Alexander, a lone soldier from New Jersey, was abducted from the Kisufim outpost after volunteering to cover a Shabbat shift at the base. At the end of November 2024, his family received a sign of life when the terrorist organization Hamas released a video of him.

In the video, Edan addressed his family, "To Mom, Dad, Grandpa, Grandma, every day that passes, the pain inside grows, I miss you so much, every day, I pray to see you again soon, please stay strong. It's only a matter of time until this nightmare ends."

Video: Hamas propaganda video with Alexander in captivity

The captive soldier also appealed to US President Donald Trump, asking for assistance in securing his release, and to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, saying, "People of Israel, don't abandon us. We want to return home with our sanity intact. Fear and isolation are killing us, please don't forget us. It's not fair that we pay for a mistake the government made. Please, citizens of Israel, go out and protest every day, put pressure on the government."

Video: Alexander's parents call for a hostage deal

Chillingly, on the morning of Saturday, October 7, Yael, Edan's mother, was visiting Israel. In a phone call that morning, she told her son, "Edan, I'm with you. Take care of yourself. I'm with you. I love you." That was how their conversation ended.

After the video was released, his mother Yael said, "I haven't been breathing for 500 days. For 500 days, he's been in darkness, in a tunnel underground, without sunlight, without a mother's hug, without knowing when it will end. 500 days of fear, hunger, and unimaginable uncertainty. I'll only start breathing again when everyone returns, the living for rehabilitation, the fallen for burial."

Edan's grandmother, Varda Ben Baruch, is also highly active in the hostage families' advocacy group. She even joined a protest outside the Prime Minister's Office in Jerusalem, demanding her grandson's release.

She protests alongside other families whose loved ones were not included in the first phase of the deal, saying, "Edani, my dear and beloved grandson, it's almost here... there's light at the end of the tunnel... and you will walk toward it and come home. We'll meet, we'll hug, and we won't let go. You were born to be free."

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An overwhelming majority of Israelis oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state, according to the "Trust Index" survey conducted by Direct Polls Institute for the Regavim movement. The survey, conducted among 511 citizens from all sectors of Israeli society, indicates a consensus against the establishment of a Palestinian state.

A year and a half after October 7, and following the July vote of 68 Knesset members on a declaration against establishing a Palestinian state, the Regavim movement examined public positions on this issue as part of the "Trust Index" conducted by the movement for the third year.

According to the survey, 81% of the public opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state. Of these, 53% firmly oppose ever establishing a Palestinian state, while another 28% expressed reservation by answering "not in the foreseeable future." On the other side of the political map, 13% who identify themselves as left-wing party voters answered "yes and soon" to this question.

The Trust Index indicates a trend: the Israeli public is increasingly moving away from the two-state idea.

Attitude toward Israel

These results correspond with the responses to questions about the relationship between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. To the question of how similar the Palestinian Authority's aspirations are to those of Hamas regarding the State of Israel, 70% answered they are similar to very similar, compared to 23% who answered "somewhat different" and only 7% who answered "very different."

Against the backdrop of a series of exposés by the Regavim movement in recent months about incitement and identification with Hamas actions by senior figures in Arab society in Israel, the survey examined whether trust in Arab society in Israel has weakened after the events of October 7.

68 Knesset members opposed the establishment of a Palestinian state in July, and now 81% of the public opposes it. The findings indicate a clear trend: 47% believe that trust in Arab society in Israel has weakened. In contrast, 33% answered that they did not identify any change in trust, and 17% believe that trust has actually strengthened.

"The survey can be summarized as the end of innocence. The public is sobering up," Meir Deutsch, CEO of the Regavim movement, said. "The Israeli public is waking up and shaking off the conceptions that blurred reality, the loss of trust in the Palestinian Authority and the understanding that it is no different from Hamas, alongside the erosion of trust in Arab society within us, require leadership to recalculate its course."

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In a powerful display of solidarity, approximately 200 people gathered at Vancouver's Burrard Bridge on the morning of April 6, 2025, for a pro-Israel march organized by Masha Kleiner, perhaps the most notable pro-Israel advocate in Canada's third-largest Jewish hub (home to some 30,000 Jews). Despite relentless rain, participants assembled to mark nearly 18 months since the October 7, 2023 attacks. Kleiner, an Israeli who has lived in Vancouver for 16 years, has become a prominent figure in the local community for her unwavering stance against anti-Israel sentiment on campus following the attacks. As a mother and community leader, her organizing efforts have rallied support across diverse segments of Vancouver's population.

The demonstration drew a notably diverse crowd, including at least 100 pro-Shah Iranian exiles who displayed both the old Iranian flag (the one before the ayatollahs took over in 1979) and Israeli flags. Among them were Soudabeh Cassandane and Irandokht (literally in Farsi "daughter of Iran") whose passionate Zionist sentiments were matched only by their evident admiration for Reza Shah, the Shah in exile.

Danko, an Argentinian man of Croatian descent who is not Jewish himself but is married to a Jewish woman, also attended the march. While his wife remained at home with their 8-month-old daughter, Danko's presence exemplified the broad-based support extending beyond the Jewish community. His perspective was particularly pointed regarding Canadian politics, as he drew parallels between his experiences in Argentina and current trends in Canada. "I know what is going to happen," he remarked regarding the Liberal Party's lead in polls ahead of the April 28 election, adding with concern, "It's just not going to work." He said that he has felt that there are many "Oct. 8" Jews, Jews who have embraced their identity and raised their head up high after the atrocities of Oct. 7. "I see it with my wife's friends and my daughter's school," Danko said, noting that Israel is such a great county ("The food is amazing").

The march itself saw participants traversing the Burrard Bridge, a key artery connecting Downtown Vancouver to its western part and the University of British Columbia. They were met with mixed reactions from passing motorists. Many drivers honked in solidarity, though it was difficult to determine if this was from Jews or just local residents.

Not all responses were supportive, however. Some passing drivers shouted "Free Palestine" and "Free Hamas" – the latter phrase causing confusion about its intended meaning among marchers who shouted back "Have a good day." In one particularly disturbing incident, a driver directed a Nazi salute toward the demonstrators, a stark reminder of the antisemitism that continues to surface even in progressive urban centers like Vancouver. The security volunteers wearing windbreakers labeled "Bitachon" ("Security" in Hebrew) maintained order throughout these encounters, with local police ensuring the crowds was safe and that the joggers who crossed the bridge for their morning run were not inconvenienced by the participants. .

