With voter turnout around 65% of 218,000 registered voters, the mandate signals broad Turkish Cypriot support for reviving peace negotiations with Greek Cypriots Erhürman campaigned on reinvigorating stalled talks and pursuing a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution to Cyprus's decades-long division. In contrast, Tatar had staunchly advocated a two-state policy, in line with Turkey's recent stance, seeking international recognition of the north as a separate sovereign state – an approach firmly rejected by the Greek Cypriot south. Erhürman's victory is therefore widely viewed as a pivotal turning point that could reopen the door to UN-backed reunification efforts after an eight-year stalemate.

Prospects for Reunification Talks

Erhürman's win raises cautious optimism for the resumption of Cyprus peace talks under the long-established UN framework of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. The new Turkish Cypriot leader has pledged to explore a federal reunification deal, aligning with the solution model favored by the United Nations and the Republic of Cyprus. Greek Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides promptly welcomed Erhürman's victory and reiterated readiness to meet "as soon as possible" to restart negotiations. The return of a pro-federation partner in the north stands in stark contrast to Tatar's term, during which formal peace talks languished. Erhürman sharply criticized his predecessor's refusal to engage in negotiations over the past five years as a "costly loss of time" that left Turkish Cypriots isolated from the European Union and on the international periphery.

However, significant hurdles remain. Any new talks will revisit core disputes that derailed the last major reunification effort in 2017. Questions of political equality and security guarantees loom large. Erhürman insists that Turkish Cypriots must enjoy political equality in a new federation – a principle agreeable in theory but contentious in practice (earlier talks stumbled over the extent of Turkish Cypriot veto power in federal decisions).

Likewise, the issue of Turkey's military presence and guarantor rights will test the negotiations. Ankara maintains over 35,000 troops in Northern Cyprus and claims an intervention right as the Turkish Cypriot community's protector. Greek Cypriots view those troops and any unilateral intervention rights as threats to their security and sovereignty, a key reason the 2017 Crans-Montana talks collapsed. Erhürman has already reassured that he does not intend to eliminate Turkey's guarantor role outright, reflecting a pragmatic recognition that any deal must assuage Turkish security concerns.

From a realpolitik perspective, the success of renewed negotiations will depend on hard bargaining and trade-offs: each side must secure its vital interests – for Greek Cypriots, a reunified state free of perpetual foreign military control, and for Turkish Cypriots (and Turkey), sufficient power-sharing and security guarantees to protect their community's rights.

Turkey's Influence and Calculations

Turkey, as the only country that recognizes the TRNC, remains the decisive external actor in Northern Cyprus. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly praised the Turkish Cypriot election as a sign of democratic maturity and congratulated Erhürman, affirming Turkey will "continue to defend the sovereign rights and interests" of Turkish Cypriots on all platforms. Despite this cordial message, Ankara's strategic posture bears watching. As recently as September, Erdoğan told the UN General Assembly that Turkey "backs a two-state deal" on Cyprus.

Erhürman's ascent could thus test whether Turkey is willing to recalibrate that stance. The new TRNC leader has promised to coordinate closely with Ankara – "in consultation with the Republic of Türkiye" – on all foreign policy steps, a clear acknowledgement of Turkey's leverage. Indeed, Northern Cyprus is economically and politically dependent on Ankara's support, meaning Erhürman has limited room to maneuver without Turkey's consent.

Ankara's acceptance of federation talks will likely be driven by pragmatic interest. Former Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat suggested Turkey could yet adapt its approach "depending on what Turkey can get out of a solution". In realpolitik terms, Erdoğan's government may calculate that re-engaging in UN negotiations could yield benefits – for example, improved relations with the EU (where Cyprus wields veto power over Turkey's stalled accession bid) or a share in Eastern Mediterranean energy development.

If these gains outweigh the advantages of the status quo, Turkey might support Erhürman's outreach. Conversely, should Ankara judge that a federal compromise endangers its strategic foothold on the island, it may quietly rein in the Turkish Cypriot leader's ambitions. Erhürman's challenge will be balancing his voters' mandate for a settlement against Turkey's determination to safeguard its regional influence and security red lines.

Southern Cyprus' and regional reactions

In the Republic of Cyprus (the internationally recognized Greek Cypriot south), Erhürman's victory has been met with cautious hope. President Christodoulides hailed the election result and signaled readiness to resume talks immediately. For the Greek Cypriot leadership, a partner in the north who embraces a federation is a welcome change after years of impasse under Tatar. It potentially opens the way to restart negotiations from where they left off in 2017. Nonetheless, Nicosia will approach talks pragmatically. Greek Cypriot officials insist any deal remain within the agreed UN parameters – no outright partition or two-state arrangement – and they will be mindful of domestic constituencies wary of excessive concessions.

