The former German leader, who was Israel's most important ally in Europe during her long tenure spanning 4 terms from 2005 to 2021, toured the Nova site Wednesday alongside Gail Shoresh, from the Dvora Forum that promotes women's equality, receiving explanations about sexual atrocities committed by Hamas some two years ago during the massive attack on the Gaza border communities, with German Ambassador Steffen Seibert sharing her visit on social media. Nahal Oz resident Amir Tibon also shared with Merkel his unique ordeal, retelling the story of how he managed to survive after terrorists invaded his kibbutz and started slaughtering and kidnapping residents.

Oct 7 revisited: Angela Merkel met Gail Shoresh of Project Dvora at the Nova site who explained about sexual violence on that terrible day. And @amirtibon showed her the room in Nahal Oz where he and his family hid for 10 hours and survived. pic.twitter.com/gDLbc3kCRs

— Steffen Seibert (@GerAmbTLV) November 12, 2025

"Oct 7 revisited: Angela Merkel met Gail Shoresh at the Nova site who explained about sexual violence on that terrible day," Seibert wrote.

"Tibon showed her the room in Nahal Oz where he and his family hid for 10 hours and survived," he continued. Tibon, who lives in Nahal Oz with his wife and children, was rescued after his father, former IDF Major General Noam Tibon, rushed to the south with his wife to help fight against the Hamas terrorists who had invaded his kibbutz and other locations in the area. 

Former Chancellor Angela Merkel received an honorary degree from @WeizmannScience, praising Israeli and German scientists who were the first to build new bridges between our peoples after the Shoah. Amid anti-scientific tendencies worldwide she spoke for science-based politics. pic.twitter.com/smSGbhcwcN

— Steffen Seibert (@GerAmbTLV) November 11, 2025

During her visit this week , Weizmann Institute of Science conferred an honorary degree upon Merkel, who delivered remarks praising Israeli and German scientists as the first to construct new bridges between the two peoples following the Holocaust, the German Ambassador wrote. Speaking amid worldwide anti-scientific tendencies, the former chancellor advocated for science-based politics during the ceremony, Seibert noted.

The beauty of „attosekundenschnelle Rastertunnelmikroskopie" - former Chancellor Merkel firmly in her element visiting @TechnionLive in Haifa - world class science flourishing through diversity and international cooperation. pic.twitter.com/pKMOOJdv2p

— Steffen Seibert (@GerAmbTLV) November 11, 2025

The Technion – Israel Institute of Technology in Haifa received a visit from Merkel as well, with the German Ambassador describing world-class science flourishing through diversity and international cooperation at the institution. The former chancellor appeared firmly in her element exploring "attosekundenschnelle Rastertunnelmikroskopie" during the tour, according to Seibert's social media posts.

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Israeli assessments indicate Hamas can immediately transfer five deceased hostages of out of the remaining 13, with several more requiring additional effort to locate.

More than 100 Gaza border residents gathered to honor the casket of the deceased hostage as the convoy passed through the Nahal Oz junction, including Yael Adar, mother of Tamir Adar whose body was returned six days ago in the previous pulse. "I came here to receive whoever arrives," Yael Adar said. "I wish I could receive all thirteen today. I know how moved I was when they received the convoy when Tamir arrived, and when I discovered after the fact it was him. I understood this is the least I can do for the others. I'll be here until the last hostage. I stand with the families."

A diplomatic source announced Monday that one of 13 deceased hostages would be returned to Israel overnight but the handover, it turns out, was apparently, either deliberately or accidentally was not that of a hostage.

Hamas officially confirmed the deceased hostage would be handed over to Israel through the Red Cross. A source in Hamas's military wing told Al-Jazeera that during searches Tuesday a deceased hostage was found in the at-Tuffah neighborhood and coordination was underway with the Red Cross regarding transfer.

Earlier, Prime Minister's Office spokesperson Shosh Bedrosian said, "Israel has been committed to this ceasefire plan for more than two weeks, and so has Hamas. Hamas violated the agreement and did not return all our hostages. Israel received only the bodies of 15 out of 28 murdered hostages. And in the past five days we have received nothing from Hamas. Promises and commitments have been broken. Hamas is still a terrorist organization, and its only motivation for holding the bodies of murdered hostages is to continue torturing their families."

She added, "Hamas committed to President Trump and other Arab leaders that it would stand by this plan, which includes in the first phase the release of all our remaining hostages. Hamas knows where they are located, and there is no other possibility but to return them home. An Egyptian technical team is currently in Gaza to assist in searching for the bodies of the hostages. The team will bring additional equipment to help locate the hostages, including tractor-type vehicles. The Red Cross, the Egyptian technical team and Hamas personnel also received approval to enter beyond the IDF's yellow line in Gaza under close IDF supervision, in order to identify the location of our hostages. Hamas kidnapped them and murdered them. Israel demands the terrorist organization locate them."

US President Donald Trump wrote Saturday evening on his TRUTH account that "We have a very strong PEACE in the Middle East, and I believe it has a good chance of being EVERLASTING," but added a direct warning to Hamas, "Hamas is going to have to start returning the bodies of the deceased hostages, including two Americans, quickly, or the other Countries involved in this GREAT PEACE will take action." Trump added, "Let's see what they do over the next 48 hours. I am watching this very closely.""

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Enat Angrest revealed that the terrorists debated whether it was "worth keeping him alive or giving up on him" because of his severe injury. In a video the family released from October 7, Angrest is shown being extracted from the tank, bent and kneeling on the ground, his military shirt pulled up and his chest exposed, being guided and held by terrorists.

Angrest added that the terrorists informed Matan they saw her on television and that she was "very dominant in the struggle" to bring him home. "Matan didn't know that an entire nation was crying and waiting for them. He believed there was a protest here and a protest there. He wasn't aware of the intensity of the publicity."

She also stated her son told her "I did what was expected of me as a soldier" and that he is proud of his decision to fight that morning, and that he considered the possibility he would be abducted.

Earlier, Matan and Einat met with President Donald Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner and Special Envoy for Middle East Steve Witkoff. They presented Witkoff with a photograph from Kiryat Bialik Mayor Eli Dukorsky of the city's soccer stadium that will be named after Trump. Matan is a resident of the city.

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Located just 700 meters (0.4 miles) from Gaza's Shuja'iyya neighborhood, Nahal Oz is home to 450 residents across 120 families. The community was preparing to celebrate its 70th anniversary on October 7, with numerous guests present when the attack began.

What distinguished the Nahal Oz battle was the partial success of local security forces in repelling the initial assault wave "against all odds," according to the investigation. This was partly due to the fortuitous presence of 11 members of the Israel Police Counter Terror Unit (Yamam) counterterrorism fighters who happened to be sleeping in the kibbutz as a standby force for potential fence disturbances. However, the investigation, conducted by Colonel (res.) Yaron Sitbon, identified a critical failure in directing reinforcement forces to the kibbutz, noting: "If we had been more efficient in directing reinforcement forces, we could have prevented the second and deadlier wave."

