president who allowed Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. The fact that the president is a lame duck until after the elections means that he will find it difficult to stop significant moves that Israel chooses to make.

If Israel knows how to "sell" the attack to the president correctly, it can also paint it as something that will give the Democratic candidate, Kamala Harris, an electoral boost. Instead of an agreement with Saudi Arabia or a ceasefire in Gaza, eliminating the Iranian nuclear program can be perceived in Washington as a first step towards truly shaping the new regional architecture. It is certainly much more significant than a ceasefire agreement in Gaza, which will lead to nothing in the long run, and it will greatly increase the Israeli standing in the eyes of the Saudis, for example.

Moreover, the Iranians are also in an inferior position vis-à-vis other Western countries after being caught transferring UAVs to the Russians for the war in Ukraine and connecting to the "bad guy" of the neighborhood. They suffered sanctions and lost a lot of the legitimacy they might have had before. In addition, the IAEA declared publicly that it is unable to know what is happening in Iranian nuclear facilities and monitor them, and in fact, has made any possibility of cooperation now meaningless.

But the most important fact from Israel's point of view is that the most powerful "whip" that Iran held over our heads, Hezbollah, is now perceived as something that can be dealt with. Even before that, following the attack in April, Israel understood that Iran is not a significant threat to its security – even when it launched hundreds of missiles and UAVs towards us. At the same time, the Lebanese terrorist organization is not what it was three weeks ago, and along with it, Iranian deterrence towards us following a possible attack on nuclear facilities has decreased greatly.

Perhaps the fact that should most indicate this is the claim that Iran's leader, Ali Khamenei, was taken to a "hidden and safe" place following Nasrallah's assassination. Even in routine, the Iranian leader is certainly tightly secured, with the best defenses Iran has to offer, but his concealment indicates that the Iranians don't know exactly what to expect now. These things are added to the publication that even the Revolutionary Guards stopped using their communication devices following the operation against Hezbollah, which indicates their fear of Israeli penetration.

Now is the time to act. Israel has already proven in April that it can attack in Iran, and later did something similar in Yemen. The IDF and security forces have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to operate in distant arenas and Israel's excellent intelligence. The rise in Israeli morale and reconnection following recent successes can increase internal legitimacy for an attack now. In addition, our defense arrays are on high alert and in immediate readiness.

However, we must not act alone. We must convince the America and our other allies to join the struggle against the Iranians before it's too late. We need to emphasize to them how the region might look if Iran has nuclear weapons and what could have developed after October 7 if Tehran had a nuclear umbrella sheltering the head of Hamas and Hezbollah. This reality must be prevented now.

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Dr. Dan Sagir
Researcher and lecturer on Israel's nuclear program
Research Fellow at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Author of the book "Dimona - Israel's Nuclear Deterrence"

Dr. Dan Sagir, we just had a tense week in which Iran threatened to attack us for the second time in less than four months. How much worse can this situation get?
"I believe that Israel, Iran, and Hezbollah all want to avoid a regional war. On the other hand, we are in the Middle East, and everyone wants to maintain their self-respect and the status they believe they deserve."

There's an unknown here that might not be clear to some of the public. On the surface, we are supposedly a nuclear state – which should create deterrence. But in practice, does Israel's nuclear capability, according to foreign sources, still deter Arab states? It seems Hezbollah and Iran are not particularly impressed by it.
"Iran and Hezbollah are not fazed by nuclear weapons, and likely for good reason. They know that no sane country would ever use them first. There's no connection between Israel being a nuclear state, according to foreign sources, and the current crisis. The present situation is being managed on a conventional battlefield between Israel and Iran, and against Hezbollah. Another threat front includes the Houthis, Syria, and Iraq. This strategy by the Islamic Republic has been ongoing for decades and has recently reached a troubling maturity that we now have to deal with."

