Yitzhak Rabin was a chief of staff beloved by his soldiers. Looking back across the decades, it's striking to see him in an old Yoman Hatzahal newsreel from just after the 1967 Six-Day War, attending an officers' graduation ceremony. As the event ended, soldiers and their parents crowded around him, forming warm circles of admiration. You could see in their eyes the affection and respect he inspired. There were no such scenes around Moshe Dayan. He commanded admiration, but not closeness.

Looking back, Rabin was a military leader whose relationship with his soldiers felt almost intimate. He studied at Kadoorie Agricultural School, on the slopes below Mount Tabor. The old Chizbatron troupe once sang about the calf stolen from Kadoorie by the guys from Sejera as a gift for their beloved Hedva. Locals still recall stories of how, in 1942, Rabin and his men from the Palmach scoured the hills near Juara in a frantic search for his lost pistol. That says it all.

There are probably Israelis today who no longer recognize his distinctive voice. Years ago, when I asked a colleague to check a recording for me, he came back puzzled: "Who's speaking on this tape?" It was Moshe Dayan. I was stunned that someone could fail to recognize such a familiar sound. Rabin's voice was equally distinctive, a firm, authoritative baritone, clipped and decisive, lending him an air of analytical intelligence.

Behind that commanding tone, though, lay shyness and vulnerability. His role in the Six-Day War was less prominent than legend suggests, and the postwar struggle over credit soon began. Within the Israeli Labor establishment, the old Palmach elite, academia, and cultural circles, a battle raged between the camps of Rabin and Dayan. Levi Eshkol, the prime minister during the war, was largely forgotten, even though he was the one who declared, "We have returned to our holiest places, never to part from them again."

Later, the group calling itself "Citizens Supporting Eshkol" became "Citizens Supporting Rabin." Along with his achievements, the war left Rabin with a scar that would follow him for life, his breakdown after a bitter meeting with David Ben-Gurion, who accused him of having dragged Israel into the war through poor judgment. Ben-Gurion, curiously, always had a soft spot for Rabin. He despised the Palmach and Yigal Allon, yet liked Rabin deeply, perhaps because of Rabin's conduct during the Altalena Affair, when he acted according to Ben-Gurion's wishes.

Because of that Oslo

For three decades, memorial ceremonies and community events commemorating Rabin have drawn their meaning largely from the fact that Benjamin Netanyahu has dominated Israeli politics since his assassination. Some argue that the unspoken "charge" behind the legal campaign against Netanyahu has always been his supposed moral responsibility for Rabin's death, a kind of modern blood libel that reenergized the Left.

Unlike other countries where leaders have been assassinated, in Israel an entire segment of society was blamed collectively. The tragedy is that Rabin's death enshrined the Oslo Accords as a sacred legacy of the Left, while for the Right they symbolized deception and national endangerment. Rabin himself had long resisted the idea of negotiating with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Only two months before the signing ceremony on the White House lawn did he agree to meet Yasser Arafat and accept the PLO as a partner. Until then, he remained committed to the official Washington talks with the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation he inherited from Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.

Many on the Right felt betrayed, that Rabin had concealed his true intentions during the 1992 election campaign. True, he repeatedly ruled out direct talks with the PLO, but he did say publicly that he planned to grant the Palestinians autonomy in the territories within nine months of taking office. That was his policy, not a capitulation to Shimon Peres or Yossi Beilin, except insofar as he later signed that autonomy agreement with Arafat.

I followed Rabin closely during that 1992 campaign as a reporter for Tel Aviv Weekly. I heard him speak about Palestinian autonomy at a house meeting in Beersheba and again at a gathering of Arab mayors in Shfaram. His spokesman, Gad Ben-Ari, who was a friend of mine from the army, got me in. Labor was betting heavily on Arab voter turnout, as Rabin was not especially popular in that sector. Four years earlier, at another rally, he had bluntly said: "No one expelled more Arabs than I did." But by 1992, he was conciliatory and pragmatic. To Tel Aviv's bourgeois voters he promised "to take Gaza out of Tel Aviv," a slogan born of the wave of stabbings that had struck the city.

"Rabinism" encouraged

Rabin's worldview embodied the spirit of the 1948 generation and the victory of 1967: peace would come, eventually, but only when the Arabs were ready. Israel would hold the territories until then. In his final Knesset speech, a month before his assassination, he insisted that "the Jordan Valley, in the broadest sense of that term, will remain Israel's security border" and that Jerusalem "will remain united under Israeli sovereignty." He declared repeatedly that Israel would never return to the pre-1967 lines.

But Rabin and his colleagues failed to foresee that the territories handed to the PLO, the Palestinian Authority, would become bases for rocket fire and terrorism. He dismissed warnings from Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon that rockets would one day be launched from Gaza toward Ashkelon. "From Gaza? Impossible," he scoffed.

During that same period, Meretz MK Yossi Sarid declared, "Rabin must be encouraged." And indeed, as Labor shifted leftward, the Israeli Left was already legitimizing contact with Hamas, the terrorist arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. In December 1992, Rabin's government expelled 415 Hamas leaders to southern Lebanon. The move was turned by the Left and by US President Bill Clinton into a propaganda victory for Hamas. Israel was forced to bring the deportees back, and left-wing activists, led by Uri Avnery, protested in solidarity with Hamas in Jerusalem. Avnery later boasted that their campaign had proven that Israel could never again carry out such expulsions.

That episode marked a turning point. The return of Hamas leaders from Lebanon inspired a wave of suicide bombings between 1994 and 1996 and signaled the collapse of the Oslo process. Ironically, Clinton, who sent Rabin off with the words "Shalom, chaver" – "Goodbye, friend" in Hebrew – helped undermine Oslo even before it began.

A battle over legacy

Today, Rabin's legacy has hardened into dogma. Figures like Prof. Uri Bar-Joseph, a leading voice in Israel's old defense establishment, still promote the formula of ending "the occupation" through a Palestinian state and land swaps, the same thinking that would bring Hamas tunnels within meters of Kibbutz Be'eri. To them, even the October 7 massacre was not a historical rupture but merely another large-scale terrorist attack, on a continuum with Maalot, Munich, or the 1978 Coastal Road attack.

The old Left still refuses to see the Palestinians as a jihadist, antisemitic enemy bent on Israel's destruction. Just as Rabin saw parts of the right "murderers of peace," the Left today brands "messianic annexationists" as the main problem for Israel's future.

After Rabin's assassination, the upper echelons of the IDF and the defense establishment were dominated by his loyalists, including successive chiefs of staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak and Ehud Barak. They passed down a worldview that dismissed military solutions to terrorism and treated the conflict as a "manageable confrontation." Settlers were framed as obstacles to peace. In later negotiations, Rabin was even willing to withdraw from most of the Golan Heights – back to the June 4, 1967 lines – when the Assad regime still appeared powerful.

Ultimately, Rabin's true directive was not peace, but the defense of the Jordan Valley and Jerusalem, and rejection of a sovereign Palestinian state. That is the mission facing Israel's next generation of leaders: to unite the nation across political lines in firm opposition to Palestinian statehood, and to accept the price, even sanctions, that such unity may entail. In that struggle, Israel can still draw on Rabin's spirit as a source of national strength.