Despite these concerns, the atmosphere remained predominantly one of peaceful solidarity rather than confrontation.

Video: Man shouts 'Free Palestine' and 'Free Hamas' at marchers / Erez Linn

As the march concluded, participants gathered in a nearby park where, undeterred by the persistent rain, they joined together in singing both "O Canada" and "Hatikvah," Israel's national anthem, a powerful closing symbol of resilience exactly 18 months after the October 7 attacks that have reshaped Jewish community consciousness worldwide.

Video: Marchers sing the national anthems after the rally / Erez Linn

"Our war is not over, antisemitism is not over, the hostages are not back, " Kleiner told the crowd after thanking them for getting out of the house on a rainy Sunday to support Israel for a full hour. "Next time [we march] let's hope this will be the end of Hamas," she said, to the cheers of the crowd. She said that now that 18 months have passed, it's important to show this solidarity. "It's crucial that we stand together, after almost exactly a year a half."

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Who was blamed for the final solution Haman prepared for us? Even then, there were those among us who blamed ourselves. The Jews are guilty, they said, because they angered their murderers, because they went to pray on the Temple Mount, a place known for its sanctity only to their killers; because they decided to cancel the pampering conditions given to their murderers in prison, and stopping academic studies for terrorists drove them to slaughter us; because Jews settled in their ancient homeland, which enraged their enemies to slaughter, rape, and behead; sure. In short, the massacre happened because Jews are different and their existence constitutes defiance in the eyes of their murderers. And in the ancient words: "There is a certain people, scattered and dispersed among the peoples in all the provinces of your kingdom, and their laws are different from all people" (Book of Esther 3:8).

There were among us those who received awards from the world for taking an "objective" stance regarding their own people's conflict with their murderers. After every massacre, they passionately argued that Jews would not be safe as long as their enemies were not safe, And so, perhaps unknowingly, they justified the massacre that our murderers committed against us. Our soldiers evacuated invaders from the homeland? They made a film about it in which Jews play the villains who stole a land not theirs, while their murderers are portrayed as victims. Thus, they could claim that "there is background to the massacre" and that hatred of Jews doesn't come without reason, and had Jews not decided to settle in Palestine – a land that was never historically or religiously connected to them (as written in Section 20 of the Palestinian National Charter!) – the world would be quiet and Jews would not be murdered. Of course.

2.

I envy anyone who reads the Book of Esther for the first time. The experience of salvation is dozens of times more powerful after the fear of the danger of extermination of the final solution. Mordechai knows the details of the plot and urges Esther to plead before the king for her people. She is full of doubts: I wasn't invited, and if I deviate from custom and arrive without an invitation, I'll be executed. Who said she would succeed in convincing the king to cancel the decree, after all, his national considerations are greater than the connection with the queen or her people? At this stage, it seems, the change is too fast for Esther – from an anonymous girl to queen of an empire, and then to savior of the Jewish people.

But a person doesn't determine when their moment of truth arrives. Mordechai says that the fact she is in the palace in a high-ranking position will not grant her immunity from the fate that will befall her people. If she doesn't dare and take a risk – "relief and salvation will come to the Jews from another place" (4:14) and she will disappear in the mists of history. "And who knows whether it was for a time like this that you attained royalty" (ibid) meaning why did it fall specifically to your lot to be plucked from your people straight to the top of the pyramid. It's now or never.

3.

I don't know if Esther was confident in her ability to turn the tables and foil the plot, but she decided to act. Before that, she asked to do so with the power of the entire people, as their representative. She instructs Mordechai to gather the Jews and fast for her for three days in prayers for the success of her mission, "and so I will go to the king, which is against the law; and if I perish, I perish" (4:16).

It's no coincidence that Esther chose to end her words on a pessimistic note. At this stage, it seems we've reached a dead end: our enemies' hand has prevailed and the extermination plans they prepared for us are advancing. Esther is sent on a mission where she will need to confront an antisemitic scoundrel for the heart of a drunken king.

It's important to remember this moment whenever we fall into national despair. Where we were on October 7 and where we are now. True, the mission hasn't been completed, but much has been achieved, both in the area of destroying our enemies and in the matter of returning our hostages. This is a long campaign containing progress alongside tactical retreats. This week a new IDF Chief of Staff enters the campaign with a different worldview regarding the use of military force against our enemies. The White House also recently welcomed a president with a different worldview on the world, the Middle East, and the relationship between Israel and its enemies. We should prepare for the second part of the Megillah.

4.

The Sabbath before Purim is called "Shabbat Zachor," because we read in it the biblical commandment to remember Amalek and to erase his memory. Amalek as an archetype for Israel-haters throughout all generations, especially the worst among them like Hitler and Haman.

On November 7, 2023, marking one month since the massacre, Tel Aviv University President Professor Ariel Porat said at a university rally: "The State of Israel has sworn to destroy the memory of Hamas. 'Remember what Amalek did to you on the way when you came out of Egypt,' so we learn in the Book of Deuteronomy (25:17). And then there is the divine commandment directed at the people of Israel: 'You shall erase the memory of Amalek from under heaven, do not forget!' (25:19). This is how Hamas should be treated, and I am convinced that the State of Israel will do so. Comparing Hamas to Amalek flatters Hamas. Amalek did not do terrible things like the Hamas murderers did."

Less than a year and a half since the massacre, and it seems we've forgotten a bit. We've cooled off. The Torah describes what Amalek did: "How he met you by the way, and attacked all the stragglers behind you, when you were faint and weary; and he did not fear God" (25:18). They called in the name of Allah when they raped our daughters and when they choked our babies to death and burned parents and children alive.

5.

Amalek comes by chance ("met you"), when we are not prepared, when we are captive to the conception that he prefers to improve his life economically rather than die, that we are sure he is similar to us in his considerations. Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch (19^th Century) explains: "A chance event is an occurrence outside the calculations and expectations of the one affected by it. You were going your way and had no reason to assume an enemy would attack you. His attack came without any provocation and stemmed only from joy in human slaughter, or perhaps he felt in his heart the danger posed to him by your entry into history, for you represent the principle of pure humanity and loyalty to duty, which contradicts the principle of the sword engraved on his flag."

