Across all theaters, Israel has achieved significant gains following the blow it suffered on October 7. It has struck its enemies hard and, with American assistance, succeeded in forcing Hamas and Hezbollah into moves they had refused to take – releasing hostages while the IDF maintains its presence in the Strip, and ceasing fire from Lebanon as an expression of solidarity with Hamas, despite Israel's continued freedom of operation in Lebanon and ground presence at five points along the border.

However significant these achievements are, they do not guarantee sustained and strategically meaningful long-term change in the regional landscape. To achieve this goal – which means victory in the war – Hamas must be fully disarmed, and Hezbollah must either be disarmed or at minimum prevented from strengthening and returning to southern Lebanon.

Realizing these objectives is far more difficult than achieving the goals reached so far, because for Hamas and Hezbollah, this is no longer about paying a heavy price to ensure survival and protect strategic assets, but rather about making concessions of existential significance. This is because they require Hamas and Hezbollah to relinquish a central component of their identity and control over territory, and because such a move would amount to Hamas admitting that the October 7 attack was a mistake and accepting that, in Palestinian national memory, the attack that galvanized the Palestinian public will be recorded as a disaster and grave error.

The impression is that the American administration has not yet decided whether to back powerful Israeli force moves that would enable completing the collapse of Hamas, or to prefer, as it currently leans, to begin implementing phase two of the plan (perhaps even without waiting for the return of Ran Gvili's body), at least in the area under IDF control, without disarming Hamas. Each path faces numerous obstacles due to the plan's ambiguity, which requires agreement on small details, the parties' differing interpretations of the plan's intent, the multiplicity of parties meant to be involved, and above all – President Trump's eagerness to demonstrate progress and strengthen the message that the war has ended, even when conditions on the ground actually indicate difficulty in advancing the plan.

To avoid having to make a strategic decision between completing the war objectives and leveraging achievements so far to shape a better security reality for the coming years, versus avoiding an undesired confrontation with an especially friendly American president who operates from his own motivations – Israel must make every effort to convince Trump that backing Israel to complete the mission is also in his interest. Among other reasons, it could help expand the Abraham Accords. One way to do this is to create a broad internal Israeli front on this issue, beyond the government. After all, the hostage dispute is already behind us.

The writer is the head of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security.

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Some are unfolding right now. Understandings solidifying between the United States, Israel, Arab states and others demand serious preparation, diplomatic and security work, and nonstop attention. Right now, Israel is pushing with the United States an international deal to end the Gaza war by stripping Hamas of weapons, demilitarizing the Gaza Strip, and ultimately expanding peace deals.

Nothing far-fetched here, over two years since the war started with the October 7 massacre. The Middle East braces for dramatic shifts, with Israel driving most directly or indirectly – backed or trailed by the US.

Challenges versus opportunities

Top challenge: Iran, chief source of chaos, terror and war against Israel and the region. Last June's 12-Day War exposed Tehran's radical regime as weak and exposed, unable to shield facilities or top officials. It also opened a rare shot at toppling the Islamist dictatorship.

Iran's economy crumbles day after day, poverty surges, educated masses flee, water is running out – yes, literally. Reservoirs shut one by one, taps run dry across vast areas, and unrest builds. The regime cracks down brutally, cuts internet to contain it.

Israeli and Washington sources see regime collapse as viable amid civilian strife. That could transform Israel's security and strategic situation, removing its top existential threat. Plus, it would gut funding for Hezbollah, Houthis, Hamas and other Iran-backed terror groups.

Opportunities include Saudi Arabia, among others. Israel Hayom reported Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's White House meeting with President Donald Trump fell short of normalization kickoff hopes. Still, everyone knows the process starts soon – likely post-war. Contacts already run direct and indirect on specifics like overflights via Saudi airspace, trade deals, security and cyber business with Saudis, and beyond.

Netanyahu hinting at under-the-radar progress? Entirely plausible – maybe crafting a deal letting bin Salman claim victory on demands, netting F-35s or even a US nuclear reactor in trade.