Issues like rotating presidency in a federation, power-sharing ratios, and the withdrawal of Turkish troops will be politically delicate to sell internally. The south also retains a powerful card: as an EU member, it can influence Turkey's European ambitions. The prospect of unlocking EU benefits could be used to encourage Ankara's cooperation in a Cyprus deal. At the same time, Greek Cypriots know that if this new round of talks fails, the island's de facto partition may deepen. Thus, while expressing optimism, the south's strategy will be grounded in hard-nosed calculations of security and diplomatic leverage. Any compromise will likely be incremental and contingent on tangible guarantees that Turkish Cypriot intentions – and Turkey's – align with a reunified, EU-member Cyprus that protects the interests of both communities.

East mediterranean energy and Israel's stake

Erhürman's win also reverberates in the context of Eastern Mediterranean energy diplomacy. A reunified or more cooperative Cyprus could significantly alter regional energy plans. The island sits near substantial natural gas deposits under the seabed off its southern coast. These resources have been a source of tension – with the Republic of Cyprus licensing exploration in its exclusive economic zone, and Turkey (on behalf of Turkish Cypriots) contesting some areas. From a realpolitik standpoint, a Cyprus settlement might unlock joint exploitation of these gas fields, benefiting all parties. In fact, observers note that peace "could expedite the exploitation of sizable natural gas deposits" off Cyprus, supplying markets in Egypt and Europe Cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots would remove a major obstacle to developing these resources and could attract international investment currently deterred by the dispute.

Beyond hydrocarbons, regional infrastructure projects could gain momentum. One example is the planned electricity interconnector linking Israel, Cyprus, and Greece. Ankara has objected to portions of this project, which aims to tie Cypriot and Greek power grids to each other and possibly to Israel. A political resolution might lift Turkish objections to an undersea cable connecting Cyprus with Greece, and Israel is reportedly keen on extending that link to its own grid. Israel's broader interest lies in a stable Eastern Mediterranean where energy cooperation is maximized.

For the past decade, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece have bolstered ties – forming an energy partnership and even a regional forum excluding Turkey – partly as a response to Turkish assertiveness. If Cyprus reunification talks progress, it could ease regional frictions and potentially bring Turkey into a more collaborative framework. For instance, a settlement could revive consideration of an Israel-Turkey gas pipeline, a project that was politically unthinkable amid the Cyprus impasse.

In short, Erhürman's presidency introduces a new variable in East Med energy calculus: the possibility of redirecting competition into cooperation. Still, much depends on whether Turkey moderates its approach. Israel will pragmatically assess whether any Cyprus deal leads to a more predictable environment for its energy exports and whether Turkey's posture shifts from zero-sum rivalry to pragmatic engagement. Until concrete changes materialize, Israel is likely to continue its close energy partnership with Cyprus (South) and Greece, while remaining open to opportunities a Cyprus peace might create.

Geopolitical alignments and outlook

Regionally, the change in Northern Cyprus could influence the East Mediterranean's geopolitical alignment. Turkey's decade-long estrangement from Greece, Cyprus, and at times Israel has produced competing blocs. The Greek Cypriot south has entrenched itself in a strategic partnership with Greece, Israel, and Egypt, partly to counterbalance Turkey's claims in regional waters.

A breakthrough on Cyprus would be a game-changer: it might soften the Greece-Turkey rivalry and reduce one flashpoint in Turkish-EU relations. In turn, that could shift Ankara's calculus in the wider region, potentially easing tensions with Israel and others. Indeed, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan's recent diplomacy hints at interest in mending ties with the West, and a solution in Cyprus could be one element of a broader realignment.

On the other hand, if reunification efforts falter despite Erhürman's good intentions, the likely outcome is a continuation – or even acceleration – of existing trends. Turkey may double down on integrating Northern Cyprus economically and militarily, cementing the "two-state" reality on the groun. The Turkish Cypriot community, if left without a peace prospect, could drift further into Ankara's orbit, deepening the island's division. That scenario could in turn harden the Greece-Cyprus-Israel alignment, as unresolved Cyprus tensions often spill over into broader regional disputes.

