The question of how the Israel Defense Forces reached this situation, when time is running out, becomes even sharper when comparing what's happening in the Gaza Strip with the IDF's battle against Hezbollah in Lebanon – a campaign that once it began intensively, ended within just a few months. How is it possible that the IDF defeated the terror organization considered the strongest in the Middle East so quickly, while it's been mired in the Gaza mud for so long, struggling against a weaker terror organization? What are the differences between the two theaters that caused this?

Indeed, many similarities exist between the two theaters that opened against Israel on October 7 and 8. In both, the IDF fought against an Islamist terror organization supported by Iran, and our soldiers succeeded in eliminating almost all of their political and military leadership. Moreover, in both cases, Israel delivered a decisive military blow against its enemies, emerged from the crisis with them, and severely damaged their rocket capabilities, thus largely neutralizing the long-term threat against it. Many enemy fighters were killed in Lebanon and Gaza, and the enemy was pushed back from its border line with us in both cases.

Alongside this, there are also many differences between the theaters, related to objective conditions, our conduct toward them, the goals we set, and more. We'll present only a partial list of these differences, but they're sufficient to teach about the great challenge facing Israel in Gaza, and also to explain what we still need to deal with to finish the campaign there.

Before diving deep into the analysis, we must warn and say that any measurement of such a campaign cannot produce a binary equation, absolute victory or defeat. Perhaps the government also erred when it tried to present the goal in the strip in such a way. Eliminating Hamas, its operatives, and weapons is a binary outcome – yes or no. But "victory" is a much more ambiguous concept, and it's difficult to define it clearly.

Therefore, it's possible that even looking at what's happening in Gaza – similar to examining the other theaters Israel fights against – we must honestly admit that the situation in the strip is not similar to what it was on the eve of the war, and not even three weeks after its opening. The IDF worked very hard in Gaza; the situation there is very different from what it was, and from Israel's perspective, it's more positive in many ways. The bottom line is that Hamas' strategic threat to Israel has been removed; it's almost unable to launch rockets at us, doesn't carry out infiltration attacks, and doesn't endanger civilians in the rear. This doesn't mean Hamas has been defeated, but there's certainly a change here.

Victory or threat elimination?

The differences between the basic situation in fighting in Gaza and the campaign against Hezbollah can be divided into several types – geographical reasons, setting different types of goals, differences in the enemy's internal politics, different consciousness here in Israel, a political alternative, and more.

First of all, preparedness – Israel came to the war against Hezbollah after preparing for it for many years. In some ways, after internalizing the lessons of the Second Lebanon War, the IDF and the entire system began preparing the ground for a return confrontation with the Shiite terror organization, and to that end, built complex scenarios, established intelligence systems, wrote operational plans, and more. Hamas, on the other hand, was always perceived as an enemy against whom, at most, a short-term campaign would be conducted, in an attempt to reach understandings that would lead to containment and calm. It's not that the security establishment ignored its existence and didn't prepare against it, as evidenced by the attempt to hit the "Metro" in Gaza in May 2021, but there wasn't the same approach as with Hezbollah. The IDF prepared for the campaign in Lebanon, and in Gaza, it tried to buy quiet through prosperity and welfare.

Moreover, there's a difference in operational coping with Hezbollah and Hamas – the Lebanese organization was built in recent years with many characteristics of an organized army, and therefore it's easier to identify its sites and targets, its weapon caches and strategic assets, and of course this allows building plans to strike them. Hamas, on the other hand, established for itself a fighting framework of brigades and battalions, but it quickly crumbled, its fighters dug into tunnels and moved to guerrilla warfare. The organization hides its systems under hospitals, inside clinics and schools, and among the civilian population. This makes it much harder to hit it, and many attacks are also canceled due to concern about harming innocents.

Another major gap between the strip and southern Lebanon relates to the geographical characteristics of these areas – Gaza is a narrow, closed strip, sealed on one side by the Egyptian border from the south – where the leadership in Cairo was not eager to open it for mass Palestinian flow – the Mediterranean Sea from the west and Israel from the north and east. Residents there have nowhere to flee, and no one allows them to leave. In Lebanon, on the other hand, residents in the south of the country moved north and went to safe places, and thus could avoid IDF bombardments or ground entry.

Hamas, of course, understands this issue. It hides within the civilian population, and therefore, Israel often also harms residents who are not armed. Due to this, the number of civilians killed in Gaza is immeasurably higher than residents in Lebanon – hundreds of civilians in the northern theater, compared to many thousands in the strip. The IDF was also forced to find creative solutions for the population during the fighting – moving it, evacuation to demarcated areas, and even fighting inside populated buildings.

This is also the background to the question of the siege on Gaza and the "starvation" campaign conducted abroad against the IDF. Hamas deliberately hoards food and doesn't distribute it to residents, who often have no other sources for purchasing food. Although many argue that there's still no real food shortage in Gaza, this campaign pressured Israel due to the basic fact that the strip is closed and there's no exit or entry from it. In Lebanon, such a campaign could not have existed. If we go back even further, this is also the source of the legal claim by the International Court of Justice in The Hague that Israel still "occupies" Gaza, even though it evacuated its soldiers from there in the disengagement. The judges believed that Israel's control over exit and entry from the strip effectively makes it an occupying force.

Another significant difference between the two campaigns against Hamas and Hezbollah relates to the goals Israel set – in Lebanon the IDF didn't try to eliminate Hezbollah, but only to push it back from the border area and thwart its ability to pose a threat to Israel, with the aim of returning northern residents to their homes safely. The derivative of this goal was ultimately not taking control of southern Lebanon or attempting to stay there for a long time, and even after the ceasefire, it included only staying at five strategic points along the border.

In Gaza, however, the situation is different. The government aspires to emerge with "absolute victory" over Hamas, which includes disarming the organization, eliminating it as an active fighting force, killing its commanders, or getting them to agree to leave Gaza for exile. This is a much more ambitious task, more complex, requiring greater resources than pushing terrorists back from the border and denying their ability to cause damage.

Political and diplomatic struggle

The nature of IDF activity in Gaza and Lebanon is very different, derived among other things from differences in physical and operational characteristics between the two theaters. There are, of course, additional reasons for this, and one can focus, for example, on reasons taken from the world of domestic and international politics.

Thus, for example, in Lebanon, the IDF succeeded in reaching a situation where a political alternative faced Hezbollah. The battles Israel conducted in Lebanon disrupted the political balance that had prevailed in the country until then, and suddenly it became clear that there was another address in Beirut that could be approached to manage affairs. The war actually triggered a powerful social change in Lebanon, at the end of which it's possible that perhaps the new state institutions, those that arose in response to the great destruction the country experienced in the war, will succeed in disarming Hezbollah.

In Gaza, the situation is very different. The Palestinian Authority is not perceived as a relevant option for managing the strip in the eyes of the government in Israel, and as long as no other international body is found that will take upon itself the management of the strip – a task no one is interested in as long as Hamas holds enough power to demonstrate its strength against any such factor – no potential alternative to the terror organization's rule over residents will arise. Hamas doesn't agree to loosen its control over Gaza, whether behind the scenes or openly, and won't consent to accept a body that doesn't answer to its authority as a factor for managing affairs there.

Another matter relates to international pressure applied to Israel. Not only does the government in Jerusalem face claims, threats, and condemnations from countries on specific issues, like bringing in aid or harming civilians, but generally, the international community perceives the conflict with the Palestinians differently from the struggle in the northern theater. Hezbollah is not found in the consensus of foreign countries, but rather the opposite. Its war with Israel is not viewed favorably, and is perceived as a struggle whose end is to bring destruction upon Lebanon. The northern theater, therefore, didn't stand at the heart of petitions filed with courts in The Hague against the security establishment and government.

The Palestinian struggle receives "legitimacy" in the world, an action that has justification due to the Israeli "occupation." Palestinian supporters in the Western world are very numerous, and they see before their eyes the image that is well-marketed by interested parties regarding Palestinian "victimization," the dangers, and the perception that they are David fighting Goliath. This situation puts Israel under pressure in its actions, specifically in this theater, and even the credit Israel gained as a result of the horrors Hamas committed on October 7 was quickly eroded. This is the background now, for example, to the starvation campaign against the siege on Gaza, which aroused messages even from Trump's White House against Israel. Due to this, Israel's options for action are shrinking, and it always fights with a political hourglass hanging over it.

World countries also often try to preserve the framework plans they've stuck to in the region, especially the two-state solution for two peoples. Thus, when France, for example, speaks with Israel about the war in Gaza, it still operates from the assumption that it wants to advance recognition of Palestinians. Therefore, in the middle of the war, when many hostages were still held in Hamas' dark tunnels, Ireland, Norway, and Spain officially announced recognition of a Palestinian state. Such consciousness can explain, for example, why this week's announcement by France, Britain, and Canada against Israel, while threatening sanctions against it, combined both the continuation of the war in Gaza and "construction in settlements." This is also the reason that, parallel to the British announcement about stopping discussions on a trade agreement with Israel due to the operation in Gaza, personal sanctions were imposed on settlement people in Judea and Samaria due to the alleged harassment of Palestinians.

This trend also connects to the internal political dispute in Israel – many in Israel still adhere to the two-state solution and believe this is the correct way to exit the deadlock with the Palestinians. They give backing in a certain sense to European moves on the matter, and become justification for actions whose purpose is to try to preserve this idea as a practical possibility. On the other hand, there's no movement in Israel calling to reach a political solution with Hezbollah, among other things due to understanding the futility of such an act, especially after Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 and the fact that it seems the Shiite organization is only looking for excuses to justify its aggression toward the IDF.

The analysis up to this point didn't touch on one of perhaps the most important issues that constitutes the difference between the situation in the northern and southern theaters – the hostage issue. Hamas didn't just take Israeli civilians and soldiers to Gaza's dark tunnels as hostages, but understood very well the implications this would have on Israel's options for action. In the operational dimension, for example, this means the IDF isn't free to operate freely in all of Gaza's terrain cells, since there are places where there's concern that its activity will lead to harming hostages – whether from bombardments or as revenge by their captors. Soldiers also operate throughout the strip with a dual mission – on one hand turning over every stone to free the hostages, and on the other hand destroying Hamas in the process. These are tasks that sometimes clash with each other, and within Israel, there's disagreement between the operational level and decision-makers on which goal comes first.

This dilemma is also reflected in public opinion in the country and in the political pressure it creates among the leadership. There wasn't a large internal movement in Israeli society to stop the fighting against Hezbollah, but this isn't the case in Gaza. Wide segments of Israeli society believe that freeing hostages comes before continuing the war, and think there should be an agreement – even if it's not clear how – with Hamas to stop the campaign, withdraw from Gaza, rehabilitate it, and give the terror organization the possibility to rearm. All in exchange for returning the hostages to their homes or graves.

Cumulative effect

There are many differences between Gaza and Lebanon, and the enemy is not the same enemy. The variance between the basic equation in both theaters stands at the foundation of the fact that the IDF hasn't yet succeeded in achieving final victory in Gaza, but on the other hand it doesn't constitute an excuse for the current situation, where the campaign in the strip has been characterized too many times since the beginning of the war mainly by stagnation.

On the other hand, this doesn't mean Israel won't ultimately achieve victory over Hamas, or at least in a model similar to the defeat we inflicted on Hezbollah. The campaign hasn't ended, and it's difficult to predict where it will develop. This also depends, among other things, on defining goals as finally as possible, on the tension found between the military and political levels, on specific successes that will create an inertia of events, and more. The elimination of Mohammed Sinwar, for example, if it indeed occurred, might be such an event – the brother of the October 7 attack's architect is considered an extremist symbol in Hamas, alongside being the senior commander and operational brain currently, and his removal from the theater might lead the way to compromises by the terror organization, even if for now it appears that talks between the sides about releasing additional hostages have stalled.

We must understand that the war also creates a cumulative effect on our enemies, and actions are sometimes evident only in the long term. Here, for example, is one interesting point from recent days – in one of the conversations an unidentified "Palestinian senior" conducted with foreign press, the source mentioned conditions Hamas set for Israel to end the war. In these conditions, for the first time to the best of my memory, a demand for safe passage from Gaza for Hamas seniors.

Before celebration, we must remember to take this statement with very limited credibility, and it's not clear who said it, what their organizational and political affiliation is, and what exactly the source saw in their vision. But nonetheless, there's innovation in this demand, an echo of an Israeli goal that didn't previously appear on the Palestinian side. It perhaps teaches that pressure is also working on Hamas and Gaza residents, and that it's possible that in the future we'll be able to realize the goals we set for ourselves.

The meaning is that there's a possibility here to make a change in reality, but it also depends on us in many ways. Will we know how to continue to the end and persevere under pressure? Will our leaders be brave enough to make difficult decisions, despite the difficulties and limitations? Will we have political, military, and human resources for realizing our goals? On these questions, Israel will be tested in the coming months.

Elie Klutstein is a researcher at the Misgav Institute for National Security.

The post Why is the IDF, which defeated Hezbollah, not defeating Hamas? appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

One of the interesting questions regarding Iran's nuclear program is why Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, needs this headache. The diplomatic, economic, and even military pressure on him is enormous, as are the prices his country pays for choosing this path. After all, Khamenei is the man who decides everything in Iran, and he is also the one whose published religious ruling prohibits building nuclear weapons. How do we explain this contradiction, the enormous investment despite the religious prohibition and heavy prices, especially at a time when the Iranian currency is recording another all-time low, trading at one million rials to the dollar?

There are several reasons for this: A nuclear bomb, and the national pride it can inspire, could become a unifying factor for the Iranian people at a time when they are falling apart from within, social divisions are widening, and abandonment of religion is increasing. After the blows Tehran has suffered in the past year, success against all odds could help unite parts of the population around a common goal. Presenting the bomb might also justify the difficult economic situation of Iranian citizens in recent years, proving that it was worth enduring the suffering to maintain the country in a position of power. Another reason is related to power struggles within the Iranian leadership, and the internal confrontation between reformist and conservative currents.