The investigation specifically praised the Nahal Oz community for showing "comradeship, resourcefulness, responsibility, and courage" while enduring hours under attack. Special recognition was given to teenager Tomer Arava and the Yamam force that fought throughout the assault.

According to the findings, more than 180 attackers infiltrated the kibbutz, with some estimates placing the number between 200-300. Approximately 80 were eliminated within the kibbutz grounds. The attackers caused extensive damage to homes and agricultural areas, with equipment losses estimated at over 17 million shekels ($4.8 million). Officials expect the rehabilitation process to be lengthy.

The timeline constructed by investigators shows that at 7:00 a.m., the first wave of 30-40 attackers entered through the southern gate. A captured map revealed the Hamas plan was to approach from Shuja'iyya to the kibbutz's back gate, with a special team designated to target communications infrastructure.

The attack commenced with a barrage of rockets and mortars, some landing within the kibbutz. One child was injured by shrapnel from a shattered window blind. The bombardment caused a power outage that prevented electric gates from opening – a critical factor in subsequent events.

A deputy company commander from the Golani Brigade, stationed at a nearby outpost, arrived at the gate at 6:49 a.m. Unable to enter due to the power failure, he made the crucial decision to defend from a tank position northwest of the kibbutz. This proved fortuitous when, three minutes later, his force engaged six attackers on motorcycles, eliminating five. Concurrently, a tank from the Nahal Oz outpost headed toward a position near the fence, encountered attackers on vehicles, and destroyed several.

The investigation identified a significant vulnerability in the kibbutz defense: following an IDF-endorsed guideline, the security response team's weapons were stored in a central armory. Security coordinator Ilan Fiorentino (deceased) had the key and access code but incorrectly assumed the power outage would prevent the code panel from working. Consequently, 16 security response team members were never mobilized. The IDF assessment concluded that these additional defenders "could have stopped the other waves." Only deputy security coordinator Nissan de Kalo, who had his personal weapon, and another response team member named Beri joined the Yamam force to defend the kibbutz.

At 7:05 a.m., the first attackers infiltrated from the south, approaching the back gate and dairy farm area by motorcycle and on foot. This initial wave was successfully repelled by Yamam fighters, the two armed security team members, and a former police officer who was a kibbutz resident. However, the defenders suffered casualties, including security coordinator Ilan Fiorentino, Staff Sergeant Jacob Shlomo Krasinski (23) of Yamam, and kibbutz resident Shoshi Brosh (75). Her husband, Yonchi, was wounded along with several Yamam personnel.

Critical hours

From this point until 1:15 p.m., when the first IDF reinforcements finally arrived, the kibbutz's defense rested entirely on eight fighters with two armored vehicles – two kibbutz security team members in a protected Defender jeep and six Yamam fighters in a Ze'ev armored vehicle equipped with firing ports, which proved effective for mobile combat operations. This small force faced a second, larger wave of attackers that reached the kibbutz around 10:00 a.m., beginning with 60 fighters from Hamas's Shati Battalion breaching through five entry points, followed by approximately 150 additional attackers through other access points.

By 10:30 a.m., the attackers had seized control of the kibbutz, a situation that would persist for several hours until Maglan special forces arrived. During this period, all kidnappings and most murders occurred, concentrated largely in the Keshet neighborhood. A roadblock prevented the Ze'ev vehicle with Yamam fighters from accessing parts of this area, likely why attackers established a stronghold there.

The investigation noted a disturbing tactic used in Nahal Oz: Attackers broadcast several "Facebook Live" videos using victims' phones. Around 10:40 a.m., they forced Tomer Arava-Eliaz to knock on neighbors' doors, demanding they exit their homes. At the Idan family residence, attackers shot through the safe room door, killing daughter Ma'ayan and wounding father Tsachi, who was subsequently kidnapped. At 11:29 a.m., attackers entered the Miran family home with Tomer, later moving the family to the Idan residence at 12:15 p.m. while continuing their broadcasts.

During this period, the Zohar family – parents Yaniv and Yasmin and daughters Keshet and Tchelet – were murdered. In separate incidents, Yasmin's father, Haim Livne (87), and kibbutz member Shlomo Ron (85) were also killed.

Investigators noted that Tomer Arava maintained remarkable composure throughout his ordeal, repeatedly telling attackers that houses were empty. The practice of using a "neighbor procedure" and broadcasting propaganda via Facebook Live appears unique to the Nahal Oz attack. The attackers delivered messages in English, including claims they "won't kill you" and warnings to the Israeli Air Force not to strike. The IDF continues investigating whether security personnel viewed these broadcasts in real-time, potentially missing vital intelligence about the unfolding situation.

The Arava-Elyakim family was kidnapped in their Hyundai Tucson, with evidence suggesting accidental fire from Israeli forces struck the vehicle's rear window. Dikla was killed by this gunfire, while Noam was later found deceased near the dairy farm, with uncertainty whether he died from existing wounds or was shot again by attackers.

By noon, the first images of female Israeli hostages in Gaza were published – Noam's daughters Dafna and Ella Elyakim. Around this time, Tomer Arava managed to escape his captors and fled toward a kibbutz entrance gate. After hiding behind a mound, he was shot at approximately 12:40 p.m., with investigators assessing this was likely accidental fire from exhausted Yamam fighters who had been operating for hours without water or air conditioning in their damaged armored vehicle.

The first external reinforcements to reach the vicinity came at 12:05 p.m., when a Maglan force commanded by Major Chen Buchris approached a route near the kibbutz and encountered an ambush by 10 attackers. The ensuing firefight killed Buchris, Lieutenant Yiftach Yaavetz, and Staff Sergeant Afik Rosenthal, with only two soldiers continuing to fight. Approximately ten minutes later, Major General (res.) Noam Tibon arrived with paratroopers who joined the battle alongside another Maglan team.

Turning the tide

The first relief forces finally entered the kibbutz at 1:15 p.m., even as kidnappings continued on the opposite side near the dairy farm and back gate. At 1:30 p.m., attackers handcuffed American citizens Yehudit and Natali Raanan, along with Tsachi Idan and Omri Miran, attempting to transport them in Tsachi's vehicle. When they couldn't start the car, the four were taken on foot through the northern fence.

By 1:44 p.m., Maglan forces began systematic searches through the kibbutz, marking the beginning of the "turning of the tide." A Givati reconnaissance battalion force entered at 2:00 p.m. to assist. At 3:30 p.m., a tragic friendly fire incident occurred when one force entered another's sector without coordination and misidentified armed kibbutz security team member Ran Posloshny as an attacker, fatally shooting him.

The investigation concluded with a critical assessment of command failures, noting the Northern Brigade's poor situational awareness and inability to effectively direct forces. It identified a crucial "missed opportunity" between the first and second attack waves, concluding that "even a small force arriving would have prevented kidnappings" – a sobering acknowledgment of how different the outcome might have been with proper reinforcement.

