One of the most persistent – and pernicious – myths being bandied about in the debate over how to achieve some peaceable resolution to the violence induced by radical Islam in Gaza is the proposed "panacea" of "de-radicalization" of extremist Islamist elements. The rationale underlying the prescription of deradicalization is as glib as it is deceptive.
After all, prima facie, what could be more reasonable? If radical Islam is the problem, surely the solution should be deradicalization. However, this deceptively sound reasoning begs two crucial questions: How is this to be achieved – and by whom.
Beware false narratives
In this regard, it is crucial to bear in mind that while it is true that extremist ideologies have been defanged in the past, such as in post-WWII Germany and Japan, before extrapolating from such success to the case of radical Islam, it is essential to be aware of the substantive differences in the structural parameters that separate the two cases. Indeed, any suggestion that policy-relevant conclusions can be drawn from comparisons between authoritarian ideologies of the WW II era and modern-day Islamist extremism rests on entirely misplaced analogies.
After all, Nazi Germany was not surrounded by a swath of Teutonic nations, nor Imperial Japan by a swathe of Nipponic nations that could undermine any moderating influences introduced by the victorious Allied powers. Thus, unlike the challenges posed by radical Islam, there were no significant sources of influence generating adversarial incitement or insurgence among their vanished kinfolk. This, however, is precisely the situation that prevails with regard to radical Islam. So, as opposed to the cases of Germany and Japan, Gaza is adjacent to extensive Muslim-majority areas in Egypt (Sinai) and in close proximity to others, which can serve as a base for hostile incitement and subversive operations.
Radicalization's trans-border reach
However, amenable geography – proximity and accessibility – is not the sole difference facilitating continued preservation of radical ideology compared to the conditions in the post-WW II era. The other is technology – chiefly in communications and the advent of the internet, cell phones, and social media, which all enable the conveyance of extremist content to large sections of the population, exposing them to subversive sermons from Islamist clergymen in far-flung mosques.
Accordingly, there is likely to be little correspondence between the physical location of sources of radicalization, on the one hand, and the targets of the deradicalization efforts, on the other. Thus, even if meaningful deradicalization initiatives are launched in educational and other public institutions in Gaza, it is more than likely that they will to be countered, undermined, and neutralized by radical Islamist messages conveyed over the ether from the pulpits of the fanatical imams and mullahs across the region to the hearts and minds of a receptive audience, via laptops, mobile phones and other devices so readily available today. Indeed, the perpetrators of the 2025 Bondi Beach atrocity in Sydney –one resident in Australia for two decades and the other a native-born Australian – illustrate just how far-reaching the influence of the agents of radicalization is – and how immune it is to national frontiers and geographical distance.
Deradicalization will demand decades
A third element differentiating the challenges facing deradicalization today from those of the past is that of time – both in terms of the length of the extremist regime and in terms of the time required to eradicate the extremist ideology. While the Nazi Party ascended to power in 1933 and was totally demolished by 1945, Hamas has been the dominant element in the Palestinian polity at least since 2006, when it won the Palestinian parliamentary election over the Palestinian Authority controlled by Fatah's Mahmoud Abbas (aka Abu Mazan), just a year before it violently ejected Fatah from the Strip. Indeed, the fact Abbas has put off further elections since then – for fear of another Hamas victory – is telling evidence of its continued hold on that dominance. The Islamic terror group has thus had two decades to inculcate its noxious credo into the population's psyche – especially that of the younger generation, who has never experienced any other type of regime. Thus, the expunging of radical ideas from the hearts, minds, and souls of the population will clearly not be an instantaneous process. Far from it!
Indeed, even under favorable conditions, informed estimates suggest a 20-25-year transformation period, as this must entail not just disarming militants and restructuring the education system but rebuilding civic institutions and political culture.
The only practical path
Moreover, with regard to time, apart from the issue of duration, there is the issue of who will undertake the deradicalization process.
After all, if it is to be Israel, this would necessitate at least a two-decade-long Israeli presence in Gaza, which in effect would imply continued occupation, with all the attendant uncertainties entailed in such an extended timeframe. Alternatively, if it is seen as being left to external forces, the pertinent question is which foreign power is likely to have the will and stamina for such a daunting project, in which it may well be widely viewed as a foreign interloper, and in the face of stiff opposition from countervailing Islamist forces, both internal and external.
Seen in this context, the prospect of deradicalization is nothing more than a forlorn hope for avoiding the harsh reality, which is the following:
The only way Israel can ensure how the Gaza Strip will be governed, and who will govern it, is to govern it itself. Moreover, the only way Israel can govern the Gaza Strip without becoming an external oppressor of "another people" is to remove "the other people" from the confines of the Gaza Strip itself.
This is the only feasible path to durable deradicalization of Gaza.