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Trump's plan is being put into action. Most notable is the determination shown by the president, his team, and all relevant arms of the US government. Their resolve goes beyond stabilizing the ceasefire, they are committed to advancing step by step toward the primary goal: dismantling Hamas, or at the very least, disarming it. This process, and Trump and Netanyahu's shared drive to pursue it, is what distinguishes their leadership amid the political turbulence engulfing both men – especially Netanyahu.

The basic coordination and understandings demonstrate that the Trump-Netanyahu alliance remains intact, despite comments from Trump and his allies, including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, suggesting that Israel is losing control. What opposition leaders and media commentators interpret as a "protectorate" or growing Israeli dependence on the US is, in fact, an unprecedented wartime partnership.

We're simply not used to seeing two countries – one a global superpower and the other a small, embattled state – operate as allies in a multifront war. The contrast is stark: one is a massive logistical and diplomatic powerhouse; the other is bearing the brunt of combat on multiple fronts and reshaping the Middle East in ways not seen in 80 years.

This provides a realistic basis to believe that the war could end with Hamas dismantled through a combination of diplomatic and military means. It's not a fantasy, even if it's hard for some to envision who will actually disarm Hamas on the ground. Within the Trump-Netanyahu team, Netanyahu has demonstrated how to build solutions from scratch – not from nothing, but by assembling disparate elements into executable plans, as seen with Hezbollah, Iran, and more. Trump has proven to be the "orange hammer" – tough when needed, whether confronting Iran's nuclear program at Fordo or aligning the Arab-Muslim world behind a ceasefire and hostage releases.

As the dust settles, the facts on the ground become clearer. The IDF now control nearly 60 percent of the Gaza Strip, while the population remains crushed under Hamas' murderous tyranny. For the past week, discussions have centered around investment and reconstruction in the quiet, Israeli-controlled part of Gaza. Meanwhile, Hamas' "Somali-style" enclave will remain stuck unless it is dismantled.

There's no need to speculate about the timeline of Hamas' collapse. The Islamist terrorist enterprise won't simply disappear. Its backers will likely look to shift its operations to other spheres – including Europe, which has effectively become part of the Middle East, at least in political terms.

It's understandable that the Saudis are hesitant to send troops into Gaza. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has no desire for soldiers to return home radicalized by Hamas' ideology. But the idea of deploying Azerbaijani or Indonesian forces is a step in the right direction. Ultimately, transforming Gaza without Israel taking on direct governance of its population is a novel concept – one that hinges entirely on the commitment and tenacity of Trump and Netanyahu. America's seriousness is reflected in the high-level airlift of officials – Trump, Vice President JD Vance, and Marco Rubio. They're coming to signal that this time, they mean business.

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"This step is completely detached from reality and contradicts its own stated goals," they wrote. "It will do nothing to bring the sides closer to a two state solution." Malley and Agha are known for their pro Palestinian positions, and are certainly not political conservatives.

Despite such warnings, on Monday Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced his government would recognize a Palestinian state in a UN vote. Israeli officials said the move will only push peace further out of reach and amounts to giving a gift to terrorism. In plainer terms: a terrorist organization that has effectively become an army, attacking Israel with a level of barbarism unseen since the Holocaust, is now being rewarded.

For nearly two years, the Israel Defense Forces have been working to defeat and dismantle Hamas and other terrorist organisations in the Gaza Strip. But distressing images, including faked photos from Hamas propaganda campaigns, have convinced some leaders in the so called enlightened world to side with the terrorist organization.

Israel views the recognition moves not merely as betrayal but as active support by Western left wing governments for Hamas and its massacre of October 7. Germany's Chancellor Friedrich Merz added to the outrage by imposing an arms embargo on Israel, in an act that strengthens terrorism.

These Western governments, aided by political unrest inside Israel, have lowered Hamas' motivation to agree to a ceasefire or a hostage-release deal. Israel, now cornered diplomatically, sees no choice but to press on militarily to defeat Hamas, warning that otherwise the terrorists will exploit any imposed ceasefire without freeing hostages, at least until Israel makes concessions tantamount to surrender.

Jerusalem is being urged to couple its military campaign in Gaza with unilateral steps such as extending sovereignty over Area C of the West Bank and the Jordan Valley.

Recognition of a Palestinian state is also seen in Israel as a threat not only to the country but to Jewish communities in those Western nations, amid a spike in antisemitic violence. In Australia, the government and authorities have repeatedly taken steps signaling to radical Muslims and far-left activists that targeting Jews is tolerated, as happened when former justice minister Ayelet Shaked was barred from entering the country.

These governments are ignoring both reality, and international law.

An acquaintance in Gaza told a parliament member by phone that residents there are searching desperately for food and may soon have nothing to eat. Yet that same MP believes the proper response to this humanitarian crisis is recognition of a Palestinian state.

The fact remains that the Palestinians have no functioning governing or state infrastructure worthy of recognition. When they have been granted territory and the opportunity to govern, the entity created has descended into violent barbarism. Hamas' brutal aggression is directed not only at Israel but also at the civilians of Gaza,  a level of exploitation of one's own population that experts say has no precedent in history.

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The pattern is as follows: Hamas attacks Israel. Israel responds with a military campaign that demands combat in crowded urban areas, bringing with it heavy civilian casualties and massive devastation. A ceasefire follows within weeks or months. It typically includes "rebuilding the Gaza Strip." Billions of dollars pour into Hamas' coffers or straight into its hands, often Arab money, whether from Qatar or other sources.

This time, we're told, things are different. We are supposed to believe that. Even though the cannibalistic Hamas has lost much of its manpower and despite the extensive destruction in Gaza, the underlying deal remains the same: rebuild the Gaza Strip.

Aid disguised as bridging loans

Temporary aid is presented as humanitarian assistance, a bridging loan of sorts. Hamas survives mainly as a myth and a mechanism to seize control of humanitarian convoys. And now, as part of a temporary agreement accompanied by a near-total Israeli withdrawal from the Strip, the organization is receiving an influx of aid. In the end, beyond all the interim steps, comes the real reconstruction: rebuilding Gaza's ruins and the terrorist infrastructure, courtesy of Britain, France, Canada, Qatar, and the US.

The original Donald Trump, not the current occupant of the White House, would have been offended to hear that the cost of rebuilding Israeli communities around the Gaza border, after the mass killing rampage by the "Einsatznachba" death squads, is estimated at 4.5 billion shekels (about $1.5 billion). Meanwhile, Qatar, the European Union, and other supposed "sponsors" of Gaza's reconstruction are not asked to contribute to repairing the damage inside sovereign Israeli territory.

There's no question that the brazen terms of the proposed deal suggest rising confidence within what's left of the Hamas leadership. If any of them were to show up today in Paris, or even at a Lincoln Center gala in New York, they'd be greeted with hugs and applause.

The October 7 massacre was described by the chair of Britain's inquiry committee as the lowest point in modern combat history, unmatched since 1945. And if France, Britain, and Canada respond to that by bestowing statehood recognition on the Palestinians, then the terrorists have every reason to demand an encore.