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Being a military installation, this incident produced the most documented investigation – captured by cameras inside the base, on armored vehicles, and even by the terrorists themselves. While the situation across Gaza border communities remained unclear to division commanders and General Staff that morning, the severe crisis at Nahal Oz was known to leadership from the beginning due to consistent reporting from the base. This explains why the location received the most airstrikes on that horrific morning.

IDF faults exposed across the board

The devastating battle at Nahal Oz represents a systemic failure in IDF preparedness for a wide-scale ground attack under rocket fire. According to investigators, the failure wasn't one of conception but rather the absence of the most basic IDF principles that should have been applied that morning and during the long period preceding it.

Retrospective analysis of Hamas's invasion plans clearly shows that the organization specifically targeted Nahal Oz base as a key objective within its operational strategy. For years, Hamas gathered intelligence on the base through direct observation from Sajayia (which overlooks the camp), drone surveillance, and information collection from inside the camp via social networks and IDF media publications.

Documents captured from terrorists contained precise diagrams of the base, including locations of shelters, generators, and security cameras. They knew exactly who occupied which rooms, sleeping arrangements, command post location, fighters' weaponry, and more. In their meticulous planning, Hamas analyzed access routes to the camp, terrain passability, agricultural cover areas, fence vulnerabilities, and other tactical details.

Video: Footage showing the kidnapping of IDF female field observers on Oct. 7 by Hamas terrorists

Military investigators note that Hamas prepared for the raid with precision comparable to special forces planning, modifying their approach based on gathered intelligence. Captured terrorists possessed detailed maps with specific takeover plans for each section of the base and instructions for individual terrorists detailing their positions, vehicle assignments, and required weaponry. Their strategy was to attack broadly during minimum force deployment (Saturday and holiday), employing deception tactics, rapid breaching, and overwhelming firepower. The terror organization calculated that reaching the camp within fifteen minutes would ensure victory.

On Friday, October 6, around 6:00 p.m., Hamas's raiding platoon commanders received their briefings. Junior operatives were briefed between 9:00 PM and midnight, while cell commanders received instructions between 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m..

The IDF, meanwhile, had fallen into a years-long complacency. For an extended period, forces stationed at the camp never trained for defending against a direct attack, despite being located just 850 meters from the border fence. No defense protocol existed in standing orders against a ground raid. The investigation found that when Battalion 13 entered operational deployment in the sector, they conducted a thorough process within the parameters defined for them.

One reasonable scenario forces should have prepared for involved raids by two different Hamas Nukhba companies targeting different IDF battalion areas in a concentrated brigade effort, striking an outpost or settlement. The objective in this scenario would be kidnapping and conducting mass killings. Forces should have also prepared for barrier area raids or fence-crossing attacks toward outposts or settlements. The more dangerous scenario (considered less likely) involved concentrated efforts by two Gaza brigades with coordinated raids by three Nukhba companies from different battalions in staggered but closely timed assaults.

On October 7 morning, Nahal Oz camp maintained full routine operations without any warnings or unusual reports, operating with reduced personnel according to weekend and holiday guidelines. Security consisted of a gate guard, an administrative soldier guarding the armory, a balloon operator, and another soldier monitoring communications in an armored vehicle. The base housed forces from Battalion 13 of the Golani Brigade (designated as the Nahal Oz battalion combat team), two tank teams from Brigade 7, a collection platoon from Battalion 414, and additional support personnel.

After 4:00 a.m., a perimeter fence sensor triggered an alert that prohibited movement on a nearby route. The incident concluded after a few minutes and was later assessed as unrelated to the main attack.

At 5:30 a.m., the deputy commander of the 13th Battalion, serving as sector commander that morning, conducted a situation assessment while implementing limited "dawn readiness" procedures (with only selective positions fully manned) according to standard protocols. A company commander headquarters departed the Nahal Oz camp with two reconnaissance vehicles, while a readiness force consisting of a tank and APC remained stationed in the nearby "Black Arrow" area.

The IDF divided Hamas' attack on Nahal Oz camp into four main phases according to the timeline, with the first fifteen minutes proving decisive.

Phase One: Enemy infiltration and fighting (6:29-8:20)

At 6:29, intense barrage fire targeted the camp as female spotters reported enemy approaches to the fence. Soldiers followed their only known procedure – running to shelters – having received no other training for base attacks.

Female spotters (field observers monitoring the Gaza border from the command center) followed their protocols, moving to observation positions to identify possible raids. Two spotters identified terrorists approaching the fence, and at 6:31, the sector commander reported terrorist infiltrations across multiple border points over radio, declaring a "complex event" of 'Purple Rain' (rocket fire) and "Turkish Horsemen" (infiltrators) throughout the sector. At 6:33, a female spotter identified the first explosion at the primary fence, and Company Commander Major Shiloh Har Even declared a confirmed complex event.

After communicating with the Northern Brigade commander in the Gaza Division, the deputy battalion commander left the camp to prevent infiltrations into nearby settlements. Meanwhile, commanders inside shelters organized combat forces to reinforce defensive positions. Major Har Even, who was on patrol, directed a tank to take position with an APC behind it to identify and eliminate infiltrating enemies. Two Golani fighters ran to reinforce their comrade at the camp – these three fighters fought heroically and became the last position to fall within the camp.

At 6:37 a.m., two trackers abandoned the camp while the third, Chief Warrant Officer Ibrahim Haruba, chose to remain – becoming another hero in this account. At this time, spotters identified an explosion in the secondary fence – the final barrier between Gaza and the camp. Just two minutes later, dozens of terrorists reached the breach only 850 meters from Nahal Oz camp.

By 6:45 a.m., most fighters present had rushed to defensive positions, except for the reinforcement force that had just arrived at the gate. At this point, tanks began moving according to readiness protocols, but a quarter-hour after the attack began, approximately 65 terrorists from the first wave had already reached the camp.

The investigation noted a profound cognitive disconnect between what soldiers had been trained for and the reality they faced. Even under heavy attack, one soldier still asked whether he had permission to use explosive ammunition.

At 6:55 a.m., during engagement with the main terrorist force, the deputy commander of the 13th Battalion was wounded. His fighters attempted medical treatment, temporarily pausing combat operations. By 7:04, all personnel who had been reinforcing positions retreated toward shelters due to overwhelming terrorist fire. A minute later, the first terrorists breached the camp as a platoon commander reached the command post, reporting extensive infiltration while ordering all armed personnel to engage the enemy.

At 7:00 a.m., five minutes after the deputy battalion commander was wounded, the Northern Brigade commander contacted Company Commander Har-Even by radio, instructing him to assume command with the primary mission of preventing kidnappings. This indicates the brigade commander quickly became aware of the deputy commander's condition and understood the battle situation. In the following minutes, the company commander attempted to establish situational awareness with female spotter platoon commander Shir Eilat.