In other words, there is a deep abyss between us and them. Indeed, they did not succeed in realizing all their evil intentions, but their intention was clear – genocide: "to destroy, to kill, and to annihilate all the Jews, young and old, children, and women, in one day" (Esther 3:13).

6.

"And it shall be, when the Lord your God has given you rest from all your enemies around you, in the land which the Lord your God gives you for an inheritance to possess – you shall erase the memory of Amalek from under heaven; do not forget!" (Deuteronomy 25:19). Amalek seeks to destroy us, but he appears together with our hope for redemption, when we want to reach rest and inheritance in our land. He attacks us on our way from Egypt to the Promised Land; he fights against us when we apply our sovereignty over the land and crown Saul, our first king; he fights against us while we are in the Persian Empire, when the Return to Zion begins in the Second Temple period; and he carries out the final solution when the Return to Zion begins in our time. Even after the State of Israel was established, he continues to gnaw at the righteousness of our path and arouses doubts in us regarding our right to our land. And when that doesn't help, he attacks with cries of "slaughter the Jews" and massacres us.

We are at a fateful hour. Doubt gnaws at us to stop, to give up. Remember, do not forget! We must finish our mission and erase our enemies. We are in a biblical event, only in the middle of the Megillah. We will yet see the other days when "the Jews had light and gladness, and joy and honor" (Esther 8:16).

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Being a military installation, this incident produced the most documented investigation – captured by cameras inside the base, on armored vehicles, and even by the terrorists themselves. While the situation across Gaza border communities remained unclear to division commanders and General Staff that morning, the severe crisis at Nahal Oz was known to leadership from the beginning due to consistent reporting from the base. This explains why the location received the most airstrikes on that horrific morning.

IDF faults exposed across the board

The devastating battle at Nahal Oz represents a systemic failure in IDF preparedness for a wide-scale ground attack under rocket fire. According to investigators, the failure wasn't one of conception but rather the absence of the most basic IDF principles that should have been applied that morning and during the long period preceding it.

Retrospective analysis of Hamas's invasion plans clearly shows that the organization specifically targeted Nahal Oz base as a key objective within its operational strategy. For years, Hamas gathered intelligence on the base through direct observation from Sajayia (which overlooks the camp), drone surveillance, and information collection from inside the camp via social networks and IDF media publications.

Documents captured from terrorists contained precise diagrams of the base, including locations of shelters, generators, and security cameras. They knew exactly who occupied which rooms, sleeping arrangements, command post location, fighters' weaponry, and more. In their meticulous planning, Hamas analyzed access routes to the camp, terrain passability, agricultural cover areas, fence vulnerabilities, and other tactical details.

Video: Footage showing the kidnapping of IDF female field observers on Oct. 7 by Hamas terrorists

Military investigators note that Hamas prepared for the raid with precision comparable to special forces planning, modifying their approach based on gathered intelligence. Captured terrorists possessed detailed maps with specific takeover plans for each section of the base and instructions for individual terrorists detailing their positions, vehicle assignments, and required weaponry. Their strategy was to attack broadly during minimum force deployment (Saturday and holiday), employing deception tactics, rapid breaching, and overwhelming firepower. The terror organization calculated that reaching the camp within fifteen minutes would ensure victory.

On Friday, October 6, around 6:00 p.m., Hamas's raiding platoon commanders received their briefings. Junior operatives were briefed between 9:00 PM and midnight, while cell commanders received instructions between 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m..

The IDF, meanwhile, had fallen into a years-long complacency. For an extended period, forces stationed at the camp never trained for defending against a direct attack, despite being located just 850 meters from the border fence. No defense protocol existed in standing orders against a ground raid. The investigation found that when Battalion 13 entered operational deployment in the sector, they conducted a thorough process within the parameters defined for them.

One reasonable scenario forces should have prepared for involved raids by two different Hamas Nukhba companies targeting different IDF battalion areas in a concentrated brigade effort, striking an outpost or settlement. The objective in this scenario would be kidnapping and conducting mass killings. Forces should have also prepared for barrier area raids or fence-crossing attacks toward outposts or settlements. The more dangerous scenario (considered less likely) involved concentrated efforts by two Gaza brigades with coordinated raids by three Nukhba companies from different battalions in staggered but closely timed assaults.

On October 7 morning, Nahal Oz camp maintained full routine operations without any warnings or unusual reports, operating with reduced personnel according to weekend and holiday guidelines. Security consisted of a gate guard, an administrative soldier guarding the armory, a balloon operator, and another soldier monitoring communications in an armored vehicle. The base housed forces from Battalion 13 of the Golani Brigade (designated as the Nahal Oz battalion combat team), two tank teams from Brigade 7, a collection platoon from Battalion 414, and additional support personnel.

After 4:00 a.m., a perimeter fence sensor triggered an alert that prohibited movement on a nearby route. The incident concluded after a few minutes and was later assessed as unrelated to the main attack.

At 5:30 a.m., the deputy commander of the 13th Battalion, serving as sector commander that morning, conducted a situation assessment while implementing limited "dawn readiness" procedures (with only selective positions fully manned) according to standard protocols. A company commander headquarters departed the Nahal Oz camp with two reconnaissance vehicles, while a readiness force consisting of a tank and APC remained stationed in the nearby "Black Arrow" area.

The IDF divided Hamas' attack on Nahal Oz camp into four main phases according to the timeline, with the first fifteen minutes proving decisive.

Phase One: Enemy infiltration and fighting (6:29-8:20)

At 6:29, intense barrage fire targeted the camp as female spotters reported enemy approaches to the fence. Soldiers followed their only known procedure – running to shelters – having received no other training for base attacks.

Female spotters (field observers monitoring the Gaza border from the command center) followed their protocols, moving to observation positions to identify possible raids. Two spotters identified terrorists approaching the fence, and at 6:31, the sector commander reported terrorist infiltrations across multiple border points over radio, declaring a "complex event" of 'Purple Rain' (rocket fire) and "Turkish Horsemen" (infiltrators) throughout the sector. At 6:33, a female spotter identified the first explosion at the primary fence, and Company Commander Major Shiloh Har Even declared a confirmed complex event.