An additional reason is the lessons learned from the war in the past year: While there are claims that Hamas started the war partly to disrupt the establishment of a new regional order, such as normalization steps with the Saudis, there are also others who said it was a distraction intended to allow Iran to continue pursuing its bomb. But during this time, Iran made a mistake and involved itself more strongly than ever in the conflict, which allowed Israel to attack it directly. The question is whether one of the lessons Iran drew from the war is that it must develop nuclear weapons at all costs, as a final gamble for the entire pot. As a reminder, nuclear weapons are the means that more than anything ensures the survival of the ayatollahs' regime, and would protect it from further Israeli attacks – especially these days, when it is perhaps more unstable than ever before. If this assumption is correct, it means Iran will do everything to obtain this weapon, and the only way to stop it is through military means before it achieves it.

The Americans have not yet decided whether this is Tehran's current motive, or if there is no choice but to stick to attacking nuclear sites. It is evident from the statements of the new administration over the past month that it understands time is pressing, but that there are still two courses of action: the military option, or the path the White House is sticking to – negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program, hoping it will voluntarily give it up, while making it clear that President Donald Trump will not accept a nuclear Iran. A partial agreement, or one that does not address the range of burning issues related to the Iranian nuclear program, is probably not on the table from the American perspective.

Trump publicly called on the Iranians to negotiate on the program, asked the Russians to mediate between them – although it's difficult to call the Kremlin a fair mediator – sent a letter to Khamenei through an envoy from the Emirates – a letter that according to reports included a two-month ultimatum to reach a new nuclear agreement. At the same time, the president advanced his plan to increase economic pressure on Iran to the maximum level, to force it to enter discussions about the program.

But Tehran is not willing to back down at this stage. Despite some ambivalence in the position of senior officials in the Islamic Republic, and the clash between different opinions that led, among other things, to the dismissal of former Vice President and Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif, most responses to Trump's demands have been quite negative. For example, President Masoud Pezeshkian told him "do what you want, to hell with it," and Khamenei himself declared that the US would not stop them. Among other things, Iran has made it clear that it will not under any circumstances give up its nuclear aspirations, and that in any future solution it will continue to operate a civilian nuclear program – so the room for dialogue between the parties is small in any case. The existence of a civilian program is a guarantee that the Iranians will accumulate more knowledge and will be able to secretly continue activities related to nuclear development. The West cannot risk allowing such a scenario.

If there is something Israel should worry about at the current stage, following the American president's desire to resolve the conflict through diplomatic means, it is the existence of a secret dialogue channel – similar to the contacts his envoy conducted with Hamas. At the same time, it's important to understand that there are major differences between Hamas and Iran: the threat that the Republic could pose to the US if armed with nuclear weapons, as well as to its forces in the region, is too serious for the president to ignore. Trump has also made it clear that he understands the problem with a nuclear Iran, so the probability of such a channel – or at least of it maturing to practical tracks – seems not particularly high. Also, the fact that Trump's letter to Khamenei included, as mentioned, an ultimatum, reduces the likelihood of this possibility.

Moreover, the actions of the American military in recent days against the Houthis in Yemen, including the especially clear message Trump delivered Monday evening to Iran regarding its responsibility for "every shot" fired by the Houthis, can serve as another reassurance to Israel. The fact that the Houthis did not restrain themselves and indeed launched a missile toward Israel, in direct defiance of the president, constrains him and forces him to exact a direct price from Iran – or show the whole world that he does not stand by his word.

America's second option is to begin leaning toward military strikes, most likely in cooperation with Israel. The military exercise that took place in the Mediterranean skies about a week and a half ago, during which Israeli Air Force planes were seen together with an American strategic bomber, was a clear message in this direction. The president's decision to expedite shipments of heavy bombs to Israel that the Biden administration had delayed is another message in this vein.

The Iranians have not yet fully rebuilt their air defense array and their air force, but they are working in that direction. Among other things, they have declared that they will equip themselves with advanced Russian aircraft, and they are certainly trying to project – at least outwardly – the resilience of their anti-aircraft systems, even if it's difficult to take all these declarations completely seriously. But to minimize damage to the attacking force, and before Iran recovers its defense arrays, it's advisable to exploit the current window of opportunity to hit important targets in Iran and neutralize the nuclear program.

Return of the sanctions

The US is not the only player in this arena. European countries are showing more and more pressure around the Iranian nuclear issue (reminder: the range of missiles currently in Iran's possession reaches the eastern part of the continent), and they were the driving force behind the closed discussion held by the UN Security Council on this issue last week. The discussion, defined as "private" – not a regular procedure in the Security Council – dealt with Iran's nuclear program and recent developments surrounding IAEA reports on uranium enrichment in the country, against the backdrop of statements by Germany, Britain, and France about concerns over Tehran's moves.

Government leaders in London reiterated last week their declaration that they are ready to activate the "snapback" mechanism in the 2015 nuclear deal – which means the immediate reinstatement of all pre-agreement UN sanctions on Iran. This requires a Security Council decision, and contrary to the normal course of affairs, countries do not have veto rights on the vote. If Britain were to initiate such a resolution, it's not unreasonable to assume it would win a majority.

The process of proposing the return of sanctions and voting on them takes time, and the course of events is pressing: in mid-October, according to the original agreement, the deadline by which sanctions can be reinstated will expire – so the powers must act in the coming months, or the opportunity will be lost. Trump, whose withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018 denied him the ability to activate this mechanism, has instructed American diplomats to work with their counterparts to advance the activation of the snapback in the near future by any means.

Israel marks targets

Iran has found itself in a particularly difficult situation in the past year: a much more determined and less sleepy American president than his predecessor, who is directly threatening it; all the world's eyes are focused on it, both because of the advancement of the program and due to the war in Gaza and its role in it; it has been stripped of a significant part of its defense capabilities, has in many respects been revealed as a paper tiger, and has apparently also lost at least some of its response capabilities against Israel. It is receiving much more attention than it would like, and is trying to hide as much of its activities as possible, hoping to complete them before being struck by its enemies.

By the way, in this context, it's important to understand exactly what Israel is marking as a target for attack. It's not enough, apparently, just to sabotage Iranian enrichment capabilities or uranium stockpiles. They constitute one important component of the entire program, but other components, unrelated to the accumulation of fissile material, must be hit to inflict real damage on Iran's weaponization capability.

But after all this, why have the Iranians gone on alert just now? Why would Israel attack now, when according to estimates there are still at least a few months until Iran reaches an irreversible state? First of all, Iran knew that the ceasefire end date in Gaza was approaching, and that the Americans and Israelis are working together, perhaps trying to surprise it simultaneously with attacks in Gaza. On other fronts, Israel is operating with force, and it is certainly preparing for a major blow to Iran itself.

In Tehran, they are also getting into Israel's head, understanding that its basic assumptions are as follows: it's not certain that Western assessments about the time left to act are correct, as they are based on knowledge in our possession, and we may be missing additional intelligence. Therefore, understanding that there are always things we don't know, a preemptive safety margin should be taken to avoid surprises – and in this case, to advance the attack. Iran's statements at the beginning of the year, according to which 2025 will be a significant year for its nuclear program, certainly don't help in this regard.

Second, even if Iran doesn't reach the bomb itself, it is accumulating knowledge, experience, and tools that will be very difficult – perhaps even impossible – to erase in the future. The sooner Israel acts to thwart the program, the easier it will be to push Tehran back and gain more time before it tries again to break through to a bomb. The Iranians are aware of this and fear military action against them already in the immediate time frame. They also understand that the maneuvers of hiding, concealment, and defense improvement raise the level of alertness of the enemy – namely, Israel and the US – and are preparing accordingly.

Five scenarios

In the near future, it seems, there are several different scenarios that could materialize in the struggle between Iran, Israel, and the US.

Renewed nuclear agreement: It's likely that Iran will not agree to give up many of its nuclear capabilities, but unlike in 2015, there is hardly any agreement that would be relevant now without dramatic steps to dismantle the nuclear program itself. The program is so advanced, and Iran has so much fissile material (some of which it can hide), that there are almost no conditions under which the US should – logically, at least – agree in negotiations to reduce pressure on Iran without its complete surrender. Probability: Relatively low

Disintegration from within: Recent weeks have been characterized by quite a few protests in Iran, which is suffering from deteriorating economic and social conditions. American pressure will do its part, in addition to economic hardship and the hostility of large segments of the population to the extreme version of Islam dictated by the regime, and the protests will expand until they lead to the overthrow of the government. What worked in 1979 might also work in 2025. Probability: Medium

Spillover of the conflict in Yemen or Gaza into Iranian territory: Israel and the US initiate a limited attack on Iran in response to provocations by proxy organizations such as Hamas or the Houthis. As part of the joint response, some components of the nuclear program will be hit. Probability: Low

Direct Israeli attack to destroy the nuclear program, perhaps with US backing: All options have been exhausted, and Israel has decided it can no longer tolerate the advancement of the nuclear project. An attack by Israel, with partial or complete success, will set back at least some components of the program. Researchers have warned that such an attack could ignite a campaign of covert and overt blows between Iran and Israel, economic pressure, and more, so perhaps this is just the smoking gun appearing in the first act of the play.

A side effect of such an attack could be the destabilization of the regime. Among other things, this is the other side of the nuclear race issue: if you failed to achieve it, if you were beaten thoroughly after all the sacrifices and investment, then a successful attack can bring you closer to internal disintegration due to the sense of disappointment and humiliation of the local population. Probability: Medium-high

Resolution of the issue within some international framework promoted by President Trump: There are quite a few opinions suggesting that Trump is cooking up a comprehensive global move that will advance calm on multiple fronts. This is a combination of a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, a solution to the conflict in the Palestinian arena, and more actions in bubbling arenas that will allow the White House to devote its full attention to domestic challenges and the economic struggle against China. Within this framework, combining a solution to the Iranian issue in some way, without causing unrest in global markets and without prompting Israel to decide to take independent action, might seem particularly appealing to President Trump.

However, it's difficult to see exactly how President Trump will manage to resolve the crisis to the satisfaction of all parties, including his domestic allies, Israel itself, and also the Iranians and their friends in Russia and China. On the other hand, no one thought Trump would succeed in bringing about the Abraham Accords either. Probability: Medium

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This statement was preceded by a phone call between the newly inaugurated president and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who pledged to expand trade with the US and invest $600 billion "or perhaps even more" in the American economy over the next four years. This suggests that Trump's planned visit is likely to materialize.

The extended Trump family has longstanding business interests in Saudi Arabia. The Trump Organization is expected to build hotels in the kingdom, Saudi business partners are promoting extensive projects with the organization in other countries, and the president's son-in-law, Jared Kushner, has secured investments worth approximately $2 billion from Saudi Arabia's sovereign wealth fund.

The rulers in Riyadh, who are well-versed in large-scale economic investments, including leveraging them for political gain, are already jumping on the bandwagon of the new US president and will undoubtedly continue to align with him swiftly. They aim to use this momentum to expand their economic and diplomatic foothold in Washington, thereby elevating their status in the region and worldwide.

For his part, Trump is eager to bolster Saudi Arabia's regional standing, particularly by reviving the normalization agreement between Riyadh and Jerusalem. This deal had been on the table before the war with Hamas, but the Biden administration failed to secure it. The new White House administration sees such an agreement as a potential solution to several pressing Middle Eastern issues, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the war in Gaza. In recent days, progress seems to have been made on this front, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to Washington this week may focus on this matter.

Meanwhile, the convergence of interests between Riyadh and Washington, driven by their mutual desire to strengthen ties and potentially shape a new regional framework, is occurring alongside another significant trend in the Middle East: the decline of Iran and the Shiite axis it led, along with some of its key proxies.

Since the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, Hamas has lost most of its leadership, its military capabilities have been significantly reduced, its weapon stockpiles have dwindled, and Gaza has been left in ruins with no clear path to reconstruction. Hezbollah has suffered a crushing blow in Lebanon, its leadership has been decimated, and its political power has weakened as a result. In Syria, Bashar al-Assad's regime - an Iranian ally - has been ousted, and even in Iraq, efforts are underway to curb the power of Shiite militias backed by Tehran.

These developments have eroded Iran's power and influence throughout the region. While grappling with deep economic crises and internal social challenges, Iran has watched as its various proxies, cultivated for the fight against Israel, have fallen like dominoes. The Islamic Republic itself has been targeted twice by Israeli Air Force strikes on its own soil and has been unable to effectively respond. At the same time, speculation that Trump may launch a maximum pressure campaign against Iran, though this has not yet materialized, further isolates the Ayatollah regime.

As Iran retreats, several actors are stepping in to shape the region's future. Israel is, of course, one of them, though it has primarily operated in the military sphere. Other key players include Egypt and Qatar, both vying for influence in post-war Gaza, and Turkey, which is leveraging its influence over the rebel faction that has taken control of Syria to advance its war against the Kurds and strengthen its grip on the country.

Saudi Arabia, too, is seizing this opportunity. It seeks to capitalize on the decline of the Shiite crescent to establish itself as a leading regional force, this time at the head of a Sunni bloc whose interests and goals may be significantly different from those of Tehran.

A new chapter

Syria has broken free from over 50 years of Assad family rule, thanks to the Turkish-backed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham rebel group. Without Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's support, the rebels might not have been able to seize control of the country so swiftly. However, despite the rebels' ongoing ties to Ankara, the first destination of Syria's new foreign minister was not the Turkish capital, but Riyadh.