Meanwhile, terrorists continued infiltrating the camp, using holes beneath perimeter concrete barriers as firing positions to target any soldiers visible inside. At 7:09 a.m., female personnel in the command post initiated position abandonment procedures upon realizing terrorists had reached the command post entrance.

Around 7:15 a.m., 13th Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Greenberg arrived from home and, unable to contact Major Har Even, transferred command to the Support Company Commander.

According to investigation findings, gate defenders fought courageously against superior terrorist numbers, killing several before being overcome around 7:30 a.m. , when all three defenders were killed. This position then became an entry point for additional terrorists.

While these events unfolded in the camp, Major Har Even attempted to stabilize the situation at Black Arrow, directing his tank to engage infiltrating terrorists. At 7:40 a.m. , Har Even's force arrived from Black Arrow and entered the camp battle. Despite losing his hand from a wound, Har-Even continued fighting, maintaining composure in radio communications.

At 7:43 a.m., the first air force attack drone arrived but, unable to establish contact with ground forces for targeting guidance, fired at the soccer field.

By 7:46 a.m., terrorists overwhelmed the women's shelter. Ten minutes later, the two company commanders coordinated an attempted linkup at the entrance gate to regain control. "It's you and me against the whole world now," the Support Company Commander told the wounded Major Har Even. Despite his severe injury, Har Even declared himself sector commander and prepared an offensive to retake the camp. While the Support Company Commander diverted toward Kfar Aza following reports of infiltration there, Har Even led two tank teams, an APC, and infantry from his company toward the camp. His entire force, except for the radio operator, was killed in a deadly ambush at the camp entrance.

Meanwhile, the women's shelter housed 31 female soldiers, only six armed, with one untrained in weapons use. When the first terrorist entered, they managed to wound him before terrorists threw three grenades inside. The women successfully repelled two grenades. Fourteen female soldiers escaped through the northern shelter exit. When terrorists breached the shelter, one armed female officer struggled with a terrorist attempting to seize her weapon before being fatally shot. The terrorists then bound the remaining women and searched for those who had escaped.

At 8:40 a.m., two airstrikes targeted areas near the female spotters' quarters, driving terrorists away and saving eleven female soldiers' lives.

Hamas terrorists at the Nahal Oz outpost

Phase Two: Continued fighting (8:20 a.m.-12:00 p.m.)

Forces continued engaging terrorists, sustaining casualties. At 8:53, a tank still fighting in the camp was disabled by two anti-tank missiles. Meanwhile, air support targeted areas in and around the camp. The second tank joined an APC, moving to the western section to prevent kidnappings.

Around 9:00, the tank identified a second wave of approaching terrorists. After directing helicopter fire toward them, the crew charged the terrorists in open terrain. At 9:02, the tank reached the northwestern corner outside the camp before being disabled by an anti-tank missile. Later, another missile strike injured the crew. Around 10:00, a third terrorist wave arrived and kidnapped the tank crew. The APC, now with only three fighters remaining (others having been injured after dismounting earlier), broke contact and later joined the fight at Kfar Aza.

By this stage, no forces operated outside shelters within the camp. All personnel had fortified positions inside shelters. According to evidence collected by investigators, kidnappings from Nahal Oz camp began around 10:00, with seven female spotters taken captive from their shelter around 10:20.

Throughout this period, terrorists attempted to breach the command post but encountered determined resistance from two platoon commanders, a Golani fighter, and tracker Haruba. All staff officers and female spotters had taken refuge in the back room. Haruba assumed command, refusing terrorist demands to surrender. He called his family and told the female spotters it would be his greatest honor to die for them and the country.

Aircraft attempted to prevent a fire in the command post but failed. During communication with the Northern Brigade Commander, Haruba was heard choking, reporting that terrorists had thrown something inside. Fire then broke out, filling the space with smoke. Five officers, one soldier, and one female spotter managed to escape – six through a bathroom window and one through another exit. All others perished. In retrospect, investigators noted the difficulty in judging those who sought self-preservation by moving toward light, while emphasizing IDF doctrine that commanders should exit after soldiers, female fighters after female soldiers, and all military personnel after civilians. Fifteen soldiers and commanders died in the command post.

Despite the clear threat – no adjustments made against raids

The main conclusions from the investigation deal with the surprise, and the fact that the camp did not function as an outpost and was not prepared for defense, combat capability, and staying in the camp. The camp was not planned against a ground attack and the protected areas in it provided a response only for high-trajectory fire, not terrorist infiltration.

Despite the command post being defined as a defense target, and being the closest and most threatened on the border, its protection was defined only for high-trajectory fire, and no adjustments were made against raids. Also, the definition of readiness state did not match, in time and space, the threat that could reach the camp in a vehicular ground raid, as analyzed by the brigade. Also, there was no existing defense plan for non-combat forces, such as the female spotters, and the possibility of an attack on the camp as analyzed in the brigade's reference scenario was not trained for. These gaps, the investigation determined, led to severe damage to non-combat forces and the ability of combat forces to defend the camp.

It further emerged that the surprise attack led to some of the commanders in the field being killed within a short time, and the forces operated in a disorganized manner without orderly commands. The investigation team positively noted the commanders' decisions to send their forces to fight in the nearby kibbutzim and protect the residents rather than fighting in the camp. Also positively noted was the performance of the female spotters and the commander of the collection platoon who continued to provide operational reports to forces with composure despite the many enemies in the camp. The team recommended awarding citations to a number of male and female soldiers and officers.

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Two minutes and eight seconds. That's the time Hamas terrorists estimated it would take them to reach their target – the Nahal Oz kibbutz – from their starting point in Sajaiya. Revealed here for the first time, this chilling detail, along with other instructions and methods of operation, appears in "Operation 402" – Hamas' attack order for the conquest of the kibbutz on October 7 that left 15 residents dead and eight kidnapped. Alongside stories of heroism, questions also arise regarding the military's performance that day concerning the tragic death of kibbutz resident Ran Poslushni.

Operation 402

Drawn on impressive aerial photographs in Operation 402, a green arrow shows the short, simple route along which dozens of heavily armed Hamas terrorists rode motorcycles as they raided the kibbutz on the morning of October 7. It starts at the outermost building in Sajaiya and stretches directly eastward from there. Upon reaching the border with Israel, the arrow turns right, and after a distance of only about 164 feet, it immediately turns left, back towards the east. After easily jumping over the border fence, the arrow again rushes in a straight line through the potato fields and watermelon patches of Nahal Oz, ending at the southeastern corner of the kibbutz.

Other operation orders prepared by Hamas for the capture of communities in southern Israel have been revealed in the past, but Operation 402 is undoubtedly the most detailed published to date. Written in military language with over ten pages total of data and instructions, members of Hamas' military wing laid out step by step their plan for the massacre.

"The mobilized and reduced platoon from the third company in the fourth battalion will attack Nahal Oz kibbutz," it states. "It will cause as many casualties as possible, take hostages, and position itself inside the kibbutz – until further instructions are received."