A Saudi deal or normalization talks would mark a huge win for Israel and Netanyahu, pulling more nations into Abraham Accords – ties with Israel, trade pacts, and real Palestinian conflict progress.

The implicit statement in Netanyahu's letter is that he can bring about the strategic achievements, or more precisely, only he can.

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"I think right now it's almost impossible," said Alghashian, a researcher of Saudi foreign policy, in an interview with Israel Hayom. "First of all, Netanyahu has made relations with Israel and his government too toxic. Saudi public opinion has a very negative perception regarding normalization, and in effect Saudi Arabia is distancing itself from normalization. Second, the things Saudi Arabia wants from the US are achievable in stages. It can achieve a defense alliance because that doesn't require Congressional approval."

Beyond that, Alghashian noted that since Israel's strike in Qatar, its perception in Saudi Arabia has become particularly negative. "I think many people are trying to raise speculation out of wishful thinking or even as part of a certain practice. It has become the norm to raise speculation about normalization. It seems as if nothing else is happening in the region besides this. There is a situation of ethnic cleansing in Sudan, but people mainly talk about Saudi Arabia and Israel."

Factors are in motion

According to him, there are too many factors related to normalization that "are in motion" – like the elections in Israel, the conduct of the administration in the US, and even potential elections in the Palestinian Authority – so it's doubtful whether Saudi Arabia will even consider such a move.

When asked by Israel Hayom why Saudi Arabia views the strike against Hamas leaders in Qatar as something negative, he replied: "It's not necessarily related to Hamas. There isn't much love for Hamas in Saudi Arabia, it must be said. What the Saudis were furious about is that the talks (regarding a ceasefire agreement and hostage deal) were held in Qatar because that's what the Americans wanted for this mediation. Netanyahu and his people appreciated the fact that Qatar was mediating and serving as a channel of communication. From the Saudi point of view, the reason for the fury is the fact that the Qataris hosted the mediation efforts and Netanyahu attacked Doha.

"Another reason is that right now it seems Israel reaches anywhere it wants in the Middle East. It shows that, and it doesn't hide it. That's another reason why Saudi Arabia is not interested in normalizing its relations with Israel right now. Any discussion about normalization now will appear as if it's being conducted from a position of weakness on Saudi Arabia's part, or that it's being pushed into normalization forcibly. That's something that would be considered political suicide, to be honest. There's also a question regarding relations with the US. There is a lack of trust because the Americans are not willing to restrain Netanyahu."

Different government

Given that there will be a different government in Israel, will this development advance normalization, or is it more complicated?

"In my opinion, if such a government could bring something to the Palestinian issue, then it could happen, but it's more complicated than that. Theoretically, it's not enough, as I think a significant move is needed to be convincing to both parties. First of all, for the Saudi public opinion. Right now, Saudi public opinion must be taken into account. For a long time, they say 'Palestinian state.'

"Therefore, anything less than a state will need to be significant enough. Another matter is that the Palestinian Authority also needs to be convinced by this move. That the Palestinian Authority will say 'yes, this is good enough.' Lapid, Eisenkot, and even Bennett can get there, but these are the conditions. And this doesn't include the American component. The Saudi public knows much more about the dynamics of the occupation and the Palestinian-Israeli issue. That's the reason something significant is needed, and public opinion needs to be taken into account more."

You mentioned the influence of Saudi public opinion on decision-making. Is this a new phenomenon, or has the royal house considered this over the years?

"It's not new," he said. "Saudi Arabia always took public opinion into account. This is one of the reasons why, historically, the Saudis were gradual or slow in their process regarding Israel and regarding their foreign relations in general.

"That's the reason why people think Saudi Arabia opened quickly under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, when the reality is that it's part of a gradual process. In foreign policy decisions, they always took local public opinion into account. That's the reason why fatwas (religious rulings) are very important, and they will continue to be important. You can see this even in the case of 'Desert Storm' (the first Gulf War, in which American forces were deployed to the kingdom). Believe it or not, Saudi Arabia made relations with Israel legitimate in the early 1990s in religious discourse."