Uncertainties and scenarios ahead

Erhürman's triumph in the 2025 TRNC election opens a window for diplomacy, but the trajectory of Cyprus's future is far from predetermined. Several uncertainties will shape what comes next. First, Turkey's true intentions remain a wildcard – whether Erdoğan will allow a pivot back to federation talks or quietly insist on his two-state red lines will determine the scope of what Erhürman can achieve. Secondly, the Greek Cypriot side must be willing to strike a balance between safeguarding its national interests and accommodating Turkish Cypriot equality; without mutual compromise, even a well-intentioned dialogue could stall. The role of external players is another factor: the European Union's appetite to facilitate a deal (perhaps by offering incentives to Turkey), and the United States' or United Nations' engagement, could bolster momentum or leave the parties to their own devices.

In the energy arena, a lot hinges on whether stability on Cyprus materializes – a deal could herald new energy corridors and cooperation, whereas a breakdown may keep the Eastern Med in a competitive posture over gas and infrastructure. From a realpolitik viewpoint, each actor will pursue its perceived national interest: Turkey will seek strategic advantage or concessions, the Cypriot sides will maneuver for security and legitimacy, and regional states like Israel will watch for opportunities to secure energy and alliances.

The coming months may see confidence-building steps and renewed negotiations, but also potential spoilers if trust falters. In sum, the 2025 Northern Cyprus election has reset the board in a longstanding conflict; whether this leads to a historic settlement or a return to deadlock will depend on how pragmatically the leaders navigate the intricate balance of power, interests, and diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean

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The latest United Nations reports reveal that the use of foreign weapons in Sudan's civil war has made the conflict even more complicated. These reports highlight in particular the presence of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı drones, along with electronic warfare systems, in the hands of the Sudanese army, shifting the balance on the ground.

These findings raise questions not only about the trajectory of the war in Sudan but also about Turkey's regional image and international responsibilities. Ankara is being criticized for providing advanced weapons to one side of the conflict, while at the same time presenting itself as a proponent of peace.

The Course of the War and the Role of Drones

Since late 2024, Sudan's army has been using Bayraktar and Akıncı drones actively, significantly altering the course of the conflict. The Rapid Support Forces' supply lines have been targeted, and heavy strikes have been carried out in urban centers. This has undermined peace talks and turned the war into a longer, bloodier struggle.

Supplying arms to parties involved in Sudan's war is a highly sensitive issue under international law. The UN arms embargo on Darfur remains in force, and both EU and U.S. sanctions are also in place. In this context, arms transfers to Sudan's army present a contradiction with Turkey's international commitments. This situation places Ankara under serious scrutiny before the global community.

The Rise of Extremist Groups

It is well known that extremist Islamist elements within the Sudanese army have become increasingly visible. Groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and other radical movements are fighting alongside Burhan's forces. In such an environment, the possibility of Turkish-made weapons ending up in the hands of these groups represents a security risk not only for Sudan but for the wider region.

Sudan holds one of the most strategic positions on the Red Sea. Plans to grant Russia a naval base in Port Sudan remain on the table. In this equation, Turkish weapons under the control of Sudan's army pose a long-term threat to European security, energy supply lines, and global trade routes. It is worth recalling that in the 1990s, Sudan harbored al-Qaeda and became a hub for international security threats. If history repeats itself, this time the Red Sea could become the epicenter of new risks.

The Civilian Burden

As always, civilians are paying the highest price. According to UN data, more than 18 million people in Sudan face the risk of famine. The use of Bayraktar and Akıncı drones in city centers has caused significant civilian casualties in marketplaces and other crowded areas. Human rights organizations warn that the humanitarian crisis is deepening and that civilian protection has become nearly impossible.

Turkey's official rhetoric is built on themes of peace and stability. President Erdoğan's proposal to mediate in Sudan was framed in this context. Yet, the simultaneous provision of weapons to the army reveals a stark contradiction between words and deeds. This double standard risks eroding Ankara's credibility on the international stage.

The European Union has called for an end to all external support that fuels the war in Sudan. This call is not only about Sudan itself but also about regional security. Sudan's instability could affect a vast area stretching from the Horn of Africa to the Mediterranean. For this reason, Europe adopting more concrete diplomatic and legal measures is not merely desirable but essential for global security.

The war in Sudan has become more than just a regional tragedy; it is a challenge to international peace and security. The role of Turkish weapons in this picture forces a reevaluation of Ankara's foreign policy. For Turkey's image and its global responsibilities, it is imperative to turn the language of peace into concrete action and to refrain from steps that further inflame the conflict.