According to you, all the actors you described are not afraid of a non-conventional action. If that's the case, I wonder why this issue has surfaced in public discourse. Just last month, former Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman said that since Iran's nuclear program cannot be stopped by conventional means, "We will have to use all the means at our disposal."
"The strange and worrying instances where public figures – from academia, former defense ministers, or the current Minister of Heritage – threaten or hint at Israeli nuclear use are mostly reckless. These are baseless claims that were never seriously discussed, and the reason is simple: The Israeli nuclear program, developed according to foreign sources, was initiated by the first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, who understood Israel's inherent security problems. As various reports suggest, he believed we needed a weapon to protect us from annihilation. However, Israel has never faced, and is not facing today, an 'existential threat' since 1948."

Will China shiver from the cold?

Perhaps to better understand the current constellation, we need to understand why Iran initially pursued the development of nuclear weapons.
"The timing reveals more than anything else the reasons behind their nuclear weapons development. In 2003, about two years after the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush decided to invade Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein based on the belief that weapons of mass destruction were present there. For Israel, this was a gift that came with a price: The crushing of the Iraqi army and the fall of Baghdad's regime completely disrupted the regional balance, making Iran a dominant regional power in the Persian Gulf.

"Iraq also came under Iranian influence due to the Shia majority in Iraq. But more importantly, the U.S. invasion of Iraq terrified the leaders of the fundamentalist-Shia regime of their own collapse, and they decided to revive the nuclear weapons program that the Shah had initiated. This was a completely rational decision aimed at preserving their regime, not at destroying Israel or the U.S."

You speak about rational arguments, but an experiment conducted by Israeli professor Moran Cerf found that participants wearing a virtual reality helmet, putting themselves in the shoes of the U.S. president, responded to an intense missile attack of unknown origin by launching nuclear weapons. The proportion was nearly fantastical – 190 out of 200 participants, and almost all regretted the use afterward. What is the likelihood of non-rational nuclear weapons use, and how can that risk be reduced?
"I'm not familiar with the experiment you mentioned, but generally, the decision to launch a nuclear missile is in the hands of the primary decision-maker in every nuclear-armed state after a long series of checks and discussions. To be more specific, in all nuclear-armed countries, nuclear weapons are referred to as 'the captain's personal weapon,' and they are not part of the capabilities under military command. Due to the 'ambiguity policy' that Israel has adopted regarding its capabilities in this area, there is no public information on the decision-making process in Israel on this issue."

You believe the current conflict will remain below the nuclear threshold. How so?
"Over the years, there has been a strong international norm known as 'the nuclear taboo.' In other words, any country developing nuclear weapons, whether considered 'good' or 'bad,' has learned and understood the nuclear logic that has existed since 1945, which dictates that such weapons should not be used. They are weapons for ultimate deterrence.

"Of course, these things are enshrined in the famous Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The countries that signed the treaty, including Iran, are committed to a complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons, especially against non-nuclear states. In the end, the presence of nuclear weapons maintains the highest level of international order. Furthermore, over the years, there are those who claim and prove it numerically that there has been a significant decrease in the number of wars worldwide due to nuclear weapons.

"To be more specific about the current conflict, Israel needs to make it clear to the Iranians that any harm to Israel's strategic assets or massive missile fire towards population centers will elicit a suitable response. The Houthis in Yemen have already understood this after their port went up in flames."

But the Iranians didn't understand. In the previous April attack, four warheads of 'Amad' missiles hit the Nevatim base. Twelve sirens even sounded in Dimona. Theoretically, and I'm not referring specifically to Israel here, is a deliberate attack on a nuclear facility equivalent to using a nuclear weapon?
"Absolutely not. Every country's nuclear systems and facilities are protected against conventional weapon attacks. I doubt the Iranians aimed their missiles at a sensitive facility in Dimona. From all indications, they aimed at the Air Force base in the Negev. In any case, as I mentioned earlier, any Iranian attack on a strategic Israeli asset will be met with the harshest response.

"By the way, it's important to remember that we have no real reason for war against the Iranian people, quite the opposite. Iran is ruled by a regime hated by most Iranians. Therefore, Israel must ensure it does not harm Iranian civilians, only regime assets."

Explain.