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On September 15, 2020, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates signed the Abraham Accords in a formal ceremony on the White House lawn, establishing official ties with Israel. Morocco and Sudan later joined the accords, although Sudan's recent civil war has disrupted the normalization process, and the agreement has yet to be implemented.

Witkoff's remarks in Florida add to growing speculation about expanding the circle of countries entering formal relations with Israel under the framework initiated during the Trump administration.

Kazakhstan is the largest country in Central Asia and the ninth-largest in the world, spanning roughly 2.7 million square kilometers. It is also the largest landlocked nation. Around 70% of its population are Sunni Muslims, with a significant Christian Orthodox minority making up about 26%. Kazakhstan gained independence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. For 28 years, it was led by President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who was succeeded in 2019 by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Nevertheless, Nazarbayev retained considerable influence under the title "Leader of the Nation."

Kazakhstan is a presidential republic, though political opposition operates under heavy restrictions. The country is rich in natural resources, including oil—accounting for approximately 3% of the world's reserves—natural gas, and minerals, making it an important economic player in the region. Its capital is Astana, while the largest city is Almaty.

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With the start of President Donald Trump's second term and the war in the Gaza Strip, Indonesia became even more linked in consciousness to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For example, its name came up in the media as one of the main destinations for the idea of voluntary migration of Gaza residents – though it firmly denied this and completely rejected the concept.

In recent weeks, Indonesia has been gaining greater recognition as relevant to "the day after" as well. Its president, Prabowo Subianto, impressed with his speech at the UN General Assembly: He managed in his address to show concern, determination, and vision in the thicket of the conflict – and without hatred – to present his vision for an independent Palestinian state, while addressing the need to ensure Israel's security within any future arrangement.

He also expressed willingness to send a significant military force that would integrate into an international peacekeeping force in the Gaza Strip, and positioned himself as a partner in the American effort to end the war. Expectations even arose, for several hours, of a groundbreaking visit by him to Israel – but Indonesia quickly denied it.

The Indonesian desire to integrate into the American effort to end the war in the Gaza Strip stems from several motives: First, growing activism in its foreign policy, led by its president, to strengthen its international standing and his standing among world leaders. Second, a deep interest in advancing relations with the current American administration. Third, a growing desire to be politically involved in the Middle East and promote a settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – mainly as an expression of its commitment to establishing an independent Palestinian state.

Indonesia's growing interest in the Middle East began to emerge about two decades ago, when it successfully navigated the difficult transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy. This sense of success also influenced its foreign policy, which became more dynamic and ambitious.

Its growing involvement in the Middle East stemmed from a desire to promote stability and reconciliation and reduce religious extremism – also from fear that it would have to deal with the ripple effects of this trend. Indonesia adopted a policy of encouraging democratic reforms in the region and the Muslim world, and emphasized that it proves democracy can exist even in countries with a Muslim majority. When the "Arab Spring" began, it tried to help Egypt and Tunisia advance democratic reforms.

The democratic failure there didn't lead to despair. With the collapse of Assad's regime and the fog that covered Syria's future, it became clear that the crisis would only be resolved through an inclusive and democratic transition process by peaceful means.

Indonesian foreign policy also began adopting a goal of fighting religious extremism through promoting moderate Islam values – "soft power" diplomacy. This policy rests on two leading movements in Indonesian Muslim civil society: "Nahdlatul Ulama" and "Muhammadiyah." They have a broad, extensive base, and they're a leading force in building democracy and shaping moderate Islam – including fighting religious extremism and encouraging tolerance and interfaith dialogue.

Particularly impressive is the activity of "Nahdlatul Ulama," the larger of the two, in the global space. The activity has been conducted for about ten years under the banner "Islam Nusantara" ("The Islam of the Indonesian archipelago"), and is also directed at the Middle East.