After communicating with the Northern Brigade commander in the Gaza Division, the deputy battalion commander left the camp to prevent infiltrations into nearby settlements. Meanwhile, commanders inside shelters organized combat forces to reinforce defensive positions. Major Har Even, who was on patrol, directed a tank to take position with an APC behind it to identify and eliminate infiltrating enemies. Two Golani fighters ran to reinforce their comrade at the camp – these three fighters fought heroically and became the last position to fall within the camp.

At 6:37 a.m., two trackers abandoned the camp while the third, Chief Warrant Officer Ibrahim Haruba, chose to remain – becoming another hero in this account. At this time, spotters identified an explosion in the secondary fence – the final barrier between Gaza and the camp. Just two minutes later, dozens of terrorists reached the breach only 850 meters from Nahal Oz camp.

By 6:45 a.m., most fighters present had rushed to defensive positions, except for the reinforcement force that had just arrived at the gate. At this point, tanks began moving according to readiness protocols, but a quarter-hour after the attack began, approximately 65 terrorists from the first wave had already reached the camp.

The investigation noted a profound cognitive disconnect between what soldiers had been trained for and the reality they faced. Even under heavy attack, one soldier still asked whether he had permission to use explosive ammunition.

At 6:55 a.m., during engagement with the main terrorist force, the deputy commander of the 13th Battalion was wounded. His fighters attempted medical treatment, temporarily pausing combat operations. By 7:04, all personnel who had been reinforcing positions retreated toward shelters due to overwhelming terrorist fire. A minute later, the first terrorists breached the camp as a platoon commander reached the command post, reporting extensive infiltration while ordering all armed personnel to engage the enemy.

At 7:00 a.m., five minutes after the deputy battalion commander was wounded, the Northern Brigade commander contacted Company Commander Har-Even by radio, instructing him to assume command with the primary mission of preventing kidnappings. This indicates the brigade commander quickly became aware of the deputy commander's condition and understood the battle situation. In the following minutes, the company commander attempted to establish situational awareness with female spotter platoon commander Shir Eilat.

Meanwhile, terrorists continued infiltrating the camp, using holes beneath perimeter concrete barriers as firing positions to target any soldiers visible inside. At 7:09 a.m., female personnel in the command post initiated position abandonment procedures upon realizing terrorists had reached the command post entrance.

Around 7:15 a.m., 13th Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Greenberg arrived from home and, unable to contact Major Har Even, transferred command to the Support Company Commander.

According to investigation findings, gate defenders fought courageously against superior terrorist numbers, killing several before being overcome around 7:30 a.m. , when all three defenders were killed. This position then became an entry point for additional terrorists.

While these events unfolded in the camp, Major Har Even attempted to stabilize the situation at Black Arrow, directing his tank to engage infiltrating terrorists. At 7:40 a.m. , Har Even's force arrived from Black Arrow and entered the camp battle. Despite losing his hand from a wound, Har-Even continued fighting, maintaining composure in radio communications.

At 7:43 a.m., the first air force attack drone arrived but, unable to establish contact with ground forces for targeting guidance, fired at the soccer field.

By 7:46 a.m., terrorists overwhelmed the women's shelter. Ten minutes later, the two company commanders coordinated an attempted linkup at the entrance gate to regain control. "It's you and me against the whole world now," the Support Company Commander told the wounded Major Har Even. Despite his severe injury, Har Even declared himself sector commander and prepared an offensive to retake the camp. While the Support Company Commander diverted toward Kfar Aza following reports of infiltration there, Har Even led two tank teams, an APC, and infantry from his company toward the camp. His entire force, except for the radio operator, was killed in a deadly ambush at the camp entrance.

Meanwhile, the women's shelter housed 31 female soldiers, only six armed, with one untrained in weapons use. When the first terrorist entered, they managed to wound him before terrorists threw three grenades inside. The women successfully repelled two grenades. Fourteen female soldiers escaped through the northern shelter exit. When terrorists breached the shelter, one armed female officer struggled with a terrorist attempting to seize her weapon before being fatally shot. The terrorists then bound the remaining women and searched for those who had escaped.

At 8:40 a.m., two airstrikes targeted areas near the female spotters' quarters, driving terrorists away and saving eleven female soldiers' lives.

Hamas terrorists at the Nahal Oz outpost

Phase Two: Continued fighting (8:20 a.m.-12:00 p.m.)

Forces continued engaging terrorists, sustaining casualties. At 8:53, a tank still fighting in the camp was disabled by two anti-tank missiles. Meanwhile, air support targeted areas in and around the camp. The second tank joined an APC, moving to the western section to prevent kidnappings.

Around 9:00, the tank identified a second wave of approaching terrorists. After directing helicopter fire toward them, the crew charged the terrorists in open terrain. At 9:02, the tank reached the northwestern corner outside the camp before being disabled by an anti-tank missile. Later, another missile strike injured the crew. Around 10:00, a third terrorist wave arrived and kidnapped the tank crew. The APC, now with only three fighters remaining (others having been injured after dismounting earlier), broke contact and later joined the fight at Kfar Aza.

By this stage, no forces operated outside shelters within the camp. All personnel had fortified positions inside shelters. According to evidence collected by investigators, kidnappings from Nahal Oz camp began around 10:00, with seven female spotters taken captive from their shelter around 10:20.

Throughout this period, terrorists attempted to breach the command post but encountered determined resistance from two platoon commanders, a Golani fighter, and tracker Haruba. All staff officers and female spotters had taken refuge in the back room. Haruba assumed command, refusing terrorist demands to surrender. He called his family and told the female spotters it would be his greatest honor to die for them and the country.

Aircraft attempted to prevent a fire in the command post but failed. During communication with the Northern Brigade Commander, Haruba was heard choking, reporting that terrorists had thrown something inside. Fire then broke out, filling the space with smoke. Five officers, one soldier, and one female spotter managed to escape – six through a bathroom window and one through another exit. All others perished. In retrospect, investigators noted the difficulty in judging those who sought self-preservation by moving toward light, while emphasizing IDF doctrine that commanders should exit after soldiers, female fighters after female soldiers, and all military personnel after civilians. Fifteen soldiers and commanders died in the command post.