"We have the capability to hit their oil fields, which is a very serious matter – because the Chinese have a deal to buy and purchase oil from Iran for the next 25 years. If China wants to ensure a steady oil supply from Iran, it will have to restrain Tehran because damage to the oil fields could leave the Chinese freezing. But if there are casualties in Tel Aviv from missiles, let the Chinese freeze. After all, China will not go to war against us. Israel cannot live in fear that Iran may have nuclear weapons in the future. We must not allow them to turn us into hostages of the Iranian nuclear threat.

"Another important point that Israelis do not sufficiently understand: Iran is a militarily and economically weak country. The ayatollahs' regime fears for its future, which is why they have avoided investing in strengthening the army, fearing it would support the overthrow of their regime. As a result, a hybrid entity with limited power was created, called the Revolutionary Guards. Their air force is outdated and irrelevant, and they pose no threat. We, on the other hand, can do as we please in Tehran. The Iranians are highly vulnerable, but Israeli citizens are losing sleep at night out of fear, and unjustifiably so. The Iranians are highly exposed and have more reasons to fear than we do. They have simply developed a way to fight Israel through third parties – the Houthis and Hezbollah."

Rabin's Concerns

In 2031, our array of concerns is expected to change. This is the year when the nuclear agreement with Iran expires, which may bring it to a completely different stage in its project, if it doesn't happen much sooner. What will be Israel's deterrence strategy against a nuclear-armed Iran, and how will it affect the policy of ambiguity?
"The policy of ambiguity is fantastic and will be effective for us until mid-2031 and possibly beyond. Fortunately, we did not have to pay a political price at the time for developing nuclear weapons, according to foreign reports. The decision to abandon the ambiguity policy depends on international circumstances.

"Firstly, it's important to remember that it's not at all certain that Iran will rush to declare it has nuclear weapons. If it does declare itself a nuclear state with Chinese and Russian backing, we'll have a problem. We might have to inform the U.S. that we are ending the ambiguity. This should, of course, be done with American consent because, according to foreign reports, it was agreed in the Golda-Nixon understandings that the U.S. would agree that Israel could have nuclear weapons as long as it did not declare it. But if Iran becomes an illegitimate nuclear state, like North Korea, it's likely to face crippling sanctions – so there's no real reason to abandon the ambiguity policy."

I want to go back to an interesting chapter you wrote in your book "Dimona – Israel's Nuclear Deterrence". The chapter is titled: "Israel Without the Bomb, an Alternative History." What would our security reality look like today vis-à-vis Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis if Israel did not have a nuclear program, as is reported by foreign sources?
"The threats would be the same. Iran and Hezbollah are not fazed by nuclear weapons, as mentioned. The reality would be exactly as it is today, except for the panic that Israeli governments in the 1980s experienced due to Iraq's and later Iran's nuclear programs. Back then, Israel would likely have initiated an accelerated program to develop a military nuclear capability in response. This would have led us to develop nuclear weapons in a short period, but the costs we would have paid would have been higher."

Yitzhak Rabin feared the Iranian threat, and he is certainly not the only one. If we look at this from the other side, how much do leaders fear initiating the use of nuclear weapons?
"Every leader understands the clear dangers posed by that. That's why democratic countries are not preoccupied with this issue. I'll share an anecdote that reflects the whole story: In the U.S., a document is issued annually summarizing the U.S.'s nuclear strategy. It is supposedly updated every year, but in reality – there are no real changes and nothing to update, because it's clear to Americans that nuclear weapons are not to be used. We're trying to save the planet from global warming and sweating through the summer months, so use nuclear weapons?"

Are you including Putin in your remarks? Just three months ago, he ordered a nuclear drill.
"It's true that Russia is concerned with nuclear weapons, especially after it was nearly defeated by Ukraine. Putin declared that he has nuclear weapons, and at that time, there was enormous panic worldwide for two hours following an unexplained explosion. In the end, it turned out there was no nuclear explosion. Putin certainly went through some tough moments in the war against Ukraine and tried to leverage anything possible, but despite all the threats, he never actually came close to pressing the button."