It's simpler and easier to talk about an Indonesian contribution on "the day after" in the form of a military force that would integrate into a multinational force to stabilize peace and provide humanitarian aid. But it's worth focusing on the less clear and familiar, and much more challenging to implement, promoting democratic reforms, especially by leading projects on religious tolerance and de-radicalization among the local population.

Indonesia itself, as far as known, doesn't raise these paths in its references to "the day after" – perhaps because it understands that this doesn't serve its immediate interest in competing with leading countries in the Arab camp for leadership in advancing the American plan.

The democratic idea raises reservations and even opposition in Arab regimes. As for the moderate Islamic message and fighting religious extremism, Indonesia has partners for the idea among leading countries in the moderate Sunni camp.

But even among the mainstream Islamic currents in Indonesia, some wonder: Is it even possible and right to offer the center of the Muslim world the unique Sunni Islam that developed with them? After all, this is Islam that grew in a completely different political, social, and cultural context – "peripheral," foreign, and perhaps even strange to societies in the Middle East.

For example, Indonesia is a country whose ideological foundation is considered secular or neutral in religious terms. Despite the distinct Muslim majority, Islam has no preferred constitutional status over the five other religions that received official recognition. This approach draws on a deep-rooted local cultural tradition of pluralism and religious tolerance and is expressed in the national motto, very prominent in political and public discourse: "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika" – "Unity in diversity," or, in literal translation, "Many, yet one."

This is how a strong Muslim civil society grew there that fills a significant role in building democracy and is ready to defend the separation between religion and state. Indonesian democracy indeed suffers from weaknesses, but the journey the country has made – home to the world's largest Muslim population – remains impressive.

There's another significant obstacle on the way to realizing the Indonesian contribution on "the day after" – the absence of diplomatic relations with Israel. Indonesia really wants to see the American plan advancing toward ending the war in Gaza, and certainly reaching a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – but its position is clear: There will be no diplomatic relations with Israel before an independent Palestinian state is established, or according to the current president's formulation – before Israel recognizes an independent Palestinian state.

This position rests on a very broad consensus in Indonesian society, which draws its determination – among the Muslim majority – also from a sense of deep pan-Islamic solidarity.

It can't be ruled out that, in the future, Indonesia will show some flexibility on these principles, but even then, it will want to see real progress toward a political solution to the conflict. As long as that doesn't happen, it will be difficult to exhaust the Indonesian contribution to "the day after," since this requires official relations with Israel and direct cooperation with it.

Perhaps, suppose the American plan to end the war in the Gaza Strip advances as planned. In that case, the change that Indonesia will see will be significant enough to cause it to change its policy toward Israel – and then the potential of its contribution to "the day after" can be realized.

The author is an associate fellow at the Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a research fellow, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Reichman University, and a research fellow at the Forum for Regional Thinking (FORTH).

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Regarding Shas's departure from the government coalition, he said he lost patience long ago with these games. He said government could complete serve out its term but there is no such thing as being in the coalition while not being in it, and the coalition failing to pass laws, there is a country that requires governance. There is no such thing as continuing to control ministries remotely through associates while actually being outside, he noted.

Video: Smotrich speaks about Saudi normalization / Credit: GoLive

He said that he told Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, "Either succeed in resolving the conscription issue with a genuine law and change the abnormal reality that Haredim do not participate in army service, or go to elections. This story must end quickly.​"

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Ofir understands the Saudis perhaps better than any other Israeli. She has facilitated numerous achievements, including bringing Israeli teams to Saudi Arabia's Dakar Rally in 2021, brokering various deals between Israeli and Saudi companies, and becoming the first Israeli to lecture at a public Saudi conference in September 2023, when normalization appeared imminent.

Here is another assessment: Within the coming year, likely before Israel's elections, substantial rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia will occur – perhaps not full Abraham Accords membership, but at minimum a significant political-economic development. A senior US diplomat estimates and assures in conversation with Israel Hayom, "This isn't a matter of gambling [on it happening], it's geopolitics and economic interests – what should have happened long ago will occur shortly."