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Moscow has long eyed the Red Sea as a gateway for global influence and trade. In recent years, the Kremlin revived Soviet-era plans for warm-water ports along this strategic corridor. A 2020 agreement to establish a Russian naval facility at Port Sudan was touted as a breakthrough, granting Russia a foothold on Africa's Red Sea coast. However, Sudan's erupting internal conflict in April 2023 derailed the deal, putting it "on hold indefinitely" after initially being offered in exchange for arms and aid. Undeterred, Russian officials have repeatedly claimed the project is back on track – as recently as February 2025 – underscoring Moscow's persistence despite Sudan's turmoil

With Sudan's stability in question, Russia has courted neighboring Eritrea as an alternate anchor. Eritrea's authoritarian leadership, diplomatically isolated from the West, has signaled openness to deeper ties with Moscow – even hinting at hosting a foreign base in the future Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Eritrea in early 2023, discussing access to the Red Sea port of Massawa and signing a cooperation memorandum with Eritrean officials. Potential sites like Massawa or Assab could give Russia a strategic berth near the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint, complementing its naval facility in Syria and projecting power along vital shipping lanes. In Egypt, while no base is on the horizon, Moscow has strengthened naval diplomacy. Joint exercises such as the regular "Friendship Bridge" drills, first launched in 2015, reflect growing Russia-Egypt defense ties Russian warships have also made port calls in Egypt, highlighting a quiet naval presence around the Suez Canal. Together, these engagements with Sudan, Eritrea, and Egypt illustrate Russia's realpolitik drive to secure Red Sea access and protect its maritime trade (an estimated 8–10% of Russia's foreign commerce moves through Suez and the Red Sea).

China's strategic foothold in Djibouti

Beijing's entry into the Red Sea arena has been swift and transformative. In 2017, China opened its first-ever overseas military base in Djibouti, overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The PLA Navy's Djibouti facility – officially a "logistics support base" – sits just miles from the US Camp Lemonnier, symbolizing China's expanding global reach. Chinese officials insist the base supports anti-piracy and peacekeeping operations, but its mere 7-mile proximity to America's largest African base has raised US eyebrows. Notably, Djibouti now hosts at least eight foreign military bases (American, Chinese, French, Japanese and more) due to its strategic location at the Red Sea's mouth, where roughly 10–12% of global trade transits each year

China's presence extends well beyond troops on the ground. State-owned Chinese firms have invested heavily in Djibouti's ports and infrastructure as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China Merchants Group holds stakes in Djibouti's key container terminals and helped finance the modern Doraleh port complex. Beijing's dual economic–military strategy is evident: Chinese companies build and operate port facilities, then the PLA Navy gains access. (Doraleh, initially a commercial venture, was quietly expanded in 2017 to host China's naval pier) Across the wider Red Sea region, Chinese investment runs into the billions of dollars, funding ports, railways and industrial zones that knit into the BRI's maritime silk road. For example, Chinese enterprises have a hand in Egypt's Suez Canal Economic Zone developments and recently agreed to build a large new container terminal at Ain Sokhna on the Red Sea coast. This economic foothold bolsters China's energy security and trade: vital oil and LNG shipments from the Persian Gulf pass through Bab el-Mandeb, as do China–Europe container routes. In short, China has secured a strategic Djibouti anchor and a network of regional investments to safeguard the Red Sea leg of its global supply chain.

Trade routes and chokepoints: global stakes

The Red Sea–Suez corridor is a jugular vein of world commerce, linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean. Close to 15% of global trade – from Mideast oil to Asian manufactures – travels via these waters toward the Suez Canal. Likewise, the narrow Bab el-Mandeb Strait sees enormous energy flows. In 2023, an estimated 8.6 million barrels of crude and petroleum products per day transited Bab el-Mandeb, roughly 10% of seaborne oil trade. This makes the Red Sea a strategic prize but also a vulnerable chokepoint. Any disruption can send shockwaves through global markets – as seen when a grounded megaship blocked the Suez Canal in 2021, or when past Arab–Israeli wars closed the canal entirely.

Today, instability at the Red Sea's southern end is a real concern. Yemen's ongoing civil war has periodically spilled into the maritime domain: the Iran-backed Houthi rebels have used mines, drones and missiles to threaten ships near Bab el-Mandeb. Late 2023 saw a surge of Houthi attacks on commercial vessels (nominally targeting Israeli-linked ships in solidarity with Gaza). In reality these strikes hit indiscriminately – even a Russian-owned tanker was struck by a Houthi missile in January 2024 The violence forced some shippers to reroute vessels around Africa, adding weeks of transit. By mid-2024, oil transit through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait had plummeted by over 50%, falling to just 4 million barrels/day as wary tankers avoided the danger zone. Such disruptions underscore how quickly local conflicts can endanger global supply lines.