The Macron–Yair Golan war

It is hard to predict what might compel Hamas leaders to surrender and release all the hostages. But one possible trigger for ending the war and dismantling Hamas' arsenal is the kind of pressure now being exerted in Lebanon and Syria. As of last week, the current stage of the conflict could be dubbed the "Macron–Yair Golan War."

Hamas sees that the global intifada is working. The attack in Washington, the elite-driven campaign of capitulation designed to topple the Israeli government, and the internal chaos over strategic issues like "conflict of interest" and the Ronen Bar imbroglio, all this could well encourage Hamas' leaders to demand a curtain call.

The performance is going well, and they're calling for more. Above all, they sense a growing rift between the US administration and Israel. Israel, in turn, has little choice but to keep playing Hamas the music it loves most: the music of war.

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The executioner behind the violin

Richard Rokita was a prominent German officer at the Tarnopol camp and earlier at Janowska. He had two hobbies – one as a mass murderer, the other as a violinist and musician who organized an orchestra from Jewish prisoners. The orchestra accompanied many of Tarnopol's Jews to execution sites while playing the "Death Tango." Rokita insisted on this. Sometimes he would point his pistol at someone and kill them simply because he felt like it in that moment. But occasionally, one of Poland's greatest violinists, someone Rokita knew from pre-war days, would see the hand with the gun and rush over. He would break into virtuoso playing, enchanting Rokita, and the gun would return to its holster.

When Professor Ram Ben-Shalom was about three years old, around 1962, he disguised himself as a secret agent equipped with a Beretta pistol with the clear mission to hunt down Rokita. This story closes the narrative of one of the best books I've ever read about the Holocaust. That closing chapter brings into action figures like Ilya Ehrenburg, the Beatles, and Rokita himself. Rokita was then in his 60s. He had given up one hobby – the mass murder of Jews – and kept his second hobby, which became his profession – playing violin in jazz bands in Hamburg. Simon Wiesenthal managed to discover the murderer behind the violin. The man who played in one of the clubs near the basement where the Beatles sometimes sang and sometimes screamed their first hits before becoming famous in Liverpool.

When I met Professor Ben-Shalom this week, author of "Salomea's Letter" (Magnes Press), I asked if he could guess what my first question would be. He couldn't say. The question was why he included Chapter 86 in the book. For me, the story called "Report from 1962" confused and troubled me greatly. His character takes the stage and whispers in violinist Rokita's ear, "Rache." Revenge.

"In this book, I'm actually in two roles. I'm also the researching historian, looking at this detective story from the outside," he answers. "And as a historian, I operate according to all the known methodologies and possibilities of the profession. At the same time, I also serve in some way as a witness. It's hearsay, not eyewitness testimony, as a second-generation survivor. As such, I'm both one of the story's heroes and examining the plot from the outside with all the facts, documents, and archives. But I'm also reflecting my father's story (Shmuel Ben-Shalom) from fragments, from broken pieces that I heard in my childhood, and had to undertake a long journey into my memory to bring them back. This is how the last chapter was written, which was obviously written after the entire book was finished. I was left with some empty space that I needed to resolve."

About revenge

"You beautifully develop this revenge motif. I read what seems to me a masterpiece. I felt you were in the same territory as Timothy Snyder's 'Bloodlands' but penetrating much deeper, in a more detailed way. And then, with the story at the end, you make me doubt whether everything you wrote until the last chapter is even real."

"I know. I took into account that this could raise doubts. On the other hand, I'm so confident in my work as a historian and in the professionalism of the puzzle of facts, the realistic details. I'm so in command of the methodology and the material that after so many years in the profession, I allow myself to also go in the direction of the detective novel. With the understanding that the skilled reader can make the distinction themselves."

After reading "Salomea's Letter," it seems that the letter event, which is almost unknown in Israel, soars to heights parallel to the "Warsaw Ghetto Uprising," which has lost altitude over time. Salomea Ochs Luft was Ram Ben-Shalom's aunt. She was the sister of his father Shmuel, who survived the Holocaust. Her cousin is the artist Willy Ochs, known by his Hebrew name Ze'ev Porat, who immortalized German sadism in his amazing illustrations and later became known as an architect. Only about a decade ago, Ben-Shalom discovered that the letter Salomea left before she too was led to the killing pits in the Tarnopol region of Galicia had become legendary in Germany. We're talking in a café in Ramat Aviv, Ben-Shalom's childhood district, as descendants of Polish ancestors. My father would say about the miraculous twists and turns that accompanied Salomea's letter that it's "a lange mayseh" (a long story). The letter documents over about 12 pages the acts of slaughter from the German occupation in summer 1941 until April 1943.

"I am still alive and want to describe to you everything that happened from April 7 until today," Salomea wrote in her letter, and Ben-Shalom describes how a German aristocrat reads the letter years later, in days when German editors and politicians tried to clean up their past and destroy evidence. "The prevailing opinion is that now it's time for 'everything.' Galicia must be free of Jews ('Judenrein')... We, in the camp, could look from our room windows and see everything. Oh, these scenes, these images. How to describe them? We ceased to be human... One sees the square filling up with an increasing number of those condemned to death. This time, the graves in Petrikow were prepared in advance... The men were stripped to their shirts and led like sheep to the slaughter on foot. It was very close. Why waste fuel for cars, why bother with the train? It's a shame. It's simpler to get rid of this harmful material on the spot."

Salomea ended her letter with a call for "revenge." The fact is that the letter fell into the hands of officers in the Red Army when they captured Tarnopol from the Germans in 1944. It was a powerful, living, and moving testimony of an eyewitness who was later murdered, and the Soviets worked constantly to instill a fighting spirit in the troops, and that fighting spirit also contained the motif of revenge. Ben-Shalom describes in detail the role of writer Ilya Ehrenburg in propaganda directed at Red Army soldiers. The slogan was "Kill a German." Salomea's letter brought to life the hate slogans against the Germans.

Action against terror

Meanwhile, the Soviets decided to send the letter by mail to the Lichtblau family living at 3 Geula Street in Tel Aviv – the address Salomea had written. But Ben-Shalom's discovery that excited him so much was that already in 1954, author Erich Kästner organized a public event in Munich intended to mark a decade since the assassination attempt on Hitler. The atmosphere in 1954 in West Germany was that the July 20, 1944, conspiracy was an act of treason. Not to mention, in the background, the major victory in the World Cup in Switzerland. At that evening organized by Kästner, Salomea's letter was read aloud. How did it get there? How, in 2005, was an exhibition presented by a Berlin artist featuring an item called "The Jewish Woman's Letter"?