What drives Saudi interest? Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's Vision 2030 fulfillment integrates closely with business, technological, and security relationships with Israel. The vision incorporates technological development and advancement in which Israel already participates in areas including cyber defense, fintech, and additional sectors.

Furthermore, bin Salman, who favors mega-projects involving enormous monetary figures, strongly identifies with President Donald Trump's mega deal, the grand Middle East plan, and intends to integrate thoroughly into what should transpire here. The project focuses extensively on shortening commercial routes from the East, Indo-China to Europe, and potentially oil and gas pipelines en route. Regarding security, MBS seeks an agreement constituting a defense alliance with the US and through it with Israel, protecting his nation from Iran and its proxies, including the Houthis.

The security dimension was demonstrated conversely through Saudi assistance to Israel during the June war with Iran. As we revealed in our Israel Hayom report, Saudi military helicopters intercepted Iranian drones en route to Israel.

This represents exactly what Iran and its proxies, including Hamas, attempt to prevent. An intelligence-exposed document from Hamas leadership revealed this was one of Hamas' declared objectives in launching the October 7 massacre.

Among Hamas' (and Iran's) declared war objectives was torpedoing Saudi Arabia's Abraham Accords entry and normalization with Israel. This objective was essentially achieved while a Democratic administration unable to handle the situation's complexity.

Long and complicated, yet possible

With Donald Trump's re-entry as the Abraham Accords' architect into the White House, this possibility returned to consideration, though the road remains lengthy and complex. Recently, the American president reiterated hearing willingness and desire from senior Saudis to join the Abraham Accords. Trump characteristically adds, correctly, that Saudi entry will pave the way for additional Arab and Muslim nations.

Throughout 2023, direct contacts occurred between Saudi Arabia and Israel, including conversations between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. In September, contacts reached near maturation, and Netanyahu's UN General Assembly speech discussing the vision for the developing Middle East and building alliances was broadcast initially on Saudi television.

The war delayed the process, although beneath the surface contacts have been maintained and continue at multiple levels. The Saudis expressed shock at the massacre while, consistent with Middle Eastern Arab society sentiment, sharpened discourse toward Israel during the war, and their political process demands intensified. Trump's plan addresses this and removes obstacles to progress in this direction.

"The United Arab Emirates is Israel's genuine Arab friend, demonstrated during the most difficult time, wartime," a senior Israeli official maintaining contact with the Gulf country for many years tells us.

The official recalls that the sole international companies that continued flights to Israel throughout the war were Emirati ones, and the UAE's sharp condemnation of the October 7 massacre and Hamas generally. The UAE, alongside Saudi Arabia, maintain a firm position against Hamas, arguing that Gaza rehabilitation is impossible while it exists. Nevertheless, they finance numerous aid operations to Gazans, effectively since the war's beginning.

The Emiratis leveraged positive connections in Israel to introduce aid into displaced persons camps, establishing clinics and field hospitals. Now they constitute the dominant state in establishing humanitarian spaces in IDF-controlled territories, including constructing clinic buildings, schools, and electricity, water, and sewage infrastructure. They initiated and funded establishing a water pipeline from the Egyptian side to southern Strip residents.

Like the Saudis, they also perceive the promising business horizon in a peaceful Middle East recovering from wars, the enormous commercial potential for their ports on routes from the East to Europe, and the tremendous advantages of cooperation with Israel. For instance, the Dubai diamond exchange, established merely twenty years ago, became the world's largest with Israeli assistance.

The security dimension against the Iranian and Houthi threat also matters, and the war's end will bring genuine expansion of weapons and military technology agreements with Israel.

An important aspect involving both countries is the Palestinian de-radicalization process. In both nations, such processes occurred in educational systems, media, and cultural and political discourse. Educational programs from both are already implemented in temporary Strip schools, at minimum in IDF-controlled territories.