Despite the clear threat – no adjustments made against raids

The main conclusions from the investigation deal with the surprise, and the fact that the camp did not function as an outpost and was not prepared for defense, combat capability, and staying in the camp. The camp was not planned against a ground attack and the protected areas in it provided a response only for high-trajectory fire, not terrorist infiltration.

Despite the command post being defined as a defense target, and being the closest and most threatened on the border, its protection was defined only for high-trajectory fire, and no adjustments were made against raids. Also, the definition of readiness state did not match, in time and space, the threat that could reach the camp in a vehicular ground raid, as analyzed by the brigade. Also, there was no existing defense plan for non-combat forces, such as the female spotters, and the possibility of an attack on the camp as analyzed in the brigade's reference scenario was not trained for. These gaps, the investigation determined, led to severe damage to non-combat forces and the ability of combat forces to defend the camp.

It further emerged that the surprise attack led to some of the commanders in the field being killed within a short time, and the forces operated in a disorganized manner without orderly commands. The investigation team positively noted the commanders' decisions to send their forces to fight in the nearby kibbutzim and protect the residents rather than fighting in the camp. Also positively noted was the performance of the female spotters and the commander of the collection platoon who continued to provide operational reports to forces with composure despite the many enemies in the camp. The team recommended awarding citations to a number of male and female soldiers and officers.

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In 1945, the area now known as the Gaza Strip had approximately 70,000 residents. During the War of Independence, about 200,000 refugees arrived in the territory, which remained under Egyptian military control after their failed advance toward Tel Aviv was thwarted by Israeli forces. In the early 1950s, the UN established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) as a temporary organization until the refugees could be resettled. Arab nations pressured to keep the agency operational, understanding the impact of perpetuating refugee status and preserving the "right of return" – creating a permanent question mark over Israel's existence. Hamas emerged as a product of UNRWA and its educational system, which raises generations of children who view Jewish killers as role models.

UNRWA's existence produced another lethal outcome: in its care for the Gaza population, the UN relieved the perpetrators from civilian responsibilities, allowing them to focus on terrorism. Arab leaders in historical Palestine never saw themselves as responsible for any civilian aspects of their subjects' lives. They shifted this burden to the international community. In a display of profound historical shortsightedness, Israel refrained from dismantling the organization and refugee camps, even after capturing the Strip in 1967, when relocation to Sinai and other locations was possible.

2.

Toward the late 1980s, Hamas emerged as an organization that considered even Fatah operatives too moderate. Their political and religious manifesto established two principles: total commitment to Israel's destruction and killing Jews wherever they may be. No compromise with Jews would be possible, as this was a religious obligation. Few paid attention to this neo-Nazi document that guided terror operations for decades until its culmination at the October 7 massacre. The manifesto's motto quoted Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: "Israel will rise and continue to exist until Islam obliterates it, as it obliterated what came before it." It is astounding to hear serious people discuss the "situation" and its solutions without having carefully read Hamas's charter.

The fundamental assumption of successive Israeli governments and security establishments was that improving Gaza residents' lives would ensure quiet. The Qatari cash suitcases were merely an extension of the economic peace concept and shallow thinking that we faced an entity with rational considerations, preferring material interests over ideology and religious belief. The Oslo Accords were the primary fruit of this thinking, and the unilateral disengagement followed from it. We left Gaza to its own devices and allowed barbarians to establish a Nazi monster on our southern border, within spitting distance. Yes, we built walls and electronic obstacles. Fine. That's the foundation for the conception.

3.

After October 7 and what we've seen since, including the evident involvement of most residents in Hamas's terror and slaughter machine, one would have to be intellectually and morally bankrupt to think we could continue living alongside this ticking bomb. Continued existence in this destroyed place under Hamas rule would encourage the region's madmen to launch similar massacre operations. They already know how to emerge standing from any massacre, even the most horrible: by kidnapping Jews. Sooner or later, the rocket drips and attacks will begin again, and the cycle continues.

Our sages taught that facing the Torah's great principle – "love your neighbor as yourself" – when your life stands against your friend's life, your life takes precedence, as it is said "that your brother may live with you" – with you! This was said about brothers of the same people; how much more so regarding our enemies whose reason for existence is murdering Jews wherever they are, even at the cost of destroying all their homes and killing their people. Our brothers and sisters in the south must not live beside these barbarians, at zero distance from them. "I swear if by morning I return to my ways,\ having learned nothing this time" (Avraham Shlonsky).

4.

Therefore, political, military, and diplomatic activity must aim for a permanent solution to the problem: transferring Gaza's population to other countries, as the world has done with tens of millions of refugees in other conflicts. In any case, most Strip residents are defined as refugees. This is also correct from a moral perspective, and might allow their next generation to begin new lives. As the song goes, "Don't say a day will come, bring the day!"

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For several years, the Air Force Intelligence Wing had been closely monitoring Hamas's aerial capabilities. While the organization didn't maintain a sophisticated air force, before October 7 they possessed several dozen small unmanned aerial vehicles, some smuggled into Gaza after being manufactured in Iran. These drones were primarily used for surveillance, including gathering intelligence ahead of the invasion into Israel. But at the time, Hamas also possessed suicide drones capable of attacking ground targets.

The career officer followed protocol, passing along information about the unusual activity in Hamas's aerial array. The intelligence reached the Air Force's central control room commander, also located in The Pit, and the IDF's Intelligence Directorate. But due to limitations in interpreting the signals detected by the Intelligence Wing, the unusual activity in Gaza wasn't recognized as a prelude to war. "They knew something unusual was happening, but didn't know what," says a source familiar with the details.

According to the source, based on the preliminary information available to the Israeli Air Force at the time, it was not possible to reach a definitive conclusion that Hamas was preparing for a major attack in the near term. Only in retrospect was it understood that the irregular activity was connected to the attack on Israel.

Why were no questions asked? 

The information about the irregularities in Gaza was indeed transferred from the Israeli Air Force to Military Intelligence (AMAN), but the flow of information that night was largely one-directional: the IDF Intelligence Directorate did not in turn update the Air Force about the suspicious signals they had also detected during those fateful hours – the activation of SIM cards by Hamas's Nukhba forces.