"We seek to open a new and bright chapter in the history of Syria-Saudi relations, one that reflects our shared past," stated Asaad Hassan al-Shibani, Syria's new foreign minister. He arrived in the kingdom at Riyadh's invitation and spent his visit giving interviews advocating for the removal of sanctions on Syria following its regime change.

Al-Shibani's choice to push this narrative in Riyadh was no coincidence. Shortly after Assad's ouster, Saudi Arabia began pressuring world powers, especially the European Union, to change their policies toward Syria's new regime. In mid-January, Riyadh hosted an international conference of European and Middle Eastern diplomats to discuss Syria's future, publicly calling for the lifting of sanctions on Damascus. The kingdom pledged to help Syria's new government stand on its feet and quickly began an airlift of humanitarian aid to the country.

Meanwhile, Syria's new strongman, Ahmed al-Sharaa (or Mohammed al-Julani), who last week officially appointed himself president, dismantled armed factions, and dissolved the Baath Party, knows where his bread is buttered. In an interview with Al Arabiya, the Saudi news channel, Syria's new president praised Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's Vision 2030 initiative and expressed enthusiasm about attracting Saudi investments. He also reassured the Gulf states that Iran no longer poses a threat in Syria. "Saudi Arabia will play a significant role in Syria's future," he emphasized, recalling that he spent his early childhood in Riyadh and would be happy to visit again.

The rapprochement between the two countries is particularly significant given their relations during Assad's rule, which experienced far more downturns than upswings. Even before the Arab Spring, tensions were evident between Assad's regime and the Saudi kingdom, due in part to Damascus' support for Iran, particularly in connection with the assassination of Rafik Hariri in Lebanon. A brief reconciliation attempt in 2009 did not last, and relations between the two countries quickly deteriorated again.

The uprisings that erupted across much of the Middle East in 2011 were not welcomed by Riyadh's rulers, but in Syria, they supported the rebels, again, largely due to their strained relations with Assad and their desire to curb Iran's influence in the country, which was seen as a regional rival. Thus, despite Saudi Arabia's general reluctance to encourage elements that destabilized the regional order, it found itself aligning with several Syrian opposition groups. However, it was careful to distance itself from factions associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda, preferring to support more secular or nationalist groups.

The disconnect between the two sides remained largely unchanged until about two years ago. The fact that Assad remained in power despite more than a decade of rebellion, the desire to use reconciliation with him to get closer to Iran, and the necessity of cooperating with Damascus to combat drug smuggling into the kingdom, all these factors contributed to a gradual thaw in relations between Saudi Arabia and Syria. Meanwhile, Russia, which had previously been the dominant and most powerful player in Syria, became preoccupied with its war in Ukraine, leaving the Syrian arena primarily in Iran's hands. Determined to prevent Tehran from becoming Assad's sole and primary backer, the Saudis sought rapprochement with his regime.

The fall of the Alawite dictator's regime suddenly presented the Saudi leadership with an entirely new opportunity. Within a short time, they gained access to a new government eager for their support, one that explicitly sought to expel Iran from Syria entirely. The threat of Captagon drug smuggling significantly declined, as did concerns about a new wave of refugees. On the surface, everything seemed set for Saudi Arabia to make a full-scale entry into Syria.

However, for now, the Saudis appear to be exercising patience and caution. One possible reason is their concern over the Islamist background of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham organization and the possibility that it might promote a jihadist ideology within Syria and beyond. The way the new regime stabilizes itself, the policies it adopts, and the laws it implements will all play a crucial role in shaping Riyadh's future relationship with Damascus. The disbanding of armed factions last week was a step in the right direction.

Still, Saudi Arabia has much to gain from Syria in the current period. Therefore, despite its cautious approach, Riyadh is likely to become involved in numerous initiatives in the country. Among other objectives, the kingdom aims to prevent Turkey from dominating the Syrian arena, much like Iran did in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The Saudis also want a significant stake in Syria's reconstruction and redevelopment projects and seek to position themselves as a key supplier of oil, fuel, and potentially even natural gas to Damascus, which, until now, has relied on Iranian imports.

Reforms and aid

This situation is particularly interesting in light of a similar development in neighboring Lebanon, where Saudi Arabia has also found itself facing a new scenario filled with opportunities - something that just a few months ago seemed impossible. Riyadh has long harbored concerns over Hezbollah's influence in Lebanon, and the two countries plunged into a major crisis in 2021. When a Lebanese minister criticized Saudi Arabia's war against the Houthis in Yemen that year, the Saudis responded with severe punitive measures: they expelled Lebanon's ambassador from Riyadh and halted all imports from Lebanon. For an impoverished country like Lebanon, this was a devastating blow, and all attempts since then to reverse the decision proved futile.

However, Hezbollah suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of the IDF in the war, its top leadership, including Hassan Nasrallah, was eliminated, and during the ceasefire with Israel, Lebanon reached an agreement to elect a president, a move that reshaped the balance of power in the country and significantly weakened the Shiite axis. Into this power vacuum stepped Saudi Arabia, which, together with Western nations, pushed for the election of Joseph Aoun, the Lebanese Army commander, to the presidency. This position, the most powerful and significant in Lebanon, had remained vacant for two years due to domestic political deadlock over who should hold the office.

Aoun, a member of the Christian community, was indeed elected with support from Shiite political forces in Lebanon, but it was clear that he was not their preferred candidate. Moreover, the Shiites suffered an even greater setback when Aoun appointed Nawaf Salam, the President of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, as prime minister. Salam's appointment passed in the Lebanese parliament without the support of Hezbollah and Amal, which together form the Shiite bloc, and he was widely regarded as Saudi Arabia's preferred candidate.

With Aoun as president and Salam as prime minister, Riyadh feels it finally has partners it can work with, leaders who prioritize the interests of Lebanon itself over narrow factional or external interests, particularly those of Hezbollah and Iran.

It is no surprise, then, that shortly after Salam was appointed prime minister, Saudi Arabia's foreign minister visited Lebanon, marking the first visit by a Saudi minister to the country in 15 years. From there, Prince Faisal continued on to neighboring Syria. In Lebanon, he met with President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam, and afterward, he expressed his hope that "we will soon see real reform in Lebanon, a commitment to the future rather than the past, so that we can increase our involvement in the country."

Prince Faisal's emphasis on reforms was no coincidence. For years, Riyadh has conditioned all economic aid to Lebanon on economic, legal, and political reforms. Analysts explain that the foreign minister's visit signals Saudi confidence that the appointments of Aoun and Salam have put Lebanon on the right track toward these reforms, paving the way for real and meaningful cooperation.

Another key focus was the diminishing influence of Iran. Analysts noted that without Hezbollah and Iran weakening in Lebanon, neither Aoun nor Salam could have been appointed, nor would Saudi involvement have been possible.

A further sign of Riyadh's growing influence at Tehran's expense in Lebanon came from an announcement by President Joseph Aoun. He declared that his first official diplomatic visit as Lebanon's new leader would be to Saudi Arabia, where he is expected to sign dozens of economic and security agreements.

"Saudi Arabia is emerging as the great winner in the Middle East," explained Lina Khatib, a Chatham House expert, to the Financial Times. "The major changes in Lebanon and Syria highlight Riyadh's central role in the region. Neither country could have made these shifts without Saudi support."

In the coming period, Saudi Arabia will need to assess the stability of both Lebanon and Syria and accordingly adjust its level of involvement and investment in these countries. If Syria's new government stabilizes and develops the country, and if the Lebanon ceasefire holds without renewed clashes between the IDF and Hezbollah, it will be of utmost importance to Riyadh.

For example, Lebanese military cooperation with hostile elements in southern Lebanon last week was a troubling sign for Saudi Arabia. While Riyadh supported the IDF's withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Aoun, as a former army commander, is expected to restrain Lebanese troops and ensure they do not get involved, even indirectly, in hostilities against Israel.

In this regard, Saudi Arabia's interests align closely with Washington's: to prevent Syria and Lebanon from being drawn into regional conflicts, particularly any potential continuation of the war in Gaza. Meanwhile, both countries are also highly motivated to prevent a renewed Iranian foothold and the resurgence of Tehran's proxies.

Israel, for its part, should feel encouraged by Saudi Arabia's involvement in both Lebanon and Syria. This window of opportunity, in which Riyadh is interested in advancing normalization with Israel and a strategic agreement with the US, could potentially lead to the formation of a new regional framework and new norms.

The Saudis, for their part, continue to declare their desire for progress on the Palestinian issue - whether this is a statement aimed at appeasing public opinion in the kingdom or a genuine interest of the Saudi leadership - but in Jerusalem, many believe that a mutually acceptable formula can be reached.

In any case, Saudi Arabia's regional strengthening is far preferable to the alternative, namely, the entry of other nations, particularly Iran or other representatives of the Shiite axis. The same applies to so-called "moderate" Sunni players in the region, such as Qatar or Turkey, especially given that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared last week his support for the "spirit of resistance" demonstrated by Hamas in its war against Israel.

From Israel's perspective, as long as Saudi Arabia's growing influence does not conflict with its security interests, it is important to encourage Saudi involvement in Lebanon and Syria. In any case, dialogue and negotiations with actors like Saudi Arabia should be prioritized over continuing engagement with regional players like Qatar, which has so far supported Hamas and the terrorism it generates.

Since this interest aligns with President Trump's vision, Israel stands only to benefit from such a scenario.

The post A new Middle East: Saudi Arabia replaces Iran appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

Baghdad has been at the center of regional attention in recent weeks, as it finds itself at a crossroads: will it disengage from Iran's grip and use the new circumstances to develop sovereignty and independence, or will it do the opposite—leverage Iran's need for it to secure a closer embrace from Tehran? For now, before it becomes clear which path the Iraqi leadership will choose, the two contenders for its loyalty are working to position themselves more favorably to influence Baghdad's decision-making.

For instance, about a week and a half ago, outgoing US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited the city and held a deep discussion with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. According to senior American officials familiar with the content of the conversation, Blinken explained to the prime minister that Iran is currently at its lowest point of weakness and that this presents an opportunity for Iraq to reduce the Islamic Republic's influence in the country.

A senior official said that during the discussion, Blinken also asked al-Sudani to prevent the transfer of Iranian weapons to Syria via Iraqi territory and promised to work with Baghdad's leadership to prevent the rearming of the Islamic State and its fighters in the country. Additionally, it was reported that Blinken urged the Iraqi government to shut down the offices of the Houthi outpost in the country. Ultimately, in order to combat Tehran's influence in Iraq, the Secretary of State asked Baghdad to act to disarm the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.

In the past year, these militias have gained notoriety for launching drones toward Israel as part of the "Resistance Axis" operations against us during the war. But even before that, they had carried out terror attacks against US forces stationed in Iraq, causing injuries among American soldiers. Thus, when the State Department spokesperson was asked whether the US was working to dismantle the militias, he did not attribute the motivation for the move to the influence struggle with Iran but rather to the fact that the militias pose a threat to American troops. This distinction is significant because, according to him, the US desire to dismantle the militias is not new, as Washington has always acted against those who attack it, and therefore its actions now are not tied to the unique circumstances that have emerged in the Middle East.

However, it seems that this time the US is indeed trying to promote an unconventional initiative. Among other things, it was reported that the Americans held two meetings with Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the highest Shiite authority in Iraq and possibly worldwide, to urge him to issue a religious ruling calling for the disarmament of the militias. The elderly Ayatollah refused the American request, and according to a report in Iran, he also recently declined to meet with a representative of the UN Secretary-General who sought to discuss the same issue.

As a result, it seems that the Americans are directing most of their pressure toward the Iraqi leadership, devoting special attention to the matter. American concerns are heightened by the fact that the government in Baghdad has demanded the international coalition, led by the US in the fight against ISIS, to withdraw from the country by the end of next year. The Americans are certainly not eager to leave Iraq, where approximately 2,500 soldiers are currently stationed, leaving the stage to other actors. Still, they are mainly worried about the possibility that Iran and its militias will exploit the vacuum that will be left in the country to solidify their control. From Iraq, the Iranians could also once again destabilize the new regime in Syria and try to increase their influence there as well. Among other concerns, there is a fear that militia members who fled Syria after Assad's fall may join armed groups in Iraq and continue their activities from there.

A temporary lull

The Iraqis are well aware of the pressure being exerted on them to change the balance of power in the country. Ibrahim al-Sumidei, an advisor to Prime Minister al-Sudani, said last week after Blinken's visit: "To be honest, we need to reassess the current situation." According to him, Iraq can no longer remain tied to the "Axis of Resistance," as he put it, after the fall of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Assad in Syria. Al-Sumidei added that unlike in the past, now "if we don't comply, it will be forced upon us." He concluded by noting that talks on disarming the militias have begun with some of them, including the Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades and members of the Popular Mobilization Forces ("al-Hashd al-Shaabi"), and that these talks are in an advanced stage.

Another senior advisor to al-Sudani, Hussein Alawi, also confirmed the Western demand from Baghdad, stating that the disarmament of the militias is "a key to Iraq's national security." These statements can be interpreted as more than just an American demand—they amount to a threat, coupled with the clarification that failure to comply will result in enforcement.

On the other hand, another close associate of the prime minister, Baha al-Araji, who previously served as deputy prime minister in Baghdad, argued that fears of changes in Iraq's political or security situation are unfounded. He also stated that the existence of armed militias is a product of the "occupation," which is also the reason for their continued presence.

Yet despite these denials, this week, it appears that the seeds of American pressure have borne fruit: on Monday, it was reported that at least some militias have reached an agreement with the government in Iraq to stop firing on Israel. A leader in the pro-Iranian al-Nujaba militia confirmed that, at the government's request and following the events in Syria, there was a consensus to avoid dragging Iraq into a scenario worse than Assad's ousting, which could plunge the country into chaos and terror. A spokesman for another militia, Kata'ib al-Fartusi, tied the attacks on Israel to Hezbollah's activity in Lebanon, claiming that once a ceasefire was agreed upon with the organization in the Cedar State, militia activity in Iraq ceased.