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This describes the individual sometimes dubbed "rabbi to kings." Schneier's persona has been linked for years with Arab and Muslim state leaders worldwide, from Saudi Arabia's monarch to Azerbaijan's president, from Qatar's emir to the United Arab Emirates' ruler. In an exclusive Israel Hayom interview, Schneier discusses diplomacy and pragmatism through the lens of faith and stated that for him the real prize is not political, but spiritual.

"I'm the 18th generation rabbi in my family," he begins. "I've always wanted to be a rabbi – and to appreciate what it means to be a rabbi."
Schneier received ordination in 1983 by Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik, yet his calling extends beyond the synagogue and community he founded in the Hamptons, New York. "In my office… one wall has photos with kings and presidents, but the other side overlooks the synagogue. That's what gives me a sense of purpose and fulfillment."

"In my family, you have to make two contributions – both congregationally, spiritually, and also from the social-action point of view," he continues, and consequently, in 1989 he founded the Foundation for Ethnic Understanding, to restore the historic alliance between African Americans and Jews forged during the civil rights movement in the United States. "Martin Luther King comprehended that whoever struggles for his own rights can only do so if he also battles for others' rights. King was a great champion of Israel… He had zero tolerance for antisemitism."

After two decades leading it, he decided to pursue a new direction, "I thought that the great challenge of my generation would be to find the path to narrow the divide between 16 million Jews and 1.8 billion Muslims. And that's what sent me off on my global journey."

Schneier recounts how Muslim world doors opened before him. "My great patron was the late King of Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah… he introduced me to the King of Bahrain, who introduced me to the Emir of Qatar, who introduced me to the ruler of the UAE, who introduced me to [Azerbaijani leader] Aliyev — and then Kazakhstan… Even i24NEWS today said, 'this is the one who planted all the seeds for the Abraham Accords.'"

"I say everywhere – in Riyadh, Doha, Baku, Ankara – anti-Zionism is antisemitism. Israel is not some political 77-year-old aspiration; it's at the very core of our religion." He adds, "How can you be a Jew and not be a Zionist? Why would you bifurcate? … I am, in this work, a watchdog when it comes to Israel." The leaders, according to him, value his consistency.  "One of these leaders said to me, 'Presidents and heads of state, ambassadors — they come and go, and you're always there. We all need a rabbi.'"

Beyond his community position in the Hamptons, he was appointed special advisor by the King of Bahrain to the King Hamad Global Centre for Peaceful Coexistence based in Manama, and in 2022 served as interfaith consultant to the World Cup organization in Qatar, whose reputation in Israel naturally transformed completely following the war.

"The Qataris always come through for me… I served as interfaith advisor to the World Cup. I had three conditions: 15,000 Israelis, direct flights between Doha and Tel Aviv, and kosher food," he states, "I brought two rabbis from Turkey...  check, check, check [referring to all three conditions being met]." Qatar itself naturally leveraged the treatment of Israelis to bolster its image, while preserving relations with Israel's adversaries in the Middle East.

He portrays his warm relationship with Aliyev, Azerbaijan's president, whom he calls "like family for me. There's nothing Aliyev wouldn't do for Israel." He recalled telling one Arab leader that if he wanted to normalize relations with Israel, he should simply follow what Azerbaijan does.

With Turkey, Schneier was involved in the thawing of relations between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President Isaac Herzog in 2021. "The Turkish ambassador to Washington called Erdoğan from my office… I said it would be a wonderful opportunity for President Erdogan to call President Herzog – which he did. And by March 2022 we had the famous reconciliation meeting in Ankara." Schneier adds that "Erdogan was a big disappointment to me because of his absolute hatred for Netanyahu... Erdogan loves Herzog. Loves him."

He characterizes Hamas as "a perversion of Islam," saying that the war in Gaza "is a war against evil, not a war of religion." According to him, there are 12 Muslim countries that support or express sympathy for Israel. Muslim leaders support Israel's right to defend itself.

Schneier believes the agreement to release the hostages and ceasefire signals a regional transformation. "If Hamas doesn't behave... not only will they have to deal with the Israelis, they'll have to deal with the Americans — and good luck to them." He notes that is an unprecedented opportunity. If Gaza is demilitarized and administered by an Arab consortium and provided economic hope, everything can be transformed.