Section 3 of the plan includes a table detailing the time in which members of the third company are supposed to complete the route from Sajaiya to the kibbutz. "Distance of the advance route between the exit point and the target – 3,050 meters," the table states. "Average speed of the group's advance towards the target – 40 mph. Travel time to reach the target from when the order is received – 2:08 minutes."

Two minutes and eight seconds. That's all Hamas terrorists needed to get from their starting point inside Gaza to the entrance of the isolated Israeli community. Two minutes and eight seconds, during which no one stood in their way. With this as the starting point, it's no wonder the battle for Nahal Oz was lost from the start. Almost.

Nahal Oz victims

There's no need for Hamas' aerial photographs or their calculations to understand how close Nahal Oz is to the border with Gaza. Since its establishment in 1951, the kibbutz has suffered from its proximity to the Gaza Strip, from Fedayeen attacks, through more than 20 years of Qassam rockets and mortars, to the "March of Return" protests held throughout 2018 that enveloped the kibbutz in thick smoke every Friday. But even the veteran residents of Nahal Oz couldn't have imagined October 7, when 15 kibbutz members were murdered: Staff Sergeant Ilan Fiorentino, Staff Sergeant (res.) Ran Poslushni, Shlomo Ron, Shoshi Brosh, Haim Livne, Yasmin, Yaniv, Keshet and Tchelet Zohar, Dikla Arava, Tomer Arava-Eliaz, Noam Elyakim, Maayan Idan, Somkuan Pansa-ard, and Joshua Mollel.

Eight people were kidnapped from the kibbutz on that black Saturday – Tsachi Idan and Omri Miran, who are still in captivity; Judith Raanan and her daughter Natalie, American citizens who were released after 14 days; sisters Dafna and Ela Elyakim and Alma Avraham, who were released after 51 days; and Clemence Felix Matanga, a Tanzanian citizen who was murdered and whose body is being held in Gaza.

Since October 7, Nahal Oz has been a closed military area. Although it is almost empty of residents, the kibbutz is still well-maintained: a group of volunteers passes between the houses and tends to the shrubs so they don't grow wild. The green lawns are also waiting for the community to return home. On a visit to the kibbutz this week, it's easy to imagine the pastoral scene of that Simchat Torah morning. It's also easy to imagine the dust cloud raised by the motorcycles on which Hamas terrorists rode on their short journey from nearby Sajaiya.

The IDF investigation into the battle in Nahal Oz has not yet been completed, and its publication is not expected soon. However, the remarkable bravery displayed by the kibbutz's emergency response team is already evident. Despite losing their security coordinator, Ilan Fiorentino, in the opening minutes of the assault, this small group, along with a few border police officers who were coincidentally spending the weekend in Nahal Oz, mounted a fierce resistance against dozens of heavily armed terrorists. In the face of overwhelming odds, their courageous actions undoubtedly prevented an even greater tragedy from unfolding in the kibbutz. Only after six and a half hours would the first IDF forces arrive at the kibbutz gate to finally clear it of terrorists.

Members of the emergency response team described their experiences in "Testimony 710," an extensive civilian documentation project that recently went online. Now, in a first-of-its-kind reconstruction based on these testimonies, along with internal materials and Hamas' operation order, it's possible to get a full picture of the battle. From this picture emerges, just as in the IDF's investigation of the battle in Be'eri, questions regarding the army's performance in Nahal Oz. As in Be'eri, in the case of Nahal Oz, it turns out that during the clearing of the kibbutz from terrorists, IDF soldiers accidentally killed at least one Israeli civilian.

Top secret

The fourth battalion of Hamas' Gaza Brigade is the Sajaiya battalion, which has caused trouble for the IDF since Operation Cast Lead in 2009. In Operation Protective Edge, the battalion also inflicted heavy casualties on Israel. In the current war, the army has had to maneuver in its sector three times and still hasn't defeated it decisively. The third company of the battalion belongs to the Nukhba force (Arabic for "elite"), Hamas' special forces unit. Operation 402, which bears the heading "Top Secret," is intended for this elite company.

The entire order was printed, but someone had attached a note with the handwritten name "Abu Salama." This is the codename of the force commander, who received the document only hours before setting out. According to the battle order, the raiding force on Nahal Oz included 27 terrorists. The force should advance towards the target on 14 off-road motorcycles, moving in two columns. An additional motorcycle, on which the commander and driver will ride, will be positioned in the middle of the convoy. The order even specified the name of the commander's driver – Bilal Abu Kanuna.

The navigators who led the force were also mentioned by name, although their movement route was not particularly complicated. Another professional, Mohammed Hamto, was defined as a "media photographer." Later, under the "Communications" section, it states that "photos will be taken using head cameras and phones, in addition to the presence of a media photographer." This instruction clarifies how important it was for Hamas to broadcast the atrocities it committed live.

The order also included three aerial photographs of the area, which, in addition to the route of movement, indicate the locations of IDF communication antennas, cameras, and motion radars, along with guard posts, barbed wire fences, and dirt mounds. The entry point to the kibbutz is located in its southeastern corner, that is, in the part furthest from the Gaza Strip, a location that Hamas operatives probably assessed would be a weak point.

After completing the first stage – the rapid arrival at the destination – the terrorists would move to the second stage – conquering the kibbutz. According to the order, the force's sappers would breach holes in the fence using explosive charges, through which their comrades would enter for the mission and split into two groups. One group would focus on raiding the eastern part of Nahal Oz, while setting ambushes and booby-trapping houses. This group's mission was to take over the clubhouse and dining hall and also raid the secretariat, which, according to Hamas, "is considered an important source of information for our forces" from which communication with factors outside the kibbutz is conducted.

The second group of terrorists would focus on the western side of Nahal Oz, take over its visitors' center, "clear" the kindergartens, and blow up the kibbutz's communication antennas. Then, they would gather hostages from the first group and concentrate them in the kindergartens. The dining hall is also described in the order as a "central place" where "hostages can be held." Section 5 of the plan states that if, during the fortification with the hostages, there is a need for water and food supplies, they can be obtained from the grocery store, which can serve as a "source of logistical support for the forces – food, drink, fuel, gas."

Simultaneously with the conquest of Nahal Oz kibbutz, another Hamas force also raided the adjacent Nahal Oz outpost and completely conquered it, inflicting heavy casualties on the IDF. The lookout post's command and control center were breached, and most of the female observers were shot dead. Seven female IDF observers were kidnapped to the Gaza Strip. The people of Nahal Oz quickly realized that help would not come from the direction of the nearby outpost. "At some point, I called a friend and told him, 'You must save us and bring the army. There are dozens of terrorists in the kibbutz, and we're alone.' I really cried for help," said Barry Meyerowitz, co-manager of the Nahal Oz community and a member of the emergency response team who fought the terrorists on October 7. "The friend said, 'I'm checking what can be done,' then I realized there's no one to help us."