The letter came to the artist from the daughter of Wehrmacht General Otto Körps. She found it in her father's estate. The Germans deleted the "revenge" from the letter, and that text served them for purposes completely opposite to the use the Red Army made of the letter during the actual days of battles. Ben-Shalom determines that "the artist" developed a fetishistic relationship toward the letter. She was unwilling to give him the copy of the letter called the "Abel-Körps version." "From this moment, the roles were reversed, and in the relationship between us, I (Ram Ben-Shalom) became the aggressor... while she again filled the role of victim. The reversal of images and roles – 'the upside-down world,' where the victim becomes the aggressor, and the victimizer takes the place of the victim – is what allowed the artist to ignore all my requests to receive the letter. Salomea's letter became her exclusive property(...) She refuses to transfer it to the victimizing, strong 'Jew,' the Jew who extracted from her the 'secret,' intimate information about Gunhild Körps" (the general's daughter).

Ram's wife is curator Yael Katz Ben-Shalom. He quotes her in his book, "The letter that survived time and place reveals Salomea's act of writing as an action fighting against terror and silencing. She does not remain silent even though her body is already mute, and she is on her way to her death. In the video work, there is a role reversal. The poetic gaze destroys the victim's words, Salomea's voice, and focuses on the German's bodily performance... presented as suffering in the face of the erased words."

Ben-Shalom's discovery is that General Körps, who kept the letter until he returned from Russian captivity, was supposedly anti-Nazi but was very excited by the storm of battles in the war. So were the senior German administrators in Tarnopol. They too were anti-Nazis; they even wanted to evade their role in organizing life in the city, in the ghetto, in the camp, in various factories. Yet they were very instrumental in the exemplary organization of Jews, masses of Jews, on the route that led them to death pits or to the gas chambers in Belzec. One of them was Franz Josef Schöning. On days when he knew that such actions were going to be carried out, after completing his bureaucratic work, he would go on vacation, on hunting trips in the mountains. Schöning was the founding editor of the important West German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung.

How did you get the letter?

Dora, Ben-Shalom's aunt from 3 Geula Street, received the original letter. Dora never opened the envelope. One of the mysteries that Ben-Shalom tries to crack throughout his years of research as a detective historian is how the letter reached its destination in Tel Aviv. Was it his father who brought the letter in 1946, immediately after the war, or did an envelope simply arrive by mail as an initiated operation of the Soviet Army? The one who provided him with vital information on the subject is Russian historian Ilya Altman, a man from the Red Army archive.

"Since she writes the letter in 1943 and addresses it to Geula Street in Tel Aviv, I had to find out what was happening at the time she was writing at 'Geula Street' in '43," says Ben-Shalom. "And I have a chapter where I describe the Habima Theater on the day she was writing, the theater was performing the play 'People of Russia.' Both at Moghrabi, where Habima was operating in those days, and at Edison Hall in Jerusalem, performances dealing with the war, dealing with questions of revenge, and the Soviet soldier were being shown. But not about Jews. About Soviets, not Jews! And this was within walking distance of 3 Geula Street, where it was happening."

I told Ram Ben-Shalom that I wasn't surprised that the archivist at Yad Vashem was asked to locate Salomea's letter and couldn't find it. "That was when Ilya Altman was looking for it. I remember my father's immortal sentence, 'I don't want to bury the letter in Yad Vashem's drawers.'"

"For Ilya Altman, in the Red Army archive, the letter is the crown jewel," I say to Ben-Shalom. He replies, "True."

At Yad Vashem, it's an item that someone pushed into some drawer. "My father thought something needed to be done so this letter would be recognized, would be read, would serve as testimony. That was very important to him. And luckily, I came upon the discovery that allowed me to fulfill this spiritual testament. Previously, it echoed in me that I had not succeeded. My father asked me to make something of it, and I didn't do it, I tried and didn't succeed. And this discovery in 2016, that this letter had a life of its own, allowed me to embark on this path, to expose the mystery, and ultimately to fulfill the testament.

"The initial impulse didn't come from the desire to fulfill the testament but from my curiosity as a historian. But during the journey, the testament was fulfilled. Although even now, not everything is resolved."

The existence of Dr. Altman became known to Ben-Shalom from an article by Alex Doron in Maariv. Ilya Altman explained in a meeting with Ben-Shalom in Moscow that if on the copy of the letter it says "sent," there is no doubt that the army sent the letter to Tel Aviv. The reason is simple – in Stalin's days, if you wrote such a thing and it turned out you hadn't sent it, it would end with a bullet in the back of your neck. But Altman was disappointed that Ben-Shalom hadn't brought the original copy with him; he so wanted to touch the paper and see Salomea's handwriting. Such an intimate relationship was also expressed by the German chaplain of one of the divisions of the 6th Army that fell into Russian captivity at Stalingrad, when he returned from Russian captivity in the 1950s. "Imagine, he takes sheets of makhorka (for rolling cigarettes), writes on them word for word the contents of the letter, and sews them inside his coat – knowing that this way it doesn't rustle and when leaving the USSR, they won't find it."

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The newly confirmed Secretary of State has already branded the initiative with a memorable slogan: "Make Gaza beautiful again."

He said that US would ensure something truly remarkable takes place and that "the United States stands ready to lead...Our pursuit is one of lasting peace in the region for all people," referring to the ambitious plan that could reshape the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The initiative aligns with various Israeli proposals from the past year, including plans for a land bridge stretching from the East through the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean Sea.

If the destination port is located within Israeli territory, the logistical support base for cargo transport to the Mediterranean coast could potentially be situated in northern Gaza, broadly speaking.

The joint appearance of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Trump between Tuesday and Wednesday served as a platform for further discussion of this concept, indicating increased American investment in the proposal. This may prove challenging for certain right-wing settlers who view Trump, rather than Israel's prime minister, as their leader, potentially positioning Netanyahu as insufficiently hawkish.

However, these creative military and diplomatic initiatives are pushing Israeli discourse back into partisan political corners. Experts suggest focusing less on population transfer discussions and more on the fundamental changes occurring in Washington that Netanyahu's leadership could potentially leverage.

This represents bankable support, as detailed in The Wall Street Journal. Trump and his team are presenting a new strategic vision for America's global role – while avoiding direct military interventions overseas, the US will strengthen and support its allies in defensive operations.

For Israel, this translates to significant increases in equipment, weapons, and ammunition supplies, alongside enhanced diplomatic and political support in international forums.

This marks a historic departure from general American policy toward Israel since the War of Attrition ended in summer 1970, which preceded Egypt and Syria's Yom Kippur War offensive. That policy had imposed defensive passivity on Israel and required restraint in response to serious ceasefire violations in every conflict since 1970.

This policy of containment and restraint wasn't born after the Gaza disengagement or in the wake of the Oslo Accords – it emerged when Israel was constrained (somewhat willingly) from responding to missile deployments or other serious provocations. Israel maintained activism only against terrorism. This enforced passivity was reinforced during Barack Obama's presidency 16 years ago, manifesting in supply interruptions, partial embargoes, and sanctions. Even during Joe Biden's term, American support faced constraints.

Trump is reversing this policy, with Israel receiving encouragement and support for implementing Phase Two – the elimination of Hamas. Additionally, Israel apparently isn't required to make diplomatic or settlement-related concessions in Judea and Samaria to secure a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia.

Trump appears to value the prime minister's strong leadership qualities, according to analysts, noting Netanyahu's success in establishing Israel as the region's preeminent power while weathering sustained opposition from what Trump refers to as the "deep state."