The SIM card activation wasn't the only information withheld from the Air Force. From the Air Force investigation of October 7, substantial portions of which are being published here for the first time, it emerges that throughout that fateful night, no one in the military updated the Air Force about the detailed events unfolding in Gaza. While Military Intelligence, the Shin Bet, and Southern Command tried to decipher the meaning of the SIM card activations, and even as IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi held an extraordinary situation assessment at 4 a.m. with the Southern Command commander and the head of the Operations Directorate – in the Air Force's underground command center, the drowsy routine continued.

Even the Israeli Air Force commander wasn't brought into the loop during the night of October 7 and wasn't summoned to any of the discussions held on the matter. Nevertheless, after the Chief of Staff's early morning situation assessment, the Air Force command center did receive directives from the IDF Operations Directorate.

According to these directives, which arrived around 4:45 a.m., the Air Force was instructed to reinforce the Gaza sector with one additional drone and to transfer two Apache attack helicopters from their alert status at the Ramat David base in the north to the southern sector. The attack drone was directed to deploy immediately, but the helicopters were requested to arrive in the south only at 8 AM.

Perhaps because of this, the Air Force didn't press for answers or try to understand the reason for the heightened alert in Gaza. This despite the fact that they were aware, as mentioned, of the unusual activity in Hamas's aerial array that night. "Raising alert levels on orders from the Operations Directorate is something that happens routinely, and you don't always bother to ask why the alert was shortened or why an additional drone is needed," explains a source who spent considerable time in the Air Force command center. "On October 7 too, they didn't ask why."

The unusual aerial activity, the SIM cards, the chief of staff's conversation, the shortened helicopter alert, the drone deployment – the sad truth is that no one in the Air Force, the IDF, or the intelligence community connected all these dots together. In less than two hours, the gates of hell would open. The drowsy shift in The Pit would transform into a runaway Hollywood blockbuster, a slow-motion catastrophe with an especially tragic ending.

As for those Hamas suicide drones? They took part in the attack that day, aiming to destroy Israel's defensive array along the border fence. According to a source familiar with the details, they did not cause significant damage.

While the Air Force investigation of October 7 does praise the actions of that female Intelligence Wing officer, it barely dwells on the night of October 7, on intelligence that was or wasn't received during those hours, and on the Air Force's tendency not to press for answers when receiving orders from the Operations Directorate. The vast majority of the investigation deals with events in the Air Force command center only from 6:30 a.m. on October 7 until midnight that day. The first day of fighting in a war that has now lasted a year and a half.

Current and former IDF officers express sharp criticism of the decision to barely investigate the night of October 7 in the Air Force, as well as the conclusions of the battle day investigation itself, which has already been presented in broad forums. We'll get to that criticism, and other claims directed at the institution of IDF investigations in general.

But first, it's worth examining the October 7 investigation itself, which details how the Air Force responded to Hamas's cruel – and it must be admitted, brilliant – surprise attack.

As befitting the Air Force, the investigation, which has yet to be finalized by Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and is still considered a draft, is loaded with data, graphs and videos. It tells a complex story of a war machine that was completely surprised but after just a few hours of recovery, operated to the best of its ability with all tools at its disposal. This story contradicts a long series of testimonies and media reports claiming the Air Force barely functioned during the fighting on October 7. "It's true that there were people who looked to the skies that day and didn't always see an aircraft or helicopter," says an Air Force source in response. "But that doesn't mean we weren't in other places."

Indeed, data revealed here for the first time shows that during the fighting on October 7, the Air Force fired 11,000 shells, dropped more than 500 heavy one-ton bombs and launched 180 missiles. According to the data, during the battle the Air Force eliminated 1,000 fighters. Even if this is an exaggeration, these are impressive numbers.

"That terrible morning we failed to defend Israel's citizens," says an Air Force source. "But it should be said that from 6:29 a.m. we did everything we could. We pounced, took off with everything possible, pursued contact, linked up with forces on the ground, flew thousands of fighters, evacuated hundreds of wounded and from 7:15 that morning, we have not stopped attacking ever since."

The investigation further reveals that besides the attack formations, the Air Force's special units – Shaldag and Unit 669 – took a significant part in combat operations, and that Air Force transport helicopters landed about 1,700 infantry fighters in the Gaza sector during the fighting and evacuated more than 150 casualties. During one mission a Yasur helicopter was hit and destroyed by an RPG after making an emergency landing. The air defense array also dealt, with relative success, with the heaviest barrage ever fired at Israel. In other words, the skies were not completely empty.

True. The most well-funded and powerful branch of the IDF, the fear of the entire Middle East, was exposed in its nakedness that day. The Air Force investigation authors made sure to emphasize right from the start the fact that the Air Force failed completely in its mission to defend Israel's citizens and borders. Nevertheless, it appears that from the moment the Air Force engaged at 6:30 a.m., it did operate well and with initiative, resourcefulness and pursuit of contact.

The Air Force investigation materials, based on an enormous database that reached Israel Hayom exclusively, fully map out the battle the Air Force fought on October 7, and provide the best answer so far to the tormenting question: where was the Air Force?

The Air Force investigation of October 7 was conducted by 20 senior Air Force officers with the ranks of brigadier general and colonel. These were reservists with rich experience in the Air Force, but ones who didn't take an active part in the decision-making chain on October 7.

They based their work on an enormous database including detailed documentation of every sortie conducted in the Gaza sector on October 7. This database was overlaid on an interactive map showing with a mouse click every attack carried out by the Air Force, including precise time and location, type of munition fired, the aircraft that fired it, the relevant squadron and the result of the hit (destruction of a vehicle, elimination of a fighter, etc.).

The map, which can be viewed on a timeline, shows how in the first three hours the Air Force still operated hesitantly and far from understanding the situation on the ground. For example at 8:18 a.m., there were only six fighter jets over Gaza (some were equipped with air-to-air missiles and therefore weren't effective at stopping the attack), five attack helicopters and three drones.

According to the investigation, Air Force Commander Major General Tomer Bar arrived at The Pit at 7:03 a.m. and declared a state of war at 7:10 a.m. The Air Force's number two, Chief of Staff Brigadier General Omer Tishler, arrived at the control center at 7:44 a.m. While Tishler, who by virtue of his role is responsible for force employment, took command of the control center, Bar was engaged in situation assessments with the Chief of Staff.