US and allied responses

Western powers and regional allies have not been idle in the face of Russia and China's expanding Red Sea roles. The United States maintains a robust presence – centered on Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti – to safeguard shipping lanes and counter terrorism. US Naval Forces Central Command (5th Fleet) regularly patrols the Red Sea corridor, and American warships have intervened directly against emergent threats. Since late 2023, US destroyers and allied vessels have shot down dozens of Houthi-launched drones and missiles menacing Red Sea shipping. In one notable case, the USS Carney intercepted a "complex" barrage of Houthi missiles heading toward commercial ships and potentially Israel. This rapid response likely prevented a major maritime crisis. Meanwhile, European allies such as France (which also bases forces in Djibouti) and the UK have enhanced naval security missions in the region, building on years of anti-piracy operations off Somalia. Even Japan – heavily reliant on Middle East oil – operates a base in Djibouti and deploys naval assets to protect freedom of navigation.

Strategically, Washington is also adjusting to great-power competition on the Red Sea. Concerned by Beijing's Djibouti stronghold, US policymakers are exploring deeper partnerships with Red Sea states and Gulf allies. One proposal envisions a "triangle of influence" linking the US , the UAE, and Israel to support Djibouti with economic and security incentives as a counterweight to China. American diplomats are likewise re-engaging Sudan's neighbors and the new Red Sea littoral forum to promote stability. While the US still far outpaces China militarily in the region, officials acknowledge that influence cannot be taken for granted when Chinese trade and investment loom so large.  Thus, expect sustained US naval patrols, training initiatives with local navies, and quiet diplomacy to keep this corridor open and balance the new Russian and Chinese presence.

Implications for Israel's security and trade

For Israel, the Red Sea is both a critical artery and a potential arena of risk. The waterway provides Israel's only direct link from Eilat to the Indian Ocean, and via the Suez Canal to Asia. Historically, blockading the Red Sea has been viewed by Israel as an existential threat – the closure of the Straits of Tiran in 1967 helped trigger war. Today's challenges are more complex. Yemen's Houthi rebels, for instance, explicitly threatened Israeli shipping in late 2023, raising alarm in Jerusalem that one of its main shipping routes could be cut off. In practice, only a small portion of Israel's trade (mostly imports from Asia) actually transits the Red Sea, limiting the economic impact of disruptions. But even a temporary diversion of cargo ships around Africa drives up costs and underscores Israel's geographic vulnerability. Memories of the 1967–1975 Suez Canal closure – which forced Israeli goods to circumnavigate the continent – linger as a cautionary tale. Not surprisingly, Israel has beefed up its naval posture in these waters.

In recent years the Israeli Navy has quietly extended its reach into the Red Sea and beyond. Under US auspices, Israel now participates in multinational Red Sea security exercises, drilling alongside Arab states and Western navies to counter piracy and terror threats. Israeli warships have reportedly escorted commercial vessels at risk and even carried out covert strikes on hostile targets in Yemen when vital interests were at stake. The presence of Russian and Chinese fleets adds a new dimension: Jerusalem must navigate carefully to protect its freedom of operation without clashing with these great powers. While Israel maintains cordial ties with both Moscow and Beijing, it relies on the US-led security framework in the Red Sea. Thus, an expanded Russian base or a growing Chinese flotilla could complicate Israel's calculus – for example, by boosting Iran's confidence or constraining Israeli naval movements. At the same time, a stronger international patrol presence might deter common threats like arms smuggling to Gaza or attacks on shipping. Israeli officials therefore watch the Red Sea chessboard closely, weighing how Russia's and China's moves might affect the delicate balance of maritime security.

Regional instability and great-power maneuvering

The backdrop to Russia and China's Red Sea foray is a region rife with instability. The protracted war in Yemen has turned the Bab el-Mandeb into a flashpoint where militias target tankers and trigger global alar In Sudan, the outbreak of fighting between rival generals not only stalled Khartoum's foreign partnerships but also raised fears of a humanitarian and security vacuum on the Red Sea's western shore. Both Moscow and Beijing have had to recalibrate their approaches as these conflicts unfold – evacuating citizens, pausing investments, or engaging in quiet mediation. Instability can both hinder and invite great-power involvement: Russia's naval base plans were thrown into limbo by Sudan's war, yet Moscow may see opportunity in offering Sudan's embattled leaders military aid for future access. China, for its part, has generally avoided entanglement in local wars, but it has dispatched envoys to promote peace in the Horn of Africa and even offered to mediate the Yemen conflict. Both powers publicly stress that their Red Sea presence contributes to regional stability – protecting trade routes from piracy or terrorism. Indeed, international naval patrols did suppress Somali piracy a decade ago, a success all stakeholders welcomed. But an emerging concern is that the Red Sea could become a theater for major power rivalry layered atop local conflicts. As Russian, Chinese, American, and allied vessels all operate in proximity, the risk of miscalculation or proxy friction grows. A crowded geopolitical stage also means Red Sea littoral states must deftly manage external suitors while addressing internal strife.