However, before the recent report, it appeared that the Iraqis had already halted their attacks, likely around the same time as the ceasefire in Lebanon. According to available information, Iraqi militias have not claimed responsibility for drone launches toward Israel for over a month, since November 24. The ceasefire in Lebanon took effect two days later, on November 26.

Still, despite the declaration of a ceasefire, it is worth paying closer attention to the statements of al-Fartusi, who represents the Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades. On Sunday, the day before confirming that his organization had ceased firing at Israel, he declared that the militias "have neither abandoned nor will they abandon" the principle of unifying the fronts against Israel, which calls for coordinated attacks from various directions, including Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere—even if, due to a combination of internal and external circumstances, the militias temporarily suspend their activities. According to him, this principle is "a matter of doctrine and is unrelated to losses or defeats."

This statement underscores the worldview driving many militia members. They are not fighting solely for interests but are driven by ideology and a comprehensive vision of opposing Israel, the West, and liberalization. This shared vision with Iran and its strategic plan means that even if the militias temporarily cease their attacks on Israel, it is difficult to say they are likely to give up their weapons entirely or willingly reduce their influence in Iraq. Nor can it be assumed that they will participate in an overarching effort to oust Iran's interests from Iraq while simultaneously allowing for increased American influence and abandoning their "resistance" against Israel.

This likely explains earlier statements from al-Nujaba militia two weeks ago when they strongly condemned "foreign forces plotting to destabilize Iraq." Similarly, on December 10, the Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades claimed there was a conspiracy to overthrow the Baghdad government, alleging an "Anglo-American plot," with Turkish and Israeli support, to sow chaos in the country. Such statements reflect the pressure the militias are under—fearing that in the struggle against their Iranian patron, they might be forced to surrender their weapons, diminish their influence, or even face existential threats.

Iranian setbacks

Another interesting question relates to the Iraqi government's interests: why would it comply with American pressure to remove Iranian influence from the country, even at the risk of confrontation with armed militias—a scenario that could spiral out of control into open conflict? After all, US troops are set to leave the country soon, and it seems unlikely—despite the fears of some militia members—that the Americans would launch airstrikes on Baghdad.

There are several possible reasons for this:

First, there are many Iraqis who do not wish to see continued Iranian influence in their country and even openly call for Baghdad's "liberation." "The new map of the Middle East will not be complete without Baghdad being set free," wrote Farouk Yousef last week. "It's time to free it from Persian occupation, just as Beirut has nearly been rescued and Damascus was indeed liberated from Assad's claws after he burned it down—not before he fled."

Another reason might be that the government in Baghdad wants to avoid turning Iraq into a battlefield between Israel and the militias, thereby exposing itself to the kind of damage and destruction seen in other states like Syria, Lebanon, or Yemen. On November 20, Al-Hadath reported that Washington had sent a message to Baghdad's leadership, warning that the US could no longer prevent Israel from striking militia targets within Iraq and that only government action could avert such attacks. Prime Minister al-Sudani reportedly informed all political factions in the country of this danger. Just days later, drone launches from Iraq ceased and have not resumed since.

Iraqis also need to dedicate their full attention to developments in Syria: there is a deep concern in Iraq that instability during Syria's transition period, including attempts by groups such as ISIS to exploit the leadership vacuum, could reignite a bloody civil war. A potential Turkish invasion of Syria would only exacerbate tensions. In such a scenario, Iraq fears that unrest will spill across the border, accompanied by terrorist groups seeking to provoke chaos on both sides and draw other actors into the conflict.

This concern has already prompted various Iraqi actions in recent weeks: halting oil exports to Syria due to fears of instability, repatriating thousands of Syrian soldiers who fled into Iraq, and monitoring smuggling along the border. Iraqis have been particularly encouraged by reports of a significant drop in attempts to smuggle Captagon pills across the border following Assad's fall—a trade long controlled by the Assad family, particularly the former president's brother, Maher.

In the meantime, as the situation remains unclear, Iraq is examining the new regional order and seeking to score diplomatic points, achievements, and fresh connections. Leading this effort is al-Sudani himself, who may see distancing Iraq from Iranian influence as a way to cultivate a new image in the West—as a key player shaping the new regional reality. At the same time, to maintain appearances, Iraq continues to emphasize its commitment to resolving the Palestinian issue, perhaps echoing Saudi Arabia's rhetoric. Notably, al-Sudani met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman last week to discuss regional developments.

From Iran's perspective, if the militias indeed agreed to lay down their weapons, this represents a tremendous setback and disappointment. Another part of the fire ring built by the infamous Qassem Soleimani has crumbled, leaving Iran with only one remaining proxy actively targeting Israel—the Houthis. The only other group that hasn't ceased its attacks is Hamas, the organization that initiated the current war, though its capabilities have significantly diminished since October 7.

However, Tehran is unlikely to give up so easily. Iraq remains a strategic geographical asset for Iran: aside from bypassing the Turkish border, which is not always a reliable route, Iraq serves as a crucial land corridor back to Syria. Furthermore, it offers a path to another target Tehran has identified for expanding its influence—Jordan.

Iran's calculations

Iran is recalibrating its strategy following Assad's fall, attempting to restore confidence among its proxies and supporters. Tehran's leadership fears a domino effect: after the significant blows suffered by Hezbollah and Hamas, and following the collapse of Assad's regime in Syria, Iraq is seen as the next potential domino to fall. Pro-Iranian forces in Iraq have essentially already declared their submission, raising the stakes for Tehran. The final target on the axis of resistance could ultimately be the Iranian regime itself.

This concern drives Tehran to consider how to preserve its interests in Iraq and prevent further losses for its regional axis. It may even seek to tighten its grip on Baghdad as compensation for the loss of Syria. Analysts point to three potential paths Iran might pursue:

1. Increase its influence in Iraq, even at the cost of alienating local populations and damaging the government.
2. Loosen its hold on Baghdad as a signal to the West of a willingness to negotiate in the Trump era.
3. Maintain a modest but stable presence, hoping to consolidate its position in the future when circumstances become more favorable.

In the meantime, Tehran is using its media outlets to remind Iraqis of the positive role played by the Popular Mobilization Forces and other militias in defeating terrorist groups such as ISIS—the same forces that the Americans are "maliciously" trying to dismantle. "This is a grassroots resistance organization," read one Iranian article, "which, alongside the Iraqi army, has become a powerful tool against terrorism and continues to safeguard Iraq's security."

References in Iranian media also hint at broader fears, often invoking the name of Abu Mohammed al-Julani, leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria. Once a jihadist fighting with al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-Julani's rise is framed as a warning to Iraqis: the choice isn't merely between the West and the militias—it's between forces like al-Julani, who brought devastation to their land and overthrew Assad's regime in Syria, and the militias that "protected" Iraq from similar fates.

Will Iraqi residents and leadership be swayed by such arguments? For now, it seems that even in this, Tehran is facing yet another defeat.

The post After Assad's fall, Iraq may break free from Iran's grip appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

It seems that not a day goes by without the discovery of another Middle Eastern country advancing its civilian nuclear ambitions. Indeed, the trend of establishing civilian nuclear programs for electricity production is sweeping across the Middle East. The Egyptians are currently building a nuclear power plant with Russian assistance, expected to supply up to half of the electricity needs of the Nile state. The Turks are also hard at work constructing the Akkuyu plant, with Ankara's energy minister announcing this week that Turkey expects to begin operational tests as early as next year.

The Barakah power plant in the UAE, completed about three months ago, is the first nuclear power plant in the Arab world. It is expected to meet about a quarter of the country's electricity demand. Iran operates the Bushehr nuclear power plant, which functions with the approval of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and under its supervision. Currently, Iran is planning the construction of additional civilian reactors to address the country's severe electricity issues.

Apart from these, other countries in the region have expressed interest in building similar facilities. Earlier this year, Iraq agreed with the IAEA to establish a civilian nuclear program, following the lead of other regional countries, including Saudi Arabia. According to reports, the Saudis have shown interest in developing a nuclear electricity program as part of the conditions for a formal normalization agreement with Israel. Last year, even Jordan, Israel's neighbor to the east, announced that it was considering the purchase of small reactors, mainly for electricity production and water desalination.

The Middle Eastern trend is not without context. In recent years, there has been a renewed global interest in civilian nuclear energy, particularly against the backdrop of global warming and the pursuit of renewable energy sources to replace fossil fuels.

Nuclear energy is considered "green" and "sustainable," and according to the IAEA, it can "help the energy sector transition away from fossil fuels more quickly and safely." Currently, nuclear energy generates a quarter of the electricity produced with low emissions—evidence of its favorability compared to other alternatives to coal and oil. The European Union declared nuclear energy "green" about two years ago, and earlier this year, the Council of Europe designated it a "strategic tool" for reducing pollutant emissions on the continent.

Nuclear energy can help meet the rapidly growing global electricity demand driven by human population growth. Relatively new phenomena like Bitcoin mining or artificial intelligence applications consume enormous amounts of electricity, and as their usage grows, the demand for electricity is expected to increase—nuclear solutions could help alleviate the burden.

However, nuclear energy has gained a bad reputation. The Chernobyl reactor disaster in the 1980s or the meltdown and explosion at the Fukushima reactor in Japan in 2011 tarnished the reputation of nuclear energy and raised fears of accidents and safety failures causing significant damage, casualties, and radiation hazards. These disasters cannot be understated, but in general, nuclear power plants are considered in many countries—including the US and Canada, for example—as particularly safe compared to other industrial facilities. These accidents likely occurred due to poor design or negligence, and all these cases are being thoroughly investigated. Their lessons are recorded and applied in the construction of future reactors and in updating safety measures at existing reactors.

In fact, despite the extensive resonance of disasters originating from nuclear power plants, it is easy to forget that more than 400 nuclear power plants currently operate worldwide, supplying about 9% of global electricity production. Nevertheless, news headlines are not filled with reports of accidents at these sites, and demand for nuclear technology in electricity production is only increasing.

International restrictions

If everything is ideal, safe, efficient, and convenient to use, why doesn't Israel have a nuclear power plant? What prevents the government from building one?

The issue of civilian nuclear energy in Israel has been discussed many times over the decades, but so far, no tangible program for building a civilian nuclear reactor has advanced. "In Israel, there are many discussions and study days on the subject," says Col. (res.) Dr. Uri Nissim Levy, a nuclear defense expert, lecturer, and chairman of the global nuclear forum WNF-193. "Many leaders, former officials, and scientists, including from the Ministry of Energy, believe there is no reason not to advance nuclear energy in Israel."

Recently, it was reported that the Energy Ministry is examining the possibility of building nuclear power plants in Israel by 2050 to replace the polluting fuels currently used in the country.

However, building a reactor is not similar to constructing other plants. It is a complex and expensive task, requiring expertise in the construction and operation of nuclear facilities that Israel currently lacks and is barred from acquiring from other countries. "This stems primarily from the fact that we are not signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), so we are not eligible to build civilian reactors," explains Prof. Shaul Chorev, former head of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission and head of the Maritime Policy and Strategy Research Center at the National Institute for Blue Economy.

According to Chorev, "Significant resources must be invested in building a civilian nuclear power plant. Currently, the program for nuclear engineering at the Technion no longer exists, unfortunately, and therefore we lack the industrial capacity and professional workforce to advance the construction of a civilian power reactor independently. Beyond that, obtaining nuclear fuel for a reactor in relatively large quantities is needed, unlike the small amount of fuel required for a research reactor, which operates at low output. Since we are not signatories to the NPT, no entity will be willing to supply us with fuel for such a reactor."

To understand Chorev's remarks, it is worth noting that Israel already operates two nuclear reactors. One is the Soreq Nuclear Research Center, and the other is the Negev Nuclear Research Center in Dimona. The Soreq center includes a research reactor like the one Prof. Chorev mentioned and is under IAEA inspection. The Dimona reactor—allegedly used, according to foreign sources, for producing plutonium for nuclear bombs—is not subject to oversight.

Israel is not obligated to open its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection because it is one of the few countries not signed on the NPT, along with India, Pakistan, South Sudan, and North Korea—a country that was a signatory but withdrew and openly conducted nuclear tests. Thus, IAEA inspections of Soreq are conducted voluntarily.

The NPT governs two main areas of nuclear issues: the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the proper use of nuclear energy for civilian purposes. In an effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide, the treaty allows only five countries—the permanent members of the Security Council, all of which conducted nuclear explosive tests before the treaty's signing—to possess such weapons. Other countries that signed the treaty are prohibited from possessing nuclear bombs. Therefore, India and Pakistan did not sign the NPT, similar to Israel.

In exchange for refraining from developing nuclear weapons, the treaty allows countries not permitted to possess nuclear weapons to rely on the IAEA to develop civilian nuclear technologies and use them, including for building nuclear power plants. Israel, not being a signatory to the treaty, cannot rely on the IAEA for this purpose.

In the past, Israel had other options. According to Prof. Chorev, the array of rules and mechanisms in this field were not in effect before the mid-1970s. Back then, "The US administration allowed Israel to contract with Westinghouse to build a nuclear power plant in the country. The agreement was canceled after India's first nuclear test in 1974, which led the nuclear powers to conclude that the NPT alone would not stop nuclear proliferation. To this end, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an organization of 48 countries, was established to operate according to guidelines for exporting nuclear technologies. Today, it refuses to transfer nuclear-related materials and equipment to Israel."