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Hamas is left with just one card, one final coin in its pocket. "This isn't the same Hamas as during the [Gilad] Schalit deal," a senior source has told me. "Back then, they had complete control of the [Gaza] Strip with all their mechanisms intact. What they received then was a bonus. In today's situation, Hamas would gladly give up the hostages – their last card – just to return to where they were before Oct. 7."

This perhaps offers a proportional perspective as we approach the hostage release deal. "No prime minister would want to be in this situation – deciding between the hostages and future dangers. Such a deal is always charged with many emotions."

But there's a broader view – we have nothing more to gain from prolonging the war, as we've already achieved the major objectives. As the past two weeks have shown, Israel is on the verge of stagnation in Gaza, with the cost being more casualties. This is the price of fighting that must continue until we get back our last hostage. I'm already looking at the days after the deal's implementation. The "day after" is far more relevant to us Israelis than the political goal of endlessly deliberating what will happen in Gaza afterward. For us Jews, the release of the hostages will fulfill one of the war's greatest achievements. At the war's start, it was very difficult to envision an ending where Hamas would be crushed, Gaza in ruins, and we would recover numerous hostages without leaving any living hostages in Hamas' hands.

We can't easily dismiss voices measuring the deal's worth against future dangers. But I have an answer to this. While Hamas may be like crabgrass – we haven't fully weeded the field – it has no offensive capability, and Gazan society as a whole has suffered losses beyond anything they imagined. Regarding the danger of released prisoners, Oct. 7 proved Palestinians have no shortage of mass murderers. What these cannibals learned is that the price of massacre and kidnapping is total war with destruction on a massive scale, including the killing of thousands of terrorists and unavoidable civilian casualties among those trapped as human shields for the murderous gangs.

This wasn't the case before. The Jibril deal in 1985 gave momentum to the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987, and the Schalit deal created a sense among the enemy that they paid no price for kidnapping. Even those who reminisce about the achievements of the Yom Kippur War know that terrorism gained momentum afterward and the 1970s were full of mega-attacks.

This time conditions are such that the Israeli government and IDF will exact heavy prices up to renewing the campaign in Gaza if any offensive actions are taken.

"Oct. 7 requires us to end the containment policy," Jerusalem officials promise. "This means we'll act not just in case of direct attack, but also against attempts to rearm."

The challenge lies with the government, as military response could create friction with the American administration, and facts will need to be established. "Gaza will be treated like Tulkarm. Activity in Gaza will become routine security," say Jerusalem officials. Around 5 p.m. Wednesday, Hamas' response to the formulated agreement hadn't been received, despite all the chatter that suddenly erupted at 2 p.m. Ministers were tensely awaiting a call from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's office to discuss and vote on the agreement.

The ongoing test will be maintaining the perimeter, which reduces the Strip's area by about 17%. The IDF won't be physically stationed there. It will control the area with a serious addition of forces. Rules of engagement haven't yet been determined for enforcing security in that kilometer-deep strip. The government wants to move to the next chapter – Iran. Will Israeli society wake up at the end of this process to different days? Considering the regional transformation resulting from the victory in the north, we can expect this. Eyes will be on Iran. The assessment is that President-elect Donald Trump will first attempt diplomatic efforts with Iran. The government doesn't give diplomatic moves high probability of success. "He'll try to bring them to their knees."

Final understandings haven't been reached with the Trump administration, which will take power next week. But senior Diplomatic-Security Cabinet ministers are pleased with what they're hearing from Trump's team. The international arena awaits clarity. Partially cloudy skies mean there's expectation of canceling arrest warrants against Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. The Hague courts' conduct toward Israel has greatly complicated the war on terror. The American administration will remove this obstacle. After completing the war's end process and hostage release, we'll be more united. Those who harm unity, including factions threatening government stability, will lose public support.

Which Trump will we get? The president-elect's conduct this past week should raise a red flag in Jerusalem. After the southern agreement and northern victory, Israel needs to harness Trump for decisive handling of Iran's nuclear program.

The hostages will be released, and perhaps this difficult chapter in our state's history will finally end. But as Trump's second term inauguration approaches, it seems he played a role here that raises a glaring red flag regarding his presidency and attitude toward Israel. His main pressure operated primarily on Israel. His threats of hell toward Hamas had less effect. Envoy Whitcof behaved rudely toward the prime minister, while saying Qatar's ruler "did God's work."

Trump wants this finished by his inauguration, and Israel is required to deliver. This teaches that US-Israel relations in Trump's second term could be more problematic than in his first. Israel won't be able to make concessions every time the president with grandiose aspirations wants to demonstrate his power and see results. Work and disruptions ahead.

Before his first term, interpretations and forecasts are remembered from at least two major Middle East and US-Israel relations experts, Aaron David Miller and Daniel Pipes. Both more or less predicted an explosion between Trump and Israel's government within about a year, and that the president would turn against Israel. This really didn't happen. Trump was the most supportive and friendly president ever to Israel. We must hope this will also be true in this presidential round. This time Trump arrives at the White House strong, self-confident, feeling he received an almost absolute mandate from the American people to lead, navigate, decide.

So much so that even outgoing President Joe Biden and his Secretary of State Antony Blinken are essentially aligning with him. Biden in his speech this week tried to claim Netanyahu's huge achievement for himself when declaring that Iran "was never as weak as today."

And Blinken in an American TV interview said, This is a moment of opportunity. Opportunity to solve long-term the nuclear challenge posed by Iran, but not just that, also to end all of Iran's actions in the region.

In other words, after Israel's victory on the northern front, two in one card – Hezbollah plus Syria – Blinken and Biden congratulate on the accomplished fact. Even General Aoun's election as Lebanon's president is a result of Hezbollah's eroded status to the point of collapse.

The question is what Blinken meant by "solve long-term." Since he didn't elaborate, it seems he's backing whatever "solution" Trump decides. This could be a nuclear agreement with real content that completely neutralizes Iran's nuclear project; or it could be a military blow to destroy nuclear facilities. Israel will again need to decide itself whether it gives Trump priority in moves he'll decide, or if it launches its own attack on the facilities. There's a sense that if Trump invests in ending the Gaza war, and tries to end the Ukraine war, he won't want to see the beginning of a wonderful new war.

Something positive in Trump's dominance: His threats will influence the next stages of the hostage release agreement. There are respected commentators who see holes in the agreement that could allow Hamas to escape executing the final release moves. It seems at this point the Trump effect will work in our favor. Does the agreement that will include ending the war and releasing all hostages hint at the direction of US-Iran negotiations? It's a reasonable possibility. But the current agreement affair presents Trump in a different light. He lost some of his credibility.

Like Then

"Since 1948 they haven't allowed us to achieve complete victory," Yitzhak Rabin accused the Americans already in 1975, in what seems as if said these very days. Even the administration change in Washington doesn't show expected change.

The one who defined without inhibitions America's dubious role in Israel's confrontations with the Arab world was Rabin. He is the founder of the genre of political or military leader who is first of all a commentator. In early 1975, quite at the start of his term as prime minister in the years after the Yom Kippur War, he spoke with an American reporter. I found the quotes in the State Archives, and it's unclear if Rabin's words were quoted in American publications.