In summary, the Red Sea in August 2025 stands at a crossroads of global strategic currents. Russia and China's expanding footprint – one reviving old Soviet ambitions, the other extending a modern Silk Road – is reshaping the security landscape of this vital corridor. Their moves have prompted a measured response from the United States and partners determined to maintain open sea lanes. For countries like Israel, which straddle the region's nexus of trade and security, the stakes are high but nuanced: opportunities for cooperation exist alongside new vulnerabilities. Ultimately, the Red Sea's future will be influenced not just by great-power competition, but by the resolution of regional conflicts in Yemen and Sudan that continue to threaten the lifelines of global commerce. A balance between external engagement and local stability will be key to keeping this strategic waterway a conduit for prosperity rather than confrontation.

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Energy and maritime disputes

Energy remains the core driver of both opportunity and tension. Israel's gas exports to Egypt and Jordan have strengthened its regional role, while planned projects with Greece and Cyprus aim to connect East Med gas to European markets. But Hezbollah's missile threats to offshore platforms, instability in Gaza, and the unresolved Israel-Lebanon maritime boundary continue to deter investment.

Meanwhile, Turkey's "Blue Homeland" doctrine challenges the maritime boundaries claimed by Greece and Cyprus under international law. June 2025 saw Ankara publish a new maritime zoning map that Athens rejected as illegal. Although both sides have pursued cautious rapprochement, such moves show how fragile the détente remains.

Regional actors' calculations

For Israel, East Med gas is both an economic asset and a strategic lever. It bolsters partnerships with Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt, but also requires careful security management to protect infrastructure.
Turkey seeks to position itself as a regional energy hub—courting Israel for pipeline talks while expanding ties with Russia via TurkStream—yet its assertiveness keeps tensions high.

Egypt, as home to LNG export terminals, positions itself as the basin's liquefaction hub, buying Israeli gas and hosting the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) to promote cooperation.
Greece and Cyprus continue to align closely, leveraging EU support to defend their EEZ claims and deepen trilateral security cooperation with Israel and Egypt.

External powers and strategic stakes

The United States backs energy cooperation and security in the region, mediating disputes and maintaining a naval presence to deter escalation. The EU, seeking to diversify from Russian gas, supports East Med projects but is mindful of Turkey's role. Russia, through its military base in Syria and ties with Turkey, remains a disruptive but influential player.

Risks and opportunities

The Eastern Mediterranean stands at a crossroads. Energy could be the catalyst for a new era of regional cooperation—through joint development zones, dispute resolution, and integrated export routes. But zero-sum nationalism, unresolved conflicts, and the risk of military incidents could lock the region into another cycle of rivalry.

For now, overlapping interests offer a slim but genuine chance for de-escalation. If regional leaders choose pragmatism over provocation, the East Med's gas wealth could power not just economies, but a rare moment of stability in a historically volatile sea.

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Damascus's Response and Motives

Facing this turbulence, the Syrian regime – now led by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa – has struck a cautious, at times contradictory, posture. On one hand, Sharaa's government has publicly hailed the Druze as "an integral part" of the nation and vowed to punish any abuses by its forcesapnews.com. Such rhetoric signals a desire to calm tensions and project inclusive authority. On the other hand, regime troops and allied fighters have been implicated in harsh reprisals during the Sweida operation, with reports of field executions, looting, and arson committed by security elementsapnews.com. This dual approach reflects Damascus's strategic dilemma. It cannot afford an autonomous rebel enclave in Sweida – allowing one minority to peel away could embolden others – so it feels compelled to reassert control. Yet heavy-handed tactics carry their own risks. Even under Assad, the regime largely avoided an all-out assault on Sweida, opting instead for intimidation, targeted arrests and kidnappings to chip away at dissent, wary of turning the once-loyal Druze community irreversibly against Damascuswashingtoninstitute.org. Today's rulers face the same constraint: a brutal crackdown would only deepen Druze alienation and could invite outside intervention. Indeed, despite Sharaa's pledge of restraint, his forces' behavior has so alarmed the community that local Druze leaders insist on maintaining their own armed factions for protection. While the interim government's priority is to reunify Syria, its capacity is limited – evidenced by Sharaa's difficulty controlling all fighters in his ranksfdd.org. Military pressure alone may backfire. Lasting stability will likely require a political accommodation with Sweida's leaders, who, even after Assad's fall, remain determined to be a "thorn in the side" of Damascus until their longstanding demands for representation and services are addressedtheguardian.com.