Thus, Israel must consider another scenario: should it advance capabilities to build such a plant independently, despite the lack of industrial and professional infrastructure? In the past, the state allocated land in the Shdot Negev area for building such a power plant, so a site for construction already exists. However, it must first overcome the negative public perception of nuclear power plants. "There will be opposition from residents," Prof. Chorev believes, "After the Fukushima disaster, the safety image of nuclear power plants is not good, although in recent years, there has been an improvement due to the integration of new safety measures and recognition that using nuclear energy for electricity production is one of the leading solutions for reducing polluting emissions."

Dr. Levy agrees that public opinion is indeed changing, but he does not believe it will be an obstacle. "Public opinion is changing in Israel and worldwide. All the polls in the first half of 2024 in the US showed that more than 60% of Americans support nuclear energy, partly because the European Union classified nuclear energy as green energy a year and a half ago." He believes this mindset is gaining traction in Israel and Europe: "In Belgium, which had four old reactors that were supposed to close at the end of 2023, the public protested against shutting them down, calling for extending their operation—contrary to logic," says Dr. Levy. "This happened because electricity prices would have quintupled as a result."

Terror concerns

Even if Israel could develop the expertise for a nuclear plant, the costs would be immense. Egypt committed to paying the Russians $30 billion to build its new reactor—a sum comparable to Israel's entire defense budget. The government in Israel would likely need to invest an even larger sum to establish a power plant to compensate for the lack of expertise and experience in the field.

"The construction of a nuclear power plant is very expensive," says Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Raphael Ofek, a nuclear technology and physics expert. "When you can produce electricity using means like oil or gas, it is much simpler and cheaper, and seemingly, there is no immediate need for nuclear. Israel also has five steam turbine power plants for electricity production, a form of renewable energy that is not as costly as nuclear. The cost of building and operating a nuclear power plant makes the idea insufficiently economically viable."

Another complicating factor in establishing a nuclear power plant is security. "Given our situation in the Middle East, there is a risk that a nuclear power plant could be a target for bombing," notes Dr. Ofek. "This is different from the reactors in Dimona or Soreq, which are smaller sites used primarily for research. A nuclear power plant is on a different scale—much larger, more prominent, and harder to defend."

Prof. Chorev points out that this is indeed a significant concern: "Israel is a small country surrounded by threats, and a nuclear power plant could be an attractive target for attack, as we have recently experienced with Iran and Hezbollah. Even in the war between Russia and Ukraine, there were deep concerns about the possible consequences of damage to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear reactor."

Dr. Levy believes that there are solutions to the security threats: "The fear of terrorism can be overcome. There are two dangerous parts in a reactor—the nuclear fuel storage area and the core. The core is strong, made of concrete, and well-protected," he explains. "There is no perfect insurance, and it is complicated to protect such a plant, but that is not a reason not to build nuclear reactors—at least small or medium-sized ones."

He also suggests that the economic obstacle could be resolved. "Building a reactor is expensive, but it could pay off in the long term," says Levy. "We won't do it alone, without help from the world. Israel is a technologically advanced country, but in our situation, it's impossible to undertake such a project alone."

Israel's non-membership in the NPT complicates international cooperation in building a civilian reactor, but Levy believes that, theoretically, a way around this obstacle could be found. "Israel is not a signatory to the treaty due to its policy of nuclear ambiguity, which is now at the center of public debate about whether it is the correct policy. I believe it is appropriate to maintain ambiguity, but it is uncertain whether it will remain in place in the long term. In any case, even under conditions of ambiguity, cooperation with other countries is a solvable issue."

Before that, he argues, Israel must make a definitive decision about whether it wants to promote a civilian nuclear energy policy: "First and foremost, a political decision must be made—not remain at the level of opinions and suggestions. If the state decides to pursue civilian nuclear energy, it will find a way," he says confidently.

Prof. Chorev offers a relevant course of action on the matter. "India's case, which was recognized by the US in 2002 as eligible for a civilian nuclear program due to American geopolitical considerations, should serve as a model for Israel," he says. "This is a case of a country that gained recognition for a civilian nuclear program even though it is not a signatory to the NPT, and at the right time, the Americans agreed to grant it an 'exemption.'"

"In my opinion, the State of Israel should act similarly. In one of the appropriate opportunities—such as when the Saudis raise their demands with the US for a civilian nuclear program as part of a normalization agreement with Israel—the government in Jerusalem should request US assistance in advancing a civilian nuclear program, similar to India."

Until such an opportunity arises, Chorev suggests another possible course of action. "If a foreign company operates such a reactor outside the territorial waters of the state, meaning about 20 kilometers from the coast, it could meet the requirements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty since the reactors would be outside our sovereign territory," he says.

The US, Russia, and China are competing to promote this advanced technology—floating reactors—and Russia has already operated the world's first floating nuclear power plant, Akademik Lomonosov, for four years, generating 60 megawatts. The Biden administration has invested heavily in this nuclear pathway, which, in many ways, resembles the internal electricity production system of nuclear submarines.

The IAEA recognizes the potential of such facilities, which can assist in powering offshore gas and oil rigs, desalinating seawater, and conducting deep-water drilling. Is this a technology that could suit Israel in the near future? According to Prof. Chorev, this is the course of action that should be developed now: "Such floating reactors," he says, "are the right future solution for Israel."

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When people think of Iran, the image of a vast desert nation, filled with endless stretches of sand and intense heat, often comes to mind. But in reality, that is not the case. Tehran, for example, is located at an elevation of over 900 meters, with some areas reaching as high as 1,800 meters, situated at the foot of a high mountain range. In winter, snow often falls there, and the cold strikes harshly.

Therefore, authorities in the country have already begun preparing for the freezing winter, trying to conserve vital energy resources for heating, transportation, and other needs. As a result, Tehran recently began implementing planned daily two-hour electricity outages. In a city of about 9.5 million residents—nearly the same as the entire population of Israel—this is no small decree. However, Tehran can count itself lucky: in other parts of the country, power outages last for a third of the day, about eight hours daily. This situation naturally impacts many sectors in Iran, harming industries, commerce, sanitation, and more.

A energy giant in crisis

This phenomenon is particularly surprising, given that Iran is one of the largest energy powers in the world. Only two countries hold larger oil reserves than the Islamic Republic—Venezuela and Saudi Arabia. Additionally, Tehran boasts the second-largest natural gas reserves in the world. More troubling is that the energy crisis in Iran is so severe, and the demand is only growing, that the Islamic Republic is forced to import gas from Russia to meet its citizens' needs even during times without planned outages. In July, the government in Tehran reached an agreement with its northern neighbor, Turkmenistan, on another deal to increase gas imports from Ashgabat, in an attempt to open an additional channel of gas supply.

Incidentally, even in the summer, the capital's residents suffered from widespread power outages. When the heat rises and residents turn on air conditioners, the electricity grid cannot meet the demand—and collapses. Last summer, for instance, Tehran's temperatures neared 40°C, which naturally increased the demand for air conditioning. In July, as a result of the extreme heat and power outages, authorities decided to reduce working hours in public institutions, partly to prevent deaths from dehydration and heatstroke.

Given these difficulties, it is no wonder that Iranian citizens feel harmed. Some have even dared to complain anonymously to media outlets affiliated with the opposition abroad. One of them, for example, noted, "The officials speak of war against Iran, yet they squandered Iranian resources by funneling funds to groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, leaving the entire nation to suffer the consequences." Another resident added, "For years, you waged a global war over nuclear energy, but you can't even guarantee stable electricity for the entire country."

Even in Bushehr, the city home to the country's nuclear power plant—nuclear power plants being considered particularly efficient for electricity production—residents suffer from power outages. One resident described the situation during the summer months: "It's not just the heat; it's the unbearable summer humidity," he said. "This August, the heat was so intense that if you went outside in sandals, as many do in southern Iran, the skin on your feet would get burned." During the same period, Bushehr residents faced another blow: the extreme heat forced authorities to ration water supplies in addition to electricity.

According to opposition reports, the electricity crisis remained unresolved during the summer, leading to protests in many cities across the country, including Tehran. Merchants in the capital took to the streets and blocked roads in protest of the government's failure.

This crisis has wide-ranging impacts across various sectors: for example, agriculture suffers greatly because farmers cannot pump water from wells due to the lack of electricity, alongside crop damage caused by the extreme heat. Electrical appliances break due to sudden power outages, traffic jams form in cities where traffic lights stop working, and industrial factories report significant economic damage. Many people find themselves trapped in elevators due to unannounced outages. If the situation continues, it is expected to affect even heavy industries such as the steel industry. Overall, estimates suggest that power outages alone could cost the Iranian economy between $5 billion and $8 billion annually.

Why continue exports amid shortages?

Why does this happen? How can a country with so much oil and gas be forced to conserve energy for winter and fail to supply electricity to its citizens—a basic modern commodity?

The electricity shortage in Iran during the summer was so severe, for example, that it required twice the amount of electricity produced by neighboring Azerbaijan to meet the needs of the Persian giant's residents. This is no trivial figure: Azerbaijan exports about 10% of its electricity production to Russia, Georgia, Iran, and Turkey in deals collectively valued at over $400 million. Based on this calculation, experts noted, the cost of producing enough electricity for Iran's entire population during the summer alone could reach $8 billion.

The gap between electricity demand and supply is currently about 20%, according to some estimates. This is partly due to the burden in a country of nearly 90 million people, which has suffered from years of neglect and insufficient electricity infrastructure. The nuclear power plant in Bushehr can supply, according to one estimate, only 1% of Iran's electricity demand—far from sufficient to meet the needs of the entire nation.

Root causes of the crisis

The root of the problem lies in several factors. The government has failed to invest adequately in electricity infrastructure for many years, has not built advanced power plants in recent decades, and the electricity grid is outdated. Rising oil prices have disrupted the balance that previously existed between supply and demand. Authorities have neglected maintenance of the crumbling electricity grid, which continues to deteriorate—leading to summer blackouts.

In winter, additional factors worsen the crisis: the government is trying to reduce its reliance on mazut, a low-quality and highly polluting byproduct of oil refining. Experts explained that fueling three power plants in the country with mazut posed health risks and caused air pollution, prompting the government to halt its use. As a result, and due to the government's decision not to use diesel in the power plants of Arak, Isfahan, and Karaj, Iran is forced to provide less electricity to its citizens.

Iran's infrastructure is so outdated and inefficient that a significant portion of its electricity generation potential is lost and unused. For example, 13% of the electricity produced in the country is lost during transmission from power plants to the national grid and from there to homes. In addition, Iran's thermal power plants, which produce over 90% of the country's electricity, are fueled by natural gas. Gas usage in Iran is inefficient, and the country already lacks enough gas to fuel these plants—one reason it is seeking additional sources for gas imports. Experts predict that this winter, Iran will face a gas shortage of 260 million cubic meters per day.

Moreover, Iran faces high demand for transportation fuel, which depletes the country's oil reserves. However, fuel refining for vehicles in Iran is of very poor quality, serving old and inefficient vehicles that do not make optimal use of the fuel. Public transportation infrastructure in the country is underdeveloped, forcing most citizens to rely on private vehicles. This reliance is further encouraged by Iran's extremely low fuel prices, among the cheapest in the world, at about 2 cents per liter. Recently, President Masoud Pezeshkian publicly questioned the government's need to subsidize fuel. This sparked rumors of a potential price increase, which has certainly not helped public morale. In 2019, fuel price hikes led to riots in which hundreds were reported killed or even more.

Perplexing energy exports

Against this backdrop, it is particularly puzzling that Iran continues to export gas and electricity to countries like Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The amount of electricity it exports is not very large, estimated by experts to be equivalent to about 1% of its total production. However, when citizens are suffering such severe shortages, why is any electricity being exported at all?

There are several reasons for this: first, because electricity prices in Iran are subsidized, exporting it generates nearly eight times the revenue for Iran's central electricity company, Tavanir. This is perhaps one reason why Tavanir often operates at a financial deficit, forcing it to seek any alternative source of income—hence the need for exports.

In addition, although summer and winter see high electricity demand, during the fall and spring, Iran has excess electricity and must export it to retain foreign customers. A similar situation exists in Iran's gas market. Finally, commentators note that electricity exports serve as a tool for political influence. Iraq, for example, depends significantly on Iranian electricity, giving Tehran substantial leverage over Baghdad's leadership.

The nuclear dilemma

Iran's energy crisis is exacerbated by its international stance and its conflict with Western countries over its nuclear program. If in the past North Korea was attributed with the statement that its leadership would prefer its citizens to eat grass rather than abandon its nuclear program, then the Iranians are approaching a similar situation today.

Beyond the fact that Tehran funnels enormous funds to its proxy organizations in the Middle East and its nuclear program—estimated to fund Hezbollah alone at about $1 billion annually—the confrontation between Iran and the US has led to a strict sanctions regime on the Islamic Republic, which over the years has crippled its ability to meet its citizens' basic needs.

For example, sanctions prevent it from advancing nuclear developments or building additional nuclear power plants beyond the one in Bushehr. Iran also cannot refurbish its electricity infrastructure or construct new conventional power plants. Sanctions further prevent Iran from developing its vast gas fields, leaving valuable resources unexploited. The reason is that Iran struggles to attract investors who could assist it economically, and international experts avoid the country. Moreover, Iran lacks some of the components necessary for such projects, such as compression platforms for its gas fields.

Renewables, a missed opportunity

One potential solution to the energy crisis may lie in transitioning to renewable energy. Currently, only a negligible portion of the country's electricity is generated from renewable sources. Iran has minimal infrastructure for such projects, and what little exists is not connected in a way that would allow for significant savings in fuel consumption or reduce electricity lost through the national grid.

If in 2023, the Islamic Republic built infrastructure for about 75 megawatts of renewable energy production, other countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia or Turkey, constructed facilities with production capacities 40 to 50 times higher. The government in Tehran had set a target of achieving renewable energy production capacities of nearly 3,000 megawatts, making this a clear failure.