"The war indeed broke out in surprise," he said, "but despite that, we were in a position where we could carry out a preventive air strike. We didn't execute this attack for a simple reason – in order not to find ourselves disconnected from the US. In the past 26 years Israel was limited in its use of military power to end the confrontation with the Arabs in the normal way wars are ended. Israel had the ability to end the conflict through military means, but since 1948 they haven't allowed us to achieve complete victory. And therefore, although we win on the battlefield, we don't have the power to translate our victories into complementary diplomatic arrangements. In the October War Egypt was on the verge of military collapse.

"Dr. Henry Kissinger and the US saved the Egyptians more than the USSR. The American strategy was to demonstrate to Anwar Sadat's eyes that Egyptian interests were in Washington, not Moscow. And Israel had to pay the price... We released the 3rd Army and made territorial concessions on the western bank of the canal and gave up part of the territory on the eastern bank."

The Persian Shah in his final days met in Mexico with former President Richard Nixon. This was already after the Shah's fall and several years after Nixon's resignation. "The Shah told me that what worried him about American policy wasn't whether the US was for or against him," Nixon quoted, "but the uncertainty that characterized American policy. There's nothing worse when you're confronting radical revolutionaries than uncertainty in the support you have.

"At one moment there are American declarations publicly and privately speaking of absolute support. The next day – a leak from a high-ranking source telling that mid-level officials are meeting with Khomeini, whose goal is to overthrow the Shah. Another day and more leaks about the US being ready to accept any government formed in Tehran if the Shah leaves Iran. The effect of all these things is encouragement to his enemies, and in parallel weakening and suppressing the spirit of his supporters. What happened to the Shah, and this is how it was understood in the Middle East and the world in general – that it's dangerous to be America's friend, and on the other hand – it pays to be its enemy."

Nixon told that the Shah expressed puzzlement about liberal Jews in media, who harshly criticized him as a reactionary. "He couldn't understand this – since he was Israel's only friend in the region," and also assisted Israel and the US with fuel supply.

Rabin and Nixon, who quite liked each other, describe in their words the current reality as well. It's unclear if Trump fundamentally really signals change.

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Now, as the hostage release deal nears completion, the cat is out of the bag. In an interview with The New York Times, Secretary of State Antony Blinken acknowledged the damage that American pressure on Israel caused to the hostage release efforts. "There have been two major impediments, and they both go to what drives Hamas. One has been whenever there has been public daylight between the United States and Israel and the perception that pressure was growing on Israel, we've seen it: Hamas has pulled back from agreeing to a ceasefire and the release of hostages....The other thing that got Hamas to pull back was their belief, their hope that there would be a wider conflict, that Hezbollah would attack Israel, that Iran would attack Israel, that other actors would attack Israel, and that Israel would have its hands full and Hamas could continue what it was doing."

He revealed that during his first visit to Israel, amid an argument with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, he threatened that if the "humanitarian" supply issue wasn't resolved, President Joe Biden would not make his promised visit.

Analysts in Israel can continued and state the obvious corollary to Blinken's statements. Hamas looked toward the US and drew its conclusions; but certainly also observed the short term, watching Jerusalem and the angry streets in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. It's not much speculation to assume that after the initial shock of Donald Trump's victory and his threat against Hamas, the organization has watched Israel's internal turmoil. The internal developments within the political and judicial system has also motivated Hamas to withdraw from agreements. Simply seeing the renewal of Netanyahu's trial in mid-December with the strange decision to force him to testify three days a week while the sword of being declared incapacitated hangs overhead was enough to return Hamas to a waiting position.

But all this seems behind us now, and most importantly, the current optimism may well be justified. Hamas remains essentially isolated. Israel achieved unexpected decisiveness and victory, contrary to Hamas' calculations, which had hoped for an endless war of attrition in the north. In the broader context of restoring operational sovereignty and control in various sectors, this is a good time to do what remains to bring the hostages home. It's worth perhaps going back 15 months to October 2023. The possibility that the IDF would succeed in dismantling Hamas, that most of this terror army's operational capabilities would be destroyed, and that at the end of the process we would also manage to bring back the hostages seemed distant and even imaginary. Just look back at the newspapers from that period. The sentiment among some opinion leaders and well-known security experts was "all for all" and opposition to a broad ground operation in the Strip; accepting that "this time we lost." Wait for the next round.

The leadership in Israel now feels this is possible. Putting a bandage over our society's internal bleeding over the hostages is worth the concessions – even if "the day after" searches for "yesterday." The supreme interest now isn't eliminating more terrorists and tunnels and infrastructure but eyes on Iran and preparations for coordination with the new Trump administration. Even those in the government who oppose the hostage release will prefer to contain the agreement despite its flaws and look forward.

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"If needed, we'll know how to disengage from Gaza," says a senior IDF commander, as the military prepares for a potential hostage deal. While Israel will ultimately need to relinquish certain security assets to secure an agreement for the hostages' release, there's a crucial distinction between surrendering recoverable territory and accepting new propaganda narratives like "Military pressure is killing the hostages" appearing on Ayalon Highway bridges.

"Having control of central Gaza holds significant operational value," a senior military official in the south told me during a spring-like December day. He was referring to the Netzarim corridor, whose strategic importance is often underestimated. One of the IDF's divisions maintains complete control over the area surrounding this corridor, between Gaza City and the northern edges of the "central camps," particularly Nusseirat.

The forces acknowledge they might need to withdraw. "We can easily return to the buffer zone," sector officials explain. Currently, the IDF maintains optimal deployment for both operational control in Gaza and western Negev defense. While securing both the Philadelphia corridor and the expanding Netzarim corridor stretching north and south, the IDF is "establishing a perimeter along Gaza. We're also preparing for a sustained military presence. The buffer zone from the fence inward will be significantly deeper than before." The IDF continues organizing for long-term presence: "We maintain full operational tempo. Raids continue with daily precision airstrikes. If ordered, we can disengage according to political directives."

Any IDF withdrawal under a ceasefire agreement would prioritize maintaining complete operational freedom while minimizing friction. Currently, "we hope our sustained pressure will facilitate the hostages' return." During my southern visit, military officials showed genuine openness to potential agreements, indicating that even the military is preparing for possible deal scenarios.

Hamas's greatest loss is northern Gaza, where an estimated 200,000 to 250,000 residents remain. Approximately one million Gazans have relocated to southern refugee shelters. Many remaining northern residents want to leave but remain trapped in combat zones. Hamas terrorists now focus more on terrorizing the population than engaging IDF forces. Many new Hamas recruits concentrate on population control rather than combat roles. Intelligence facilities established in the buffer zone have transformed the "Netzarim corridor" into an effective filter for north-south movement, enabling precision, intelligence-based operations against terrorists in the area.