Turkey's Posture and Priorities

The flare-up in southern Syria has drawn in regional powers – notably Turkey, which has its own complex stakes in Syria's future. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has responded to the Sweida crisis with characteristic forcefulness. In remarks this week, he blasted Israel's involvement across the border, accusing the "terror state" of cynically "using the Druze as an excuse" to expand its "banditry" into Syriatimesofisrael.com. Erdoğan vowed Ankara would not permit Syria's division or the undermining of its territorial integritytimesofisrael.com. These statements, delivered after he consulted directly with Syria's new president Sharaa on the situationtimesofisrael.com, highlight Ankara's broader Syria policy at play. For years, Turkey backed Syrian rebel factions against Assad; now, with Assad gone, Turkey has recalibrated to assert influence over the post-war order. A cornerstone of Turkish policy is preventing any fragmentation of Syria that could embolden Kurdish separatism or reduce Ankara's leverage. From Turkey's perspective, Israeli airstrikes and talk of protecting a minority could set a precedent for foreign powers carving out spheres of influence in Syria – a precedent Turkey vehemently opposes. Moreover, Erdoğan's sharp rhetoric serves domestic and regional aims: presenting Turkey as defender of Muslim communities and Syrian sovereignty, while pushing back against Israeli actions that he claims "sabotage" the fragile ceasefiretimesofisrael.com. Notably, Turkey's interests do converge with others in desiring stability in Syria's south – but on Ankara's terms. It prefers the Syrian state (now dominated by factions Turkey can dialogue with) to reestablish control, rather than an autonomous Druze zone or international intervention. In short, Turkey is walking a fine line: supporting Syria's unity and the new Damascus leadership, yet seeking to limit rival powers' footprint in the unfolding Sweida drama.

Regional Implications and Israeli Interests

Though Syria's Druze unrest is a local crisis, its ripple effects reach Israel's doorstep and highlight wider strategic undercurrents. Jerusalem is watching intently. Throughout the civil war, Israel's paramount concern has been to prevent Iran and its proxies from entrenching near the Golan Heights. The turmoil in Sweida has reactivated those concerns – and prompted unprecedented Israeli action. In the past week, the Israeli Air Force struck Syrian military convoys moving toward Sweida, with Israel's government openly stating that the strikes were to "prevent the Syrian regime from harming" the Druze community and to "ensure disarmament in the area adjacent to our borders"apnews.com. This marked a rare direct intervention, justified in part by the deep bonds between Israel's own Druze citizens and their co-religionists across the frontier. (Israeli Druze serve loyally in the IDF, and Israeli officials referred to a "covenant of blood" with the Druze as a driving force to shield their brethren in Syriafdd.org.) From Israel's viewpoint, a bloodbath in Sweida or a hostile army deploying in force in the south could spell not only a humanitarian tragedy but a security nightmare. Jerusalem would quietly welcome a scenario where local communities like the Druze manage to keep extremist militants – especially any Iran-backed groups – out of the area. In effect, a self-reliant Druze zone could act as a buffer on Israel's northeast border, complicating Tehran's ambitions to use southern Syria as a staging ground against Israel. At the same time, Israel must calibrate its involvement. Too overt a role risks validating the very accusations Erdoğan levied about foreign meddling, and could hand Damascus or Tehran a pretext to rally Syrians against "Zionist aggression." Israeli leaders appear aware of this balance. Analysts note that while Israel's intervention to defend the Druze is morally and strategically understandable, it carries the danger of drawing Israel deeper into Syria's quagmirefdd.org. Thus far, Israel has signaled it will enforce a red line against heavy weaponry or hostile militias operating near the Golan frontier – going so far as to warn it will uphold a "demilitarization" of Syria's southwest if neededfdd.org. But beyond targeted strikes, Jerusalem has been cautious, avoiding any long-term military engagement.