In some parts of Iran, the sun shines for 300 days a year, making solar power generation especially ideal for Iranians. However, to secure the necessary financial guarantees for such initiatives, Iran needs relief from the sanctions regime. This is one of the goals set by President Pezeshkian when he assumed office following the untimely death of his predecessor, Ebrahim Raisi. The smiling face Pezeshkian presents to the West is partly intended to promote the resolution of the electricity problem with the help of international entities.

Ironically, if Iran were permitted to build additional nuclear power plants, it could improve its electricity sector. As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), it is supposed to benefit from the expertise and knowledge accumulated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the field of civilian nuclear power. However, because Iran is suspected of pursuing military nuclear capabilities, both the IAEA and other nations worldwide refuse to share nuclear technologies such as reactors and fuel, fearing they could be diverted for non-civilian purposes.

Another obstacle facing Iran is that it appears on blacklists for money laundering and financing terrorism, placing it among a group of nations denied access to advanced technologies of certain kinds. This means that as long as Iran continues to fund its regional proxies, it will struggle to provide for its citizens and modernize its national electricity grid.

Trump's return and rising tensions

To all this, one must add the new reality Iran is facing these days. After several years in which a Democratic administration in the US somewhat eased the burden of sanctions on it, Donald Trump's re-election to the White House raises significant Iranian concerns about what lies ahead. Just days after his victory, reports emerged that on his first day in office, he intends to renew the "maximum pressure campaign" against Iran, attempting to bring it to its knees over its nuclear program. Such a scenario will not contribute to Tehran's economic recovery and certainly will not assist in rehabilitating its electricity infrastructure. During his previous term, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on Iran's petrochemical industry, and it is likely that this sector will again be a focus of sanctions.

Additionally, following Iran's ballistic missile attack on Israel on October 1, it was reported that among the targets considered by the IDF for retaliation were Iranian refineries, oil fields, and nuclear facilities. Although it is unlikely that Israel would target an operational nuclear power plant like the one in Bushehr, and would instead focus on sites such as Fordow and Natanz, oil infrastructure could be another possible target. Such an attack would not only risk fluctuations in the global oil market but would also have extensive implications for the local electricity market in Iran.

As usual, in such a case, the Iranian citizens themselves would bear the brunt of the consequences rather than the leadership, which would undoubtedly be safely ensconced in fortified bunkers equipped with advanced generators. However, one of the key questions facing the Iranian leadership regarding its ongoing direct confrontation with Israel is how far it can stretch the suffering of its citizens before they rise up to consign it to the dustbin of history.

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Javelin anti-tank missiles, launchers, spare parts, and more: a small Middle Eastern country, led by a dictator who oppresses his people, will pay just over $100 million for American weapons, courtesy of Washington's foreign service.

As required by law, the US State Department sent a notification to Congress last week detailing the recently approved weapons deal with Tunisia, allowing Congress members to review it. The notice claimed the sale would improve Tunisia's defense capabilities and advance US interests in the region. The deal would not upset the Middle East's balance of power, the document stated, nor would it diminish America's wartime emergency reserves. It would add money to American coffers and create more jobs for Americans. Everyone, apparently, wins.

Tunisia – designated by the US a decade ago as a "major non-NATO ally" – is ruled through a system of oppression, silencing, and imprisonment, but this doesn't seem to trouble State Department officials as an obstacle to a possible agreement. How is it that officials who scrutinize every Israeli action in Gaza with seven pairs of eyes are not bothered by such a situation?

Tunisia's president is Kais Saied, 66, a constitutional law expert. He has ruled the country since 2019. Initially, things proceeded smoothly. The COVID-19 pandemic and its restrictions sparked protests in 2021 over the government's poor performance, which prompted Saied to fire the prime minister, temporarily dissolve parliament – and take almost every possible authority for himself. Since then, the president has restricted freedom of expression, eliminated judicial oversight of himself and his appointed judges, and imprisoned his opponents and electoral rivals. He now rules the country unopposed.

Tunisia's last presidential election was held two months ago. Saied didn't even bother to present a platform but won easily with 90% of the votes, partly because he had imprisoned all his rivals. The leading candidate against him is currently serving three separate prison sentences, including one for 12 years. Eight other potential candidates were imprisoned or placed under house arrest. Others were disqualified from running. In the end, only two candidates were allowed to participate in the actual election.

Less than 30% of Tunisia's eligible voters went to the polls. This minority is much larger than the voter turnout in parliamentary elections less than two years ago, which didn't even reach 10%. This grim reality reflects a bitter change that has occurred in the country within just a decade, a descent into dark oppression after great hope.

Tunisia was the birthplace of the Arab Spring protests in the Middle East. Young vendor Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation in protest of authorities' harassment and his dire economic situation sparked thousands to take to the streets. The massive demonstrations ended with the ouster of longtime President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who had ruled for about 24 years. He fled to Saudi Arabia, opening the way for a period of flourishing, prosperity, and democracy in Tunisia.

In fact, Tunisia was perhaps the only country to emerge from the Arab Spring mass protests on what at least then appeared to be a path toward establishing genuine democracy. Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Yemen experienced revolutions, but their subsequent paths were very different.

But the reversal of trends in Tunisia over the past three years is even stranger, because at least officially – if one ignores opposition protests and low voter turnout – it was approved by referendum. Many residents believed the president's steps to restrict individual rights and political freedoms were necessary, given the country's difficult economic situation and political mood.

Despite concerned statements from the US and European Union, despite the persecution of candidates and the huge election gap – the White House hasn't really condemned Tunisia's government. The Biden administration's treatment of Saied is not similar, for example, to the US government's treatment of elections in Venezuela (which it declared "fraudulent") or to President Joe Biden's public criticism of election results in Georgia.

Moreover, the situation in Tunisia isn't stopping Americans from continuing to sell weapons and armaments to the local military there. So why does the State Department, which uses a special unit to monitor the use of American weapons by the IDF to determine if it is committing war crimes and thus restrict their sale to it, suddenly not express concern about selling weapons to an African dictator who has crushed the hopes of millions? How is Tunisia's case different?

Anger over vaccines

The US has maintained close ties with Tunisia for decades, since its independence in 1956 – long before the Arab Spring revolution. Due to its location in North Africa, it is considered a vital ally of both EU countries and the US. In 2012, it signed agreements to strengthen political and economic ties with countries north of it, and three years later, it gained status as a major non-NATO ally of the US.

Many Tunisians have always viewed America as the model superpower, and the EU was the main trading partner of the former French colony. The local military purchases weapons from European and US manufacturers and conducts joint exercises with their armed forces.

However, since Saied's rise to power, Tunisia's relations with the US are approaching a crossroads: Will Tunisia remain an ally of Western nations, or will it drift toward the opposing axis led by Russia, China, and Iran? And what will be decisive – security and economic interests or the state of human rights in Tunisia?

There are multiple reasons why Tunisia itself is distancing itself from the US. One is its traditional stance against what are considered "Western" values and against Israel in particular. Tunisia consistently adopts anti-Israeli or anti-Western positions. Tensions with the US intensified in the 1980s due to Israeli attacks on PLO camps in Tunisia and later due to American intervention in the First Gulf War. The Americans also complained that Tunisia showed too much leniency toward suspects in an attack on the US embassy in the country two decades later, in 2012.

President Saied, even before Operation Iron Swords began, refused to join the Abraham Accords and establish relations with Israel, despite the existence of a Jewish community in the country for hundreds of years. Since the war began, tension has developed between Tunisia and the US over American support for Israel and over the administration's refusal to use all tools at its disposal to pressure the IDF to end the war. Some analysts have argued that the damage caused by the situation may be irreparable.

There are other reasons for Tunisian disappointment with the Americans: Many there felt dismissal from the US, as if the country was good enough for fighting terrorism but doesn't receive good treatment in other areas. During the COVID crisis, the outbreak in Tunisia was among the worst in the world, and delays in vaccine shipments from the US frustrated many in the country – especially when shipments of inferior Chinese vaccines arrived in many Arab countries whose relations with the Americans were cold enough for the Chinese taste.

Tunisian relations with Europe have largely focused on immigration issues in recent years. The expectation on the neighboring continent was that Tunisia – as a transit country from sub-Saharan regions to Europe – would make efforts to stop migrants on their way to the continent. In return, Europeans offered very little cooperation, including a $1 billion program in loans and grants. This may seem an enormous sum, but when compared to the $20 billion Europeans offered Tunisia in 2011, it's not large. Considering the massive effort required from Tunisia to stop the masses of migrants, the amount is considered insufficient.

The Tunisian approach to the West is partly related to the power struggle between world superpowers. China and Russia are trying to accumulate assets worldwide and gain political and economic footholds at the expense of the US and Europe. In this context, countries like Tunisia, sitting at geographical and economic crossroads, are valuable prizes. However, such countries understand that competition for their allegiance allows them to weigh the advantages of connecting with each side. In this case, Tunisia is weighing the benefits of its longstanding alliance with Europe and the US against the tempting possibilities inherent in deepening ties with China and Russia.

The Europeans have developed dependence on the Tunisians – both in trade between the country and the continent, though not a huge portion of their trade, and in fighting illegal immigration to their shores. This means Tunisians have leverage over Europeans, especially regarding immigration. The US also needs Tunisians to fight jihadist terrorism due to the country's influential geographical location in the Mediterranean region. This means Americans and Europeans must maneuver to maintain relations with Saied, even if they consider his actions problematic.

Moreover, the disadvantages of Tunisian defection to the Russian axis are even more severe. Tunisia would give Moscow an important foothold in the Mediterranean at a time when its main stronghold in Syria is becoming unstable. The Kremlin wants to establish military bases in strategic locations along African and Mediterranean coasts, trying to increase its influence and military prestige – and the Tunisians are using this desire as a tool to increase their bargaining power with the Russians.

Meanwhile, as part of zigzagging between both sides, Tunisia announced abandoning negotiations with the International Monetary Fund over a large rescue package it desperately needs, and instead announced its intention to join BRICS, led by China, Iran, and Russia. This is an economic organization competing with the West, whose members include Brazil, Egypt, India, and South Africa. In President Saied's view, the loan guarantee conditions from the International Monetary Fund seemed like "foreign dictation" and an attempt at takeover, so he refused to accept them.

The courtship of BRICS may just be an effort to diversify Tunisia's economic support rather than an attempt to disconnect from its alliances with Western nations. The Tunisians have an interest in expanding relations with both sides, aiming to maintain flexibility in the long term.

Realpolitik

The US understands the trap it's in regarding Tunisia and is working to convince Saied to maintain good relations with the Western bloc. Dialogue with a dictator is always problematic, as he can defect and switch sides at any moment due to a simple whim.

Therefore, the Americans are trying to promote democratization programs in Tunisia, aiming to spark identification with liberal values and solidify its connection to the Western bloc. Opening Tunisia's economy to Western channels might also distance its leadership from Russia and China, given the need to operate according to certain economic codes. Thus, the Americans are working with Europeans to create economically beneficial relations with the Tunisians, trying to continue serving as an economic model for the African nation.

Another US course of action is promoting security cooperation. Besides using soft power to enhance America's power image, Washington ensures arming the Tunisians and making them develop military dependence on it. In recent years, the US went far, and as part of the special relationship with Tunisia as a non-NATO ally, it set a payment floor for military aid to the government: about $150 million annually. The payment floor was canceled only two years ago, a move expressing the Democratic administration's displeasure with the anti-democratic reform led by President Saied.

Besides this, the Americans maintained relations with the Tunisian military for counterterrorism purposes, while cultivating personal relationships with senior military officials. In parallel, the US worked to conduct training for internal security personnel in the country, aiming to promote democratic procedures in this field in Tunisia as well.

The American deliberation regarding President Saied stemmed partly from popular support for his actions among Tunisians: How can promoting liberal values exist contrary to what the people themselves want? How can the US promote democratization in a country whose population voted to restrict its own freedom?

This dilemma recalls what happened in Egypt after the Muslim Brotherhood's victory in the 2012 elections when Mohamed Morsi rose to power. What the Americans tried to do, attempting to prevent the continuation of anti-democratic steps in Tunisia, was to support programs that would not help the president advance his dictatorship. But now, due to the trend's continuation, the Americans need to decide again what to do: Should they cut aid funds, making Tunisia more exposed to terrorism and perhaps also joining the Russian-Chinese-Iranian axis? And how will the US continue supporting Tunisia's army, which has recently become increasingly political?

Meanwhile, it seems the Americans – or at least the State Department – aren't letting concerns about democracy's deterioration in Tunisia stand in their way. Anti-tank missiles are considered defensive weapons that cannot harm the local population or be used for offensive atrocities. In any case, the Americans will certainly exercise extra caution regarding their relations with the Tunisians, but for now, they are not expected to alienate or sever them. Donald Trump's presidency won't change the trend, as individual rights in Tunisia seem more important, specifically to the Democratic Party in the US.

One can also note that this is a good example of realpolitik that sometimes characterizes Democrats in US foreign relations. Officials in Washington don't base their foreign policy only on noble values, and not infrequently, they "get their hands dirty" in relations with dictators trying to advance American interests worldwide.

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Since Oct. 7, Israel has faced numerous internal and external challenges, yet appears to have succeeded in creating a new regional reality. However, security forces and political leadership had to advance these changes amid significant difficulties and at a heavy cost, operating across multiple fronts after failing to foresee and prepare for various developments.

The recent rapid developments in Syria should serve as another reminder of the importance of maintaining a healthy dose of pessimism. Such an approach helps prepare for worse scenarios – and allows for relief when they don't materialize.

According to reports, even Israeli intelligence was caught off guard by Bashar Assad's fall in Syria within days. Their overly optimistic assessment led political leadership to implement what hindsight reveals as flawed policy. Israel believed Damascus' ruler's position was stable, and based on this, diplomatic moves were made with Russia, including regarding the end of the Lebanon war. In practice, the Syrian lion proved to be nothing more than a paper tiger.