A key IDF mission involves facilitating roughly 200 daily humanitarian aid trucks into Gaza, maximizing legitimate delivery. Hamas seizes approximately 40 percent of supplies, profiting through inflated resale prices while creating population dependency. Supply routes from the north and along the Rafah crossing perimeter allow thorough truck inspections, though the system isn't completely impenetrable. Movement within Gaza enables more message transmission than weapons transfer, allowing Hamas to maintain decentralized organizational control despite leadership losses.

International organizations manage non-Hamas aid distribution. "They conduct comprehensive monitoring to ensure proper supply delivery," an authorized IDF source explains. These organizations effectively serve as the IDF's governance mechanism in Gaza. "Every convoy member undergoes system verification and crossing checks. Apart from medical supplies, everything requires precise divisional coordination."

Despite IDF oversight, Hamas maintains checkpoints and territorial awareness. These checkpoints partly aim to prevent civilian evacuation from combat zones. The IDF observes Hamas using crowded civilian shelters as human shields. Some surviving Hamas leaders hide within civilian shelters, including in northern Gaza. Terrorists emerge from these shelters for operations. The challenge lies in targeting terrorists while minimizing civilian harm, particularly when terrorists occupy public buildings that foreign media might label "schools," though they no longer function as such.

Hamas continues high-trajectory fire, surprisingly using remaining short-range rockets against IDF forces in the Netzarim corridor. "Most rocket fire occurs within Gaza rather than targeting surrounding areas." IDF responses require 30-60 minute civilian evacuation warnings, limiting effectiveness though terrorists typically evacuate too. These responses pressure the population, occasionally resulting in civilians expelling terrorists to avoid military engagement consequences.

Hamas prioritizes survival while the IDF continues degrading their capabilities. Commanders acknowledge progress while recognizing "zero capability isn't the goal."

"The Ruling Party"

While Trump's victory brought liberation to America, Israel remains unchanged, with its academic-legal-media establishment firmly gripping power.

Opposition to military pressure intensifies daily through media channels. Leading journalists, prominent academics, and former security officials regularly criticize the operation, potentially undermining negotiation leverage. The moment Hamas leadership hears influential Israeli voices speaking about military refusal, claims of dictatorship, and accusations of ethnic cleansing, they recognize a strategic stalemate and lose motivation to complete hostage deals.

Some connect the six hostages' murders to the mishandled release of a Bedouin captive four months prior. Detailed accounts emerged of his captors' flight enabling IDF rescue. Rather than maintaining operational secrecy, this led remaining kidnappers to view anyone releasing hostages alive as traitorous. Those considering similar actions likely reconsidered, fearing internal retribution.

The terrorists observe Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who briefly appeared to lead Israel toward victory, again becoming the target of calculated public delegitimization. The establishment aims to demoralize Israeli society. Their social media amplifiers outweigh investigations. Legal authorities have detained three intelligence officers under harsh conditions for allegedly leaking sensitive information, drawing praise from establishment media figures who normally oppose such detention practices.

This persists because Israel hasn't experienced America's post-Trump liberation. At Mar-a-Lago, observers witnessed genuine victory euphoria. Israel saw no such transformation after Oct.r 7 or the subsequent three months' victories, symbolized by the IDF chief and prime minister's summit photo.

The question arises whether Israel has become part of the same digital "echo chamber" that characterizes American political discourse. Leading Israeli media figures align closely with former Obama administration narratives, particularly regarding the Iran nuclear deal and regional policy.

Some label it the "Deep State," while others prefer "ruling class." When combined with what analysts call "the thought machine," it creates a powerful authority parallel to elected government. Even respected legal scholars sometimes echo implanted narratives rather than independent analysis.

The recent detention of intelligence officers highlights a deeper divide in Israeli society. Their actions, viewed by some as patriotic and others as dangerous, reflect broader tensions between institutional power and public interest. Unlike cases of deliberate espionage or harm to state security, these officers' motives appear rooted in conscience and concern for public awareness.

The more military and civil service officials become constrained by academic theories and establishment media doctrines, the further they risk straying from their core national mission. The case of the detained intelligence officers falls under the military principle of "citation or censure." What applies on the battlefield equally applies to public consciousness struggles. They acted on conscience – unlike cases of deliberate harm to state security. Even without commendation – still debatable – censure shouldn't equal solitary confinement or character assassination.

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The night before the ceasefire took effect, friends from the north visited. During dinner, we spontaneously declared it a celebration marking the end of the war on the northern front. A simple milestone worth remembering – after being trapped for so long by rocket sirens in their community just 4 miles from the border with Lebanon, the drive down the bustling highways to Jerusalem felt like an adventure. The country appeared transformed to them – vibrant and pulsing with energy, almost frenetic, with construction cranes everywhere, buildings rising vertically and spreading horizontally, new roads being paved, and highway interchanges under construction at every turn. A mother remarked that her son, who returned from a month's deployment in Rafah (one of many) and the Philadelphi Corridor, asked her in bewilderment shortly after washing off the dust of Gaza: "Mom, what's happening here? Who is Eli Feldstein?!"

Is the truce good or bad?

First and foremost, it's good. When there's quiet in the north, even for just two days, it typically signals a longer respite, though with some uncertainty. Displaced residents will return. And naturally, the question falls along predictable partisan media lines: Why didn't Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu call for their return? Why didn't he mention the residents' homecoming in his Tuesday evening address?

The answer is clear: New Defense Minister Israel Katz declared victory over Hezbollah. While he may have been right, what matters is that Hezbollah still managed to launch numerous large-scale rocket barrages. For political commentators, this alone provided ammunition for mockery – compounded by Katz's tendency to make sweeping and sometimes extreme statements, like his diplomatic crisis-inducing declaration about Polish antisemitism regarding the Holocaust. So Netanyahu chose not to make promises. Additionally, he wanted to maintain strategic ambiguity in the enemy's eyes. The return or continued absence of residents sends signals about Israel's intentions. Without an official announcement, perhaps it reinforces Israel's resolve regarding Hezbollah violations and the possibility of a renewed military response.

Residents will make individual decisions about returning. The extended displacement from their homes, combined with the constant state of alert and rocket sirens, has created a quiet trauma. The same applies to reserve soldiers. Clearly, Israel can now send a significant portion of its reservists home, bolstered by the government's recent decision to extend Order 8 well into 2025. This means Israel remains prepared to resume combat operations when a new, more supportive, and friendly president enters the White House. Will fighting resume in 60 days? Probably not. Everything hinges on how the Iranian situation is handled.

"The war to end war"

The prevailing narrative suggested this would be the final Lebanon war, not the Third Lebanon War. Yes, reminiscent of how the "Great War" of 1914-1918 was supposed to be "the war to end war" – until it became merely "World War I." While absolute security and final wars may be illusions, Israel has achieved a ceasefire it couldn't have imagined before September. Prior to the offensive, security experts and officials – excluding the prime minister – had planned to end the northern attacks and safely return residents through a Gaza ceasefire. Their plan didn't include addressing Hezbollah's infrastructure, leadership, or extensive missile arsenal. Back then, Radwan Force stood at the border fence, mere meters from civilian dining rooms. The contrast with today's reality – separated fronts and a neutralized Hezbollah – is striking.