In the first two hours, the control center was still convinced they were dealing with only a limited number of infiltrations. Only at 9:30 a.m., as the battle picture became clearer, did Bar instruct pilots in the field to attack along the entire border area without requesting permission. At 10:30 a.m. the control center understood that the main problem they were dealing with was waves of fighters continuing to infiltrate en masse through the fence. In a recording from that time you can hear the following order on the radio: "Whoever doesn't have a mission, go to the perimeter and ensure there's no entry into our territory."

The data shows that from this moment, the number of attacks carried out by Air Force pilots rose dramatically. "In the control center they said 'enough, attack everything in the border area, without identification,'" says someone present there that day.

In this context it's important to explain the identification protocol. The ability of fighter pilots and drone operators to identify from the air whether those on the ground are fighters, civilians or hostages is very limited. For this they usually rely on guidance from ground forces.

In certain cases the pilots did communicate with ground forces and even civilians, sometimes via their personal mobile phones, and received attack guidance from them. But as can be seen from the abundance of videos shown in the investigation, in many cases there was no one to guide the pilots, and they remained confused and deliberated at length whether to attack or not. "There could be hostages there too," says one of the pilots hovering over a large group of armed men, in a video appearing in the investigation.

Despite this inherent difficulty, one of the conclusions emerging from the Air Force investigation is that for too long, the pilots in the field continued to stick to orders and the approval chain customary in the Air Force, and didn't understand on their own that they needed to transition to a much more permissive fire policy. When presenting the investigation to various Air Force forums, the term "excessive obedience" was even used to describe the pilots' conduct in the first hours.

"What can you do, the Air Force is a force of squares?" says a former senior officer. "Until approval passes through the entire chain of command according to procedures, they don't fire. It's part of the organizational culture." Another officer in the force who was exposed to investigation details says that "99 percent of the time the Air Force's square conduct is a good thing. But in moments of chaos you also need to know how to think outside the box and work against procedures. On October 7 that almost never happened."

Of all the Air Force's branches, the saddest story is that of the fighter jets. The force's most prestigious branch was actually the least effective that day. Israel's enormous advantage over its enemies turned into a huge disadvantage on October 7.

Fighter pilots need guidance, as mentioned, to attack pop-up targets on the ground due to their high speed and altitude. Throughout the day fighter jets attacked groups and vehicles moving along the border fence, but it's hard to say these attacks were particularly helpful, and in any case they weren't numerous, since most attacks along the fence focused on a completely irrelevant matter.

Here a brief explanation is needed: The Air Force had prepared contingency orders in advance for a case of a Hamas raid into Israel, or what was defined in the IDF as "Philistine Horseman." The working assumption was that such a raid would be done underground, through "approach tunnels" with exit openings near the border fence. The contingency orders for attacking the approach tunnels were activated already at 7:50 a.m., and throughout the day fighter jets attacked many of the coordinates appearing in them. But because Hamas's raid was done above ground and not through tunnels, those tunnels were empty. The munitions dropped on them by fighter jets exploded with a big noise, but without hitting almost anyone.

At 10:30 a.m., the "Sword of Damocles" contingency order was also activated, under which the fighter jet array attacked Hamas command posts and weapons depots deep in Gaza. Even if these attacks were effective, it's understood they weren't relevant to stopping the ground raid. Either way, during the day fighter jets dropped 530 tons of bombs on Gaza, an enormous amount of explosives.

The Air Force investigation conclusions state that "the root cause of failure" on October 7 is an "effectiveness gap" that stemmed from "war by surprise, without prior preparation, gap versus the reference scenario, and slow understanding of the battle picture relative to enemy moves." In other words, the investigation conclusions are that the Air Force wasn't ready for Hamas's surprise attack, but from the moment it engaged it operated adequately. Not everyone exposed to the investigation agrees with this determination, or with the investigation conclusions in general. "This isn't a good investigation," says an Air Force reserve officer who participated in the war. "Its subtext is that even if the force didn't work optimally and quickly enough, in the end it received definitions from the larger army and met them. Meaning they told it to prepare for event X, and for that it prepared well and that it executed.

"When all hell broke loose, the force didn't know how to function, but that was barely criticized in the investigation. Additionally, all the investigation team members just left the system a moment ago. These are people whose thought patterns are identical to the conception, and who know very well all the officers they're investigating. What sharp or groundbreaking conclusions can they already reach?"

These claims are heard, and even more strongly, from several officers in the ground forces who were exposed to the "Green Army" investigations. According to one of them, in these investigations, which in recent weeks have matured toward presentation to the Chief of Staff, there is an attempt "to establish a narrative that October 7 was a puncture, and that since then everything is fine and we're winning."

An Air Force source claims on the other hand that "the investigation team members were completely independent and had full mandate to investigate, examine, access systems and present conclusions and lessons."

The post How the Israeli Air Force was caught completely off guard by Hamas appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

Hanna Katzir, who survived 49 days in Hamas captivity, passed away Tuesday morning at age 77. Katzir was kidnapped from her home in Kibbutz Nir Oz on October 7 and released in November 2023 as part of a hostage deal. Her husband Rami was murdered in their home's safe room, and her son Elad, 47, was killed in captivity – his body was later recovered from Khan Yunis. During her captivity, Katzir was held alongside the Munder family – Ruti, Karen, and Ohad – who were also later released.

50 ימים של טלטלה רגשית, התנקזו אתמול לכמה שעות של צפיה, התרגשות, שמחה על השבים, עצבות על הנותרים, געגועים ותפילה ללוחמים.

קשה להסביר במילים את ההתרגשות לראות את חנה קציר, שהג׳יהאד הודיע על מותה בשבי, צועדת על רגליה ולקרוא את רשימת החוזרים.
במערך הנעדרים הכרנו אותם היטב, יחידים… pic.twitter.com/IXcfzkGZly

— Karine Nahon • קרין נהון (@karineb) November 25, 2023

Her daughter, Carmit Palty-Katzir, said: "Mom was a loving and devoted wife and mother who was all about love. Her heart couldn't withstand the terrible suffering since October 7. Every day in captivity endangers the lives of our loved ones. A comprehensive deal to bring back our 100 brothers and sisters must move forward."

In a radio interview several months ago, Carmit revealed that her mother was hospitalized with cardiac issues. She noted that her mother had no heart problems before being kidnapped, but now suffered from severe cardiac conditions due to "harsh conditions and starvation."