Excessive optimism was also evident regarding Iran during the war. Before the April missile attack, experts claimed Iran wouldn't dare launch a direct attack on Israel from its territory, an assessment reportedly shared by US intelligence. The outcome, as we all know, was entirely different: Iran attacked Israel directly not once but twice – launching hundreds of ballistic missiles and UAVs.

This adds to the misconception held by Israeli security forces before Hamas' Oct. 7 attack: many worked under the assumption that Hamas was deterred and uninterested in confrontation with Israel. Senior IDF officials displayed complacency and dismissiveness, leading to the Gaza war that remains ongoing.

Conversely, regarding the war with Hezbollah, Israel heard exaggerated assessments of the Shiite terror organization's capabilities. Doomsday scenarios of thousands of daily missiles and rockets striking Israel, hundreds of casualties, and prolonged power grid failures circulated – but ultimately proved baseless. Israel fought Hezbollah with considerable success, and these nightmare scenarios proved false and misleading. The prices paid, heavy as they were, weren't close to the numbers cited by many commentators and professionals.

So which approach should national assessors take – those tasked with predicting reality based on available information – optimistic or pessimistic? Seemingly, an optimistic approach or operational concept that relies somewhat on intelligence about enemy intentions becomes necessary when dealing with budget constraints. The numerous missions facing Israel's security forces require prioritization and preparation accordingly.

Yet this was also part of the Oct. 7 error. Had commanders in the field based their military deployment along the Gaza Strip on the enemy's capabilities rather than their analysis of Hamas' intentions, we might be in a different place today. While budget and manpower certainly play a role, it's worth remembering that optimistic scenarios sometimes lead to faulty preparation – and the price we ultimately pay proves exponentially higher.

Is this merely hindsight wisdom? Can we draw future lessons from such thinking? In my view, two conclusions emerge: First, the way to manage budget constraints against mission allocation is simply to increase the budget. Clearly, a jump in defense spending will come at the expense of other matters and affect our quality of life and welfare. However, in recent years, we've grown accustomed to living in great comfort, each under their own vine and fig tree. A clear-eyed look at reality reveals that Israel likely needs a larger defense budget. In the long run, maintaining stability and security here is worth significant investment across other areas of life.

The second lesson concerns future assessments of our regional situation, particularly regarding Jordan and Egypt. While the Syrian government's fall doesn't mean other neighboring regimes will collapse tomorrow, we must seriously consider and prepare for this possibility. If the regime in Egypt, which maintains war readiness against Israel even in peacetime, collapses, we could find ourselves surprised again on the southern front, potentially at an especially heavy cost. Similarly, if Iran succeeds in gaining control over Jordan, it would somewhat compensate for its loss in Syria while gaining easier direct access to act against Israel and promote terrorism in Judea and Samaria.

One derivative of such thinking emerged in discussions about keeping IDF forces along the Philadelphi Corridor after our troops captured it during the war. Although senior military officials, including the Chief of Staff, indicated that Israel could handle Hamas terrorism without controlling this route – many noted that the military had expressed similar optimistic positions before, yet failed to fulfill the mission.

The economic cost of pessimistic thinking is substantial and burdensome, sometimes proving unnecessary in hindsight. However, the price paid for overly optimistic and incorrect forecasts too often comes in blood, ultimately proving far costlier than any price we would have paid for acting according to pessimistic assessments.

The post Lessons from Assad's fall: The value of pessimism appeared first on www.israelhayom.com.

Russian ships made an unusual stop in the southern Red Sea. It was late July, in the midst of the hot summer. Several individuals of Russian origin disembarked and were collected by Houthi operatives from Yemen, in boats that continued to the shores of the impoverished nation. These Russians carried suitcases and bags, though they didn't appear large enough to contain weapons or military equipment. The Russians landed in Yemen and stayed for three days.

According to intelligence and security sources, this marked a concerning development in Russia-Houthi relations: reminiscent of the Cold War, Moscow had sent "military advisers" to assist the Shiite organization in its fight against Yemen's central government. Moscow continued to deploy such advisers in the country, operating under the guise of "humanitarian aid" – exactly as Iranian advisers have done for many years.

In the past year, shortly after the outbreak of the Iron Swords war, ties between Russia and the Shiite rebels in Yemen began to strengthen. This is partly due to the convergence of interests between both sides but occurred primarily around the Kremlin's growing closeness to Iran and its regional proxy organizations in recent years. As relations between Moscow and Tehran warmed, and as Russia became increasingly dependent on Iranian support in its war in Ukraine, it also began providing various types of assistance to regional organizations.

The peak of this process between the Kremlin and the Houthis, for now, was revealed in a report published by the Financial Times this week: according to the report, since July, the Houthis have helped Russia recruit hundreds of Yemeni men to fight on the front in Ukraine. They were smuggled into the country through deception, after being dazzled by promises of high wages and an interesting security position.

Yemen, as we recall, is one of the poorest countries in the world. When residents were offered money, they rushed to seize the opportunity. When told they would also receive Russian citizenship, no one hesitated anymore. Their surprise must have been great upon arrival in Russia, when they were forcibly recruited into the Russian army, dressed in uniforms, and sent to the front.

The new recruits had no prior military training. They signed contracts in a language they didn't understand, after false promises silenced their suspicions. Since Russia needs as many able-bodied soldiers as possible, these young Yemenis served as "cannon fodder," sent to traverse mine-filled forests – not knowing if their next step would be their last.

Tim Lenderking, the US special envoy for Yemen, noted that the Russians are currently discussing the transfer of advanced weapons with the Yemeni rebels, cultivating relationships through Moscow's representatives in Sanaa. According to him, the type of weapons that Russians are considering transferring to the Houthis is "concerning."

In fact, the transfer of such advanced weapons was likely prevented only at the last minute this year. In August, reports indicated that Russia had prepared a shipment of missiles and advanced equipment to Yemen but withdrew after quiet diplomatic activity by both Saudi Arabia and the United States. The ships were apparently already in the Red Sea, and the Kremlin ultimately settled for sending military advisers instead of transferring the weapons themselves.

Upon reflection, it's hardly surprising to find Russian weapons in Houthi hands. According to testimonies from IDF soldiers in the past two months, they have encountered "large and high-quality weapons caches" of Russian origin in Lebanon, which Hezbollah used effectively. These weapons include Kornet anti-tank missiles, Kalashnikov rifles, and more. Soldiers report finding weapons still wrapped in their original packaging, still covered in plastic, and hidden in Hezbollah's numerous hiding places in southern Lebanon.

If Russia assists Hezbollah in this way, why wouldn't it help other organizations affiliated with Iran's axis? Indeed, UN experts reported last November about attempts to smuggle anti-tank missiles, rifles, and other weapons to Yemen, likely manufactured in Russia.

The Deal with the "Merchant of Death"

The Houthis have received Russian support since the beginning of the war. Moscow does not condemn the ballistic missile launches from Yemen toward Israel, and on the other hand, acts decisively in the diplomatic arena against American and British attacks on Houthi targets in Yemen, criticizing them sharply.

The Kremlin isn't satisfied with spiritual support and also works on the ground to help the Houthis. Even if Russia apparently cancelled the August shipment, it still found other ways to provide military assistance to the Shiite rebels, and apparently did transfer some weapons.

The first example is those military advisers mentioned above. Additionally, according to Western sources, the Russians ensured that the Houthis were equipped with light weapons and ammunition. One of the interesting stories in this context is the contact person who served the Russians in examining such procurement approval by the Houthis: Viktor Bout, known as the "Merchant of Death," considered the world's largest arms dealer, who served as inspiration for the infamous movie "Lord of War" starring Nicolas Cage.

Bout, who was arrested in Thailand in 2008 and extradited to the United States after lengthy delays, was sentenced to 25 years in prison after selling weapons to every possible rebel organization and dictator in Africa, Asia, and beyond. He served ten years until he was released two years ago as part of a deal between the Americans and Russians that included the release from detention of basketball star Brittney Griner. The athlete had played for several years for Russian teams until she was arrested in Moscow – on false pretenses, according to the Americans – and sentenced to nine years in prison for drug possession. As a famous and well-known personality in the United States, the negotiations for her release were intensive, and the price that included Bout's release from prison was correspondingly high.

Early this year, it was reported that Bout had "returned to business" and began mediating between the Houthis and the Russian military, including attempts to purchase advanced automatic rifles in a deal worth $10 million. According to the report, this was a small initial deal, conducted with two Houthi officials who traveled to the Russian capital under the guise of merchants interested in purchasing vehicles and pesticides. During the conversation between the parties, the possibility of examining the purchase of anti-aircraft missiles, Kornet missiles, and more apparently arose.

According to the article then published in The Wall Street Journal, the weapons shipment was supposed to arrive at the port of Hodeidah under the guise of food starting in October. This port was chosen as the destination because Russia had already sent several containers of wheat there, and it regularly serves for Iranian smuggling to Yemen. In any case, it was probably just a coincidence that the Israeli Air Force bombed the port of Hodeidah on September 29 after several Houthi attacks toward our country, hit weapons warehouses, and caused "enormous damage" in a "series of explosions that shook the city."

Last month, another development occurred, more concerning than a shipment of light weapons: according to US reports, Russia examined the possibility of transferring geographic information to the Houthis that would allow them to effectively and accurately attack ships in the Red Sea. This included satellite information that allows identifying the location of ships at sea, and also verifying the identity of those ships. This came, among other things, in the wake of a Houthi "mishap," in which a Russian-owned vessel passing near Yemen was hit. Later, toward the end of the month, it was reported that the information had indeed been transferred to the Houthis, after being sent first to Revolutionary Guards personnel stationed in Yemen. This information was actually used to hit ships passing through the area.

Although the result of using this information is clear, the Russian motive is not definitively known. It could be that the goal was to prevent hitting Russian ships, not the desire to attack Western vessels. Apart from that incident in May, the Houthis managed to avoid attacking Chinese and Russian ships. In March, it was reported that these two countries had reached a secret agreement with the Shiite rebels, under which the Houthis committed to allowing Chinese and Russian ships to pass safely through the Red Sea.

However, the Shiite militia lacked the technology to distinguish with complete certainty between such ships and Western vessels. If the Russians transferred such satellite information to them, they can truly avoid accidents. By the way, it can be assumed quite safely that the information was passed long before last October, since in July it was reported that Russian tankers had returned to sailing Red Sea routes, despite the danger and even though one of those identified in the area had previously been attacked by the Houthis. The conclusion from this Russian audacity in this case is that the ship operators decided to take the risk to increase their profit, despite concerns about being hit – or that they knew with certainty they would not be attacked, due to secret contacts we weren't exposed to. The Russians, as is known, have a proven history of success in building mechanisms to prevent friction.

Another recent development is very concerning: Iran has begun mediating between Russia and the Houthis on the possibility of transferring advanced Yakhont anti-ship missiles to them. Not only does this event emphasize the strengthening ties between Tehran and the Kremlin, but it poses a real tangible danger to ships in the Red Sea. Yakhont missiles are extremely fast and precise, and lethally effective even against naval vessels. They have a range of more than 186 miles, and the parties have already met twice to discuss the possibility of purchasing several dozen of them. We can recall how a missile of this type hit the Israeli Navy ship "Hanit" in the Second Lebanon War, leading to the deaths of four soldiers. This is no longer about light weapons, but heavy ammunition of the most lethal kind possible. Such weapons in Houthi hands are a very dangerous means.

Russia Accumulating Debts

The Iranian involvement in the connection between the Houthis and the Kremlin is not surprising, but it is concerning. In the past, Russian involvement in the Middle East could be attributed to other motives. For example, one possible motive for arming the Houthis might have been revenge against the West for how it transfers increasingly advanced weapons to Kyiv, including long-range missiles that allow Ukrainians to strike deep into Russian territory. Therefore, for instance, intelligence sources previously said they expected Russian President Vladimir Putin to choose which weapons to send to various actors in the Middle East based on what the West itself does in Ukraine. If you will, this is similar to Hezbollah's equations: as the level of escalation rises, the other side responds with similar intensity.

But there are other reasons for Russian involvement in the Middle East: The first is that the Russians tried to cultivate regional relationships against the backdrop of the global inter-bloc struggle with the United States, thus supporting any group hostile to the US in the region. The second reason is that activity in an area like Yemen, which is not at the center of global attention, can serve the Russians to intensify the "quiet" confrontation with the US, but without fear of escalation. This is a way to increase pressure on the US and its allies, but not through direct means, rather indirectly. Another reason, of course, is the desire to increase power and influence.

However, now it seems that something fundamental in the Russian position has changed. If in the past it seemed that the Kremlin had little to gain from a real flare-up in any conflict in the Middle East, and in the Red Sea in particular, it's not certain that this is still the Kremlin's position. Russian interests, it appears, have changed. Moscow apparently no longer cares now if the Houthis ignite a broader conflict, as long as they harm the US and its allies. More seriously, Russia has effectively brought its people into Yemen, putting them at risk of being harmed if the conflict in the country escalates. In fact, it has created a theoretical scenario where it could become one of the parties to the crisis itself.

In my view, the main change that has occurred recently is the strengthening of ties with Iran, and especially the dependence on it. The Russians rely significantly on the Iranians for continuing the war in Ukraine, receiving attack drones, ballistic missiles, and more from them. This means that Moscow now maintains reciprocal relations with Iran from a new position – it is accumulating debts toward it and needs to return favors in exchange. The relationship between the two is becoming much more complex now. This can explain, for example, the Russian willingness to launch Iranian satellites into space, sell Tehran advanced air defense systems and advanced fighter jets (and even allow them to build them in Iran itself), assistance to groups such as Hezbollah and also the Houthis – and the day may not be far when Russia might even agree to help Tehran in the nuclear field. At the current stage, the favors Moscow returns are embodied in advanced weapons being transferred to the wrong hands.