Regarding the Abraham Accords, Schneier enumerated Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Indonesia, Pakistan, Oman, Syria and Lebanon, as countries that may normalize relations with Israel in the near future. However, he indicated that "There's going to be very little movement in the Arab world until… Israelis recognize that everyone wants to see a Palestinian state – even if only symbolic."

Schneier participated in the "Peace to Prosperity" conference in Bahrain in 2019, and is convinced that Jared Kushner was correct, that money and hope can alter perception. He recalls Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's words, "MBS said to me, 'Rabbi, you probably think I want to normalize relations with Israel because of Iran. That's the second reason. The first is Vision 2030 – the economic transformation of the kingdom that I cannot accomplish without Israel.'"

Schneier divides the region into two blocs, "You have the Saudi bloc – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, even Qatar – and you have the Iranian bloc… Why doesn't anyone recognize that blessing?"

He expresses concern about the situation in New York and the weakening of Jewish influence in the city, and warns against Zohran Mamdani's rise, He [Mamdani] will finesse every issue – police, education, even prostitution – except one: Israel. He won't even recognize Israel as a democratic Jewish state."

At the conversation's conclusion, he sends a warm message to Israelis, "For American Jews, Israelis are a great source of inspiration. We enjoy the security and the strength we have in the Diaspora only because of the State of Israel… It has restored the honor and the dignity of the Jewish people… There's never been a better time to be Jewish than today."

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However, beyond a pompous concluding statement that forcefully condemned the acts of terror and called for international cooperation to eradicate this violent and grave threat to Israel's security and regional stability, the wave of Hamas terror renewed with all its might and cruelty, sowing murder and destruction in Israel. Thus, the dream of the meeting's architects to cultivate a more reconciled and terror-free regional environment solely through rhetorical and declarative means vanished in fire and smoke.

Nearly three decades since that stinging and resounding failure, it brings up from the abyss of oblivion and forgetfulness the pathetic and naive attempt by Britain and France in 1928 to outlaw the use of war through a toothless document and enforcement mechanisms (the Kellogg-Briand Pact).

Sharm el-Sheikh once again became the focus of mediation efforts, designed to end the fighting in Gaza and ensure, with the help of tools and mechanisms to be established later on, that the same violent and extremist Hamas would be removed and excluded from the centers of control, influence, and the military infrastructure it established. And this time, it would be done effectively and long-term, unlike the failed initiative of 1996.

Indeed, while the 1996 Sharm el-Sheikh conference featured colorful scenery but yielded no results, this time the quiet contacts held in Sharm el-Sheikh produced a dramatic agreement for a ceasefire and the release of all the hostages (Phase A of President Donald Trump's settlement plan), which was signed on October 9, 2025, between Israel and Hamas, brokered by the US, Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar.

The uniqueness of the agreement (even though it does not include agreements regarding all the patterns and details of the implementation of the next phases of the president's plan), which succeeded in bringing about a cessation of fire after two years of a difficult campaign, is rooted in the conduct and behavioral patterns of the American super-mediator, who demonstrated creative and resolute leadership, out-of-the-box thinking beyond traditional diplomatic frameworks, and a readiness to make optimal use, at the right time, of all the levers of pressure and influence at his disposal.

While the diplomatic virtuoso, Henry Kissinger, preferred to obscure or blur the final goal of his mediation efforts, and instead proceed using a slow and gradual method toward realizing his settlement vision, the 47th president Donald Trump presented the goal of ending the war (and not just achieving a ceasefire agreement) as his central objective from the outset.

Furthermore, in his diplomatic activity in the arena, the 47th president created a completely new model of a super-mediator, overshadowing even the legendary Henry Kissinger in his level of sophistication and originality. While the former US Secretary of State acted not only as an effective mediator but also as a factor that rewarded the parties during the mediation he led on the way to the interim agreement he achieved between Israel and Egypt in September 1975, Donald Trump demonstrated his full prowess last week by not settling for traditional and direct mediation, but by granting a package of incentives and perks to the sub-mediators.