The triumph of ordinary soldiers

The IDF remains wedded to the notion that "achievement isn't measured in kilometers," as a senior officer recently told me. This means territorial conquest hasn't returned to the military playbook. Instead, the focus remains on destroying targets and infrastructure – tunnels, armaments, weapons, and all types of military equipment. Yet what matters to the enemy should matter to us: controlling territory.

The IDF met this challenge halfway. After Oct. 7, 2023, it recognized the necessity of boots on the ground – paratroopers, armored units, and reserve forces – across Gaza's shifting terrain, from north to south. However, they conducted their campaign through a pattern of repeated cycles of advance and withdrawal, over and over. The psychology behind this approach requires investigation: On one hand, Hamas wasn't credited with the capability to execute operations as dramatic as Oct. 7. The terrorists were viewed as nothing more than construction workers in flip-flops. Yet paradoxically, there was paralyzing fear of ground operations in Gaza – despite Hamas repeatedly demonstrating sophisticated capabilities in kidnappings, tunneling, infiltrations, and willingness to conduct extreme suicide operations.

Once forces entered the Gaza Strip, a new generation of fighters emerged, displaying unprecedented motivation and quality. These soldiers didn't follow the names of legendary heroes at the division or brigade level, nor did they simply march to the orders of top military leadership like the chief of staff. Their drive was internal and collective. The debate continues whether these rank-and-file soldiers pulled their senior commanders forward or pushed them into action. This war had no Ariel Sharons, Moshe Dayans, or Rafael Eitans. Instead, it had countless ordinary heroes who relentlessly pursued the enemy, with the elimination of Yahya Sinwar serving as the prime example.

Who would have believed that in their eagerness to incriminate Netanyahu, some would absolve Sinwar of responsibility for the hostages? The soldiers are the ones who remain laser-focused on their mission, never losing sight of their objective. Meanwhile, the IDF's senior leadership seemed preoccupied with viewing the political echelon – the government minus former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant – as the real adversary whose influence and "deviant" decisions needed neutralizing, to use the term that Shin Bet representative Yoram Cohen reintroduced. The left's embrace of the Shin Bet and its shadowy operations raises troubling questions.

Hertzi's appointments

Defense Minister Katz has reignited public debate over the Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi's questionable practice of making appointments that will shape the army's future for years to come. Lt Gen Halevi's approach to leadership is unusual. He continues making command appointments as if in peacetime. Officer X, having served several lateral positions as brigadier general or colonel, receives a division command simply because it's "their turn." The same applies to brigade commanders.

Consider Brigadier General Guy Hazut's perspective. Among his conclusions from the Oct. 7 catastrophe and the military's broader cultural failure is that the IDF must return to younger command, bringing brigade commanders ages below 40. He advocates for ambitious, dynamic commanders not yet focused on retirement benefits. If a battalion commander who distinguished himself in recent battles can receive a brigade command shortly after, surely a brigade commander who excelled throughout nearly a year of unprecedented warfare deserves division command.

After the Yom Kippur War, Colonel Amnon Reshef, commander of Brigade 14, was promoted to lead Division 162 within six months. Division 162's commander Bren Adan became Southern Command chief shortly after, while Avigdor Ben-Gal immediately advanced to command Division 36. Such moves sent a clear message: battlefield leadership matters more than bureaucratic seniority or whose "turn" has come.

The missing Israeli legal experts

Professor Alan Dershowitz recently announced the formation of a "dream team" of legal experts to defend Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu, and Defense Minister Gallant before the International Criminal Court. The roster includes former US Attorneys General Michael Mukasey and William Barr, former Canadian Justice Minister Professor Irwin Cotler, former New York Governor and State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo, Mark Levin, and other prominent figures from the American legal world.

Reading through his strategy and list of names, a striking realization emerged: not a single Israeli legal expert made the team. No Israeli lawyers, legal scholars, law professors, retired Supreme Court justices, or even former state attorneys or attorneys general. This suggests one of two possibilities – either they're deemed inadequate, or as one insider in the political-legal battle suggested, they support the prosecution.

The conduct of Israel's justice system – from the Supreme Court down to Netanyahu's trial court and the state attorney who might answer that returning soldier's question about Feldstein – reveals a group remarkably short on patriotic sentiment. Just this week, Judge Ruth Ronnen summoned the prime minister to respond to an incapacitation petition before the Supreme Court. Based on what grounds? None whatsoever. Such unchecked power has only expanded the scope of judicial overreach. Feeling omnipotent, she no longer bothers to ground her reasoning in law, constitution, or precedent.

Despite this disconnect at the heart of Israel's elite, the country must soon launch a campaign to delegitimize the Hague courts. Since South Africa filed its petition nearly a year ago, the proceedings against Israel and its leaders have become as significant as the UN's 1975 resolution equating Zionism with racism. Back then, Israel had effective advocates: Ambassador (later President) Chaim Herzog, Ambassador (later Prime Minister) Benjamin Netanyahu, and allies like US Ambassador to the UN Daniel Patrick Moynihan.

Today we're left with Netanyahu and Amos Schocken. The Hague issue demands a massive response – it represents the essence of the cultural war underlying Israel's existence. Today's world shows even greater sympathy for terrorism than in the 1970s. Is Dershowitz's approach correct? While it might help Israel, it inherently legitimizes an international legal system that has become a key component in the terror strategy of Iran, Palestinian organizations, the antisemitic terrorist left, and Russia's allies like South Africa.

What's needed is an exceptional legal team to confront the governments of France, Britain, Holland, and other terrorism enablers, proving that their arrest warrants and case against Israel are malicious and violate international law – if such a thing even exists.

The Haaretz phenomenon

"I love many people at Haaretz and identify with many of its positions, but its cartoonish anti-Israel and antisemitic stance is wearing thin," prominent American journalist Jeffrey Goldberg wrote eight years ago, explaining his decision to cancel his subscription. Goldberg noted that Haaretz shares something with the Jerusalem Post – "a weakness for baseless hatred."

Responding to criticism from a well-known writer, Goldberg explained: "When neo-Nazis start sending me emails with links to Haaretz editorials declaring Israel an evil state, it's time for a break." This troubling pattern has only intensified under Gideon Levy's leadership, with author Eva Illouz contributing her own takes on Israeli "evil." Anyone monitoring Hamas media channels knows that Haaretz enjoys popularity not only among neo-Nazis globally but also with Hamas itself.

Sometimes exposing colleagues' ignorance becomes necessary, even with friendly acquaintances. If Goldberg labeled Haaretz antisemitic, who am I to dispute it? A lengthy conversation with Gideon Levy years ago revealed his startling ignorance of basic facts. Take the Six-Day War: "How many died in that war?" he asked, suggesting "120, 150 people?" When corrected that nearly 800 died in just one week, he responded, "Really? I didn't know." He then declared, "The Holocaust isn't relevant. Only the 'Nakba' matters." And the checkpoints.

The greatest damage stems from his hypnotic influence over loyal readers. This wasn't always the case. While the newspaper always carried a nihilistic, decadently morbid tone, readers could once maintain a critical distance. Now readers parrot its lines like actors reciting a script, complete with rehearsed talking points.

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