By the way, this is also true regarding the assistance the Kremlin receives from countries such as China and North Korea, which sent thousands of its soldiers to the Ukrainian front. Russia finds itself mired in the Ukrainian mud, and thus owes more and more favors to other actors in the "axis" it is sticking to. Moreover, if in the past it seemed that it was the spearhead of this axis, which includes China and Iran, among others, now it's not certain that its geopolitical situation hasn't actually turned it into a follower instead.

One thing is certain: This axis is now busy with three or four fronts of struggle against Western elements, with its various proxies cooperating together in this conflict. Thus, in the Ukraine war there are Iranian weapons, North Korean soldiers and Yemeni fighters, in Lebanon Russian and Chinese weapons stockpiles were found, and in the Red Sea the Houthis receive assistance from Iran and Russia, as well as from Hezbollah and Iraqi militias (who themselves might be sending Russian weapons to Yemen).

The significance of Russian assistance to the Houthis is that a major power, a permanent member of the Security Council, is helping an organization disrupt maritime transit routes, contrary to international law and also to its own commercial interests. It is helping it attack American, British, and other ships. It's difficult to call this a "cold" war, and perhaps it's better to judge the situation more severely, look at reality with cold eyes and understand: World War III has already broken out before our eyes.

The change of administration in the US, alongside the fact that current President Joe Biden is now a lame duck, is being exploited by the Russians and Iranians to improve positions, ahead of the great eruption that might still await us later. As all eyes in the world are fixed on January 20, many are trying to improve positions before President Donald Trump enters the White House. From a Russian perspective, this means a more powerful offensive in Ukraine, and also improving the situation of all its allies.

One of the last arenas that hasn't yet erupted in this context is Taiwan, which stands under constant, growing Chinese threat. It's worth noting in this context the words of the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister this week: The US is strengthening its security ties with Taipei and providing it with weapons, while ignoring the "One China" principle, he declared, noting that the reason for this is that the US wants to interfere in regional affairs and provoke conflict in Asia, according to its interests. What's the connection between Russia and Taiwan, and how does the US even enter the story? The answer is that this is a war between two axes, and Taiwan is another arena that might become part of this struggle.

Israel too needs to look at this evolving reality with sober eyes. As a country that considers itself part of the Western bloc fighting Iran and its regional proxies, we need to understand that Moscow is no longer committed to those interests we once shared, and that it actively assists the Iranian ring of fire around us. In such a situation, we have no privilege to ignore the possibility that any Russian presence will necessarily aid our enemies. In fact, the Russians have largely become a hostile factor, perhaps even an adversary, that must be treated with great and increased caution. In parallel, the Kremlin must be made clear through various channels that any continuation of military involvement in the region, direct or through assistance to the Houthis and Hezbollah, could cost it – including military actions in Syria, in a way that would undermine the Russian position there.

Certainly, Israel must not give the Russians a prize for their order-undermining activity. Under no circumstances should Moscow now be designated a role in northern arrangements and not in Gaza either. After all, if Russian weapons were found in Lebanon even before the Kremlin's forces were really there, there's no knowing what will arrive in the country when it establishes itself there as a central factor. Similarly, the Russians cannot serve as fair mediators between Israel and Iran, a country with which it has now developed particularly great dependence. The regional reality after October 7 is different, and we are operating at a heavy blood price to tilt it in our favor. We must not fall into the trap again and allow hostile elements to be part of it.

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Iran is facing a severe demographic crisis as birth rates continue to plummet and its population rapidly ages, with officials warning the Islamic Republic could lose half its population by 2101. The government's attempts to reverse previous family planning policies have failed to convince Iranian women to have more children, highlighting growing tensions between state policies and social realities.

The demographic crisis facing Tehran is starkly illustrated by a billboard in a typical Iranian city. It depicts a solitary cyclist with a single child, rendered in dreary monochrome, trailing behind a vibrantly colored family of six on an oversized bicycle – father, mother, and four balloon-wielding children who appear to race past the wistful onlookers. The message, displayed in both Persian and English, proclaims: "More children, happier life." Some variations feature rowing boats instead of bicycles, but the underlying message remains unchanged.

This public messaging campaign attempts to address one of the most critical challenges confronting Iran over the past decade: a steadily declining birth rate that is rapidly approaching crisis levels. The situation has become so dire that Iran stands on the brink of negative population growth. At this point, deaths will outnumber births, gradually decreasing the country's population.

While the statistical evidence of this phenomenon requires careful interpretation – given the sometimes contradictory and inconsistent reporting by various Iranian officials – one fact remains undisputed: this represents a fundamental challenge that deeply concerns Tehran's authorities. The gravity of the situation is evident in the frequency of international media coverage of high-level discussions in Tehran, the regime leadership's repeated references to the issue, and multiple attempts to address the problem. Propaganda articles, official speeches, and statements by senior government officials consistently indicate that the situation continues to deteriorate rather than improve or stabilize.

The Iranian fertility crisis involves three interconnected trends: first, the decline in population growth approaching zero and potentially turning negative; second, a significant increase in life expectancy, mirroring global trends; and finally, most concerning to regime leaders, Iran's rapidly aging population – meaning an increasing proportion of citizens are classified as "elderly."

Deputy Health Minister Alireza Raisi recently offered a stark forecast: by 2101, Iran's population could shrink to half its current size, with 50 percent of survivors belonging to the elderly demographic. Such a scenario, where Iran's population dwindles to just 42 million people, would fundamentally alter the nation's character.

Recent data reveals that Iran's birth surplus – the excess of births over deaths – has reached its lowest level in years. Furthermore, births in 2023 decreased by 17,000 compared to 2022, continuing a multi-year trend of declining births in the Islamic Republic.

The range of fertility rates among Iranian women varies according to different reports: some claim it remains slightly above two births per woman – the minimum required for population stability, where each pair of parents raises two children. Others cite lower figures, around 1.6 births per woman. This was apparently the rate in Tehran last year, significantly below the golden number of two children per family.

For comparison, Israel – a much smaller and more developed country than Iran – recorded a fertility rate of slightly more than three children per woman in 2022, the highest among OECD countries. That year, Israel's population grew by 1.86 percent. Iran's neighbors, Pakistan and Afghanistan, also enjoy impressive population growth. If Iran fails to reverse the trend, it will soon have the lowest birth rate in the Middle East.

According to official figures, Iran currently has approximately 89 million inhabitants. On the eve of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the population was much lower, estimated at about 37 million. At that time, Iran was far more Western-oriented, and family planning was part of normal life there.

Two parallel processes occurred after the revolution: the religious clergy who took control of Tehran encouraged childbirth, and the Iran-Iraq war sparked an unprecedented baby boom. During the 1980s, as a result, Iran's fertility rate was among the world's highest, with each average woman giving birth five or six times. The government urged citizens to produce "an army of 20 million" to fight for the Islamic Republic in Allah's name.

Growth was so rapid that the country's population nearly doubled within 15 years. At some point, Tehran's leadership realized the country lacked infrastructure to support such accelerated population growth. The war with Iraq had also left the national treasury empty, without the ability to advance extensive construction projects to meet the growing population's needs.

Therefore, in 1988, an internal reversal occurred in the Iranian approach: that year, Tehran's Supreme Court ruled that contraception and family planning were religiously permissible. The republic's leadership launched a campaign titled "fewer children, better life" and subsidized contraception, vasectomies, and more.

From then until 2010, Iranian fertility declined sharply: the average number of births per woman plunged from five or six to 1.7 or less. Over the past 15 years, the decline has moderated but remains consistent. The government campaign thus succeeded far beyond expectations, leading the country to ever-diminishing growth. Since then, the Islamic Republic's leaders have tried to encourage the population to reverse the trend and have more children, so far without success.

Among other measures, the government has launched a series of campaigns and programs to encourage childbirth. For example, the declared target for the current five-year period is to raise the birth rate per woman to 2.5. Since various measures on this issue have failed for a decade, this represents an ambitious goal. The government offers citizens various benefits for expanding their families, including extended maternity leave, grants, scholarships, low-interest loans, health insurance, housing assistance, and more. Iran has canceled subsidies for all contraceptives and offers free medical treatments to encourage fertility. This past August, for example, a new propaganda campaign was launched, offering substantial scholarships for any initiative promoting childbirth.

How much does the continued situation worry regime leaders? Here's an example: a senior imam of one southern city defined it as "more harmful to Iran than war," saying the reduction in births affects national identity, religion, economy, and all residents. The deputy health minister warned that if the situation doesn't improve soon, "we will fall into a demographic black hole, and it will take us about 150 years to compensate for it."

The highest-ranking official notable in his attention to the matter is none other than Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The man who set policy in Tehran understood at the beginning of the last decade where the wind was blowing and came out openly against family planning policy. He called it a "hostile Western policy" designed to harm Muslim countries and called on all Iranian mothers to mobilize for the nation.

Already in 2012, Khamenei declared that expanding the Iranian family was a strategic goal and published a series of steps and programs to encourage childbirth. The target set by Khamenei, which he has repeated several times, is to increase Iran's population to 150 million people by 2050. The ability of Iran to support such a large population doesn't worry the supreme leader, nor does the welfare of ordinary citizens who would have to bear the burden of such great pressure on state resources.

The birth crisis stems from several sources. The first is a sharp rise in the marriage age in Iran, which naturally affects the age at which women give birth. Findings from recent surveys in Iran reveal that the average marriage age for women in the country has reached 24, while men marry on average at 28. Moreover, the marriage rate in the republic has dropped dramatically: in 2010, almost 900,000 couples married in the country, while this year, just under half a million couples registered for marriage. Accordingly, the average age for first births for women in urban areas of the country approaches 28, while men in Tehran have children at an average age of 34.5 – a statistic that indicates the depth of the crisis. The situation is better in villages, but even there, women only start giving birth on average at age 24 and above.

Another characteristic of the phenomenon that the government wages a war of extermination against is abortions. According to estimates, more than 300,000 abortions are performed in Iran each year, only 10 percent of which are legal, meaning they stem from health reasons. With an average of about a thousand abortions per day in the Islamic Republic, they constitute about one-third of the country's birth potential. Senior officials have defined the act as "execution" and claimed that abortions are an enemy plot against Iran.

Experts point to various reasons for the birth crisis, chief among them being the economic situation in the country, which has pushed almost a third of residents below the poverty line and sharply raised inflation. Meanwhile, exposure to Western norms through illegal technological means, along with desires for personal advancement, have changed the preferences of many in the Iranian population, especially in less religious sectors. Bottom line, it appears that large parts of the Iranian public don't believe in the country's future, and children are not their primary life goal.

The challenge that declining births pose to Iranian authorities is particularly severe when accompanied by the aging problem. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, life expectancy in the country has risen significantly, similar to other countries worldwide. In 1979, it stood at 57, and today, Iranian women are expected to live to age 78 on average and men to 76. This means the Islamic Republic is currently dealing with a growing population defined as "elderly" or "senior citizens" – meaning older than 60. About 10 percent of Iran's population, approximately 9 million people, currently fall into this category.

The forecast for the future is even bleaker: according to estimates, by 2050, this group will grow to become about one-third of Iran's population and will be the largest of its kind in the Middle East. Of those aging citizens, by 2050, almost 4 percent of the population is expected to be older than 80. In fact, the only country in the world where this problem is more severe is South Korea, which, unlike Iran, is not dealing with a failing economy and strict international sanctions.

This crisis has broad implications: the expansion of the "dependent" group in Iran will place an additional burden in coming decades on the social and economic system in the country, on health and nursing services, and more. The government needs to redesign the pension system, which is not adapted for such a large population segment, and examine how it will be able to assist an especially large number of elderly who will need help dealing with physical and mental difficulties.

However, Iran's political and military choices have brought heavy international pressure upon it, deeply affecting its economy. The sanctions make it difficult for the government to allocate funds for such long-term programs, and studies have found they also directly affect ordinary citizens. For example, surveys conducted in Iranian households found that the sanctions particularly negatively affected the elderly population, especially those without organized pensions. Additionally, since elderly people often rely on family support, the economic damage to the entire country affects citizens' ability to help their elderly relatives.

A lot could also change around the rise of the new administration in the US. If President-elect Donald Trump takes a hard line toward Iran and even implements a "maximum pressure" campaign against it from the start of his term "to bring it to its knees" – as already reported in American media – this will not help the regime in Tehran face such internal challenges.

Experts suggest that one way to deal with the crisis is to better utilize the existing workforce in Iran. They particularly mean the low participation rate of women in the economy, which could boost local production and help deal with aging problems in the medium term. The problem, of course, is that policies to promote women are not at the top of Iran's priorities, and it also somewhat conflicts with the desire to encourage high fertility in a traditional society. It's no coincidence that Iranian women interviewed by international media expressed suspicion that Tehran's fertility encouragement policy is meant to keep women "in their proper place, at home," in their words.

That statement reflects the general attitude of Iranian citizens toward their leadership on this issue, along with their unwillingness to obey Khamenei's entreaties or cooperate with his plans to encourage childbirth. The supreme leader himself repeatedly declares the problem and formulates plans, grants, and additional incentives – but the people ignore him. This is further evidence of the disconnect between large parts of the Iranian population from the conservative and extreme leadership in the country and the leadership's alienation from entire segments of the Iranian people.

Here, for example, are words that Goya, a Tehran resident, told a French media network about one of the new laws to encourage childbirth and against abortion: "It's ridiculous, interfering in citizens' private lives. Instead of solving economic problems, the authorities want to interfere more in our lives. It's not their business. It's my decision. We are used to restrictions in this country and will find a way around them."

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