In the wake of the brief Israel–Iran war, President Erdoğan finds himself walking a tightrope. Ankara's careful policy of balance has been tested by both opportunity and risk. On one hand, Iran's regional proxies have been dealt a blow, a development Turkish analysts note could ease Tehran's pressure on Turkey's sphere of influence. On the other hand, the violence has driven up global oil and gas prices and stirred fears of regional chaos. Erdoğan is therefore likely to emphasize stability: publicly urging permanent ceasefires and diplomatic solutions (he welcomed the Iran–Israel truce brokered by the U.S. and pressed NATO allies for lasting calm, while quietly preparing Turkey to weather any fallout.
Economic and security pressures
The war's fallout has strained Turkey's economy. Imports of oil and gas – already a drag on a fragile lira and high inflation – became more expensive almost overnight. Crucially, Iran supplies roughly 16% of Turkey's gas. Erdoğan will likely seek alternative energy partnerships (with Russia, Azerbaijan or expanded renewables) to offset any disruption. At home, he must convince Turkish voters that economic stability is coming, even as energy costs bite.
Security concerns are equally urgent. Turkey already hosts some 4 million Syrian refugees and shares a long, porous border with Iran. Ankara has accelerated construction of its Iran border wall and tightened patrols to prevent new influxes of migrants or militants. Indeed, officials view any collapse of order in Iran as a direct threat: a surge of refugees or an empowered PJAK (the Iranian Kurdish insurgent group) could destabilize Turkey's southeast. Expect Erdoğan to portray a strong response – border fortification, intelligence sharing with neighbors, and possibly renewed pressure on Iraq to curb cross-border smuggling – as necessary for national security.
Military deterrence and defense Industry
Erdoğan is also capitalizing on the crisis to spotlight Turkey's own defense build-up. He has vowed to expand production of long-range rockets and drones so that "no one will dare" threaten Turkey. In practice this means further investment in the domestic arms sector and possible arms deals with allies. After all, Ankara does not want to appear vulnerable to Israeli or Iranian retaliation. At the same time, Turkey is careful not to be dragged directly into conflict. Although a NATO radar base in Kürecik (used for early warning) has become controversial, Ankara will likely maintain it to honor alliance ties, even as opposition voices clamor for its closure. In short, Erdoğan's military message is one of deterrence: Turkey will be stronger and better-armed, so that an Iran-or-Israel spillover does not catch it off-guard.
Diplomatic outreach and regional positioning
On the diplomatic front, Erdoğan is juggling multiple aims. In the immediate term he has pushed for a permanent Israel–Iran ceasefire and urged "close dialogue" to end other crises, including Gaza and Ukraine. At the NATO summit in The Hague he met with the leaders of the U.S., France, Germany and Britain, tying the Iran ceasefire to an urgent Gaza truce and broader regional stability. This allows Turkey to appear as a constructive mediator, even if neither Israel nor Iran trusts Ankara's neutrality.
Subtextually, Ankara may also be recalibrating its ties. In recent months Turkey had quietly sought warmer economic links with Israel and the Gulf. The war complicates public rhetoric, but Erdoğan's interest in oil-rich partners and defense cooperation remains. Notably, during talks with President Trump he touted a $100 billion Turkey-U.S. trade vision anchored on defense cooperation. This signals that Ankara still views Israel (a key U.S. ally) within a wider security framework. Erdoğan's acknowledgment that Iran's nuclear issue must be solved by negotiation also echoes international calls for diplomacy rather than wide war. In practice, we may see Ankara quietly affirming Israel's concern about an Iranian nuclear breakout even as it decries the humanitarian toll of war.
Domestic calculus and outlook
Domestically, Erdoğan will frame this upheaval as another test of his leadership. He can leverage the crisis to rally nationalist sentiments – stressing Turkey's growing defense might and its role as a protector of Muslim and regional interests. Promises of new weapons and infrastructure (and potential foreign investment resuming, if relations with Israel/UAE/other neighbors improve) can be used to court voters. Meanwhile, he may tighten internal security measures, citing the external threat, and continue to blame outside "enemies" for any economic pain.
In sum, Turkey's strategy after the Israel–Iran war will be one of cautious hedging. Erdoğan will publicly champion peace and regional dialogue, yet simultaneously harden Turkey's defenses and economic resilience. He has little appetite for joining the conflict, but will exploit any weakening of Iran's reach to reassert Turkey's influence from Syria to Iraq. His core goal will be to emerge from the crisis with Turkey both secure and somewhat strengthened – a survival strategy that, in private, acknowledges Israel's long-term security concerns even as Ankara keeps up its pro-Palestinian rhetoric.