The Red Button Protocol

In the US, there have been recent attempts to develop a protocol for when the red button needs to be pressed. Nobody wants to use these weapons, but the infrastructure is being prepared for it.
"The procedures don't really change. The Cold War ended in 1989, and military powers that threaten the global balance, like Nazi Germany or Japan during World War II, have faded from the world. So why do countries invest in this? Because it's a status symbol. The issue of use is a different phase because any country that uses nuclear weapons knows it could spark a world war. This is also related to the fact that, in terms of nuclear weapons, there is a global policeman – the U.S. It initiated the treaty and ensured it would be eternal, without an expiration date. The world accepted the logic that this is a weapon that has no place in use."

At least not for a first strike. In 1983, Thomas Schelling and Israeli Nobel laureate in economics Robert Aumann planned a classified war game centered on nuclear warfare. The participants in the game admitted that the results were terrifying, and every time the ending was the same - chaos.
"Absolutely. Once the first use happens, we are in a completely different story."

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The United States has provided $6.5 billion in security assistance to Israel since the outbreak of the war against the Hamas terror organization on Oct. 7, according to a senior Biden administration official. This previously undisclosed figure was revealed following talks with Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and his delegation to Washington this week, The Washington Post reported Thursday. 

The substantial aid package, which includes nearly $3 billion approved in May, comes amid recent tensions between the two allies over the pace of arms transfers.

"This is a massive, massive undertaking," the senior official stated, speaking on condition of anonymity. The disclosure aims to highlight the depth and complexity of US support for Israel.

To address Israeli concerns about potential delays in aid delivery, US arms transfer experts conducted a thorough review of "hundreds of separate items" with their Israeli counterparts during Gallant's four-day visit. This effort sought to counter claims of "bottlenecks" in the arms flow, allegations recently made by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and described as "perplexing" and "inaccurate" by the White House.

Gallant emphasized the importance of US support during a press briefing. "Our ties with the United States are the second-most important element for Israel's security," he said, highlighting the need for American diplomatic, political, and material assistance.

The defense minister reported "significant progress" in addressing obstacles and expediting various issues, particularly regarding force build-up and munition supply. "Obstacles were removed and bottlenecks were addressed in order to advance a variety of issues," Gallant stated.

The senior US official acknowledged the complexities of the arms transfer process while noting potential misunderstandings on the Israeli side regarding specific requests. "In terms of bottlenecks, it is a complicated, bureaucratic system that we have for good reason," the official explained, citing obligations to Congress, laws, and regulations.

Describing the visit as "highly constructive and productive," the official praised Gallant's "professional approach." 

Despite the ongoing flow of arms, the Biden administration continues to withhold a shipment of 2,000-pound bombs, citing concerns about their potential use in densely populated areas.

During his visit, Gallant met with key US national security officials, including Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan. Discussions covered various topics, including efforts to secure a Gaza ceasefire, the return of Israeli hostages, and plans for Gaza's future governance. Some 120 Israeli hostages are still being held hostage by Hamas terrorists, 43 of whom have been declared dead. 

Other topics of discussion included Iran's escalating production of weapons-grade nuclear fuel and ongoing disputes over humanitarian aid distribution in Gaza. 

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 The US is pressing European allies Britain and France to abandon plans for Iran to be censured at the upcoming International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting in June for its lack of cooperation and prohibited nuclear activities, according to the Wall Street Journal, apparently to avoid disruption with Iran before the US elections this November. 

These divisions come as a new IAEA report revealed Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium has reached unprecedented levels. The UN nuclear watchdog stated on Monday that Iran's stockpile of 60% enriched uranium rose over 20 kg (45 pounds) in the last three months to 142 kg (313 pounds) – its highest level yet. US officials say that material could be converted into weapons-grade enriched uranium within days.

The rift exposes differences in approach that have emerged since the Trump administration withdrew from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal in 2018. Europeans were strong supporters of the accord, which lifted sanctions in exchange for temporary nuclear constraints on Tehran. They sought to preserve the deal even after the US exit, while the Biden administration made reviving the agreement a top priority upon taking office in 2021.