Even if they didn't meet the ambitious target of two minutes and eight seconds, the terrorists of the Sajaiya battalion certainly managed to infiltrate Nahal Oz quickly. Already at 7:00 AM, half an hour after the start of the attack, reports began to be received of terrorist fire inside the kibbutz. In the hours that followed, dozens more armed men would enter the community, along with looters who would take anything they could get their hands on. According to army estimates, on October 7, about 100 terrorists were present in Nahal Oz.

However, in the second part of their mission – conquering the kibbutz and fortifying themselves there with many hostages – Hamas terrorists failed. Although this is the Israeli community closest to the border with Gaza (except for Kerem Shalom), and although the terrorists stayed there for long hours with a huge numerical advantage – Nahal Oz did not fall. The terrorists managed to murder many of the kibbutz residents in cold blood and kidnap eight – but at no stage did they completely control it. What prevented this from happening was the kibbutz's emergency response team.

The emergency response team

At 7:04 AM, Ari Yefet, an emergency response team member, went out to his garden and looked towards the kibbutz's perimeter fence. He saw five motorcycles there, with two armed men on each. Yefet caught sight of the armed men crossing the kibbutz's back gate, and at 7:08 AM, he called Nissan de Kalo, deputy to the security coordinator Fiorentino. "Something urgent?" asked de Kalo. "Yes," Yefet replied, "there's a terrorist infiltration from the back gate."

De Kalo, who had just put on his vest and ceramic armor and taken his M-16 rifle out of the safe in his house, called the security coordinator Fiorentino. "Bring the Defender (the community's armored security vehicle) to me," he said, and immediately afterward, he put his children in the safe room, explained to them how to lock the door from the inside, and warned them not to open it for anyone.

Fiorentino and de Kalo, it's important to note, are the only members of the emergency response team who had long guns. The rest of the weapons were stored in the kibbutz's armory four months earlier for fear of being stolen. "Bring us weapons," Yefet writes to them already in the first minutes, locked in the safe room with his family. However, these weapons will never reach the 20 members of the emergency response team who were left in the kibbutz without a real ability to defend it.

Upon receiving the report of the terrorist infiltration, the security coordinator Fiorentino left the house, under fire, and joined 13-year-old Ariel Zohar, who had left his house for a run and whose entire family – parents Yaniv and Yasmin and older sisters Keshet and Tchelet – were murdered in the massacre. Fiorentino brought Ariel to his house. There, his wife Sharon watched over him, thus essentially saving his life. He then went out again and encountered terrorists and engaged in combat with them. "I'm in battle," he replied briefly to Sharon when she called him on the phone. Fiorentino, who pinned down the terrorists with fire, still managed to update the commander of a small group of Border Police fighters, who were spending the weekend in the kibbutz, about the location of the encounter. He managed to delay the terrorists' advance, but shortly afterward was hit and killed. The police, who encountered the terrorists later, managed to eliminate five of them.

The one who took command at this stage was de Kalo, who was now driving the armored Defender vehicle. When he called the security coordinator Fiorentino, "there was a dial tone, and Ilan didn't answer," he said in his testimony. "At that point in time, I had a very clear understanding – Ilan was probably not alive. The second thing is that I'm alone, and the third is that I'm probably about to encounter now."

De Kalo drove to the kibbutz entrance gate and waited for IDF forces there. He received a phone call from emergency response team member Meyerowitz. "I heard distress in his voice and asked where he was and what was happening," Meyerowitz testified. "He said he was at the kibbutz entrance, waiting for the army inside the armored vehicle, and asked if I could join him. I was at home with a bulletproof vest, magazines, helmet, flashlight, maps, and everything I needed – but without a weapon. Nissan said he had a (long) gun and a pistol and that he was coming to pick me up. And then the most horrific morning of my life began."

After de Kalo picked up Meyerowitz from his house, the two returned to the entrance gate of Nahal Oz, where they saw an armed person dressed in uniform climbing on it. "I was seconds away from shooting him," de Kalo recounted, "and then he raised his hands. I identified him as an officer. He told me, 'I have a force here with wounded soldiers and a dead man.'" Only at this stage do the emergency response team members realize that Border Police officers are also fighting terrorists simultaneously. They decide to join the officer and unite with the Border Police fighters.

When they reach the house where the Border Police are fortified, "They bring out four wounded for me," de Kalo said, "I lift one of them to the back seat of the Defender. I wake him up and seat him. Another soldier pulls him. My entire right hand and my clothes are soaked in blood." De Kalo and the Border Police manage to get the wounded soldiers out through one of Nahal Oz's back gates, while fighting terrorists shooting at them from all directions. "I remember faces I hit, and it's very difficult," de Kalo testified. "Even when you know they're terrorists, it's not human to kill. But it's a no-choice situation." During the battle, Staff Sergeant Yaakov Shlomo Krasinski was killed, and five Border Police fighters were wounded.

While the wounded were being loaded onto a kibbutz vehicle and evacuated to Soroka Hospital, the fighting continued inside Nahal Oz. Emergency response team members de Kalo and Meyerowitz, together with Border Police fighters, took control of two armored "Ze'ev" vehicles of the Border Police force under fire and started driving them around the kibbutz. De Kalo leads the force, and Meyerowitz sits next to him in the armored Defender connected to the kibbutz's WhatsApp group, where messages are received from residents about the locations of terrorists and wounded.

Being a history buff, at this stage de Kalo remembered the story of "Zvika Force," that small armor force that repelled an attempted invasion of Syrian armor divisions into the Golan Heights during the Yom Kippur War. "My goal is to reach the armed men (who are inside the kibbutz)," de Kalo described the rationale behind his heroism that day. "It's important for me to make contact, to create combat. Always be on the move, always surprise them, and not give them peace. Every time, pop up from a different place."

And so de Kalo's Defender and two "Ze'ev" vehicles hopped between different arenas and fought the terrorists as much as possible. Although they were few against many, the "de Kalo Force" does not allow Hamas terrorists to implement the orders they received in Operation 402. "Everywhere we drove, they shot at us," he said. "Part of the time we dismounted from the vehicle, part of the time we shot from inside the vehicle." The Border Police fighters, some of whom were equipped with sniper rifles, also fired from inside the vehicles. "I couldn't believe their level of accuracy," de Kalo said. "From narrow firing slits, they sniped. We told them, 'Two terrorists on the left, white shirt, black shirt.' They took them down."

When de Kalo and Meyerowitz's Defender vehicle took close-range fire and was disabled, they left it and moved to the Border Police "Ze'ev." The Ze'ev also took an RPG rocket hit but continued to function. The emergency response team members and Border Police managed to prevent them from completely conquering Nahal Oz. Throughout all this, they and all the other kibbutz members waited for the IDF.

The IDF arrives

It took the IDF a long time to send forces to Nahal Oz. Only at 11:00 AM did the Maglan unit receive the first order, which placed responsibility for the kibbutz in its hands. As a result, several teams from the unit, who were moving around the area and had already fought in various places, began to make their way to Nahal Oz, but this was not simple and was full of ambushes set by the terrorists in advance.