Pressures on Hamas

He did not, therefore, limit himself to promising compensation (or issuing warnings, implied or explicit) to the warring parties themselves. This was to strengthen the motivation of these sub-mediators (mainly Turkey and Qatar) to exert heavy pressures on Hamas so that it would agree to soften its rigid positions.

Regarding Turkey, the American compensation appears particularly far-reaching. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was promised the supply of F-35 aircraft, which he so coveted to receive, and he is slated to become a legitimate player in the agreement's implementation process.

Thus, the White House managed to create a two-layered web of heavy-weight levers of influence on Hamas. The cumulative weight of these levers made it hard for the terror organization, at the current time, to reject his plan. (Regarding Israel, Donald Trump directly applied these levers, but with a completely different dosage). This created the necessary infrastructure for the entire deal, in which carrots and sticks were integrated based on the business principle of "give and take" from Donald Trump's business background.

Hamas' dependence on Turkey

Although Qatar has long been known for dancing not only with the US but also with the devil, the fact that Doha had not succeeded in its mediation efforts until now (especially following the failed Israeli attack against senior Hamas officials in Qatar) is what led the president to his unprecedented decision to turn to Ankara, to shower Recep Tayyip Erdoğan with words of praise and flattery, and exploited the Hamas movement's great dependence on Turkey to turn it into a central executive contractor for his plan.

In this way, he also upgraded Turkey's security and political ties with Washington (in the hope that the price for strengthening Turkey and bringing it into the arena would not be too high for Israel, and that the American partner would provide Israel with appropriate security compensation for this).

Furthermore, in his activity as a super-mediator, Donald Trump revealed a deep understanding of the timing of his powerful entry onto the stage. The level of support for Israel around the world, and especially among the American public (including among the party's youth), has recently fallen to an unprecedented low (and also reflected on the status of the American superpower, Israel's loyal ally).

The fact that the Israeli action in Doha threatened to unravel the loose seams of the Abraham Accords and steer the Middle East down a path of chaos and instability, led the president to increase his activity. This was also in light of the growing criticism from wide sectors in Israeli society regarding what appeared to be a futile bogging down in the sands and alleys of Gaza.

Frustration in the White House

The growing frustration in the White House with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's promises of Hamas' total collapse, which did not materialize, and its sensitivity to the worsening condition of the hostages and the humanitarian distress in the strip, contributed to his decision that the time was ripe to throw his full weight into an increased effort to immediately bring about a cessation of the fighting (while also being ready to apply pressure on Israel not to resort to tactics of delay and postponement).

Thus, a window of opportunity was created by the president for the establishment of a ceasefire between Israel, isolated in the international arena and where growing signs of domestic fatigue and frustration are intensifying, and the terror organization, which has been significantly weakened and has lost most of its strongholds and centers of control. This was, of course, with the assistance of the sub-mediators, primarily Ankara, who mobilized for the mission of applying increased pressure on the terror organization.

If Europe was not mentioned at all in all the above, it is no coincidence. Apart from impractical plans that left no discernible mark, no trace remains of the unilateral and preposterous initiatives of French President (as of October 11) Emmanuel Macron, the European Union and the UN institutions. Is there a need for further proof of the leading status of the US as the sole superpower in the Donald Trump era, and the absolute marginality of Europe, which, apart from the background noise it created, contributed nothing to the advancement of the ceasefire?

And finally, the question of the Nobel Peace Prize, which was not awarded to the president on Friday. After the rumor already emerged from Oslo's halls that the win is contingent on a contribution to the establishment of a sustainable peace settlement, and not just the achievement of a ceasefire agreement, one can only hope and believe that if the process that Donald Trump created from scratch is indeed realized in practice and also leads to the expansion and upgrading of the Abraham Accords and the establishment of a new, more reconciled, and stable regional order, it will be difficult for the committee to object to his selection next year as the Nobel Peace Prize laureate.

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