But those diplomatic efforts collapsed in August 2022 when Iran hardened its demands as negotiations faltered. Since then, US officials have sought to contain escalating tensions with Tehran. European diplomats now accuse Washington of lacking a coherent strategy and appear unwilling to either seriously engage Iran in new diplomacy or take punitive steps over its growing nuclear program.  

The divisions have raised alarms in European capitals that the window is closing to rein in Iran's atomic work through non-military means. There are increasing Western fears that Iran, already considered a nuclear threshold state, may be positioning itself to acquire weapons capability. While Tehran insists its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, it has significantly reduced IAEA oversight and stonewalled investigations into previous undeclared nuclear materials and activities.

European diplomats argue that failure to censure Iran at the IAEA would undermine the agency's authority as the nuclear watchdog and erode Western credibility in confronting potential proliferation risks. They contend it is time to take a firm stand against Tehran's continued defiance of non-proliferation obligations.

But the US fears an IAEA censure could prompt Iranian retaliation and further limit inspectors' access, as occurred after a 2022 rebuke. With Russia and China likely to veto any push for new UN sanctions, a failed censure vote could deal a major diplomatic blow that emboldens Iran's nuclear intransigence.

#BREAKING Multiple EU countries including Germany are pushing to classify the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization on the basis of a German court ruling, diplomats tell dpa.

— dpa news agency (@dpa_intl) May 27, 2024

The Biden administration argues that European powers could do more to economically pressure Iran, like cutting off its banks still operating in Europe and designating the Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist organization. The German dpa News Agency reported on Monday that Germany and other European nations are advocating for the EU to designate Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization, as per a recent German court ruling. However, diplomats noted that "such a terror listing would be primarily a symbolic step because there are already EU sanctions" against the IRGC. For now, US officials recently held rare indirect talks with Iranian counterparts in Oman in a bid to reduce regional tensions.

Ultimately, experts suggest any censure of Iran's nuclear activities should be part of a broader negotiating strategy of both disincentives and incentives to alter Tehran's behavior. "The board needs to send a message that there are consequences for stonewalling," said Kelsey Davenport of the Arms Control Association. "But it needs to be part of a broader strategy to pressure and incentivize Iran to cooperate with the IAEA."

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In a possible sign that the United States is ready to renew nuclear negotiations with Iran, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Tuesday night said, "The path to diplomacy is open."

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Speaking to National Public Radio, Blinken, however, said that from the US perspective, "Right now, Iran is still a ways away from being in compliance, so we'll have to see what it does." 

Later in the interview, when asked if there was "any move underway to reopen direct diplomacy with Iran," Blinken responded by saying, "At present, [Us president Joe Biden], I think, [has] been very clear publicly, repeatedly, about where we stand. And we'll see what, if any, reaction Iran has to that.

"At some point presumably, if there's going to be any engagement on this, that would have to require diplomacy. That's what we're in the business of," Blinken said.

Last week, as a reminder, the US secretary of state said that if Iran returns to fulfilling its obligations under the nuclear agreement, the US would do the same.  

Earlier this month, Biden said the US would not lift sanctions imposed on Iran unless it stops enriching uranium and returns to its obligations under the 2015 nuclear deal.

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"We are not insisting nor in a hurry for the US to return to the deal," Khamenei said in live televised remarks. "But what is logical is our demand, is the lifting of the sanctions. These brutal sanctions must be lifted immediately."

Tensions have grown between Tehran and Washington since 2018, when US President Donald Trump exited the deal between Iran and six world powers – which sought to limit Tehran's nuclear program and prevent it developing atomic weapons – and re-imposed sanctions that have crippled Iran's economy.

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In retaliation, Tehran started gradually violating the accord.

Potentially complicating efforts by US President-elect Joe Biden to rejoin the deal, Iran said on Monday it had resumed 20% uranium enrichment at its Fordo underground nuclear facility.

The UN nuclear watchdog confirmed that Iran had started the process of enriching uranium to 20% purity.

Tehran says it can quickly reverse its breaches if US sanctions are removed. Biden, who takes office on Jan. 20, has said the United States will rejoin the deal "if Iran resumes strict compliance" with the pact.

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