For years, Katzir cared for children at Kibbutz Nir Oz – she was among the kibbutz's founders, where her children Avital, Elad, and Carmit were born. In a false statement released about a week before her release from captivity, Islamic Jihad falsely claimed she was no longer alive.

In a social media post shared two days ago, Carmit described her mother's condition: "I went to be with her. There wasn't much I could do to help, but we talked a little. I played music when she didn't have the strength to talk, made her hot drinks and made sure she was warm and comfortable," she shared.

The funeral will be held Tuesday at Kibbutz Nir Oz at 4:00 p.m.

The post A mother's broken heart: Released hostage Hanna Katzir dies at 77 appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

President Joe Biden reaffirmed his unwavering support for Israel and pledged to continue working to free all remaining hostages during the White House Hanukkah reception Monday night, ABC News reported.

"I know this year's Hanukkah falls on the hearts that are still very heavy. It's the second Hanukkah since the horrors of Oct. 7. Over 1,000 slaughtered, hundreds taken hostage, unspeakable sexual violence, and so much more. The trauma of that day and its aftermath is still raw and ongoing," Biden said at the East Room gathering.

The president highlighted his administration's efforts in securing the release of hostages held in Gaza. "I've gotten over 100 hostages out. I will not stop until I get every single one of them home," he said.

Speaking about the rise in antisemitic incidents, Biden emphasized his longstanding commitment to Israel. "I've said many times before, my commitment to the safety of the Jewish people and security of Israel and its right to exist as an independent nation-state remains ironclad," he declared.

During his remarks, Biden shared a personal tradition of taking each of his grandchildren to concentration camps in Europe to ensure they understand the Holocaust's magnitude. "I wanted them to know that you couldn't pretend it didn't happen, and it should never happen again," he explained.

The president, reiterating a sentiment he has expressed throughout his career, added: "And so I learned a long time ago, you don't have to be a Jew to be a Zionist. I'm a Zionist."

The Hanukkah reception followed Sunday's Democratic National Committee holiday event, where Biden, accompanied by Vice President Kamala Harris, reflected on his administration's impact. "The one thing I've always believed about public service, and especially about the presidency, is the importance of asking yourself: 'Have we left the country in better shape than we found it?'" Biden said.

"Today, I can say, with every fiber of my being, of all my heart, the answer to that question is a resounding 'yes.' Because of all of you assembled here, we can be proud we're leaving America in a better place today than we came here four years ago," Biden said.

The post Biden at Hanukkah celebration: I will not stop until I get all of them home appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

A large fire broke out Thursday at the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne, Australia, with police investigating it as a potential antisemitic attack. Benjamin Klein, a member of the synagogue's board, told ABC that an "enormous amount" of sacred books, Torah scrolls, and furniture were destroyed.

The fire, which caused significant damage to two synagogue buildings, left Adass Israel congregants in shock, with some arriving for morning prayers to find their synagogue severely damaged by the blaze.

Firefighters arrived at the scene around 4 AM and battled the flames for nearly an hour before gaining control. According to witnesses, two individuals smashed the synagogue's window, poured gasoline, and threw Molotov cocktails that ignited the building. Worshippers present at the time were forced to flee through the back exit, with one person suffering burns to their hands.

More than 60 firefighters have fought a blaze ignited after a suspected arson attack at a Melbourne synagogue early on Friday morning. Latest: https://t.co/eWT9sXsSwJ pic.twitter.com/DpWVr7QWHN

— The Australian (@australian) December 5, 2024

 Israeli President Isaac Herzog wrote Friday morning on his X account: "I call on Australian leadership and leaders worldwide to strongly condemn this despicable act of terror and fight against the intolerable rise in anti-Jewish racism globally." The president also expressed his admiration for the community's strength, unity, and resilience in the face of the attack and wave of antisemitism.

Seventeen firefighting teams worked to extinguish the blaze. The synagogue, built by Holocaust survivors, serves as a vital center for the local Jewish community. "This is the crown jewel of the Jewish community," said Benjamin Klein, a synagogue board member. He added that the community is in shock. "We've been on high alert in recent months, with security patrols and cameras, but seeing something like this happen is shocking."

"This synagogue is the busiest in Australia, so it's a very, very active synagogue. We're open 20 to 22 hours a day," Klein said. "For this to happen to a synagogue thousands of miles from anywhere else in the world, in a peaceful neighborhood, peaceful community, it's quite terrible."

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese condemned the arson, calling it a deliberate and illegal attack that contradicts all the country's values. "I have zero tolerance for antisemitism. It has absolutely no place in Australia. The violence and intimidation and destruction at a place of worship is an outrage," Albanese said. "This attack has risked lives and is clearly aimed at creating fear in the community."

pic.twitter.com/AfmZMZgtMu

— Anthony Albanese (@AlboMP) December 5, 2024

Jeremy Leibler, President of the Zionist Federation of Australia, condemned the attack: "No one should be surprised. This violent attack is a direct result of words turning into actions. Unchecked hatred of Jews endangers all Australians." Klein also noted this wasn't the first time the synagogue had been targeted. In 1995, it was damaged in a deliberate fire.

Yossi Friedman told foreign media that he was inside the synagogue with another person around 4:10 AM when they suddenly heard a loud bang and breaking glass. "I saw glass flying, so I just jumped from my chair, ran from the synagogue through the hall to the back path," Friedman recounted. He asked a staff member at a store to call the police and then returned to the synagogue, only to find the building engulfed in flames. "I thought maybe I could open the doors and get inside, but when I touched the door my hand got burned," he said, "so I decided it was too dangerous and left."

I am appalled by the abhorrent arson attack on the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne.
Antisemitism must be relentlessly confronted. I urge Australian authorities to act swiftly and ensure the despicable perpetrators are brought to justice.
Israel stands in solidarity with the…

— Gideon Sa'ar | גדעון סער (@gidonsaar) December 6, 2024

World Zionist Organization Chairman Yaakov Hagoel addressed the antisemitic attack against the Jewish synagogue in Melbourne, Australia: "Jewish blood is not worthless! The attack against the synagogue in Melbourne, Australia, is another reminder of the antisemitic wave that has been raising its head worldwide with greater intensity since October 7."

The post Synagogue, Torah scrolls torched in Melbourne appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.