Ultimately, the Sweida standoff is a microcosm of Syria's broader puzzle after years of war. A marginalized minority is demanding dignity and security; a beleaguered central government is trying to reassert authority; regional powers like Turkey and Israel are maneuvering to protect their interests. The situation exposes the fault lines between external rhetoric and internal realities. A neutral observer might note that all players ostensibly share an interest in stopping the bloodshed and preventing Syria's disintegration. Yet their clashing agendas – Damascus seeking control, Ankara guarding against Kurdish or Israeli encroachment, and Israel focusing on the Iranian threat – make forging a durable solution immensely challenging. For Israel, the best outcome would be a stable southern Syria where neither Iranian militias nor extremist forces can find a foothold – and where local communities like the Druze can live in peace, obviating the need for Israeli intervention. Achieving that outcome will require deft diplomacy as much as force. In the meantime, the world's attention should stay on Sweida: both to support an oppressed community's legitimate grievances and to ensure that this corner of Syria does not ignite a wider conflagration at the crossroads of the Middle East.

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Economic and security pressures

The war's fallout has strained Turkey's economy. Imports of oil and gas – already a drag on a fragile lira and high inflation – became more expensive almost overnight. Crucially, Iran supplies roughly 16% of Turkey's gas. Erdoğan will likely seek alternative energy partnerships (with Russia, Azerbaijan or expanded renewables) to offset any disruption. At home, he must convince Turkish voters that economic stability is coming, even as energy costs bite.

Security concerns are equally urgent. Turkey already hosts some 4 million Syrian refugees and shares a long, porous border with Iran. Ankara has accelerated construction of its Iran border wall and tightened patrols to prevent new influxes of migrants or militants. Indeed, officials view any collapse of order in Iran as a direct threat: a surge of refugees or an empowered PJAK (the Iranian Kurdish insurgent group) could destabilize Turkey's southeast. Expect Erdoğan to portray a strong response – border fortification, intelligence sharing with neighbors, and possibly renewed pressure on Iraq to curb cross-border smuggling – as necessary for national security.

Military deterrence and defense Industry

Erdoğan is also capitalizing on the crisis to spotlight Turkey's own defense build-up. He has vowed to expand production of long-range rockets and drones so that "no one will dare" threaten Turkey. In practice this means further investment in the domestic arms sector and possible arms deals with allies. After all, Ankara does not want to appear vulnerable to Israeli or Iranian retaliation. At the same time, Turkey is careful not to be dragged directly into conflict. Although a NATO radar base in Kürecik (used for early warning) has become controversial, Ankara will likely maintain it to honor alliance ties, even as opposition voices clamor for its closure. In short, Erdoğan's military message is one of deterrence: Turkey will be stronger and better-armed, so that an Iran-or-Israel spillover does not catch it off-guard.

Diplomatic outreach and regional positioning

On the diplomatic front, Erdoğan is juggling multiple aims. In the immediate term he has pushed for a permanent Israel–Iran ceasefire and urged "close dialogue" to end other crises, including Gaza and Ukraine. At the NATO summit in The Hague he met with the leaders of the U.S., France, Germany and Britain, tying the Iran ceasefire to an urgent Gaza truce and broader regional stability. This allows Turkey to appear as a constructive mediator, even if neither Israel nor Iran trusts Ankara's neutrality.

Subtextually, Ankara may also be recalibrating its ties. In recent months Turkey had quietly sought warmer economic links with Israel and the Gulf. The war complicates public rhetoric, but Erdoğan's interest in oil-rich partners and defense cooperation remains. Notably, during talks with President Trump he touted a $100 billion Turkey-U.S. trade vision anchored on defense cooperation. This signals that Ankara still views Israel (a key U.S. ally) within a wider security framework. Erdoğan's acknowledgment that Iran's nuclear issue must be solved by negotiation also echoes international calls for diplomacy rather than wide war. In practice, we may see Ankara quietly affirming Israel's concern about an Iranian nuclear breakout even as it decries the humanitarian toll of war.

Domestic calculus and outlook

Domestically, Erdoğan will frame this upheaval as another test of his leadership. He can leverage the crisis to rally nationalist sentiments – stressing Turkey's growing defense might and its role as a protector of Muslim and regional interests. Promises of new weapons and infrastructure (and potential foreign investment resuming, if relations with Israel/UAE/other neighbors improve) can be used to court voters. Meanwhile, he may tighten internal security measures, citing the external threat, and continue to blame outside "enemies" for any economic pain.

In sum, Turkey's strategy after the Israel–Iran war will be one of cautious hedging. Erdoğan will publicly champion peace and regional dialogue, yet simultaneously harden Turkey's defenses and economic resilience. He has little appetite for joining the conflict, but will exploit any weakening of Iran's reach to reassert Turkey's influence from Syria to Iraq. His core goal will be to emerge from the crisis with Turkey both secure and somewhat strengthened – a survival strategy that, in private, acknowledges Israel's long-term security concerns even as Ankara keeps up its pro-Palestinian rhetoric.

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