The first military force to arrive near Nahal Oz was a Maglan force led by Major Chen Bouchris, the unit's deputy commander, and Captain Yiftah Yavetz. The force, which arrived around noon, included only five fighters. They drove on the main access road to the kibbutz and were ambushed just yards from the entrance gate by terrorists lying in wait by the roadside. General (res.) Noam Tibon, who was going to Nahal Oz to rescue his son Amir and his family, also joined the battle that developed. In the encounter, Bouchris, Yavetz, and Staff Sergeant Afik Rosenthal were killed.

The encounter delayed the arrival of Maglan forces to Nahal Oz. Unit teams that arrived at the scene spent about an hour neutralizing the threat and evacuating the wounded, while struggling to reach the kibbutz itself. According to the unit's reports, the first force to reach Nahal Oz finally did so at 1:15 PM.

Maglan was joined at this stage by fighters from the Givati Reconnaissance Unit, under the command of unit commander Lt. Col. Ziv Boanish, who was called up from home and arrived in the Sderot area in private vehicles. In a press interview given by Givati Reconnaissance officers, they claimed they arrived at Nahal Oz at 11:00 AM. This claim does not align with testimonies from emergency response team members and other documents in our possession.

According to emergency response team member Meyerowitz, the army arrived in Nahal Oz only after 1:30 PM. "At 1:30 PM, we received a message on the radio that forces were arriving. We stood and waited for them," he recounts. "We were already quite battered and also dehydrated, both us and the Border Police. We waited at the back gate, and then a convoy of army jeeps from the Maglan unit and Givati Reconnaissance started to enter. They spread out as defense. Nissan showed them the kibbutz on the map. For a moment, I breathed. I said, 'Wow, I can't believe the army arrived.' I wrote to my wife Roni that the army had arrived and that we were coming soon, and then I saw the briefing continued and continued. I started screaming like a madman at everyone. There was also Noam Tibon, who arrived with the soldiers. I didn't know who he was. I told him, 'Come on, we can't wait. They're killing the whole kibbutz.'"

With assistance from emergency response team members, Maglan and Givati forces divided Nahal Oz into sectors, with each team of fighters assigned an area to clear. The soldiers moved from house to house, attempting to determine which homes contained terrorists. At this stage, an unexpected challenge emerged: It became clear that Hamas terrorists had shouted, "IDF! IDF!", while breaking into kibbutz houses to slaughter residents. Now, when the IDF actually arrived, terrified residents refused to open their doors to the soldiers.

IDF forces, initially accompanied by emergency response team members and later on their own, continued to move from house to house until the evening hours of October 7, eliminating terrorists as they went. As darkness fell, they took up defensive positions. In the following two days, the army continued to eliminate terrorists in the kibbutz area and repel infiltration attempts by additional terrorists seeking to enter the kibbutz through the breached fence with Gaza, some on motorcycles. Maglan and Givati were later joined by a force from Golani's 13th Battalion, and starting from the afternoon of October 8, this combined force of about 100 fighters began to systematically go through all the kibbutz houses and finally clear them of terrorists. Only on the evening of October 9, two and a half days after the start of the attack, did Maglan and Givati reconnaissance fighters leave the kibbutz area and begin preparations for the ground entry into Gaza. They were replaced by a reserve force from the 55th Brigade. The battle in Nahal Oz had ended.

The mistake

There is no doubt about the bravery of IDF soldiers in the battle for Nahal Oz, and no doubt that from the moment they arrived, they worked to clear the kibbutz of terrorists under complex, almost impossible conditions. However, in at least one case, it appears that IDF soldiers erred. This involves the tragic case of Ran Poslushni.

Ran, 48 years old at the time of his death, grew up in Yavne and worked as a manager at the Ashdod port. He and his wife, Sharona, met while studying and moved to Nahal Oz nine years ago, where they raised their four children. "Ran was never worried about the security situation," said his father, Motti, who accompanied us inside the kibbutz. "He was happy here."

The Poslushni family's beautifully designed and warm home, standing in the southern part of Nahal Oz, was a dream come true for the couple. Motti, who conducted his own investigation into the circumstances of Ran's death, stood outside the house and recounted the events of October 7. "On Simchat Torah, the family hosted a couple of friends from central Israel, along with their children," he says. "When the 'Red Color' alerts began, everyone entered the safe room on the lower floor." Later, two Thai workers who had fled from the nearby dairy farm also joined the group.

Ran and Sharona's eldest son, Ili, lives in a complex on the other side of the kibbutz designated for soldiers. Ili, who still serves in combat engineering, had left his personal weapon, a shortened M-16, disassembled with one magazine, at his parents' house. That night, he went to sleep with his then-girlfriend in his room in the soldiers' complex. "Throughout that day, we were mainly worried about Ili," says Motti. "We weren't worried about Ran at all."

"At 7:06 AM, Ran sent me a message that there was a report of an infiltration into Nahal Oz," Motti continued. "Later, he wrote, 'Dad, I hear machine gun fire.' Then he reported that terrorists were trying to break through the entrance door." Ran, who had been a tank commander during his regular service, assembled his son's personal weapon, stood at the safe room door entrance, and began firing at the armed terrorists trying to enter his home. By the afternoon hours, he was left with only four bullets in the magazine and asked the emergency response team members to bring him magazines. They were unable to reach him.

Apart from Ran, his wife Sharona also remained with him outside the safe room. Sharona prepared food and drinks for the guests who were holed up in the safe room, while Ran turned the house into a fortress, not allowing anyone to enter. Throughout this time, the couple, known as ultimate hosts, managed to maintain a calm, even pleasant atmosphere in their besieged home.

Ran continued to defend the house, his family, and his guests until the afternoon hours. At 1:16 PM, he reported to his father about an attempt by looters from Gaza to break into the house. "They were unarmed. I stitched one of them in the ass. Haha," he wrote with his characteristic cynicism. At 1:43 PM, he already updated that, "The army is clearing the kibbutz." About an hour later, Maglan soldiers arrived at his house, talked with Ran, and gave him a full magazine. He even managed to photograph them standing on the balcony before bidding them farewell.

However, shortly after the Maglan soldiers left, another force, a team from the Givati reconnaissance unit, positioned itself in front of the Poslushni family home. The Givati force apparently did not understand that the house had already been searched and "cleared" by Maglan soldiers. While silently observing the house, the soldiers saw Ran, holding a weapon, going up the stairs to the second floor together with his wife Sharona. Since Ran was dressed in civilian clothes, they apparently interpreted this as an armed terrorist holding a hostage.

Why did Ran and Sharona go up to the second floor? According to Sharona, after the Maglan soldiers visited the house, they felt relatively calm and allowed themselves to go up to the bedroom on the second floor to rest. They had no idea they had walked into the sights of the Givati force's weapons.

While Ran and Sharona were on the second floor, the Givati force secretly flanked the house and positioned themselves in front of the three windows of the couple's bedroom. Sharona remembers even seeing one of the soldiers lying in front of the house through one of the windows, with his weapon drawn, and asked him not to shoot, as there were no terrorists in the house.

The soldier may not have heard Sharona, as at some point, the Givati force opened devastating fire towards the house. The soldiers, who fired at the second floor through the three bedroom windows, did so in a surprise burst of fire, apparently intended to eliminate the "terrorist" who was inside the house.

Ran, who was standing in front of the middle window at the time of the burst of fire, was hit by the shooting and fell. His wife, who was in the bathroom at that moment, was saved thanks to the concrete wall separating it from the windows. "Sharona, who came out of the bathroom and saw him wounded, screamed," says Motti. "That scream was heard throughout the kibbutz."

Only at this stage did the Givati soldiers realize that they had probably made a mistake in identification. The force commander contacted a Maglan team operating nearby and discovered for the first time that this team had already searched the Poslushni family home. At this point, some of the Givati soldiers entered the house and climbed to the second floor, where the horror was revealed to their eyes. One of them, apparently consumed by guilt, left a note with his phone number on Ran's body.

Now, the Poslushni family's home in Nahal Oz is empty of residents. The sole testimony to what happened there is the walls of the second floor, completely riddled with bullets, and the main entrance door to the house, which was hit by Ran's shooting. "Volunteers came and helped polish the house," said Motti in a steady voice, while standing in the corridor of the second floor, exactly where his son Ran fell. "But here," he points casually at the wall, "there are a few drops of blood they forgot to clean."

After his death, the family demanded that Ran be recognized as an IDF casualty, since he was attached to Nahal Oz's emergency response team, physically defended those in the house, and was ultimately hit by friendly fire. Shortly after his death, he was indeed recognized as such and given the rank of master sergeant in the reserves. "I have no complaints against Givati about shooting Ran," says Motti, the father. "I'm sure the soldiers were confused and scared, and because of this chaos, they fired without thinking twice and without understanding the situation. They released all their frustrations and fear through this shooting. This brigade is also fighting with all its might in Gaza."

Two fighters from the reconnaissance unit who fought in Nahal Oz were killed in Gaza: Staff Sergeant Roei Wolf and Staff Sergeant Lavi Lipshitz. "But I see it as an error that no one from the brigade has bothered to pick up the phone and apologize to us yet," continued the bereaved father Motti. "It's as if the subject has been forgotten and disappeared, and only stories of heroism remain. I think this is disrespectful behavior, especially after killing an Israeli citizen like that. Givati is rightfully proud of killing terrorists in Nahal Oz and other places. But the feeling is that there's an attempt to erase the incident with Ran."

The parents have also not yet received the pathological report of their son's body. "We still don't know what Ran died from," says Motti. "We know Ran was hit by two bullets. But where did they hit? We have no idea. Maybe it's hard to explain, but it's important for us to know exactly what he died from." When they contacted, with the help of the IDF Casualties Officer, to request the autopsy report from the Pathological Institute, they were told that due to the state of emergency, "It will take time... unfortunately, we have no estimate."

And what about Ili, Ran and Sharona's eldest son, the one who slept in the soldiers' complex? "There are six apartments in this complex," Motti recounts. "The terrorists entered five of them and sprayed, but they were all empty because the soldiers living there didn't leave for Shabbat. Ili and his girlfriend were in the sixth apartment. There, the terrorists contented themselves with firing a few bullets and left."

After sitting shiva for his father, Ili struggled to get permission to return to his unit and join them in Gaza. His request was eventually granted. "He gave his soul in Gaza," says the proud grandfather Motti. "It was an opportunity for him to avenge his father's death." Ili excelled during his service inside Gaza, and on the last Independence Day, he received the President's Excellence Award. Another hero in the chain of generations of Nahal Oz.

IDF Spokesperson's response: "The IDF shares in the sorrow of the Poslushni family and mourns the death of Ran, may his memory be blessed, in the complex circumstances during the battle. The commanders of the Givati Brigade are currently fighting in the Gaza Strip and will meet with the family as soon as possible. The investigation of the battle in Kibbutz Nahal Oz has not yet been completed. When it is concluded, it will first be presented to the kibbutz community and the bereaved families and then published transparently to the public."

The post New details of Hamas attack on Nahal Oz appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

The family of Daniel Gilboa, an Israeli soldier captured during the October 7 Hamas attack on the Nahal Oz base, has released a heart-wrenching video plea for her freedom. In the proof-of-life message, distributed by Hamas approximately four months ago, Gilboa expresses fear for her safety and implores the Israeli government to secure her release.

Video: Daniel Gilboa Hamas video

The family of Gilboa, made the decision on Tuesday, having originally watched it on the 107th day of the conflict.

The footage, sent by Hamas approximately four months ago but withheld from the general public in order to avoid spreading the terrorist propaganda, shows Daniella making an emotional appeal to the government for her release. "I'm under constant bombardment and gunfire around the clock, and I'm terrified for my life," she says. "Why should I feel like I've been abandoned and forgotten?"

"Pull yourselves together, dear government, and start doing your job properly," Daniella implores. "Bring us home alive."

In a poignant conclusion, Daniella addresses her loved ones: "I miss you terribly and love you – Mom, Dad, Nuni, and Ro'iko. Please stay strong and do everything in your power to bring me home while I'm still alive," she says, her voice filled with emotion.

Several weeks ago the families of the female soldiers who were abducted from Nahal Oz gave a green light to publish the brutal video taken by Hamas from the moments of the attack on the base.

Video: Footage showing the kidnapping of IDF female field observers on Oct. 7 by Hamas terrorists

In the footage, the girls appear covered in blood, battered, and terrified as the bodies of their friends lie beside them, surrounded by hordes of terrorists. They can be seen being forcibly handcuffed and pushed against a wall by their captors. At one point, one of the terrorists is heard telling his comrades "Take their pictures." The terrified girls, their faces stained with blood, appear to be in shock. One of the hostages is heard telling the terrorists "I have friends in Palestine," likely in a desperate attempt to appeal for mercy.

However, the ruthless terrorists shout at the girls, "I want you quiet! Quiet! Sit down." They then threaten that "we will shoot you all." One of the terrorists then asks one of the female soldiers to help him speak with his friend in Gaza. He then asks one of the girls, "Where are you from?" To which she responds "Tel Aviv."

A wide-angle photo also shows the degree to which they were bleeding as they were being held handcuffed. Some of them were placed against the wall, handcuffed. Then the video shows the captors sitting next to girls with machine guns on their chests, while others are on the floor praying. One of the terrorists says, "Here are the girls," using a term in Arabic that implies they can be impregnated, adding, "These are the Zionists. You are so beautiful." It is clear that this is met with torment by the look in their eyes. 

 In a haunting moment, one captor ominously declares to the hostages: "Our brothers died because of you, we will kill you."

The post Video of captive since Oct. 7 released appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.